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The federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Initiative was 
the major urban initiative of the Clinton administration.  It sought to replace the Reagan 
and the first Bush administrations’ reductions in support for urban programs and passive 
focus on addressing urban issues through people-based policies and market and tax 
incentives.  Baltimore was one of six cities selected for a full Empowerment Zone.   
One of the core goals of the federal EZ/EC Initiative was to create sustainable 
community capacity.  Baltimore’s implementation strategy was recognized as the most 
community driven of all of the Zones.  This dissertation examines the experience of the 
Empowerment Zone in building sustainable community development capacity in the form 
of community organizations to implement programs and presents lessons learned that can 
guide future community capacity building efforts.  This dissertation used a detailed 
literature review, interview, focus group, records review and case study approach to 
answer the question - Can a federal policy create sustainable community capacity? 
The Baltimore Empowerment Zone was partially successful in creating or 
enhancing community development capacity in six urban neighborhoods in Baltimore.  
Five of the six community organizations – in the case of the Baltimore Empowerment 
  
Zone these were called village centers -- formed or participating in the Empowerment 
Zone effort operated throughout the ten year federal funding period and four remained in 
operation after the end of the program.  This dissertation examined the internal 
(community) and external (economic, social, and political) factors that influenced each 
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WPA  Works Progress Administration 
WPNPC Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council 
The Village Center serving the Washington Village and Pigtown 




INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Background 
 This dissertation examines the impact of the federal Empowerment Zone program 
on building community capacity in six urban neighborhoods in Baltimore, MD.  The 
efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone to build community capacity and implement 
programs through community organizations represent an important case study of the 
issues impacting urban renewal and redevelopment through local, community-driven 
policy interventions.  The lessons of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone can inform both 
ongoing and future efforts to promote redevelopment of urban communities and build 
community capacity. 
The federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Initiative was 
the major urban initiative of the Clinton administration.  It sought to replace the Reagan 
and the first Bush administrations’ reductions in support for urban programs and passive 
focus on addressing urban issues through people-based policies and market and tax 
incentives.1   This new federal urban policy would be a return to the place-based policies 
that involved community residents in the design and implementation of programs.  The 
federal EZ/EC initiative was based on four fundamental principles: economic 
opportunity, sustainable community development, community-based partnerships, and a 
strategic and comprehensive vision for change (Gittell and Vidal 1998).  Thus, the federal 
EZ/EC Initiative targeted the creation of community capacity – through community-
based partnerships as one of its four guiding principles.  Baltimore was the only one of 
the six full urban Empowerment Zones to specifically focus on community-based 
                                               
1 This analysis focuses on direct program implementation.  The tax and other incentives as well as an 
emphasis on regulatory relief that were the cornerstone of past Republican administrations were a 
substantial part of the Empowerment Zone, especially in the area of job creation strategies.  These were not 
explored in this dissertation. 
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organizations as a central element of its proposal and implementation strategy (Nathan 
and Wright 1996; Chaskin and Peters 1997; Hebert et. al. 2001). 
The federal EZ/EC Initiative’s focus on promoting urban renewal and 
redevelopment through place-based strategies with substantial community involvement 
represented a return to the historical place-based urban policy emphasis of past 
Democratic administrations, most importantly of the federal War on Poverty’s 
Community Action Program and Model Cities Program.  These two programs had put 
communities at the center of policy implementation.  More importantly, the EZ/EC 
Initiative drew substantially on the more recent experience of local community 
development corporations (CDCs) and other community-based organizations (CBOs) that 
began to play an important role in urban policy in the 1980s, and the then-emerging, 
foundation-led Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs) that began in the 1990s.  
Nationally and locally in Baltimore, the experience of CDCs and CBOs had demonstrated 
that local, community-based organizations could serve as significant agents of change.  In 
addition, the CCIs, of which the Enterprise Foundation’s Sandtown Winchester project in 
Baltimore was one of the first, were promoting comprehensive, locally driven 
interventions to rebuild urban neighborhoods.  The experience of CDCs, CBOs, and CCIs 
all guided Baltimore City’s community-driven Empowerment Zone implementation 
strategy.   
The experience of the federal E EZ/EC Initiative in Baltimore City can shed light 
on the creation, role, and impact of community organizations in the design and 
implementation of urban policy interventions for two principal reasons: 
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1. Baltimore is a prototypical example of the problems facing older urban 
communities nationally.  Since 1970, the city’s population has declined by 
more than 250,000 and the city has lost over 80,000 jobs.  While Baltimore 
benefited from urban renewal efforts and the redevelopment of the Inner 
Harbor in the 1980s, it experienced both population and job losses in the 
1990s.  Baltimore's overall economic performance was highlighted in the 
1999 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Now is 
the Time: Places Left Behind in the New Economy report that classified 
Baltimore City as one of the nation's 74 "Doubly Burdened" central cities that 
faced continued high unemployment plus significant population loss or 
persistently high poverty rates.  In fact, Baltimore City is one of the extreme 
cases that faced all three measures of burden that were analyzed (HUD 1999). 
2. The Baltimore Empowerment Zone effort was unique among EZ/EC 
communities in terms of the great emphasis it placed on community 
organizations.  Of the six original federal empowerment zones, only Baltimore 
and Atlanta chose to pursue the EZ program’s goal of creating sustainable 
community development capacity by creating or strengthening local 
community development institutions.  Baltimore alone was successful in 
maintaining this strategy as of the November 2001 Interim Assessment of the 
Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC): A Progress Report 
(Hebert et al. 2001).   
This examination of the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
represents an opportunity to explore the role of both federal intervention and community 
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organizations in addressing urban decline and promoting redevelopment.  This 
dissertation assesses two basic research questions: 
1. Can federal urban policies create community development capacity? And 
2. What are the implications of community development capacity in the 
implementation of urban policies?   
To address these research questions, interviews, focus groups, and records 
review-based case study methodology were employed to explore the experience of the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone.   
Statement of the Research Problems 
This dissertation addresses the core research question: Can a federal policy that 
links the long-term provision of discretionary federal resources to the creation of new or 
expansion of existing community-based organizations result in the development of 
sustainable organizations that are effecting positive change? This dissertation will also 
address two related research questions. 
1. What internal (community) factors influence the development of community 
development capacity?  
2. What external (political, policy, social, and economic) factors influence the 
development of community development capacity? 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
There is a rich history of examining the role, impact, and importance of 
community organizations in federal urban policy and urban life in general.2  The depth 
and breadth of the urban policy literature make a comprehensive review of all urban 
policy literature addressing the role of community organizations in urban policy 
                                               
2 See Ferguson and Dickens 1999 for an excellent overview of the history and issues surrounding urban 
policies and community organizations. 
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impossible.  However, the research conducted for this dissertation synthesizes and 
extends the existing literature in two important areas.  First, this dissertation examines 
and describes how the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative of the 
Clinton administration drew on and evolved out of the experiences of past urban policy 
interventions from Urban Renewal to Model Cities to CDCs through CCIs.  Second, this 
dissertation synthesizes, applies, and extends the literature on the factors influencing 
community development capacity through a detailed case study approach. 
An Overview of Baltimore’s EZ/EC Strategy 
The Baltimore Empowerment Zone was awarded on December 21, 1994.  The 
City’s application placed a central emphasis on the use of community organizations to 
guide and implement Empowerment Zone programs.  The goal of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone effort was to build Sustainable Community Development through the 
creation of Community Based Partnerships or Village Centers (Baltimore City 1994).  As 
will be described in Chapter 3, in its EZ implementation strategy, Baltimore combined 
two trends that had shaped politics and programs in the City into a two-tiered EZ 
management structure.  Building on its experience in establishing quasi-governmental 
entities to oversee development efforts (Stoker 1987), it established the Empower 
Baltimore Management Corporation (EBMC) as an independent nonprofit overseen by a 
Board of Directors led by leading business and foundation leaders to manage the Zone 
initiative.  Building on its nationally recognized experience in working with and through 
community organizations (Crenson 1983 and Arnold 1979) Baltimore would implement 
the actual programs through community organizations, to be called village centers.  The 
original application called for the creation of eight community village centers and in the 
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end six village centers were created.  The Baltimore Empowerment Zone was organized 
like a CCI, with a grantor-grantee structure where EBMC and its Board set strategies and 
goals and the community-led village centers applied for program funding.  EBMC 
required that the village centers apply for operating and program funding each year and 
that they report on goals and program outcomes in a formal monitoring and evaluation 
system. 
The Experience of Baltimore’s EZ Funded Village Centers 
 EBMC established guidelines for the Village Centers in April 1995 and accepted 
the six applications from communities to form village centers between September of 
1995 and February of 2006.  Four of the six village centers received funding starting in 
1996 and the remaining two started operations in 1997.  The key operational benchmarks 
for each village center are presented in Table 1.  A map showing the location of the 




Milestones in the Formation and Operation of  
The Six Village Centers of The Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
       
      Washington       
  East Village/  Harlem   
Milestone HEBCAC Harbor Pigtown Poppleton Park Self-Motivated 
       
Application Accepted September 1995 February 1996 September 1995 February 1996 February 1996 September 1995 
       
1st Admin. Funding Agreement May 1996 June 1996 March 1996 September 1997 August 1997 June 1996 
2nd Admin. Funding Agreement May 1997 June 1997 March 1997 January 2001 January 2000 August 1997 
3rd Admin. Funding Agreement May 1998 June 1998 October 1998 June 2002 October 2001 June 1998 
4th Admin. Funding Agreement July 1999 June 1999 January 2000 June 2003 January 2003 June 1999 
5th Admin. Funding Agreement July 2000 June 2000 January 2001 June 2004 January 2004 Terminated 
       
Transitional Funding Year 1 July 2001 November 2003 January 2003    
Transitional Funding Year 2 July 2003  January 2004    
Transitional Funding Year 3 July 2004      
       
Land Use Plan 1997 1997 1996 2001 1999 1998 
       
Career Center Opens August 1997 November 1997 September 1997 December 1999 September 1998 November 1998 
       
Current Status Operating Operating Operating Successor Operating Closed in 2004 Closed in 2000 






A summary of the experience of each of the village centers, going clockwise from 
the north, is presented below3: 
Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC) was the second Village 
Center approved by EBMC, but was the only Village Center formed as part of a pre-
existing organization.  HEBCAC was originally formed in December of 1994 as the 
result of a nearly two year long process of meetings between neighborhood organizations, 
Johns Hopkins Medicine, Kennedy Krieger Institute, local businesses, churches, and 
community leaders.  HEBCAC was the largest (27,682 residents in 1990 falling to 18,351 
in 2000), and one of the poorest of the village center communities.  The EZ application 
called for the HEBCAC area to be served by three village centers, but the area instead 
chose to create a single organization to serve the entire community.  The HEBCAC area 
is home to major institutions (Johns Hopkins Hospital, Medical School and associated 
institutions) and has an existing commercial district.  HEBCAC is still operating and its 
service area is now the location of a major City-led redevelopment effort, the East 
Baltimore Development Inc. (EBDI) project. 
East Harbor Village Center (EHVC) was the third of the Empowerment Zone’s six 
Village Centers to become operational.  The Village Center serves the most diverse 
community in the Baltimore Empowerment Zone and includes public housing as well as 
gentrified areas and possesses a large base of existing businesses.  The East Harbor area 
is located in the natural path of waterfront-led development in the City and has benefited 
from large-scale redevelopment projects.  The EHVC is still operational today. 
Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council (WPNPC) was created as 
the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s first Village Center.  The Village Center was formed 
                                               
3 The Fairfield area in South Baltimore on Map 1 is largely industrial land and did not have a village center. 
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out of the original planning for the Empowerment Zone application and serves a racially 
diverse population in an area on the fringe – but in the path – of ongoing Baltimore City 
redevelopment projects.  The community has a commercial district and several major 
institutional partners.  The Village Center is still operating.   
Poppleton Village Center (VCP) was the last of the six Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
Village Centers formed.  The VCP serves the second smallest population of the six 
original Village Centers and is a high poverty area with only a limited base of 
commercial activity.  The Village Center area, however, is across a major street from the 
University of Maryland, Baltimore and the University of Maryland Medical Center.  The 
Village Center is now the location of the development of a major employment center 
(The University of Maryland BioPark a research park).  The Village Center experienced 
ongoing operational problems and closed when EZ funding ran out, but a CDC formed by 
the Village Center is still operating and performs some of the functions of the Village 
Center. 
Harlem Park/Lafayette Square Village Center (HP/LS-VC) was the fifth of the 
Empowerment Zone’s six village centers to become operational.  HP/LS-VC serves the 
smallest population of (6,415 residents in 1990 falling to 4,283 in 2000), has the second 
lowest level of median household income and the second highest poverty rate among 
village center communities.  Harlem Park also lacks any major institutions or commercial 
areas.  Harlem Park operated throughout the decade long EZ period, but ceased 
operations in 2004 as a result of (alleged) misuse of funds by its director. 
Self Motivated Community People’s Village Center (SMCPVC) was the second largest 
village center formed by EBMC.  One of the SMCPVC area’s three major communities – 
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Sandtown-Winchester – was the location of one of the nation’s first CCIs and this area 
has received substantial funding from/through the Enterprise Foundation for housing 
development and community capacity building.  As a result of ongoing problems in 
building an organization and financial irregularities, EBMC terminated SMCPVC’s 
administrative funding in January 2001. 
Overall, the community capacity building efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone have been successful in terms of building community capacity - defined as 
functioning community organizations that have engaged the community to design and 
implement key strategic goals through a core set of programs.  The Baltimore EZ effort 
created five village centers that operated through 2004.   
The issue of sustainability of these efforts is less clear.  Sustainability requires 
both a high level of community engagement and access to sufficient resources to fund 
operations.  Two village centers – East Harbor and Washington Village – continue to 
operate as strong organizations without EBMC operational support.  HEBCAC, the only 
village center formed as part of an existing organization, continues to operate, but has 
suffered from political setbacks.  The Poppleton Village Center closed, a CDC remains as 
a successor organization.  This CDC has become part of several major development 
projects and provides educational services to its community.  The two remaining village 
centers, Harlem Park and Self-Motivated, were closed as a result of financial 
improprieties.  Thus, Baltimore’s EZ effort was successful in creating or assisting the 
development of sustainable village centers in half of its targeted communities and a 
successor organization that continues to operate, but on a smaller scale, in a fourth.  
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Defining Community Capacity 
Despite the established literature on the role of community organizations in urban 
policy implementation, there is only a limited literature on the definition or measurement 
of community capacity.  According to Robert Chaskin (2001), “there is little clarity about 
the meaning of community capacity and capacity building in practice. Indeed, to date, 
there have been relatively few – and all fairly recent – explicit attempts to define 
community capacity in the literature (292).”  A broad academic literature exists 
exploring: the political, legal and fiscal support for; accountability issues of; and specific 
organizational performance measures impacting policy implementation by community 
organizations.  However, evaluation research on both the capacity of and delivery of 
services by community groups is lacking.   
According to Glickman and Servon (1997, p. 4), “the literature on capacity is 
uneven” and focused on the measurement of outcomes, most frequently in the area of 
CDCs and housing production.  The widespread use of the term community capacity 
without defining the term “has allowed for a broad range of meanings to be assigned to 
the term and has hindered efforts to study and measure it.” (Glickman and Servon 1997, 
p. 4).  Part of the difficulty in analyzing community capacity is that community capacity 
is both a means and an end of urban policy interventions.  Government agencies and 
foundations implement programs through community organizations to improve the 
efficiency of policy interventions.  Thus, the capacity of the community organization is 
an input to the process of producing desired policy outcomes.  However, building local 
capacity is also a goal of many of the same policy interventions.  This dual nature of 
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community capacity complicates efforts to define and measure the subject.  (Gibbon, 
Labonte and Laverack 2002; Labonte and Laverack 2001a). 
 Much of the literature defines community capacity broadly as a measure of the 
ability of a community to adapt to challenges or opportunities and/or effect changes 
according to some community goal or vision.  This ability to adapt to or effect change is 
determined by the level of individual and organizational resources within or capable of 
being accessed by the community.   Thus, in defining community capacity most efforts 
combine several levels of social agency, including individuals, organizations – with a 
focus on community-based organizations, and networks.  There is general agreement in 
the literature that community capacity is the aggregation of resources -- both internal and 
external to the community – that can be deployed by the community to address threats to 
or opportunities for the community.  Internal resources include the human, organizational 
and social capital residing in the community.  Human capital elements include the 
attributes of the persons residing within the community and include the education, 
income, and socio-economic status.  Organizational capital elements include the 
institutions, businesses and organizations located in or serving the residents of the 
community.  The social capital element is the interaction of human and organizational 
capital and is manifest in such intangible constructs as sense of community, social 
interactions, and sense of place.  External resources – such as funding for community 
events or organizations or political assistance in problem solving – are generally 




The poor communities targeted by federal or non-profit interventions generally 
have lower levels of human, organizational and social capital and weaker network 
connections to the external economic and political power structure.  The lower level of 
human capital, as measured by traditional Census-based measures such as income, 
educational attainment, and workforce participation, in poor communities has been 
demonstrated in literature on urban poverty. (Jargowsky 1997).  Similarly, the urban 
policy literature has highlighted the lack organizational capital in poor communities, with 
work by Wilson (1997), Kasarda (1988) and many others highlighted the loss of key 
economic and other institutions in poor communities.  The lack of organizational capital 
in poor communities has been reported by Vidal, who cites “the paucity of formal 
organizations in underclass neighborhoods and the low level of participation in those 
organizations by the working poor.”  (1995 p. 207).  Chaskin et al. (2001) places the lack 
of local institutions to perform the everyday functions of life as a central indicator that 
community capacity is weak in poor communities.  Numerous academic articles and 
books have been written on the lack of various constructs of social capital in poor 
communities and the various attempts to describe and measure the impact of various 
constructs of social capital on community have been described by Sampson (1999).   
As a result of the lower level of human, organizational, and social capital 
elements in poor communities, efforts to promote change or provide services often center 
on the creation of new organizations, or the strengthening of existing ones, as a central 
element of any policy intervention.  Research has demonstrated that citizens of poor and 
minority communities rely more heavily on community and neighborhood organizations 
as a means of engaging in political action than do middle or upper class people. (Portney 
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and Berry 1997; Berry, Portney and Thomson 1993).  Thus, efforts to promote the 
redevelopment or revitalization of poor communities often rely more heavily on creating 
new or building the capacity of existing organizations to serve these communities.  This 
is consistent with the findings of Gitell and Vidal, who found that “what may be required 
to foster community development in areas that have lacked formative efforts are new 
associations and entrepreneurs.” (1998, p. 21).   As a result, the capacity of these new or 
existing community organizations plays a central role in efforts to promote 
redevelopment in poor communities.   
Building the capacity of community organizations is a direct means of building 
the capacity of poor neighborhoods.  This is what EBMC set out to do by establishing the 
six village centers.  Therefore, this effort focuses on measuring the capacity of the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s village centers as a means of evaluating the success of 
the EZ in building community capacity.  Thus, this effort to define and measure the 
community capacity created by the Baltimore Empowerment Zone places the capacity of 
the organizations created – the six village centers – as a central and defining element.   
For the purpose of this dissertation, community development organization 
capacity is defined as the resources and assets that can be deployed by community 
organizations to address threats to or opportunities for the community.  A review of the 
literature on community development organization capacity4 identified numerous discreet 
elements of community organization capacity.  The five core components used to assess 
community organization capacity in this analysis are presented in Table 2.
                                               
4 See Chaskin 2001; Chaskin et al. 2001; Eichler and Hoffman n.d.; Fredericksen and London 2000; Fawcett et al. 
1995; Gibbon, Labonte and Laverak 2002; Gitell, Newman and Ortega 1997; Glickman and Servon 1997 1998 2003; 






Five Core Components of Community Organization Capacity1 
   
      
Issue Definition 
   
1) Strategic Planning A clear consistent statement of mission and goals that guides 
operations and is periodically updated. 
2) Leadership Leaders organize, manage and give direction to the 
organization. 
 a) Staff Leadership Competent mangers to direct and staff to implement programs. 
 b) Board Leadership Representative and engaged community leaders and institutional 
representatives to oversee community change activities. 
3) Management and Resources Effective policies and procedures and sufficient resources to 
deliver needed services. 
 a) Financial Management and Resources Adequate financial resources and sound fiscal management. 
 b) Operations Management Adequate staff and organizational resources to achieve goals. 
 c) Oversight, Monitoring and Evaluation Systems to track and evaluate performance and efficiency. 
4) Internal Networks - Community Relations Networks and linkages within the community. 
 a) Community Participation Community participation and engagement in community change 
efforts. 
 b) Institutional Participation The participation and engagement of core local institutions in 
community change efforts. 
 b) Representation The participation and engagement of core local institutions in 
community change efforts. 
 c) Community Outreach/Organizing Bringing community residents together for collective action. 
 d) Communications Dissemination of relevant community and organizational issues 
opportunities and performance. 
5) External Networks Networks and linkages to broader external economic, policy and 
social systems. 
   
(1) This analysis of community organization capacity draws on concepts described in several sources - most importantly Chaskin et al. (2001), 




Answering the Research Question 
Did Baltimore’s EZ Effort Create Community Capacity? 
As presented above, four of the original six village centers remain operational in 
some form today.  Thus, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone had a two-thirds success rate 
in meeting its goal of creating sustainable community capacity.  As described more fully 
in the case studies in Chapter 4, this dissertation found that the village centers that were 
able to build the five core components of community organization capacity were 
successful.   
The author’s qualitative assessment of the success of each of the village centers in 
developing each of the components of capacity is presented in Table 3.  All of the village 
centers were required to create strategic plans, but only the three most successful village 
centers, HEBCAC, East Harbor, and Washington Village, succeeded in truly basing their 
operations on the plans they created.  Strong leadership is essential for a community 
organization to succeed.  Leadership can come from either the organization’s staff or 
board, and in the most successful organizations it comes from both.  The experience of 
the surviving village centers was mixed – with some being more controlled by their staff 
(HEBCAC and East Harbor) and some being more controlled by their board (Poppleton 
and Washington Village).  The two village centers that ultimately failed, Harlem Park 
and Self-Motivated, experienced the combination of weak staff and board leadership.   
Community organizations must have competent financial and operational 
management and the most successful village centers were able to both run EZ funded 
programs and attract and run other programs efficiently.  Internal and external networks 
are also vital for community organizations to succeed.  Internally, a community 
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organization must communicate with and be representative of the community it serves in 
order to fulfill its mission.  It must also have access to external networks in order to 
attract the financial, political and other resources needed to serve the community.  Most 
of the village centers experienced difficulty in fully engaging the community in their 
activities – but this is common in poor communities.  This dissertation found that the 
participation and support of key community institutions, such as universities, churches, 
CDCs, were critical factors supporting the successful village centers and that the village 
centers that were able to form strongest external linkages during the EZ funding period 
were able to become sustainable by attracting program and other support to continue 




East Village/ Harlem 
Issue HEBCAC Harbor Pigtown Poppleton Park Self-Motivated
1) Strategic Planning Strong Strong Very Strong Moderate Weak Weak
2) Leadership
a) Staff Leadership Strong Strong Strong (1) Weak Weak Weak
b) Board Leadership Moderate Weak Very Strong Strong (2) Weak Weak
3) Management 
a) Financial Management Moderate Moderate Moderate Weak Weak Weak
b) Operations Management Strong Moderate Strong Weak Moderate Weak
c) Oversight, Monitoring and Evaluation Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak
4) Internal Networks - Community Relations
a) Community Participation Weak Moderate (3) Strong Weak Weak Weak
b) Institutional Participation Strong Strong Strong Moderate (4) Weak Weak
b) Representation Moderate Moderate (3) Strong Moderate (3) Moderate Moderate
c) Community Outreach Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
d) Communications Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
5) External Networks Strong Strong Very Strong Moderate (5) Weak Weak
(1) Washington Village/Pigtown suffered from a high degree of turnover - but each of the directors hired had strong leadership capabilities.
(2) However, Poppleton suffered from having its board controlled by a dominant board leader.
(4) Poppleton had little institutional participation until late in the EZ period - when it was able to work with University of Maryland, Baltimore on a major redevelopment project.
(5) For most of its operational period, Poppleton had weak external networks. However, as a major redevelopment project came to the community in the last years of the Zone, the 
village center was able to form a strong and positive linkage with the University of Maryland, Baltimore to support and represent the community in the development effort and is 
now playing that role in other developments.
Table 3
Core Components of Community Organization Capacity
Baltimore Empowerment Zone Village Center Success in Achieving the 




Lessons Learned From Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone Effort 
Overall, the community capacity-building experience of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone demonstrated both the challenges and opportunities of community-
driven urban policy interventions.  The Baltimore Empowerment Zone succeeded in 
creating and supporting five of the six targeted village centers over the decade long 
implementation period.  As its legacy, it left behind four organizations, three of the 
original village centers and a successor CDC, to continue its work.  These village centers 
continue to represent their communities as Baltimore’s downtown renaissance moves 
outward into new communities as well as deliver services needed and desired by their 
communities.   
The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone demonstrates that 
community organizational capacity to implement comprehensive community change 
efforts can be created, but it is an expensive, time-consuming process where success is far 
from guaranteed.  Where it succeeds it can create an opportunity to provide the integrated 
services needed by poor communities, achieve positive results, and give poor 
communities a stake in redevelopment efforts.   
As will be presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, several core lessons from 
the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s community capacity building efforts can be applied 
to other federal or philanthropic efforts.  The primary lesson is that building community 
organizational capacity takes time and effort, and any attempt should include a long start-
up period to engage the community and develop a community-driven and accepted 
strategy.  Such efforts should target communities large enough to have a critical mass of 
resources and residents, but not too large to manage and impact.  Targeted communities 
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should have engaged and active institutions willing to play a supportive role and some 
opportunities for market based re-development to occur.  Success in such an effort will 
depend on the availability of local leadership, effective communications, outreach, and 
community mobilization; and the development of strong internal and external networks.  
A final lesson is that fiscal and managerial accountability systems and ongoing technical 
assistance are essential for success.   
Research Design and Strategy 
Study Design 
 This investigation analyzed the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
in creating community development capacity though established focus group (Morgan 
and Krueger 1998) and case study (Yin 2001) methods.  Data were collected and 
analyzed through more than 50 interviews (local and national), 6 focus groups, numerous 
project meetings with EBMC staff, reviews of available documents, evaluation reports, 
funding reports, budgets and various other written and data (U.S. Bureau of the Census) 
sources.  The project directly draws on two research projects prepared for EBMC by the 
Jacob France Institute of the University of Baltimore.  The first of these projects – The 
Community Capacity Building Impacts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone was an 
interview and record review based analysis of the impact of the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone in building community development capacity in each of the five remaining village 
centers (Clinch 2004a).  The second project – The Lessons Learned from the Community 
Capacity Building Efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone was a focus group and 
interview based analysis of the key lessons learned in the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone’s efforts to build community capacity through the creation of six village centers 
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(Clinch 2004b).  EBMC was aware that the work done under contract would also be used 
in this dissertation.  Working with the EBMC on this project allowed complete access to 
both EBMC and village center documents and staff.  Research was conducted from 
August 2003 through December 2004.   
Research Strategy and Questions 
 Both research projects were based on detailed interview and focus group guides.  
Recognizing that interview and focus group based research often goes in unforeseen 
directions efforts were made to maintain focus on a core group of questions for each 
project.  
The first project interviewed EBMC staff and board members involved in the 
community capacity building efforts of EBMC, the director and the Chairman (where 
possible) and one other board member for each village center.  The core research 
questions for EBMC staff and board members included:  
 How did the Board measure or evaluate the organizational strength or 
sustainability of each of the village centers?  
 How would you measure the capacity of or the organizational strength of the 
village centers? How would you rank the organizational strength and capacity 
of each Village Center?  
 What Village Center is most likely to outlast the EBMC, and Why?  
 What Village Center is least likely to outlast the EBMC, and Why?  
 What steps can key organizations take to ensure the long-term sustainability 
of the village centers?   
 What were the strengths and weaknesses of EBMC approach to building 
community capacity?   
 
The core research questions for Village Center Board members were:  
 What is your role with the Village Center?   
 How long have you been involved?  
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 What are the short and long term goals of the Village Center?  
 What is the role of the Board?  
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Village Center?  
All of the interviews were also conducted in person with the questions not sent ahead of 
time to the respondent. 
Village Center staff was mailed a survey ahead of the interview so that key data – 
plans, record, budget, policy guidelines, etc. -- could be collected prior to the interview.  
Questions were asked and materials requested on:  
 The goals and operations of the Village Center;  
 Village Center Board Relations;  
 Staffing/Personnel Procedures;  
 Budgets; and 
 Program Implementation; and Community relations.   
The second project consisted of 5 Village Center focus groups, a series of 8 
interviews in the SMCPVC area (where the Village Center was closed) and a final focus 
group with EBMC Board members and staff.  Each focus group consisted of between 6 
and 10 participants drawn from Village Center staff, Board members, and community 
residents.  Each focus group included persons active at various times in each Village 
Center’s operation.  Each of the five Village Center focus groups was supplemented with 
between one and four additional interviews – of persons who could not participate in the 
focus group. The focus groups and interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.  Both 
the focus groups and interviews were based on a common set of questions about barriers 
to village center formation; barriers to village center operations; and lessons learned – 
including If the Empowerment Zone was starting up today – What should EBMC have 
done differently? What should the Village Center have done differently?   
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Limitations of the Analysis 
 This dissertation is subject to the limitations of all case study research – the 
problem of broadly generalizing from specific cases.  Case studies are a descriptive 
method, not an explanatory one.  Thus, in the absence of controlled laboratory conditions, 
conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships cannot easily be drawn.  Behavior can 
only be described, not explained.   This analysis is based on the experience of a single, 
large-scale program in one particular urban area.  Thus, the findings may not be 
representative of all urban areas.  Because much of the qualitative information collected 
in this dissertation is from interviews and focus groups – data collection is also subject to 
the biases and omissions of the respondents and the analyst.  However, case study 
methodologies offer important advantages – especially for policy studies.  These include 
the ability to study events in their natural settings and a holistic approach to the study of 
events that allows the study of a policy where it occurs that includes the various issues 
and events that shape its outcome.  While case studies cannot offer proof of causality they 
can offer opportunities for generalization and are well suited to the generation of theory. 









This dissertation assesses the impact of the Baltimore City Empowerment Zone 
on the development of community capacity in six low-income neighborhoods in 
Baltimore City.  As described in Chapter 1, the concept of community capacity refers to 
the internal resources and assets that influence the ability of a community to adapt to 
changes in social and economic conditions and promote development.  This chapter 
describes evolution and experience of community-driven, place-based strategies in urban 
policy interventions and how they influenced the design of the Clinton administration’s 
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) initiative.   
The Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s implementation strategy was centered on 
building community capacity, and has been recognized as having placed the most 
significant emphasis on community capacity-building of all of the EZ/EC cities (Nathan 
et al. 1995; Gitell et al. 1998; Gitell et al. 2001; Hebert et al. 2001).  Because of its strong 
emphasis on community capacity-building, Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone experience 
contributes to the substantial base of literature on the role of community organizations in 
urban policy interventions.  This chapter sets the framework for the analysis of the 
community capacity-building impacts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone by reviewing 
the literature on the role of community organizations in urban policy interventions.  The 
depth and breadth of the urban policy literature make a comprehensive review of the role 
of community in urban policy interventions impossible; thus, this literature review seeks 
to outline the historical and theoretical foundations for and the practical implications of 





From the Progressive Era in the late 1800s until today, a variety of policies have 
been applied to addressing the problems of persistent and concentrated unemployment, 
poverty and poor housing conditions in urban neighborhoods.  At different times and 
during different administrations, urban policy focused on a variety of intervention 
strategies.  According to Ladd (1994), urban policies can be people-based and assist 
people regardless of where they live, or they can be place-based and focus on providing 
assistance to residents of poor communities.   
According to Ladd (1994), urban policy interventions have alternated between 
these two strategies.  Place-based strategies concentrate on community, economic and 
workforce development.  These strategies can be demand-driven and enhance 
employment opportunities in an urban area with the hope that the benefits will trickle 
down to the urban poor, or they can be supply-driven and attempt to improve the 
employment options for poor residents.  People-based strategies such as social welfare 
interventions can be categorical and focused on a particular need such as training or 
income support, or they can be comprehensive and offer multiple services needed by the 
urban poor.   
Urban policy interventions can also be privately initiated, by the philanthropic or 
foundation community, or they can be publicly initiated, by the federal, state or local 
government.  Historically, the design of particular urban policy interventions often 
originates with philanthropic initiatives that are then adopted by government programs. 
The evolution of federal urban policy interventions shaped the Clinton 
administration’s EZ/EC initiative, which represented a return to the place-based emphasis 
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of prior Democratic administrations.  Like previous urban policy interventions, most 
importantly the Community Action Program (CAP) that drew from the Ford 
Foundation’s Gray Areas program, the EZ/EC initiative drew from the experience of 
foundation-sponsored comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs).  Because of its 
comprehensive and geographically-targeted approach for addressing urban problems, the 
EZ/EC initiative has been likened to a federally-sponsored CCI (Walsh 1997; Chaskin 
and Peters 1997).  The EZ/EC Initiative’s focus on promoting urban renewal and 
redevelopment through place-based strategies with substantial community involvement 
represented a return to the Great Society’s Community Action Program and Model Cities 
program (Rubin, M.M. 1994); furthermore, the EZ/EC initiative drew substantially on the 
experience of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and Enterprise Zones that 
arose out of the Republican Reagan and first Bush administrations (Rubin, M. M. 1994).  
The EZ/EC initiative represents the integration of post-World War II, urban policy with a 
renewed emphasis on place-based strategies.   
The Origins of Federal Urban Policy: The Progressive Era Through the New Deal 
 Halpern (1995) traced the origin of neighborhood initiatives in urban policy to the 
Progressive Era when elite reformers sought to ameliorate the negative effects that the 
rise of industrial capitalism, rapid immigration and the development of tenements had on 
the urban poor and their communities.  According to Halpern, neighborhood 
improvement was part of the Progressive agenda from the start, and “Progressive 
reformers tended to believe that the best way to help integrate poor neighborhoods and 
their residents into the larger society was to first strengthen these neighborhoods and then 
try to link them to the outside world” (1995, 30).  Progressive Era urban interventions 
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often centered on settlement houses that functioned as mediating institutions between the 
poor and the larger urban system.  Settlement houses provided services, ranging from 
health and education to training and recreation, needed to help integrate the poor 
immigrant population into the city and the broader American culture.  According to 
Halpern (1995), the settlement movement declined after the First World War, a casualty 
of the post-War prosperity and fight against Bolshevism as well as their failure 
substantially improve the lives of the urban poor they served.  Settlement houses were 
replaced by the rise of the social work system, and this marked the beginning of the trend 
toward a categorical, people-based approach. 
 According to Mollenkopf (1983), national urban policy was an outgrowth of the 
New Deal as the federal government took a more activist role in domestic policy issues, 
including economic growth and poverty.  The federal government provided aid to cities 
through categorical grants to promote program and policy implementation by state and 
local governments.  These grants continued to be the major funding source for urban 
policy through the 1960s, and the New Deal programs established the bureaucratic 
mechanisms for future urban policies. 
The New Deal created the federal urban policy infrastructure with four key 
agencies: the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA), the PWA Emergency Housing Division that became the U.S. Housing Authority 
(USHA), and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).  The PWA and WPA did not 
specifically target urban issues, but both ultimately played a major role in urban 
infrastructure and construction projects (Mollenkopf 1983).  The PWA in particular 
worked with local government authorities to condemn property, develop and operate 
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projects, and laid “the institutional groundwork for post-war pro-growth coalitions in 
urban politics” (Mollenkopf 1983, 66).  The USHA targeted “slum clearance” and the 
development of affordable housing for the urban poor, and it supported the development 
of the local housing authorities that exist today.  The FHA program had a more far-
reaching, long-term impact on urban areas by promoting homeownership through 
increased mortgage lending.  FHA supported mortgages that contributed to a dramatic 
increase in homeownership from 39% in 1937 to 57% in 1950, but this aided the post-war 
suburbanization of the urban population that ultimately contributed to the economic and 
fiscal decline of central cities.   
Outside of the formal government role in urban policy, the New Deal Era saw the 
rise of neighborhood activism and community organizing through the “Chicago School” 
of sociologists and the Chicago Area Project as well as Saul Alinsky and the Back of the 
Yards Neighborhood Council.  These efforts were the first to promote community 
participation, self-determination, and control over urban policy interventions. (O’Connor 
1999; Halpern 1995).  These concepts played a major role in later efforts to expand 
community control over urban policy. 
Starting in the Progressive Era, the first urban policy interventions were 
philanthropically-sponsored and community-driven.  Despite this legacy, the advent of 
formal federal urban policy in the New Deal targeted broad societal needs such as 
housing, employment, and economic development through categorical federal grants and 
the establishment of a formal bureaucratic infrastructure.  According to Mollenkopf 
(1983), the New Deal reforms were broadly centered on bringing the urban constituency 
into the Democratic Party; thus, unlike later Democratic programs, the reforms were 
 
 30
broad-based and did not emphasize the inclusion of community activists.  Even though 
they did not have a community focus, the New Deal programs did lay the groundwork for 
later urban policies.  First, they created the funding mechanisms that would dominate 
federal urban policies into the 1960s.  Second, they established the bureaucratic 
infrastructure of local boards and housing authorities that would come to dominate urban 
policy.  As a result, the New Deal represented an important starting point for community-
driven urban policies.  This era saw also the rise of formal community organizing and 
created the original goals for community participation and control in implementation.   
These ultimately would assume a major role in urban policy.   
Urban Renewal: The First Federal Urban Policy 
While federal urban policy is thought to have originated with the New Deal, the 
first federal policy that explicitly targeted urban areas was the Urban Renewal Program, 
created by the Housing Act of 1949.  The act was passed in an era of economic and social 
change in cities.  The out-migration of urban whites to the suburbs and in-migration of 
African-Americans from the south seeking better employment opportunities led to an 
increase of poor residents living in the cities.  Housing shortages plagued cities, and 
slums began to encroach on downtown central business districts.  Urban Renewal had 
three goals: slum clearance; housing rehabilitation; and downtown-oriented 
redevelopment efforts.  It was often complemented with federally-sponsored public 
housing development and transportation programs.  Urban Renewal efforts were 
decentralized and implemented by local public agencies (LPAs) that were generally 
dominated by the cities’ existing political and business elite.  (Halpern 1995). 
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There is a substantial base of literature critical of the Urban Renewal Program.  
According to Halpern (1995), Urban Renewal was supported by an uneasy alliance of 
mayors, private developers, and low-income housing advocates.  Mayors sought 
downtown development projects to boost their political prestige and replace the loss of 
manufacturing jobs.  Developers sought financial government assistance for their projects 
and the use of eminent domain (the right to acquire private property for “public” uses) to 
acquire property for redevelopment.  Low-income housing advocates sought to replace 
slums with improved housing.  While this broad-based coalition assisted the passage of 
Urban Renewal, it often proved difficult to balance the competing goals of the three 
interest groups in its implementation.   
Halpern (1995) viewed the Urban Renewal program as a law with multiple 
purposes framed in vague language that created cross pressures among goals.  The 
Federal Housing Act of 1949 called for the elimination of substandard and other 
inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization 
as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for 
every American family.  Despite this benign goal, Halpern states that Urban Renewal 
“quickly came to mean the clearance, rebuilding, and reviving of central business 
districts, and the building of massive public housing projects in poor and working class 
African-American (and to a lesser extent Hispanic) neighborhoods” (1995, 64).  The goal 
of Urban Renewal became buffering city commercial and cultural centers from the tide of 
African-American migration, reinforcing segregation, and the creation of high rise public 
housing “that reinforced social isolation” (Halpern 1995, 66).  Halpern believed that 
Urban Renewal directly contributed to the later problems facing urban America. 
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Greer’s 1965 analysis of Urban Renewal begins with, “At a cost of three billion 
dollars, the Urban Renewal Agency (URA) has succeeded in materially reducing the 
supply of low cost housing in American cities.  Like highways and streets, the program 
has ripped through the neighborhoods of the poor powered by the right of eminent 
domain” (3).  Greer cites two related problems with the Urban Renewal program.  The 
first problem is that the program suffered from the “unsystematic mixture of three quite 
different goals” (1965, 165).  The first goal of increasing housing and eliminating slums 
was mixed with the unrelated goal of revitalizing the central city, and to both was added 
the goal of enhancing urban planning.  As a result of these competing goals, Urban 
Renewal lacked a “clear hierarchy of intentions” and thus became concerned only with 
revitalizing the central business district. To Greer (1965), Urban Renewal lacked the 
power, precedents, planning information, and legitimacy to achieve its aims.  In the area 
of community participation in the Urban Renewal program, Greer found that the program 
was one of the most complex ever attempted.  It tried to bring together the federal 
government, local government, developers, and citizens, all of whom had different, often 
competing, interests.  According to Greer (1965), resident participation suffered from a 
lack of broad-based support for or even an understanding of the program.  As a result, 
community involvement was low and the program was captured by the urban elite.  This 
resulted in its narrow focus on downtown development and its failure to improve housing 
conditions for the poor. 
In an influential Harvard Business Review article (and later a book) critical of 
Urban Renewal, Anderson (1965) referred to the program as “the Federal Bulldozer” and 
argued that it should be stopped.  He stated that the Urban Renewal Program was based 
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on goals that everybody agreed with, but its implementation made everybody worse off.  
He argued that the program went against its core goal of improving housing conditions by 
destroying four times as many homes as were built.  It did not improve living conditions 
for the urban poor, failed to improve the fiscal condition of cities, and actually reduced 
the tax base by destroying more property than was ultimately built.  By allowing the use 
of eminent domain to acquire property for private rather than public use, Urban Renewal 
liberalized the right of government to seize property, thereby threatening personal 
property rights.  In all, Anderson argued it was an inefficient government program whose 
results “when compared to the results of private forces are negligible.  Its overall costs, 
when compared to its results are high” (507). 
Herbert Gans (1965) wrote a frequently cited article critical of Urban Renewal, 
especially on its impact on the low-income persons it relocated.  Gans (1965) argued that 
the poor residents displaced by the program could not afford to move back to the higher-
quality housing developed by the program.  It thereby caused a shortage of affordable 
housing in neighborhoods and “sometimes even created new slums by pushing relocatees 
into areas and buildings which then became overcrowded and deteriorated rapidly” (539).  
Many dispossessed tenants who found better housing often had to pay more in rent than 
they could afford.  Urban Renewal also affected communities “because, in order to 
assemble large sites to attract private developers, entire neighborhoods have frequently 
been destroyed, uprooting people who had lived there for decades, closing down their 
institutions, ruining small businesses by the hundreds, and scattering families and friends 
all over the city” (541).  To Gans, Urban Renewal hurt poor urban residents by 
destroying their existing communities and their social support system. 
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Wilson (1966) analyzed Urban Renewal and found that, as of 1962, just over half 
of the 944 federally-approved Urban Renewal projects had begun assembling land, and 
only 65 of them were complete.  Implementation suffered from red tape, and the long 
time it took for city governments and developers to gain experience with the program 
delayed projects.  More importantly, he found that the coalition between liberals, 
planners, mayors, businessmen, and real estate interests that made the program possible 
had “begun to fall apart” in “mounting disagreement over the methods and even the 
objectives of Urban Renewal” (408).  According to Wilson, substantial debate occurred 
over the racial implications of Urban Renewal as minority communities were targeted for 
renewal.  This gave Urban Renewal the nickname “Negro clearance.”  What Wilson 
found most interesting about opposition to Urban Renewal was the rise of neighborhood 
resistance to the program.  A key barrier to the implementation of urban renewal projects 
was obtaining citizen participation in the targeted communities.  While this participation 
was not required by the law, “it is expedient, if not essential” for the projects to move 
forward (410).  Wilson described the difficulties in finding citizens able to participate in 
the renewal process, especially in poorer areas with a less educated and active population.  
To Wilson, the solution of increasing the participation of residents from poor 
communities was community organizing and a reliance on the use and creation of 
neighborhood associations.  Thirty years later, the Clinton administration came to the 
same conclusion in its EZ/EC legislation. 
Jane Jacobs, a self taught journalist, wrote a classic and influential book in 1961, 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities, criticizing the impact and implementation 
of Urban Renewal.  Jacob’s criticism of Urban Renewal, which can be extended to the 
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common practice of urban planning and redevelopment that despite her protests continues 
to guide many redevelopment efforts to this day, centered on protecting the unique 
character of urban neighborhoods.  She opposed large-scale public redevelopment efforts 
and advocated for small scale, private personal efforts to “unslum the slums.”  Jacobs’ 
writing emphasized the value of preserving the character and functionality of small 
neighborhoods.  According to Drier (2006): 
Cities, she believed should be untidy, complex and full of surprises.  Good 
cities encourage social interaction at the street level. They are pedestrian 
friendly. They favor biking, walking and public transit over cars. They get 
people talking to each other. Residential buildings should be low rise and 
have stoops and porches. Sidewalks should have parks and benches. 
Streets should be short and wind around neighborhoods. Livable 
neighborhoods require mixed use buildings – especially first floor retail 
and housing above. (228) 
 
Jacobs writing and activities continued to impact urban planning long after 
the demise of the program.  Her book became required reading in urban planning 
programs.  She is credited by Drier (2006) as having influenced urban planning 
and, in an area where her impact is often overlooked, he argues she impacted 
community organizing as much as Saul Alinsky.  Jacobs’ views on urban 
redevelopment had great intellectual impact; however, they had relatively little 
influence over federal urban policy, which continues to favor larger-scale, 
redevelopment efforts.  However, her vision of urban neighborhoods guided 
policy makers, especially in local planning departments, and influenced programs 
like HOPE VI, that are now replacing old high rise public housing with low rise, 
mixed-use developments. 
While most of the literature on Urban Renewal was critical, urban scholar 
Haywood Sanders wrote a reconsideration of the program (1980).   He argued that much 
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of the work critical of Urban Renewal was published before reforms in the program went 
into effect.  In the mid-1960s through the end of the program in 1974, the amount of 
public housing constructed and homes rehabilitated increased rapidly.  He also updated 
the figures on the people displaced by the program to examine the claims that Urban 
Renewal amounted to “Negro removal.”  His figures through 1971 reported that 37% of 
the families and 56% of the single individuals that relocated were white.  He concludes 
that “while blacks bore a disproportionate burden of the costs of displacement, they were 
not its exclusive recipients” (107).   
Sanders (1980) identified the core problems with Urban Renewal in terms of its 
impact on the poor and its focus on downtown redevelopment as “not a necessary 
function of the design of the program.  Rather, it is a result of an inequitable distribution 
of political power at the local level, uncontrolled and unaltered by the federal 
government” (105-6).  Furthermore, he argued that many of the projects later referred to 
in the 1970s as examples of urban revival were initiated under Urban Renewal.   
In the area of resident participation, he reported, “The exclusion of project 
residents from the planning process was replaced with representation on Project Area 
Committees and an increasing level of resident participation and influence” (124).  In 
summary, Sanders argued that while Urban Renewal had problems, especially in its early 
stages of implementation, the program was reformed to address many of its weaknesses.  
The core problems were the program’s lack of a clear goal as well as poor federal 
oversight. 
The overall record of Urban Renewal is negative.  In his summary of the program, 
Keating (1999) argued that Urban Renewal and public housing programs were 
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complemented with federal transportation programs to connect downtown areas to the 
interstate highway system and build parking garages so as to provide access for suburban 
in-commuters.  Combined, these three programs led to the destruction of urban 
neighborhoods in poor communities where land was cheaper and residents had less 
ability and political strength to oppose projects.  Keating called the combination of the 
federal Urban Renewal and highway programs the “most visibly destructive federal 
policies to be visited on urban neighborhoods” (1999, 19).  To Keating (1999), the core 
problems with Urban Renewal were its adoption of the dual and potentially conflicting 
goals of downtown redevelopment and housing improvement; the lack of clear guidelines 
for resident and community participation; the lack of planning and evaluation information 
to guide the program; and poor federal oversight that allowed for the control of the LPAs 
and projects by the existing urban political and economic power structure. 
Resistance to Urban Renewal, facilitated by the rise of the Chicago School-
oriented community organizing tradition, the Civil Rights movement, and the urban riots 
of 1964-68, led to reforms in the core federal programs.  In addition, the community 
organizing that occurred in opposition to Urban Renewal Programs and transportation 
projects contributed to the community-oriented policies that emerged in the later War on 
Poverty programs. 
The lessons of Urban Renewal were taken into account in the design and 
implementation of the EZ/EC initiative.  The EZ/EC initiative focused entirely on the 
problems of poor communities, and thus it did not need to balance the competing goals 
that Urban Renewal failed to coordinate.  The EZ/EC initiative also required community 
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participation in program design, planning, and oversight.   HUD proactively monitored 
community engagement.  The goal for community involvement was meant to:  
 Ensure that the communities’ goals and interests were taken into account; and  
 Reduce the chances that the downtown political and business interests would 
dominate the program.   
 
Empowerment Zone implementation in Baltimore drew on Wilson’s critique of 
citizen participation in Urban Renewal by emphasizing both community organizing and a 
central role for neighborhood organizations.  Finally, unlike Urban Renewal, the program 
had substantial formal federal oversight, planning, and evaluation built into the program. 
The Great Society Programs 
 In its first decade of implementation, the federal Urban Renewal Program 
facilitated redevelopment projects that benefited cities’ central business districts by 
developing both office space and middle- to upper-income housing.  By focusing on 
downtown development; however, Urban Renewal failed to address substantially the 
problems of urban blight and persistent poverty in the neighborhoods surrounding 
downtown areas.  Thus, the first formal federal urban policy effort did little to address the 
issue of urban poverty.  This changed in the 1960s as the issue of poverty in general, and 
urban poverty in particular, became a core national priority for the first time since the 
New Deal.   
The election of the Kennedy administration and the publication of such books as 
Galbraith’s (1958) Affluent Society and Harrington’s (1962) The Other America: Poverty 
in the United States led to what Frieden and Kaplan (1975) term “rediscovering the poor” 
(27).  According to Frieden and Kaplan (1975), “Before 1960, poverty was simply not a 
direct and open subject of national political concern.  People who formulated programs to 
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aid the poor had to do so in the name of other and more politically attractive causes” (33).  
In contrast, starting in the 1960s, policies directly targeting poverty emerged as a topic of 
national interest.  While the Kennedy administration was unable to implement many of its 
anti-poverty initiatives, the Johnson administration capitalized on the assassination of 
Kennedy, an electoral landslide, a Democratic majority in Congress, a federal budget 
surplus, and a growing body of academic literature on poverty to pass a major national 
anti-poverty initiative, the Great Society Programs.  According to Kaplan (1995), “Nearly 
400 categorical programs or programs for every category of urban (and rural) problems 
were enacted by Congress from 1963 to 1968” (663).  Unlike earlier efforts, many of 
these programs directly targeted poverty and urban poverty alleviation. 
The various anti-poverty and social programs enacted by the Johnson 
administration represented a new era in federal social and urban policy.  According to 
O’Connor (1999): 
It was thus in a context of federal reform, citizen action, social protest, and 
heightening racial tension that the Johnson administration launched a rapid 
succession of federal programs and demonstration projects with the goal 
of comprehensive community renewal.  These programs, including 
Community Action, Model Cities, the Special Impact Program, and an 
array of neighborhood-based service programs, attempted to push federal 
policy beyond the New Deal framework by using federal power to alter 
existing political, economic, and racial arrangements in poor communities. 
(100)  
 
These new policies targeted the causes of poverty unlike their New Deal predecessors 
that targeted the mitigation of its effects.  Rather than relying on welfare payments alone, 
the Great Society programs would seek to address the educational, social, and political 
barriers facing the poor. 
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The new federal anti-poverty and social programs represented a break with the 
New Deal’s people-oriented approach, especially in the area of urban policy.  According 
to Kaplan (1995): 
Model Cities and the War on Poverty were what academic jargon now 
refers to as place-oriented programs.  That is, they emphasized the revival 
of urban neighborhoods and the provision of improved services to 
neighborhood residents.  Household mobility was not a primary concern.  
Coordination of existing categorical programs, provision of new, more 
flexible federal funding, and citizen empowerment were the chosen federal 
strategies to redeem cities and their residents. (664) 
 
These new urban policies were geographically targeted and focused on service 
integration rather than the people-based and categorical approach of the New Deal.  
Model Cities and the War on Poverty programs differed from the city 
bureaucracy-dominated strategies of the New Deal and Urban Renewal.  According to 
Mollenkopf (1983), “While these programs vaguely resembled the old WPA, they broke 
new ground by funding local non-profit groups to deliver community services.  They 
often bypassed local as well as state government, thus dramatically extending the tactic 
FDR had invented when he used federal programs to reach directly into and organize 
local jurisdictions” (87).  These new policies emphasized engaging and empowering the 
poor by creating new structures outside of city governments.  Citizen participation and 
empowerment was seen as a means of both improving program implementation and 
solidifying the Democratic Party relationship with minorities, the poor, and community 
activists (Mollenkopf 1983). 
The Johnson administration’s core urban programs also drew on the experience of 
two foundation-sponsored efforts of the 1950s: the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas 
program and Mobilization for Youth (MFY).  The Gray Areas program sought to address 
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the problem of urban poverty by integrating the “urban in-migrant and slum resident” 
into the urban economy by strengthening the capacity of mainstream and local urban 
institutions – schools, police, training programs – to serve poor, inner-city residents.  The 
program established neighborhood-coordinating agencies to integrate and improve 
service delivery to the residents of poor, urban communities.  MFY was an effort funded 
by the federal government, the Ford Foundation, and local foundations to address the 
problem of juvenile delinquency through comprehensive and integrated services that 
sought to change local living conditions in the Lower East Side of New York City.  As 
with the Gray Areas program, MFY recognized the need for integrated local services, but 
it also included a significant emphasis on community organizing along the Chicago 
School model.  (O’Connor 1995, 1999). 
Together, the Gray Area’s Program and MFY informed Model Cities and the War 
on Poverty by calling for institutional change to better serve poor communities, 
integration to provide comprehensive services, the participation of local residents and 
leaders in program planning and implementation, and, in the case of MFY, a central role 
for community organizing (Halpern 1995; O’Connor 1999).  According to O’Connor 
(1999), the Gray Areas Program and Mobilization for Youth were based on the principles 
of planned social change that were emerging from universities and the foundation 
community.  These social change principles consisted of three basic strategies:  
 Institutional innovation and administrative reform to promote more integrated 
social service delivery by the fragmented urban service bureaucracies;  
 Citizen participation as a means creating consensus among diverse 
constituents and involving residents in planning and implementation; and  
 Application of social science though formal planning, experimentation, and 




These strategies and reforms were incorporated as the central guiding principles 
of the Great Society’s urban programs, most importantly the Community Action Program 
(CAP) and the Model Cities Program.  These two programs were the core urban policies 
implemented by the Johnson administration.  They directly addressed the causes of 
poverty through geographically-targeted, place-based delivery of integrated and 
comprehensive services with a focus on the empowerment of target populations through 
community participation.  However, both programs faced problems in design and 
implementation that reduced their effectiveness. 
 The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 authorized the CAP.  This act created the 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to coordinate all federal activities relating to 
poverty.  It specifically targeted poverty alleviation through the coordination of the wide 
range of programs that addressed the causes and effects of poverty.  The OEO had two 
major goals: coordinating the services available to poor communities and integrating the 
residents of poor communities into program planning and implementation.  It was this 
second goal that caused the CAP the most difficulties.  The CAP was based on the 
experience of the Gray Areas and MFY initiatives.  Like Gray Areas and MFY, the CAP 
created local organizations to design and implement programs.  Local Community Action 
Agencies (CAAs) served as the fiscal agent for federal program spending and provided a 
structure for poor communities to mobilize local resources and organize local residents.  
The goal for the CAP was the “maximum feasible participation” by local residents, 
although the exact meaning of this term was never defined in the legislation.5  
                                               
5 In fact, Moynihan (1969) argues that this term was taken to mean the inclusion of residents in the 
implementation of the program, but in reality “the record, such as can be had, and recollection indicates 
that it was intended to do no more than ensure that persons excluded from the political process in the South 
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CAAs had the dual mission of implementing programs and advocating on behalf 
of poor communities to city bureaucracies that were seen as unresponsive to the needs of 
the poor and minorities.  The CAP and the CAAs generated considerable resistance from 
city mayors and bureaucracies.  The CAA’s role in funding decisions reduced the control 
of mayors and their bureaucracies over the federal funding pipeline.  The empowerment 
and advocacy roles of CAAs in calling for the reform of cities’ bureaucracies gave voice 
and standing to opponents of big city mayors.  These mayors, who were vital to the 
Democratic Party, were threatened by, and thus opposed to, the CAP and its CAAs.  
(Mollenkopf 1983).  According to Frieden and Kaplan (1975), the CAAs “tried to strike a 
balance among the three local interest groups that had to be involved in community 
action: public officials, private agencies, and representatives of the poor . . . But the three 
groups could not be reconciled, and bitter controversies erupted whenever the mayors 
viewed community action agencies as mobilizers of the poor against city hall” (32).  As a 
result, mayors lobbied for reform and, with the Green Amendment in 1967, mayors 
assumed control over OEO grants (Mollenkopf 1983; O’Connor 1999). 
 While the CAP program did increase awareness of urban problems, it was 
considered a failure.  In the title of his book reviewing the program, Moynihan (1969) 
termed the legacy of the program “Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.”  He accused 
the program of polarizing the debate over urban issues between central city residents and 
the established urban political leadership, thereby hindering not helping reform and anti-
poverty program implementation.  To Moynihan (1969), the core lesson of the CAP is 
how not to fight poverty.  Marris and Rein (1967) concluded that community action 
                                                                                                                                            
and elsewhere would nonetheless participate in the benefits of the community action programs of the new 
legislation” (87).   
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“went most seriously astray” by trying to do too much.  No attempts at such radical and 
comprehensive reform had been so broadly attempted before.  Internally, CAAs did not 
balance their own competing goals or interests, resulting in “indecision, unworkable 
compromises, and endless disputes” (229).  Externally, CAAs had little power to impose 
solutions.  By simultaneously pressing for both systemic coordination and reform, they 
only caused city bureaucracies to become “self protective.”  As new organizations, CAAs 
“could not appeal to any community of interest compelling enough to override more 
immediate loyalties to agency or personal advantage” (229).  As a result, they failed to 
achieve their desired goal of improving services and conditions in urban communities.   
Halpern (1995) was somewhat more favorable.  He termed the CAP a small 
program in relation to the overall scope of the Great Society’s reforms that included 
Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and many other programs.  It had a modest, positive 
influence on poor families.  Most importantly, to Haplern (1996), the CAP facilitated the 
emergence of new leaders from and organizations serving poor communities.  These 
leaders and organizations played a role in city programs long after the end of the 
program.  Greenstone and Petersen (1973) viewed the CAP as failing to reduce economic 
and political poverty among the poor minority populations it targeted, but they viewed 
the goal of engaging minorities and the poor into the policy process as the only means of 
facilitating needed social change.  To many, the most important achievement of the CAP 
was its acknowledgement of the needs of the poor and minorities and the development of 
community leaders to advocate for them. 
 The 1965 Presidential Task Force on Urban Problems designed the Model Cities 
program.  It became the first new major urban program to be implemented by the newly 
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created Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The original Model Cities 
program was intended to demonstrate what could be achieved if available federal 
assistance efforts were coordinated and focused on a limited number of targeted 
neighborhoods.   
 Model Cities was designed to replace the controversial CAP.  As with the CAP, 
Model Cities departed from Urban Renewal by integrating social and economic 
development and coordinating federal grant programs; however, it did so without the 
reform emphasis that threatened cities’ political leadership and doomed the CAP.  Model 
Cities also maintained the goal of citizen participation by requiring cities to develop City 
Demonstration Agencies (CDAs) with citizen participation.  However, the formal 
requirement for citizen participation was reduced from maximum feasible participation to 
“meaningful dialogue” and “widespread citizen involvement” (Cramer 1998).  Final 
program authority rested with city government, thereby avoiding the bypassing of city 
government that caused much controversy with the CAP. 
 Despite these changes in program design, Model Cities immediately experienced 
significant problems that limited its effectiveness.  The program was designed as a 
demonstration grant program for a small number of cities to coordinate federal resources 
for inner city development.  By the time the program was passed by Congress, the 
number of cities to be served more than doubled, its budget was cut in half, and its time 
frame was reduced from six to two years.  Model Cities was too broadly implemented, 
insufficiently funded, and given too little time to achieve its goals.  Within the federal 
government, HUD was never able to convince or force the larger federal bureaucracy that 
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controlled most anti-poverty programs and spending to coordinate their efforts through 
Model Cities programs.  
 Charles Haar (1975), who served on the task force that recommended Model 
Cities and as Assistant Secretary of HUD during its early implementation, concluded that 
Model Cities failed to live up to it promises but did set in motion positive changes in 
urban policy.  The positive impacts of Model Cities was its recognition that physical 
development alone is insufficient to improve urban conditions and that human concerns 
must be integrated into federal urban policy.  Model Cities also established the transfer of 
considerable control over the use of federal funds to cities; a reform that continues to 
dominate federal urban policy today.  Model Cities maintained the goal of citizen 
participation that contributed to local politics, built local development capacity, enhanced 
the ability of communities to define and organize around socio-political issues, and made 
mayors aware of and more sympathetic to the plight of disadvantaged communities.  
However, the program suffered from a cumbersome federal implementation process.   
 Haar (1965) called Model Cities a “Waterloo for Urban Planning” because of its 
unrealistically complex and burdensome planning requirements as well as a “Pearl 
Harbor for Local Capacity” as local implementation suffered from poor planning and 
technical assistance.  One of Haar’s core conclusions was that, for federal devolution to 
work, a major emphasis and commitment of resources is necessary to improve local 
capacity.   
Frieden and Kaplan (1975) reported, “the gap between promise and performance 
was conspicuously large in the Model Cities program” (234).  The Model Cities program 
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required the cooperation of many federal agencies, yet even the strong Johnson 
administration was unable to force the federal bureaucracy to cooperate:   
The power of the White House turned out to be unexpectedly limited.  Its 
ability to cajole and persuade reluctant Congressmen to vote for the Model 
Cities program proved far superior to its ability to move reluctant federal 
administrators to support Model Cities policies.  Funds appropriated for 
other grant-in-aid programs were simply out of the range of White House 
staff members. (Frieden and Kaplan 1975, 235) 
 
Robert Weaver, then HUD Secretary, reported that “HUD as a junior federal 
department lacked the capacity to coordinate the programs of its more mature peers” 
(1985, 465).  Model Cities also suffered from “the lack of consensus on effective 
strategies for dealing with the perplexing problems of urban poverty” (Frieden and 
Kaplan 1975, 237).  Frieden and Kaplan concluded, “If the designers of future urban 
policies take away any single lesson from Model Cities, it should be to avoid grand 
schemes for massive concerted federal action” (238).  Weaver (1985) disagreed and 
argued that if the number of Model Cities neighborhoods had been kept small and 
proportional to available funding, federal interagency conflicts would have been reduced, 
the legislation would have been less confusing, and HUD would have been able to 
provide more technical assistance.  He concluded, “The principal objective of Model 
Cities, to provide decent community services and rehabilitate the neighborhoods where 
the poor are concentrated, was a valid goal in 1965 and remains so today” (465).   
 The legacy of core urban initiatives of the Johnson administration, the 
Community Action Program and Model Cities, was one of failure to meet the promises 
made.  These programs did not halt the decline in urban employment and population or 
reduce poverty, and cities experienced mounting problems over the next three decades.  
Indeed, after Model Cities, the persistence of urban poverty led to questioning the very 
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ability of the government to stabilize cities in the face of larger national social and 
economic trends, most importantly the suburbanization of the population, the movement 
of manufacturing from the Northeast and Midwest to the South, and the movement of 
jobs from cities to suburbs and rural locations.  The CAP and Model Cities did not attain 
their goals of reversing urban decline; however, the successes and failures of both 
programs contributed to the evolution of urban policy. 
 There were three core changes in urban policy that evolved from the CAP and 
Model Cities that would continue to play a major role in future urban policies.  These 
were: 
 The recognition that urban policies needed a “human side” and should not 
narrowly focus on real estate projects;  
 The acceptance that, because the causes of poverty are complex and 
interrelated, poverty alleviation requires the integration of the various 
categorical social programs; and 
 The first implementation of federal programs through local community-based 
organizations rather than through city or state bureaucracies.  
 
The record of the CAP and Model Cities in the two policy areas of geographic 
targeting and community participation is mixed.  Both the CAP and Model Cities 
experienced significant problems in implementation, and these problems led to 
questioning both geographic targeting and citizen participation.  However, both concepts 
proved amazingly resilient and continue to be a core aspect of urban policy interventions.  
It is in these two areas that lessons can be learned from the CAP and Model Cities.   
Geographic targeting of policy was never truly tested by CAP or Model Cities 
because of the failure of either to secure the promised increases in or coordination of 
program spending or sufficient time for implementation.  By the end of the Johnson 
administration, the Vietnam War had consumed most of the administration’s time and 
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resources, leaving little for these urban programs.  Community participation in urban 
policy implementation failed under CAP when the Federal government tried to do an end 
run around city mayors and bureaucracy.  Never-the-less, the CAP and Model Cities 
engaged communities in program design and implementation far more than their New 
Deal or Urban Renewal predecessors, which were controlled by the federal and local 
bureaucracy and required little citizen engagement.  As a result of this change, the citizen 
participation became and remains a core goal of urban policy. 
 The EZ/EC initiative drew substantially on the lessons of Model Cities and, to a 
lesser extent, the CAP, and numerous urban scholars have noted the link between the 
Clinton administration’s EZ/EC initiative and Model Cities (M. M. Rubin 1994; Kaplan 
1995; Riposa 1996; O’Connor 1999).  Like Model Cities, the EZ/EC initiative was 
geographically-targeted, focused on coordinated federal programs, and relied on local 
mobilization through community participation.  Learning from the CAP, the EZ/EC 
initiative required that city governments serve as the organizers of the application 
process, but still required substantial citizen participation.  While the Clinton 
administration did not define or prescribe community participation, it provided both 
technical assistance and continuous evaluation to the EZ/EC cities to ensure citizen 
representation.  Learning from Model Cities, which was doubled in size and reduced in 
budget by Congress, the EZ/EC initiative balanced the goal of demonstrating that 
improvements can be achieved by targeted and concentrated efforts with Congressional 
preferences for thin and widely distributed programs through a novel approach.  It 
designated a limited number of large-scale EZ/EC demonstration sites (six full and two 
supplemental were ultimately selected) with a large number of smaller sites.  Unlike 
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either CAP or Model Cities, the EZ/EC initiative was given ample time, ten years, for 
implementation.  
Devolution and New Federalism 
 The election of the Nixon administration brought significant changes in federal 
urban policy.  The Nixon administration inherited a large number of Great Society urban 
programs that bypassed local government, rewarded unfriendly constituencies, and 
slowed development projects.  The federal bureaucracy overseeing these programs was 
viewed as being under the influence of unfriendly interest groups and as opposing the 
new administration’s goals (Mollenkopf 1983).  In response, the Nixon administration 
sought to change the fundamental relationship between the federal, state, and local 
governments through “New Federalism” that would shift policy implementation power 
from the federal bureaucracy to the states, especially in the area of federal urban policy.   
A suburban and urban white constituency that had come to oppose the societal 
changes promoted by the Johnson administration elected the Nixon administration.  As a 
result, “Many of the programs which Nixon inherited were therefore targets for 
termination” (Mollenkopf 1983, 126).  In targeting these programs, the Nixon 
administration further sought to take power away from the federal bureaucracy in a way 
that rewarded its own political constituencies.  The answer was Nixon’s New Federalism 
that emphasized revenue sharing and block grants.   
 Revenue sharing sought to reform federal aid to localities by providing funds to 
states and localities automatically rather than through categorical grants.  Revenue 
sharing was a topic of longstanding discussion in the federal government and first 
received serious national attention in 1964 when Walter Heller, President Johnson’s 
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Council of Economic Advisors Chairman, championed its cause (Dommel and Associates 
1982).  Political conservatives immediately adopted it as a core goal.  The Nixon 
administration was unable to push its revenue sharing programs until 1972, when it 
proposed two types.  General revenue sharing, which passed with both conservative and 
liberal support, sought to redistribute some of the federal surplus to the states and provide 
a predictable, steady source of program funds.  These funds were distributed 
automatically to state and local governments though a statutory formula rather than 
through traditional grants-in-aid.  They could be used for any purpose and were under the 
control of local governments (Frieden and Kaplan 1975).  Special revenue sharing, from 
which block grants ultimately arose, sought to consolidate the numerous existing federal 
categorical grant-in-aid programs in six areas – urban development, rural development, 
education, job training, and law enforcement – into single sources of funding to be 
allocated by formula to state and local governments without federal application, approval, 
or plans.  Of the six special revenue sharing proposals, only two were ultimately enacted: 
job training in 1973 under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act and urban 
development in 1974 under the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA) that 
created the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (Dommel and Associates 
1982).   
 State and local governments supported block grants because they offered 
increased flexibility in the use of federal funds to meet local needs, simplified 
administration, and provided a predictable and more equitable source of funding. 
(Frieden and Kaplan 1975).  State and local political leaders supported block grants 
because the federal categorical grants that they replaced, especially the Great Society 
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programs, bypassed local officials and agencies and fragmented implementation by 
creating special purpose agencies outside of state and local governments.  Block grants 
enhanced local bureaucratic control and, therefore, the power of the elected officials and 
bureaucracy (Dommel and Associates 1982).   
 The 1974 Housing and Community Development Act did not abolish the Great 
Society urban programs targeted by the Nixon administration, but it did consolidate them 
and other urban programs into the CDBG.  Seven categorical programs, most importantly 
the Great Society’s Model Cities program and the Urban Renewal program, but also 
historic preservation, water and wastewater utilities, urban beautification, and public 
housing rehabilitation loan programs, were merged into a single CDBG.   
The CDBG program addressed many of the perceived shortcomings of the 
categorical programs it replaced.  It provided control and flexibility to state and local 
governments in defining and implementing programs.  It put local politicians and 
agencies at the center of urban policy implementation.  The combination of CDBGs and 
revenue sharing had two main impacts on federal urban policy.  They changed who was 
in control of federal urban programs, and they reallocated funding priorities 
programmatically and geographically.   
CDBGs changed the control of urban policy by placing state and local politicians 
and bureaucrats firmly in charge, thereby diminishing the power of both the federal 
bureaucracy and local activists (Mollenkopf 1983).  This suited the political needs of the 
mostly Democratic big city mayors and the Republican Nixon administration because, 
under the New Deal and Great Society programs, federal urban policy had been under the 
control of the federal bureaucracy and local organizations.  The Nixon administration saw 
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the federal bureaucracy at best as being under the control of their clients and at worst as 
opposing the administration’s policy goals.  Local bureaucracies also resented federal 
bureaucratic control over program spending as well as the application and reporting 
requirements imposed by federal agencies.  Furthermore, the non-governmental agencies 
involved in the local administration and service delivery for the Great Society’s urban 
programs were often run by the liberal activist community.  This community represented 
a politically unfriendly constituency to both the Nixon administration and to city 
governments that were still under the control of ward bosses and machine politics.  This 
created a strange coalition between the Republican administration and big city 
Democratic mayors to change who was in charge of urban policy with CDBGs passing 
Congress with both Republican and urban-Democratic support (Mollenkopf 1983). 
CDBGs changed the programmatic and geographic allocation of federal urban 
funding.  The categorical grants of the Great Society and New Deal were specifically 
targeted geographically on high poverty areas and programmatically on the causes and 
effects of poverty.  Federal categorical grants specified where, how, and on what federal 
aid could be spent.  Local governments had to apply annually for the aid and report on its 
use.  This made budgeting difficult, created administrative hurdles, and often lead to a 
long process for obtaining and spending federal funds.  Categorical grants also made it 
more difficult to spend money on redevelopment projects, where local spending needs 
often cut across federal spending categories.  The geographic targeting of the spending 
also limited the ability of local governments to set their own programmatic goals for the 
larger city or urban areas.  As a result, local bureaucracies approved of the block grant 
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reforms, because CDBGs and revenue sharing gave them control over how funds were 
spent both programmatically and geographically.   
CDBGs allowed local governments to spend allocated money in any of the 
spending areas allowed in the grants, and funds were no longer targeted on high poverty 
communities, but could be spent anywhere in the city.  The HCDA called for CDBG 
spending to “principally benefit” persons of low- and moderate-income; however, it did 
not set targets for spending on poor communities.  It did set the goal that the CDBG 
program must “give maximum feasible priority to activities which will benefit low- or 
moderate-income families or aid in the prevention of blight”; however, the law failed to 
quantitatively define the meaning of either “principally benefit” or “maximum feasible 
priority” (Dommel and Associates 1980). 
According to Wong and Petersen (1986), the CDBG program resulted in federal 
spending being less redistributive and more focused on economic development.  CDBGs 
led to an intrajurisdictional reallocation of spending from programs targeted on serving 
the poor neighborhoods within cities to more broad-based spending priorities across the 
cities.  The 1980 HUD evaluation of the CDBG program that was the final of four HUD-
funded evaluation reports found both geographic and programmatic changes in federal 
spending as a result of CDBGs.  In the area of geographic targeting, this report found that 
62% of CDBG allocations were targeted on low-income neighborhoods, less than in the 
Great Society era.  In the area of programmatic changes, Dommel and Associates found, 
“The pattern that emerged at the beginning of the program was that communities were 
using the increased flexibility of the block grant to emphasize housing activities and 
public improvements while de-emphasizing large redevelopment activities and social 
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services” (1980, 154).  Thus, CDBGs shifted the focus of federal urban programs away 
from the activities of past eras.  Large redevelopment projects were the focus of the 
Urban Renewal program, and social services and service integration were the focus of the 
Model Cities program; and spending on both declined with CDBGs.   
Finally, the CDBG allocation formula put in place by the Nixon administration 
nationally reallocated spending.  The New Deal and Great Society programs favored old, 
large urban areas with high concentrations of poverty found mainly in the Northeast and 
Midwest.  The new allocations doubled the number of cities that could receive aid to 
include suburbs and the rapidly growing cities of the South and Southwest that had twice 
elected the Nixon administration.  This lead to an inter-jurisdictional reallocation from 
high poverty, old, large cities to more affluent suburbs and regions (Mollenkopf 1983).   
In addition to CDBGs, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 
established Section 8 housing vouchers under which eligible families could receive a 
certificate or voucher to find and lease an apartment and pay a reasonable rent, defined as 
30% of income.  The local housing authority paid the owner the remaining rent that was 
capped by the Fair Market Rent, determined by HUD.  This was the first step in making 
Federal housing policy more people-based.   
The Nixon administration’s New Federalism fundamentally reshaped federal 
urban policy.  According to Mollenkopf (1983):  
The cloud of Watergate has tended to obscure Nixon’s tremendous 
legislative achievements.  He had as much impact on the logic, politics, 
and distribution of federal urban development program grants as any Great 
Society liberal.  Over seven years, Richard Nixon largely undid their 
work, killing or severely restricting most of the new agencies the Great 
Society created.  Nowhere was his success more evident than in the 




The Nixon administration refocused federal urban programs from a narrow focus on 
poverty alleviation and poor communities to a broader focus on general urban conditions.  
He shifted programmatic control from the federal bureaucracy and citizens to city 
agencies and politicians. 
The combination of the change in programmatic control over urban policy, the 
reallocation of spending priorities, and the development of housing vouchers effectively 
ended the New Deal and Great Society programs’ emphasis on establishing direct federal 
government ties to poor communities.  This furthered the transition of federal policy from 
place-based to people-based.  While the Nixon administration criticized and reformed the 
previous administration’s Great Society programs, it did not cut federal urban 
expenditures, which actually continued to rise in his administration. However, under 
devolution, federal and community control were diminished as categorical programs were 
converted to block grants under the control of state and city governments (Mollenkopf 
1983).  According to Kaplan (1995), “Citizens were out, or their role was reduced 
regarding the distribution of funds; governors and mayors were in; or their roles were 
increased regarding how federal monies were spent” (666). 
The CDBG program created by the Nixon administration and implemented by the 
Ford administration continues to be the core federal urban program to this day.  There is 
general agreement in the policy literature that the CDBG shifted control over urban 
programs to city halls across the nation; yet, the gains made in citizen participation in 
federal urban policies during the Great Society did not end there.  They were, however, 
altered.  The concept of citizen participation in urban policy remained resilient, protected 
by both Congress and political action by the newly empowered urban residents 
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themselves.  Congress refused the Nixon administration’s goal for citizens only to be 
informed of CBDG plans through public hearings, and mandated that they be given the 
opportunity to participate in the development of the application.  However, Congress 
failed to establish procedural or structural requirements for this participation (Kaplan 
1995).   
Under CDBGs, citizen participation became more broad-based and included 
representatives and interests from across each city, not just from poor communities.  
Noted urban scholars, Frieden and Kaplan, writing immediately after the passage of the 
HCDA, argued that with CDBGs, “Performance criteria on the role of poverty area 
residents in community development decisions are weak and diffuse and suggest a return 
to the very limited city-wide citizen advisory boards used in conjunction with Urban 
Renewal more than a decade ago” (1975, 252).  This turned out to be the case.  Dommel 
and Associates (1982) found that “Formal citizen participation was an important part of 
local processes, and local executives made use of their discretion to structure that 
participation in a way that would support their broader objective of having a relatively 
conflict free process” (229).  As a result, citizen participation under CDBGs favored 
citywide constituencies rather than neighborhood activists or organizations.  Still, citizens 
did influence the use of CDBGs, most importantly through their access to elected 
officials (Dommel and Associates 1982).  The second HUD evaluation of CDBGs in 
1978 that covered the 1974 to 1976 period of the program found increased levels of 
citizen participation in the program when compared to the first review in 1977 (Dommel 
and Associates 1978).  The most important determinants of citizen participation were the 
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support of local officials and the establishment and ease of a formal participation 
mechanism (Dommel and Associates 1982).   
Devolution continued under the Carter administration; however, this 
administration sought to refocus existing federal programs on poor communities.  
According to Kaplan (1995), “Carter put the urban back in urban policy” (669) by 
retargeting the Nixon block grants to distressed areas and the poor.  With the 1977 
Housing and Community Development Act, the Carter administration also returned to the 
Great Society goal of encouraging greater involvement of neighborhoods in community 
development projects, by calling for citizen participation in project decisions.  Under the 
Carter administration, HUD issued CDBG guidelines that called for all community 
development funds to be used on activities that principally benefited low- and moderate-
income persons, and it adopted a 75-25 rule that stated that 75% of funding should be 
directly targeted on low- and moderate-income persons while the other 25% should be 
focused on preventing slums and blight or urgent city needs.   The 1980 evaluation of the 
CDBG program (Dommel and Associates 1980) found that the change in administration 
in 1976 led to changes in CDBG implementation.  This report “concluded that HUD’s 
social targeting policies have affected the distribution of program benefits.  In the third 
and fourth years [1977 and 1978], fewer jurisdictions allocated less than half of their 
program benefits to low- and moderate-income groups than occurred in previous years” 
(209).  The report found that the changes in CDBG implementation during the Carter 
administration included an increase in the role of HUD in local decision-making; a return 
to emphasizing social service and physical development; and more targeting of the 
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benefits of program spending on lower-income groups (Dommel and Associates 1980, 
209).   
The 1977 Housing and Community Development Act also created Urban 
Development Action Grants (UDAG) to foster development in distressed communities.  
Under Carter, the UDAG program was a return to categorical programs through the 
creation of a new, more flexible means for cities to leverage private development than the 
Urban Renewal programs of the past (Rich 1992).  UDAGs were designed to augment 
CDBGs and were used for neighborhood improvements, housing rehabilitation, and 
redevelopment projects (Rich 1992).  One evaluation found that “UDAG formed the 
centerpiece of urban economic development policy in America for almost a decade” 
(Barnekov and Hart 1993, 1469).  Evaluations of UDAGs were nearly all positive, and 
they found that UDAGs leveraged significant private investment with minimal federal or 
local government administrative burden (Barnekov and Hart 1993; Rich 1992).  Finally, 
the Carter administration announced a formal federal urban policy in 1978 that sought to 
establish a “new partnership” among federal, state, and city governments; the private 
sector; neighborhoods; and community organizations (Mollenkopf 1983). 
 The Carter administration returned federal attention to urban issues.  Its efforts, 
however, were constrained by tight federal fiscal conditions and global economic 
changes.  As a result, little was accomplished in reversing urban decline (Weaver 1985; 
Kaplan 1995).  Evaluations of the Carter administration’s urban policies found that “The 
Carter initiatives can fairly be summed up as imitating the New Deal without the 
financial commitment or the political reform” (Mollenkopf 1983, 275).  According to 
Mollenkopf (1983), while the Carter administration sought to bring back the federal 
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emphasis on urban issues it simply “revived the federal urban programs which the Nixon-
Ford years had starved and demoralized” and “did not reorganize the programs, make 
them more accountable to the intended beneficiaries, nor successfully use them to 
encourage political reform” (276).  Administratively, the Carter administration’s urban 
policies led to the urban program system becoming more, not less, fragmented.  The 
HUD regulatory system became more complicated, not more responsive or effective.  In 
the area of public participation, Mollenkopf (1983) found, “Despite its emphasis on 
neighborhoods and voluntary associations, however, the ‘new partnership’ contained 
little more than a symbolic nod toward the community organizations which had battled 
for a place in urban politics” (277).   
The period of devolution in federal urban policy fundamentally redirected federal 
urban initiatives in a way that continues to guide urban policy today.  No longer do 
federal policies seek to reform service delivery thorough federally-guided integration as 
the Great Society programs attempted.  No longer would federal programs seek to reform 
local city politics by creating and supporting new local organizations outside of local 
government control.  Federal urban policy after devolution funds local initiatives under 
the control of the local bureaucracies and political leadership.  Federal programs would 
target the problem of poverty through people-based programs, not place-based initiatives.  
While formal requirements for citizen participation were weakened, CDBGs indirectly 
supported mechanisms for enhanced community and citizen participation in urban 
housing and social service delivery.  According to Thomas (1986), CDBGs gave city hall 
control over the programs, but residents and community organizations retained a 
significant interest in their allocation and use.  CDBGs also allowed for local community 
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organizations to become directly involved in federally funded redevelopment activities 
and service delivery under contract to city governments.  This ultimately enhanced the 
development of the community movement. 
Programmatically, the EZ/EC initiative did not draw substantially on the policies 
or lessons of the Nixon-Ford-Carter years.  However, the urban policy changes enacted 
during this period, along with the far more radical changes that occurred in the 1980s, did 
set the context for the Clinton administration’s urban policy agenda.  This agenda, as is 
true of all federal urban programs since Nixon’s new federalism, was implemented as a 
flexible grant to city governments.  Like the Carter administration, the Clinton 
administration sought to bring the federal government back into urban policy with new 
programs, a stated urban policy, and an emphasis on poor communities.  Unlike the 
Carter programs, the EZ/EC initiative made more than a “symbolic nod” to community 
organizations and citizen participation.  Community empowerment was a primary goal of 
the Clinton program.  In implementing policy, the EZ/EC initiative drew on community 
organizations that became involved in urban policy implementation and were funded by 
CDBGs. 
Privatization: The Rise of CDCs, Enterprise Zones, and CCIs 
Federal urban policy changed with the election of the Reagan administration.  
While the federal government reduced its presence in urban areas in the 1970s, after 1980 
with the election of the Reagan administration, the federal government fundamentally 
retreated from urban areas.  The Reagan administration reduced the direct federal role in 
housing and community development and emphasized private sector and market 
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solutions.  These policies continued under the first Bush administration.  Between 1980 
and 1990, federal spending fell from 18% to 6.4% of city budgets (Wilson 1997).   
Just as the federal War on Poverty programs were supported by the emergence of 
national literature on poverty and its causes in the 1960s, the Reagan assault on federal 
urban policy was influenced by the emergence of national literature on the culture of 
poverty.  Books such as George Gilder’s Wealth and Poverty, Charles Murray’s Losing 
Ground, and Lawrence Mead’s Beyond Entitlement blamed the problems of persistent 
and concentrated urban poverty on the combination of underclass values and behavior as 
well as liberal social policies (Wilson 1997).  According to the new conservative 
movement, the Great Society and other liberal policies did not ameliorate, but actually 
contributed to, urban problems (Wilson 1997).  As a result, the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations sought to reduce the direct federal role in urban policy and to let free 
market principles guide federal housing and urban policy.  Keating and Smith (1996) 
called the Reagan/Bush years “the Conservative Attack on HUD” and argued: 
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked a shift in political power 
and the beginning of extensive cutbacks in urban programs and outlays.  
Reagan sought to roll back the prevailing New Deal and Great Society 
programs while reducing federal taxes and increasing military spending.  
As for housing and community development, he intended to reduce federal 
intervention drastically in order to leave this role to the private sector. (54) 
 
Accordingly, Reagan cut HUD more than any other agency, eliminated the Office 
of Neighborhoods, eliminated the Carter CDBG oversight and targeting policies, and 
reduced UDAG spending (ultimately eliminating the program in 1986), drastically 
reducing the direct role of the federal government in urban policy (Wilson 1997).  
According to Robert Weaver, the first Secretary of HUD, the “priority for urban 
development and housing as well as the image and credibility of HUD reached their nadir 
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with the advent of the Reagan administration and the tenure of Secretary Samuel R. 
Pierce” (1985, 469), under whose tenure HUD was accused of political favoritism, fraud 
and mismanagement and administrators were convicted of defrauding the federal 
government. 
Weaver (1985) argued that the Reagan administration “proposed a fundamental 
redirection in U.S. housing policy” (469).  According to Weaver (1985), the new 
administration reduced the federal role in low-income housing production and mortgage 
credit programs.  Under Reagan, housing vouchers became the federal government’s 
primary program for providing housing assistance to the poor.  Housing vouchers made 
federal housing programs both people-based and market-based by providing a housing 
subsidy rather than housing itself.  This emphasis on market solutions effectively 
privatized urban policy. 
 As the federal government reduced its direct role in urban policy, national and 
international economic trends and regional demographic changes led to a substantial 
worsening of economic and social conditions in most urban areas.  Older urban areas lost 
much of their manufacturing base, urban populations declined, and poverty became more 
concentrated as a result of the suburbanization of the middle class.  The problem of 
concentrated poverty, crime, and blight in urban neighborhoods worsened in the 1980s 
and began to emerge as a national policy issue.  Furthermore, the combination of the 
declining urban tax base resulting from suburbanization, high concentrations of urban 
poverty, and cuts in federal urban aid resulted in fiscal crises in most major cities, 
limiting their ability to address urban problems such as poverty, crime, education, and 
development (Jagowsky 1997; Wilson 1997). 
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 Despite the decline in federal attention to urban issues and cuts in urban spending 
that occurred in the Reagan and Bush administrations, the 1980s were a period of urban 
policy innovation that would ultimately shape the Clinton administration’s EZ/EC 
initiative.  During this period, three initiatives emerged that impacted later urban policy: 
the emergence of community organizations as implementers of urban policy; the efforts 
to created federal Enterprise Zones; and the initiation of foundation efforts to improve 
conditions in urban neighborhoods. 
The most important urban policy changes in the 1980s occurred outside of the 
federal government with the emergence of non-profit community based organizations 
(CBOs), most importantly community development corporations (CDCs), that assumed 
control of urban policy interventions in poor neighborhoods as the federal government 
retreated.  The second most important urban policy innovation of the 1980s occurred 
within the federal government as the Reagan and Bush administrations promoted the 
concept of Enterprise Zones to provide tax and regulatory benefits for inner city 
investment.  The final innovation occurred in the late 1980s with the foundation 
community responding to continued urban problems and building on the momentum of 
CDCs and other non-profit organizations by establishing Comprehensive Community 
Initiatives (CCIs) to address the problems related to concentrated urban poverty.   
Community Based Organizations and Community Development Corporations 
 The 1980s were a period of economic and fiscal distress in America’s urban areas.  
However, according to Von Hoffman (2003), “Just as inner city neighborhoods reached a 
nadir of misery, sprouts of life began to appear.  Hardly noticed at first, a wide variety of 
small non-profit organizations emerged to take up the cause of the beleaguered 
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communities” (14).  These non-profits, CBOs and CDCs, would emerge to play a leading 
role in future urban policy.  CBOs are non-profit organizations that focus on serving, 
organizing, and representing the residents of poor and moderate-income communities.  
CDCs are a subset of CBOs that are community-based non-profit organizations that focus 
on improving conditions in low- and moderate-income communities though development 
activities, housing production, and social services.6   
 CBOs have been active in urban neighborhoods as long as cities have been in 
existence.  Early informal neighborhood organizations focused on civic or political issues 
or on the needs of immigrants since the mid-1800s.  These organizations often became 
involved in local politics as organizing agencies for ward politics or as settlement houses 
for service delivery.  The formal participation of neighborhood organizations in urban 
policy emerged as the major cities annexed surrounding towns and as local residents 
sought to protect their own interests in the face of the larger and less responsive city 
governments.  According to Kotler (1969), many of today’s urban neighborhoods were 
once self-governing towns until they were annexed by expanding cites.  The rise of 
neighborhood activism in the 1960s was, in many ways, the attempt by these 
communities to regain some level of self-rule and representation from the larger 
municipal government.  Thomas (1986) traced the origins of the contemporary 
                                               
6 The distinction between CBOs and CDCs is largely artificial and used in this analysis to distinguish 
between CDCs that have been very well studied, and other community based organizations that range from 
formal neighborhood associations and non-profit service delivery organizations to informal block clubs, 
tenant associations, and other neighborhood and community associations that, because of their depth and 
breadth of activities, have been far less comprehensively analyzed.  Some authors (Chaskin 2001) call all 
community organizations, including CDCs, CBOs while others use the terms Community Based 
Development Organizations (CBDOs) to refer to community organizations involved in both development 
and service delivery (Fredrickson and London 2000; Rubin 2000) while Steinbach (1999) used the term 
CBDO to refer to CDCs only.  Silverman (2001) distinguished between CDCs and charitable organizations.  
The remainder of this discussion will focus on the well-documented history of CDCs and, where possible, 
provide information on CBOs in general. 
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‘neighborhood movement’ to the 1950s as citizens sought more control over urban life 
through community and neighborhood organizations.   
CBOs serve two urban policy functions.  As described by Thomas (1986); Berry, 
Portney and Thomson (1993); and Ferman (1996), community and neighborhood 
organizations serve a political function by organizing and representing the needs and 
concerns of neighborhood residents to the larger city government.  CBOs also play a role 
in urban policy implementation through the delivery of services to local residents.  It is 
here that government policy contributed to the rise of the neighborhood movement as 
these organizations became involved in service oversight and delivery through the CAP 
and Model Cities, and later as service delivery contractors to city governments under 
devolution and block grants (Smith and Lipsky 1993).  This dissertation will focus on this 
later role of CBOs (with the most significant emphasis on CDCs) and their direct 
participation in urban services delivery, rather than their predominantly local political 
role.  Both functions, however, are important to CBOs which often rely on their political 
activities to obtain funding.   
CDCs trace their history to the War on Poverty.  Small non-profit development 
organizations arose in a few urban minority areas in the 1960s to promote local economic 
autonomy, develop housing, and implement social programs (O’Connor 1999).  The early 
formation of CDCs was facilitated by the urban policy efforts of Senators Robert 
Kennedy and Jacob Javitts who amended the Great Society’s Economic Opportunity Act 
to create the Special Impact Program (SIP).  The SIP invested in thirteen emerging urban 
and rural CDCs and began the formal CDC movement (O’Connor 1999). 
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The development and expansion of the role of CDCs occurred in three stages.  
The first CDCs were formed out of the urban activist experience of the 1960s and of the 
War on Poverty programs.  The second stage occurred in the 1970s as new CDCs were 
formed across the county and, under devolution, began to take an active role in housing 
production and other activities.  These CDCs received less federal support than under the 
War on Poverty programs, but still received federal funding for housing production and 
other services through CDBGs and government contracts.  The third stage, beginning in 
the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, saw the rapid expansion of CDCs despite the 
Reagan-Bush cuts in urban spending.  In the 1980s, CDCs became more professional and 
were able to obtain local government and foundation support as well as tax credits and 
financing through the CDC financial intermediaries (Halpern 1995; Stoutland 1999).   
The ability of CDCs to leverage government programmatic funding with 
additional outside money was central to this increase in activities in the 1980s.  The 
CDCs were able to attract investment from foundations and the private sector, with 
private sector investors benefiting from the Low Income Housing Tax Credit passed by 
the Reagan administration (Von Hoffman 2001; Keyes, et al. 1996; Rosen and Dienstfrey 
1999).  The financial leveraging impact of CDCs was further supported by the 
development in the 1980s of the national community development financial intermediary 
system that consisted of the Enterprise Foundation, the Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation (LISC), and the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC) that 
generated investments, provided financing, and assisted with technical support to CDCs 
(McDermott 2004; Von Hoffman 2001; Liou and Stroh 1998).  Because CDCs could 
attract outside funding to leverage government funding and, in many cases, implement 
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local programs without direct government funding, they stepped in to fill the void created 
by federal devolution and the Reagan administration’s de-funding of urban programs.  
   CDCs vary tremendously, so there is no singular model describing them.  CDCs 
are essentially community-run organizations that finance, develop, and manage housing 
and commercial real estate projects as well as many other services in targeted 
communities (Twelvetrees 1996).  Larger CDCs are often vertically integrated and 
finance, develop, and manage their own properties while smaller CDCs focus on one 
aspect of the development process.  CDC activities were initially concentrated in housing 
development, but they have since become involved in nearly every area of urban policy.   
The National Congress for Community Economic Development (NCCED 1991, 
1995, 1999, 2006) tracked the evolution of the CDC movement through surveys 
conducted every five years.  According to NCCED, the number of CDCs increased from 
approximately 200 in the 1970s to approximately 1,750 in 1988, 3,600 in 1999 to 4,600 
in 2005.  They produced or renovated more than 1.2 million housing units since the 
1980s.  CDCs diversified their operations to include activities in a number of policy areas 
outside of housing, including workforce development, public safety, economic 
development, and education (NCCED 1991, 1995, 1999, 2006).  CDCs filled the void 
that was created when the federal government exited the direct production of low-income 
housing to focus on subsidies, tax credits, and vouchers under devolution.  This allowed 
CDCs to become the major producer of low-income urban housing (Vidal 1995).   
  Unlike earlier periods of urban policy history, there were few major 
comprehensive evaluations of the impact of CDCs or CBOs on urban policies.  
According to De Souza, Briggs, and Mueller (1997): 
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Unfortunately, very little research to date has directly assessed the impacts 
of CDC activities, in housing or other areas, on the lives of residents. Most 
studies have focused on challenges to and successes in housing 
development and management.  Claims about social effects have been 
largely rhetorical, based on anecdotal evidence about visible CDC 
successes in particular contexts.  Based largely on program records, 
interviews with CDC staff and funders, and CDC self-reports, previous 
research has informed us about what CDCs can produce, not how residents 
and communities benefit from these products. (2) 
 
The main arguments put forward to defend CDC activities were that they:  
 Focus on the housing needs of poor communities from which the federal 
government and the private sector had withdrawn;  
 Provide housing and other services needed by the residents of these poor 
communities;  
 Leverage outside financial resources; and  
 Integrate the poor residents of these communities into city planning and the 
political structure (H. Rubin 1993, 1994, 1995).   
CDCs also defended resident interests from the stronger corporate and regime 
interests of city governments and, when integrated into the city development process, 
served as a viable partner in promoting community-sensitive development (Robinson 
1996).  Through networking, CDCs developed bargaining power within cities to 
represent the interests of poor communities (Rubin 2000; Keyes et al. 1996).  
Neighborhoods with strong CDCs were more stable and better able to resist negative 
changes (Temkin and Rohe 1998).  Vidal (1995) identified five arguments for the 
potential of CDCs in urban policy.  CDCs: 
 Responded to the ‘spatial gap’ in housing production and service delivery in 
poor communities. 
 Demonstrated that they are flexible and persistent in housing and service 
delivery. 
 Provided a means to target the benefits of urban policy to poor residents. 




 Are part of a sophisticated support system of foundations, financial 
intermediaries, and tax incentives. 
De Souza, Briggs, and Mueller (1997) conducted a multiyear quantitative and 
qualitative research project to assess the impacts of community-based organizations on 
their target neighborhoods in three locations.  They found that the local demographic, 
institutional and political context in which they operated shaped the impacts of CDCs.  
The success of CDCs in impacting their communities depended on their access to 
sufficient resources and substantial local effort.  Sustained hard work was required for 
CDCs to impact their communities, “not just good intentions and a non-profit label.” 
CDCs were found to be successful in offering improved housing conditions to low-
income residents and in improving public safety in target communities; however, they 
were found to be only moderately successful in mobilizing the community and building 
“social capital.” 
CDCs have some challenges to overcome.  They are often small and under-
capitalized and offer low pay, making it difficult to find and maintain a core professional 
staff (Vidal 1995).  Furthermore, CDCs function best when they operate within a 
supportive political and economic environment, and few cities have created such a 
framework (Ferman 1996; Yin 1998).  In an influential New York Times article, Nicholas 
Lehman (1994) argued that community development has and will continue to fail because 
nothing can revitalize inner cities in the face of larger economic trends.    He argued that 
the community development movement acted at the fringe of urban issues and has failed 
to create jobs in urban areas. 
University of Toledo sociologist Randy Stoecker published several influential 
critiques of CDCs and community development (1995, 1997, 2003).  Stoecker’s central 
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criticism of CDCs was that they were too small and under-capitalized to truly impact the 
communities that they served.  Stoecker also argued that the call for CDCs to rebuild 
communities through community organizing in the same way that they rebuild housing 
ignores the inherent contradictions between community development and community 
organizing.  He argues that community organizing involves advocacy on behalf of poor 
communities, and this advocacy is often confrontational.  In contrast, community 
development involves building housing and implementing programs and requires 
cooperation with public and private entities.  According to Stoecker 1995, 1997, 2003), 
CDCs must rely on funding from the very same city governments and businesses that are 
responsible for the marginalization of poor communities in the first place.  As a result, 
they cannot truly organize and represent the communities that they serve.  To him, it is 
impossible for CDCs to simultaneously cooperate with and seek to change the actions of 
the existing urban power structure.  CDCs should continue to develop housing and 
provide services in underserved communities and not be called upon to do more than they 
are capable of (Stoecker 2003).  Truly improving conditions in poor communities 
requires economic and political sacrifices that society has so far been unwilling to make, 
and CDCs are unable to implement them alone. 
Halpern (1995) and Rubin (2000) summed up the arguments for and against 
CDCs.  According to Halpern (1995), “Community economic development has proven to 
be both a fragile and a vital strategy” (145).  CDCs have been vital because they provided 
a means of balancing and integrating social and economic goals, and they delivered, on a 
small scale, housing and economic development in poor, disinvested communities.  It has 
been a fragile strategy because of the difficulties inherent in providing services to and 
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developing housing in the poorest and most isolated communities.  Overall, CDCs have 
been unable to reverse the process of economic decline in poor communities, but their 
activities have benefited community residents.  They have been innovative in developing 
programs and have been able to “create a middle ground between laissez faire and radical 
reform that has been all too scarce in social problem solving” (Halpern 1995, 148).  To 
Halpern, “CDCs remain an inadequately supported and underutilized community 
development resource” (146).  
Rubin’s Renewing Hope Within Neighborhoods of Despair (2000) presented the 
results of the ten years he spent studying community development.  Rubin argued that the 
alternative to community development is “throw up our hands in resignation” at the 
visible signs of despair in poor communities.  To Rubin, “Community-based 
development organizations bridge the gap between the harshness of market driven 
capitalism and the obligations imposed to help those in need” (273).  According to Rubin, 
“The CBDO ties together a social mission with capitalist reality.  Community-based 
development organizations leverage a diverse array of social and economic resources and 
adapt to changing political climates, yet do so in ways that keep in mind the core agenda 
of empowering those within neighborhoods of deprivation” (273-274).  
The CDC movement recognizes that it alone cannot solve the problems of 
inequality and poverty that developed over generations, but it does offer a means to 
balance capitalism and social concerns.  Halpern and Rubin reached similar, balanced 
conclusions regarding CDCs.  CDCs represent a means of modestly improving conditions 
in poor communities that are poorly served by existing federal policies and negatively 
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impacted by existing economic relationships, yet CDCs alone cannot redevelop these 
communities.   
 Despite the lack of objective evidence on their efficacy, the tremendous expansion 
in the activities of CDCs and other CBOs has impacted urban policy and seems destined 
to continue to do so.  While the major federal place-based community programs were 
phased out in the 1970s, non-governmental community initiatives in poor communities, 
including CDCs in housing and other CBOs in a variety of other policy areas, expanded 
in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s.  Based on this experience, urban scholars 
called for an expanded “community option” in urban policy consisting of the further 
decentralization of services and decision-making responsibilities directly to community-
based organizations (Clavel, Pitt, and Yin 1997).  While this expanded “community 
option” harkens back to failed attempts to bypass local bureaucratic and political control 
and ignores the substantial barriers to implementing devolution on such a broad scale, 
their call demonstrates that community participation and community-based organization 
involvement in urban policy remains strong and continues to shape urban policy 
interventions. 
 Recent urban writing has concentrated on continued urban decline and the 
problems of persistent urban poverty.  To liberals who bemoaned the lack of federal 
government attention to urban problems, CDCs represented the triumph of community 
action and community organizing in the otherwise negative context of federal inaction.  
To conservatives, CDCs and community action represented the success of devolution and 
free markets as these new organizations offered improved services and implementation 
outside of historical bureaucratic control.  Thus, the experience of CDCs and other 
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community organizations represented an area of political common ground that was 
exploited by the Clinton administration.   
The EZ/EC initiative explicitly acknowledged and drew on the rapid expansion in 
the activities and roles of CDCs and other CBOs in urban policy in the 1980s and called 
for their inclusion in the Empowerment Zone application and implementation process.  
The Empowerment Zone program specifically called for a central role of community 
residents and organizations in service delivery.  CDCs and other CBOs were consulted 
and often took a central role in each city’s Empowerment Zone application process.  In 
many EZ/EC cities, CDCs and other CBOs played a major role in the service delivery 
under contract to each city’s EZ/EC management agency (Gittell, M. 1998).  In 
Baltimore, the Empowerment Zone strategy was specifically organized around the city’s 
nationally recognized community-based organizations, and it called for the 
implementation of programs through existing CDCs and other CBOs (Baltimore City 
1994; Interview with Michael Seipp 2004).   
Enterprise Zones 
  The 1980s was a period of federal retrenchment from urban policies.  Big 
government programs were deemphasized and de-funded, and the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations promoted free market solutions.  Not only were government social 
programs seen as contributing to the culture of poverty in urban areas, government taxes 
and regulations were seen as significant factors behind the decline in urban employment.  
Drawing on policies implemented in England, the Reagan and first Bush administrations 
promoted the concept of Enterprise Zones as a private sector approach to address both 
urban poverty and economic decline.  Enterprise Zones created tax and regulatory 
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incentives for companies to invest in targeted, poor communities.  The basic concept of 
Enterprise Zones was that tax and regulatory relief would stimulate investment in urban 
communities, creating jobs for urban residents, and thereby reduce poverty. 
 According to Butler (1981), the concept of Enterprise Zones originated in 
England and was first proposed by a Conservative Party politician, Sir Geoffrey Howe, in 
1978.  As in the United States, England was dealing with the problems of urban decay 
and blight caused through economic restructuring.  Cities in England, as in the U.S., had 
large areas of abandoned industrial land, and Enterprise Zones were proposed as a means 
of redeveloping this underutilized land.  Howe argued that the centrally planned 
economic policies of the then-Labor government failed to redevelop this land, and that 
the best way to promote redevelopment was to stimulate private sector activity by 
removing tax and regulatory burdens.  The election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime 
Minister in 1979 created the first opportunity for the concept of Enterprise Zones to be 
tested and, by 1980, a dozen Zones had been created (Cramer 1998). 
 According to Cramer (1998), Howe credited the work of English city planning 
professor Peter Hall as providing the basis for his concept of Enterprise Zones.  Hall 
proposed a similar concept called “the Freeport” a year earlier.  Hall modeled his 
approach on the experience of Hong Kong where low taxes and minimal regulations 
spurred the development of a strong and vibrant economy.  Hall sought “to recreate the 
Hong Kong of the 1950s and 1960s inside inner Liverpool or inner Glasgow” (86).  
According to Cramer (1998), Hall’s Freeport would be opened to the free flow of 
entrepreneurs and capital, bureaucracy would be kept to a minimum, and residency would 
be based on choice.  Blighted areas would be redeveloped through private activity, 
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through the attraction of large firms seeking low cost production locations and access to 
cheap, urban labor.   
 In the United States, Heritage Foundation scholar Stuart Butler was the earliest 
and most visible proponent of the Enterprise Zone concept.  First writing about Enterprise 
Zones in 1979, Butler and the Heritage Foundation played an important role in promoting 
Enterprise Zones in the U.S. (Cramer 1998).  Butler espoused the conservative position 
that government anti-poverty programs contributed to urban decline and that private 
sector solutions were needed to improve conditions in cities.  In his work, Butler 
combined Jane Jacobs’ work on the need to build community-based urban neighborhoods 
and David Birch’s work on the job creation activities of small businesses and 
entrepreneurship (Cramer 1998).  Differing from the English version of Enterprise Zones 
that sought to promote investment by large firms, Butler’s conception of Enterprise 
Zones sought to emphasize entrepreneurial activity (Butler 1991; Cramer 1998). 
 Jack Kemp, a Republican Congressman, championed the Enterprise Zone concept 
and promoted Enterprise Zones both to the new Reagan Administration and in Congress.  
As a concept, Enterprise Zones appealed to both conservatives and liberals.  To the 
Reagan administration, Enterprise Zones represented an opportunity to promote a 
“positive approach” to the urban problems it had ignored (Bendick and Rasmussen 1986).  
Reagan even highlighted the Enterprise Zone concept in his 1982 State of the Union 
address.  Championed by Kemp in Congress, Enterprise Zones were able to attract the 
support of both conservatives, who supported the tax and regulatory relief elements of the 
proposal, and of urban liberals, who supported the geographic targeting of poor 
communities.  The administration proposed Enterprise Zone legislation in 1982; however, 
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this legislation was opposed by key congressional leaders, especially in the House, and 
became ensnared in the political battles over the federal budget.  Despite repeated 
attempts, Enterprise Zones failed to be enacted into law during the Reagan administration 
(Cramer 1998). 
 According to Bendick and Rasmussen (1986), many state Enterprise Zones were 
first developed in order to compete for federal Enterprise Zone designation.  Despite the 
failure of Congress to pass the Enterprise Zone legislation, states went forward with their 
own Enterprise Zone programs.  According to Engberg and Greenbaum (1999), more 
than 40 states had operating Enterprise Zones.  State Enterprise Zones varied 
tremendously in terms of the types of regulatory and tax relief offered, but emerged as a 
major economic development tool.  According to Bendick and Rasmussen (1986), state 
Enterprise Zones differed from the proposed federal legislation in two ways: they 
targeted manufacturing plants and business relocation rather than the entrepreneurial 
development envisioned by Butler; and they enhanced rather than diminished the role of 
government.  State and local governments played an active role in Enterprise Zone 
operations by providing business services, land use planning, property assemblage, 
workforce development programs, and government infrastructure investment and 
services.    
According to Cramer (1998), the states’ experiences with Enterprise Zones 
impacted the Clinton administration’s integration of the Enterprise Zone concept into 
EZ/EC initiative.  Based on states’ experiences, the EZ/EC initiative built on the activist 
government role in state Enterprise Zones: “Rather than creating deregulated zones where 
the free market would allow entrepreneurial activity to thrive in areas unencumbered by 
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government interference, state zones generally became areas of targeted and concentrated 
public effort” (102).  The EZ/EC initiative combined the tax and regulatory relief of the 
traditional Enterprise Zone concept with the targeted government investments of state 
Enterprise Zones.   
The impact of Enterprise Zones has been widely studied.  Wilder and Rubin 
(1996) reviewed the existing base of Enterprise Zone evaluation literature.  They found 
that Enterprise Zones increased job growth and investment in the targeted areas.  The 
chief advantage of Enterprise Zones were the incentives, tax and others, offered to the 
businesses already in the Zones or that were moving to the Zones; however, there was a 
lack of evaluation of the costs of Enterprise Zones to assess their cost-benefit ratio.  Two 
important criticisms of Enterprise Zones were the quality of the jobs created and the 
extent to which local residents benefited from the Zones.  Wilder and Rubin (1996) 
reached two conclusions: “Enterprise Zones have not lived up to the broad panacea-like 
imagery conjured up by early federal proposals and rhetoric; neither, however, have they 
brought about the massive dislocations and dominance of large industries predicted by 
zone critics” (474).  According to Wilder and Rubin, for Enterprise Zones to provide 
more benefits to small communities, more formal planning for Zone implementation and 
targeted efforts to employ the poor local residents of the Zones are needed (1996). 
While the evaluations of Enterprise Zones found positive impacts on job creation, 
there is little evidence that Zones benefited the poor communities they were meant to 
serve.  The lack of community benefits from Enterprise Zones was examined by Papke 
(1993) who found that non-Zone residents were the primary beneficiaries from much of 
the employment gains from Enterprise Zones.  Boarnet and Bogart (1995) found that 
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New Jersey Enterprise Zones were ineffective at improving socioeconomic conditions 
around the Zones.  Engberg and Greenbaum (1999) found no positive impact of 
Enterprise Zones on housing values.   
Peters and Fisher (2002) reviewed and extended the Enterprise Zone literature in 
their book State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They Worked?  Their conclusions 
differed from Wilder and Rubin’s (1996).  Peters and Fisher argued that state Enterprise 
Zones had little or no impact on establishment growth.  They reported:  
Why are Enterprise Zone incentives not affecting growth?  Part of the explanation 
probably lies in the fact that many zones are in older, distressed inner-city 
neighborhoods.  Such places suffer from a number of important locational 
deterrents—high levels of crime, poor infrastructure, poorly skilled workers and 
so on—and it is unlikely that tax incentives alone, small as they usually are, will 
make up for these negatives. (2002, 226) 
 
They also found that most of the job gains of Enterprise Zones went to non-residents, and 
efforts to hire local residents were not successful.  Peters and Fisher (2002) concluded 
that Enterprise Zones were an inefficient strategy to promote employment in distressed 
communities and that better job placement efforts, training, and mobility strategies would 
be a better use of state and local funds.   
 According to Cramer (1998), when Kemp became Secretary of HUD under the 
first Bush administration, Enterprise Zones again rose to prominence.  The first Bush 
administration formally endorsed Enterprise Zones.  Kemp, as HUD Secretary and leader 
of the Bush administration’s 1990 Economic Empowerment Task Force that was charged 
with developing a new federal antipoverty strategy, continued to actively promote federal 
Enterprise Zone legislation.  These efforts were given a boost by support from a senior 
Democratic Congressman, Charles Rangel, who represented Harlem.  Senior Democratic 
leaders had come to see Enterprise Zones as the only type of new urban antipoverty 
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program likely to be proposed by the Republican administration.  The Los Angeles riots 
of 1992, much like the urban riots of the 1960s, created the impetus for both the 
administration and Congress to pass urban legislation, and the Urban Aid Tax Bill that 
included fifty Enterprise Zones was proposed.  Under this bill, new revenue was needed 
to offset the tax costs of Enterprise Zones.  This bill, however, was caught in the politics 
leading up to the 1992 presidential election, and President Bush, who was facing pressure 
on raising taxes in 1990, was unable to support a bill with tax increases so close to the 
election.  Despite political compromise and maneuvering, Bush ultimately vetoed the bill 
after his election defeat.  In addition, despite bipartisan support and twelve years of 
effort, Enterprise Zones were not implemented by either of the Republican 
administrations that had championed the cause (Cramer 1998). 
 The 1992 election brought renewed attention to urban issues.  President Clinton 
directly appealed to and received the support of urban voters.  As governor of Arkansas 
and as a Presidential candidate, he was familiar with Enterprise Zones, including the bill 
vetoed by President Bush.  As President, Clinton proposed and passed the first new 
federal urban policy since the Carter administration, the EZ/EC initiative, which 
incorporated key elements of Enterprise Zones (Cramer 1998).   
The link between the EZ/EC initiative and past Enterprise Zone proposals was 
well documented in the urban policy literature (Rubin M.M. 1994; Wilder and Rubin 
1996; Peters and Fisher 2002).  The EZ/EC initiative geographically-targeted poor 
communities and provided both regulatory relief in the form of waivers as well as tax 
credits, including a wage tax credit, expensing of investments made in the Zones, and 
tax-exempt bond financing.  The EZ/EC initiative went further than Enterprise Zones and 
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included federal grants and requirements for citizen participation; thereby addressing 
Wilder and B. Rubin’s criticisms of the lack of planning for and targeting of residents in 
state Enterprise Zones.   
Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs) 
As described by Kasarda (1993), Kasarda and Ting (1996), and Wilson (1997), 
urban areas faced significant economic challenges leading to a worsening of the problem 
of concentrated urban poverty described by Jagowsky (1997).  In response to the 
perceived failure of federal devolution and people-based policies to prevent the 
continuing decline in urban areas, in the mid-1980s, the foundation community began to 
fund the implementation of new place-based strategies to promote redevelopment and 
renewal in urban neighborhoods through Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs).  
These efforts sought to capitalize and build upon the successes of community 
organizations, CDCs, and other CBOs that assumed a central role in the implementation 
of urban programs under devolution.  CCIs were a return to the urban efforts of 
foundations, like the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas and MFY efforts, in that they were 
place-based and focused on offering integrated social services to residents of poor 
communities. 
There is no generally accepted definition of CCIs.  One national study of CCIs 
stated, “Defining comprehensive community initiatives is difficult because they vary 
dramatically in their form and content” (Hayes et al. 1995, 2).  In a study of lessons 
learned from CCIs, Kubisch et al. (1997) defined CCIs as neighborhood-based efforts 
that seek to improve the lives of individuals and families as well as the conditions in the 
neighborhoods in which they reside” (3).  Chapin Hall Center scholar Robert Chaskin, 
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the principal investigator of a ten-year study of one of the largest CCIs, the Ford 
Foundation’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative, argued that CCIs share two principles.  
The first is comprehensive change through integrating multiple categorical interventions 
into a strategic whole that should work together to foster sustainable change.  The second 
is a focus on relationships and community-building through organizational collaboration 
among the public and private organizations involved in the community and citizen 
participation in the planning and implementation of the initiative (Chaskin 2000).  CCIs 
represent the integration of people- and place-based strategies.  Because they provide the 
comprehensive services needed by poor residents and families, they also take a holistic 
approach to community revitalization (Gittell and Vidal 1998).   
CCIs trace their intellectual origins to the community-oriented policies of the War 
on Poverty programs.  According to Walsh (1997), they integrated the lessons of the 
failures of these programs into their design and operations.  CCIs reject that people-based 
categorical programs can solve the problems of urban poverty and instead focus on 
creating an ongoing process to improve the targeted communities.  Instead of calling for 
“maximum feasible participation” of poor residents, CCIs seek to engage business, 
foundation, and government leaders in collaboration with residents through community-
building activities.  Building on the recent experience of CBOs and CDCs, these 
community-building activities have been implemented through local community 
organizations.  The organizations funding CCIs have either worked through existing 
CBOs or created new organizations to serve as the focal point for creating or 
strengthening bonds between community residents (bonding social capital) and networks 
connecting residents together and to outside resources (bridging social capital) (Gittell 
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and Vidal 1998).  Rather than focusing only on the deficits of these communities, CCIs 
learned from the “asset-based community development” approach of McKnight and 
Kretzman (1994) to incorporate and build upon local strengths.  Finally, rather than 
focusing on welfare rights, CCIs focus on workforce development (Walsh 1997).  These 
changes represent the modern implementation of the lessons learned from the War on 
Poverty’s programs. 
Most CCIs are foundation-sponsored with the large national foundations taking 
the lead through multi-city efforts, such as the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s New Futures 
effort in five cities, the Ford Foundation’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative in five 
cities, and the Rockefeller Foundation’s six city Community Planning and Action 
Program (Walsh 1997).  Local foundations, such as New York’s Comprehensive 
Community Revitalization Program, have formed other CCIs through foundation-private 
sector collaboration, as seen in The Atlanta Project, or through local city government-
private sector collaboration, as seen in Baltimore’s Sandtown-Winchester Project (Walsh 
1997).  The Finance Project identified fifty CCIs in operation around the country as of 
1995 (Hayes et al. 1995), and by the year 2000, there was one in nearly every major city 
(Kubisch et al. 2002).  This list was overly broad and included everything from small, 
single site efforts to statewide legislative efforts.  Chaskin lists 16 large-scale CCIs as of 
2000, and classified the federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Communities as a CCI 
(2000).  Many cities, such as New York, have multiple CCI neighborhoods.  Excluding 
the EZ/EC initiative, these 15 CCIs operating in 56 locations are the larger, well-funded 
CCIs that truly represent comprehensive neighborhood interventions. 
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There have been no comprehensive national evaluations of the impact of CCIs on 
urban policy.  In a review of the activities of 50 CCIs across the nation, the Finance 
Project found that few CCIs have been rigorously evaluated (Hayes et al. 1995).  Chaskin 
(2000) lists 32 evaluations and other CCI-related reports in his bibliography of published 
CCI reports in addition to the five Chapin Hall Center’s Neighborhood and Family 
Initiative evaluation reports.  Most evaluations, however, are anecdotal and focus on 
process variables, lessons learned, and number of people served not actual impact or 
outcome measures.  Thus, there is a lack of good CCI evaluation data.  While it is outside 
of the scope of this dissertation to review the entire CCI evaluation literature, the major 
national evaluation reports and studies have been reviewed.   
In 1995, the Finance Project reviewed the activities of 50 CCIs around the country 
to document their costs, outcomes, and funding.  They found that the continued 
categorical nature of most available public funding makes it difficult for CCIs to offer 
integrated services and that innovative governance structures and public policies are 
required for CCIs to improve service delivery.  Foundation funding often provides the 
impetus for the formation of CCIs and gives CCIs the ability to attract other funding, but 
the time-limited nature of foundation funding creates long-term sustainability problems 
for CCIs.  The sustainability issues related to foundation funding of CCIs has been 
identified and analyzed by numerous other CCI evaluations and reports.  The Finance 
Project report, however, was unable to find evaluation data on the costs and benefits that 
could be generalized to all CCIs.  It found very little information on the start-up, 
operational, and program costs of CCIs, and that benefits data were concentrated on 
process variables like number of clients served, not outcomes.  As a result, it was unable 
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to link program costs and benefits.  They found that CCIs present a rich opportunity to 
“test new concepts of service delivery, community building, and economic development” 
and demonstrate that “changing established systems is a slow and cumbersome process” 
(Hayes et al. 1995).   
 In 1997, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluations 
(ASPE) in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Gray et al. 1997) 
conducted a study of the lessons learned from fourteen CCIs judged to be “successful” by 
a panel of experts.  This report found that “though evaluators are making progress in this 
area [of evaluating CCIs] it remains difficult at this time to document success or test the 
elements of success for CCIs” (4).  ASPE found that successful CCIs: arose out of a 
catalytic event in their community; grew organically; had strong leadership and staff; and 
participated in a visible signature development that impacted the community.  The ability 
to adapt to change was critical to CCIs as community needs and available funding 
sources change over time.  Successful CCIs achieved community participation through a 
sustained community outreach effort to overcome the difficulties inherent in reaching out 
to poor, transient residents.  Overcoming racial tensions was an important issue in the 
diverse communities that CCIs serve.  Successful CCIs formed strong alliances with 
organizations inside and outside of the community.  Adequate and stable financing was 
also critical to CCI success.  Administrative funding is another important issue since 
CCIs are often able to access government or foundation funding to implement particular 
services, but these funding sources often restrict the use of funds to support the necessary 
overhead to maintain the organization. 
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The Aspen Institute Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives for 
Children and Families, a national effort to study the policy implications of CCIs, 
authored two studies of CCIs (Kubish et al. 1997 and 2002).  The final report concluded: 
The last decade of work by CCIs and related community change efforts 
suggest that these efforts have considerable potential but also significant 
limitations.  Comprehensive community initiatives have made great strides 
in identifying the many moving parts that have to come together to 
achieve change and in understanding the principles that should guide the 
work.  But they have underestimated how difficult it is to implement 
complex community-change strategies and to acquire the capacities and 
resources needed to make them work effectively.  They have also 
overestimated what community-based initiatives can be expected to do in 
order to overcome poverty in distressed neighborhoods. (Kubisch et al. 
2002, 100) 
 
While most CCIs failed to significantly change conditions in the targeted 
distressed urban neighborhoods, they have led to short-term improvements in program 
outcomes and the level of community engagement.  The problem of concentrated urban 
poverty is caused by international and macroeconomic factors as well as broad national 
and regional social trends.  In the face of these factors that are outside of the control of 
urban policy, local interventions can at best assist in the adjustments to or the easing of 
the effects of these factors.  Walsh (1997) reported: 
 “It should be clear from the last 30 years of urban reform efforts that 
three- to five-year foundation initiatives and federal demonstration 
projects, however inspired, will not solve the long-term problems of low 
income neighborhoods. What is missing in most communities is a 
mechanism for continued investment in savvy, long-lasting institutions to 
attack these problems themselves(42-43).   
 
Thus, a key lesson of CCIs seems to be that the creation of local institutions to engage the 
community in revitalization efforts will support broader urban policy goals.   
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The data on the limitations of CCIs were not published until after the EZ/EC 
initiative was implemented.  As a result, the Clinton administration drew on the early 
literature on the promise of CCIs, not the later information on their failings.  The link 
between the federal EZ/EC initiative and CCIs was established in the urban policy 
literature, and the EZ/EC program is often analyzed alongside CCIs as a federally 
sponsored effort to promote comprehensive community change (Kubisch et al. 2002; 
Chaskin and Peters 1997; Wright 1998).  According to Gittell et al. (2001), the Clinton 
administration specifically drew from the emerging lessons of the foundation-sponsored 
CCIs into the Empowerment Zone legislation.  Just as the War on Poverty programs drew 
on the experiences of the Gray Areas and MFY programs, the EZ/EC program traces its 
roots to the foundation-sponsored CCIs.  This is especially true in Baltimore where the 
Mayor was involved in one of the first CCIs, the president of the Empowerment Zone 
management entity served as the city’s representative to that effort, and James Rouse the 
founder of the Enterprise Foundation participated in the early EZ planning.  
The Clinton Administration’s Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative 
 The federal Empowerment Zone was the major urban initiative of the Clinton 
administration.  It represented the first major federal program since the 1960s to 
specifically focus on direct federal intervention to promote the revitalization of poor 
urban communities through a targeted, well funded, and comprehensive federal program.  
Four fundamental principles guided the federal Empowerment Zone effort: economic 
opportunity; sustainable community development; community-based partnerships; and a 
strategic and comprehensive vision for change (Gittell and Vidal 1998).  In the first round 
of the federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community program, six urban 
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Empowerment Zones—Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and 
Philadelphia/Camden—were chosen along with three rural Empowerment Zones and 96 
Enterprise Communities.  Each of the urban Empowerment Zones received $100 million 
in block grants as well as tax incentives, regulatory relief, and technical assistance.  Two 
Supplemental Zones in Cleveland and Los Angeles were later designated and received 
similar benefits as the urban Empowerment Zones, but less funding.   
The Clinton administration viewed the EZ/EC initiative as a return to past place-
based strategies.  According to the administration’s National Urban Policy Report (HUD 
1995), the EZ/EC Initiative specifically “rejects the false choice between empowering 
poor people and revitalizing distressed places” (4).  The EZ/EC initiative integrated 
people- and place-based strategies through a comprehensive, geographically-targeted 
approach to revitalization where the community would “assume ultimate responsibility” 
and “foster locally initiated, bottom-up strategies that connect the people, businesses, and 
neighborhood sectors” (HUD 1995).    
The federal Empowerment Zone program was designed with the successes and 
failures of past federal and foundation urban initiatives in mind.  It drew on the success 
from the 1960s programs by calling for a comprehensive, community-driven approach to 
reform and integrate social service delivery.  By calling for sustainable community 
development through community-based partnerships, the Empowerment Zone program 
acknowledged and sought to build upon the experiences of CDCs and other CBOs in 
urban development in the 1980s and 1990s.  The Clinton administration’s National Urban 
Policy Report specifically recognized the importance of community organizations: “In 
distressed communities across America, neighborhood-based institutions such as 
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community development corporations and churches are in the vanguard” (HUD 1995, 5).  
The Empowerment Zone built upon the emerging experiences of CCIs by calling for a 
strategic, comprehensive, and collaborative vision for change (Chaskin and Peters 1997).  
In doing so, the Empowerment Zone, like the links between Model Cities and Gray 
Areas/MFY in the 1960s, drew from the experience of foundation-sponsored urban 
initiatives.  The Empowerment Zone implementation strategy integrated core aspects of 
Enterprise Zones by including both tax benefits and regulatory relief.   
The Empowerment Zone program integrated the lessons from the failures of past 
urban interventions into its design and implementation as well.  Drawing from the lessons 
of Urban Renewal and targeting its efforts exclusively on poor neighborhoods, the EZ 
initiative avoided the conflict between downtown and neighborhood development.  The 
EZ/EC initiative reduced the potential for the program to be dominated by the existing 
city political and business power structure by requiring substantial citizen participation, 
control, and oversight.  Unlike the Model Cities program, the number of Empowerment 
Zone communities remained small, funding commitments were large, and the time for 
implementation was sufficient.  The EZ/EC initiative drew from both Model Cities and 
the Community Action Program by requiring citizen participation in the design and 
oversight of the program.  Unlike CAP, however, citizen participation in the EZ/EC was 
implemented under the auspices of city government, reducing the opportunity for 
conflicts between the Empowerment Zone and each city’s political power structure.  The 
EZ/EC initiative provided stable, long-term funding as well as funding specifically for 




Empowerment Zone Governance 
Because this dissertation analyzes the governance structure implemented in 
Baltimore, this literature review of Empowerment Zones is restricted to an analysis of the 
governance structures implemented in the eight full Empowerment Zone and 
Supplemental Empowerment Zone communities, not the full range of programs and 
impacts of the Empowerment Zone in these cities or the experience of the larger number 
of cities that received smaller federal Enterprise Community programs.   
The goal of the Empowerment Zone was to integrate the communities to be 
served into the design, planning, and implementation of the program.  The federal 
Empowerment Zone also set broad policy goals, but allowed each site to set its own 
programmatic focus and goals.  The governance structure implemented by each 
Empowerment Zone created formal mechanisms to engage citizens in strategic planning 
and oversight as well as facilitate management, coordination, and evaluation of service 
delivery.  According to Chaskin and Peters (1997), two decisions had to be made in 
Empowerment Zones:  
1. What would be the implementation agency for the Empowerment Zone’s 
programs? 
2. How would residents be engaged in the process?  
Two different strategies emerged among the Empowerment Zones and 
Supplemental Empowerment Zones for the formal auspices of the Zones.  In four of the 
eight Empowerment and Supplemental Empowerment Zones—Chicago, Cleveland, 
Detroit, and Philadelphia/ Camden—programs were implemented through local 
government agencies, and in three Zones—Atlanta, Baltimore, and Los Angeles—a new 
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non-profit implementing organization was created.  New York City adopted a mixed 
strategy of government and non-profit implementation (Chaskin and Peters 1997).  The 
mechanisms for community representation in the Empowerment Zones generally 
consisted of an oversight organization, such as a Board of Directors that included a mix 
of government, business, institutional, and community members.  In some cases, 
additional community or advisory boards were created so that citizens would be informed 
of or involved in Empowerment Zone decisions (Chaskin and Peters 1997).   
Baltimore’s two-tiered Empowerment Zone governance system was unique 
among the six full urban Empowerment Zones.  Baltimore created a distributed 
governance structure highly independent of the city government.  The structure consisted 
of a new non-profit organization, the Empower Baltimore Management Corporation 
(EBMC), as the lead implementing agency responsible for management and oversight of 
all Empowerment Zone programs.  Unlike most other Empowerment Zones, EBMC had 
direct control and oversight of federal funds.  It also oversaw the creation of six village 
centers that developed strategic plans and implemented programs in each of the 
Empowerment Zone communities of Baltimore.  EBMC had a 28-member Board of 
Directors that included community representatives drawn from each of the village 
centers, an Advisory Council, and the Fairfield Industrial Area (an industrial area that is 
part of the Zone), as well as two members appointed by the Governor and seventeen 
appointed by the Mayor.  EBMC also had a community Advisory Council that 
represented community interests on key EBMC decisions (Nathan and Wright 1995; 





Empowerment Zone and Housing Policy 
The implementation of Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone was also shaped by the 
Clinton administration’s public housing policies and priorities.  A complete review of the 
history of public housing is too large of an undertaking for this review of the rise of 
community organizations in urban policy.  This brief review will, instead briefly 
summarize the broad trends in public housing policy and how they came to shape 
Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone experience.  Federal public housing policy can trace its 
history back to the New Deal and Urban Renewal periods.  According to Vale (2002), 
public housing advocates “saw the projects as an alternative to slums – enclaves of sturdy 
construction and carefully vetted households (5).”  However, in the post-war period, 
public housing evolved in a way that doomed the program.  According to Vale (2002), 
federal policy reduced the ability of local housing authorities to control and operate the 
program.  Changes in federal policy emphasized admitting the neediest tenants, often the 
poor who were displaced by urban renewal redevelopment projects, over the working 
poor and civil rights reforms limited the ability of housing authorities to operate 
segregated units.  As a result, working poor families began to abandon public housing.  
According to Vale (2002), “a half century before, public housing had valiantly serviced 
the working poor, but now it struggled to house America’s most desperate urban residents 
(6).”  Furthermore, the federal government capped rent payments at 25% of income and 
was slow to subsidize operating costs, causing financial pressures at housing authorities.  
When the federal government limited unit costs, local housing authorities emphasized the 
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development of the larger high-rise buildings that came to dominate the public housing 
and often skimped on construction costs and quality. (Von Hoffman 1996). 
As a result of federal policy and local implementation, public housing transitioned 
from replacing slums to becoming slums.  Pubic housing became areas of concentrated 
poverty and poor living conditions.  According to Vale (2002) “the result of all of this has 
been a convergence of increasing economic distress among residents, managerial 
incapacity, design failures, and budgetary contraction, all at a time of persistent violence, 
struggling public education, lingering racism, and inadequate job opportunities in cities. 
As a symbol and symptom of these broader societal problems, public housing has been 
blamed for them (7).”  Public housing became seen a contributing to the geographic 
concentration of poverty and social isolation of the poor, predominantly minority 
residents.  In response, federal policy began to change.  Building on the experience of the 
Gautreaux program, a court ordered housing desegregation effort that gave Section 8 
housing vouchers to residents of Chicago Housing Authority projects, federal policy 
began to target both dispersal, through programs such as Moving to Opportunity, and 
mixed use redevelopment of former housing projects, through the later HOPE VI.   
HOPE VI, or the Public Housing Revitalization program, emerged from the work 
of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.  The goal of HOPE 
VI was to redevelop public housing through mixed-use, mixed income developments.  
High rise public housing was to be demolished and replaced with low rise town homes 
that combine public housing, with rental and home ownership opportunities for both the 
poor and middle class.  Baltimore has been awarded six HOPE VI redevelopment 
projects, all in or abutting the Empowerment Zone.  While Baltimore’s EZ strategy 
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focused on workforce and community development, with housing being a secondary 
program, these redevelopment efforts would impact the EZ effort.  Lafayette Homes, one 
of the first high-rise public housing projects demolished in the Clinton administration was 
in the Poppleton neighborhood in the western part of the Baltimore empowerment zone, 
and several housing projects in the east side of the Zone were demolished and 
redeveloped under HOPE VI. 
Evaluation of the Empowerment Zones’ Community Involvement 
Successful neighborhood-based governance structures have several 
characteristics.  They engage the community in the decision-making process, are 
representative of the community served, and empower local residents (Chaskin and Peters 
1997, 2000).  Overall, the federal EZ/EC initiative varied in the extent to which residents 
participated in and influenced the EZ governance.  In only six of the eighteen 
Empowerment Zones, Supplemental Empowerment Zones, and Enhanced Enterprise 
Communities analyzed in the HUD interim evaluation report were residents viewed as 
influential actors in EZ/EC governance (Hebert et al. 2001).   
In many EZ/EC cities, mayors, not the residents, controlled the oversight boards.  
In communities where participation was high during the application, few sites maintained 
the high level of participation over the implementation period leading, in many cases, to a 
lack of true community representation on the Boards of Directors (Gittell et al. 2001).  
Furthermore, citizen participation in EZ/EC governance in many sites was indirect, 
through CDCs or other CBOs, rather than direct.  This raised questions about the overall 
level of resident oversight, as these community organizations were often part of each 
Zone’s program implementation strategy.  Finally, reliance upon existing community 
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organizations to represent residents’ interests raised the issue of the whether these 
organizations were themselves representative of the communities they served.  According 
to one analysis, the lack of federal oversight of community participation goals, the 
opposition of city governments, and barriers to citizen participation led to the 
abandonment of the community capacity-building goal of the Empowerment Zone 
program (Gitell et al. 2001).  To Gitell et al. (2001) the overall impact of the federal 
Empowerment Zone in building community capacity was questionable.     
The findings of the national evaluations that conclude that the federal EZ/EC 
program fell short in building community capacity were reinforced by the findings of the 
limited number of published accounts of the experience of individual Zones.  The 
Philadelphia-Camden Empowerment Zone experienced difficulties in building 
community-driven networks because of the problems associated with having a two-city, 
two-state Zone as well as political, economic, and structural barriers to integrating service 
delivery (O’Neal and O’Neal 2003).  Chicago’s Empowerment Zone integrated the 
community in the application process, but lost that integration in the implementation 
phase (McCarthy 2003; Gillis and White 1998).  The Boston Enhanced Enterprise 
Community faced governance problems in coordinating relationships among the federal, 
state, city, and community organizations (Snow 2000).  The Detroit Empowerment Zone 
was unable to overcome the legacy of distrust between the city’s community 
organizations, especially its CDCs, for the city government and private sector to build 
real citizen participation (Bockmeyer 2000).  The Newark Enterprise Community was 
unable to integrate individuals into the implementation process or build networks to 
establish change (Schulgasser 1999).  Part of the difficulty in building community 
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capacity in the Empowerment Zone program was the highly political and public nature of 
a federal initiative in contrast to a foundation-sponsored CCI (Gitell and Vidal 1998).  
Evaluations indicated that the EZ/EC effort was not successful in its stated goal of 
building community capacity and engagement in most cities. 
Some evidence suggested that the experience in Baltimore might have been 
different from that of the other Empowerment Zones.  In Baltimore’s Empowerment 
Zone, residents were viewed as influential actors (Hebert et al. 2001).  Gitell et al. (2001) 
reported, “The Baltimore EZ was more successful in promoting citizen and CBO 
participation than in most other Zones” (49).  The potential success in community 
capacity-building in Baltimore may be due to the time, emphasis, and resources devoted 
to the creation of the village centers.  According to Robert Stoker, the HUD evaluation 
representative for Baltimore, the success or failure of the village centers in continuing 
operations after the sunset of EBMC in December 2004 will determine if the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone was ultimately successful at empowering residents and building 
community capacity.  Accepting this measure, the Baltimore EZ is at least a partial 
success, with four of the six original village centers operating in some form in the 
beginning of 2008, three years after federal funding ended. 
Synthesis and Review -- The Implications of This Analysis 
 This literature review discussed how the role of community organizations evolved 
over the four broad phases of post-War urban policy.  Community organizations evolved 
from having little or no role in the New Deal and Urban Renewal programs to having a 
central role in the Great Society.  Then they were cut out of a direct role in urban policy 
during devolution and de-funding during the Reagan/Bush years.  Even as the formal role 
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of community organizations was reduced under devolution in the Nixon, Ford and Carter 
era, and federal urban funding was cut dramatically under the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations, community organizations continued to impact urban policy as 
contractors to provide government services under block grants and as developers of low-
income housing under privatization.  Numerous urban scholars noted the persistence of 
community-driven policies despite the changing political and urban policy environment. 
In the area of community involvement, the federal Empowerment Zone program 
represented the synthesis of the post-war urban policy experience.  It drew on the 1960s 
War on Poverty programs through its place-based community focus.  It drew on the 
service delivery experience of CBOs and CDCs from the 1970s to today by specifically 
calling for a central role for community organizations.  Finally, it drew on the planning- 
and network-driven approach of CCIs in the 1990s by calling for a strategic and 
coordinated approach to urban redevelopment.  Thus, the federal Empowerment Zone 
integrated the lessons from these eras in urban policy to design a comprehensive, 
community-driven effort to combine people- and place-based strategies to revitalize a 
targeted set of communities.  Unlike prior community initiatives, the EZ/EC initiative 
was well-funded, providing $100 million to each of the six full Empowerment Zone 
locations, and given sufficient time, ten years, to achieve results.  
While the federal Empowerment Zone initiative drew from the experiences of 
CCIs, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone was actually structured like one.  Federal 
programs were devolved to a local oversight and management entity, and they were 
implemented through newly created community organizations.  Baltimore is a true test of 
the community option in urban policy proposed by Clavel, Pitt, and Yin (1997).  The 
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success or failure of Baltimore’s efforts to build sustainable community capacity, to 
implement federal programs, and to revitalize communities is an important test case of 
the viability of other government or private community-driven urban policy efforts. 
The record of community organizations in urban policy is, at best, mixed.  There 
are examples of successful community initiatives throughout modern urban policy.  
Community organizations, working with or without government support, have positively 
impacted their communities through building housing, implementing social programs, 
and giving a political voice to residents of often-neglected communities.  Community 
organizations alone, however, cannot reverse the problems of urban decline and 
concentrated poverty because they are caused by much larger national and international 
social and economic trends. 
The current expectations for community organizations are unrealistic; they have 
been called upon to do too much.  If done successfully, community-driven urban policies 
can assist and compliment federal urban policies, but they cannot substitute for federal 
funding and attention.  Given the persistence of community organizations in urban policy 
implementation, the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone is an important 
case study.  Baltimore’s experience, recognized as the most community-driven of the 
EZ/EC initiative and operating with long-term and large-scale federal funding, can 
inform future efforts to implement federal urban policies through a community-driven 





URBAN TRENDS IN BALTIMORE 
 
 As described in Chapter 2, the EZ/EC initiative represented the return of federal 
urban policy after twelve years of devolution and de-funding under the Reagan and first 
Bush administrations.  The Clinton administration’s EZ/EC initiative integrated the 
lessons and experiences of prior urban policy interventions.  Drawing on the historical 
lessons of the CAP and Model Cities, the EZ/EC initiative was a comprehensive, place-
based approach implemented through mayors’ offices in the chosen cities.  Building on 
the experience of devolution, the EZ/EC initiative was implemented as a block grant 
program in which recipients could allocate funding among broad priorities.  Building on 
the experience of privatization, the EZ/EC initiative was structured like a CCI and 
depended on local community residents, organizations, and CDCs to integrate the public 
and private agents involved in urban policy.  The initiative also drew on the free market 
Republican policy of Enterprise Zones.  Thus, the EZ/EC initiative drew on and 
integrated all of the lessons and experience of post-War trends in federal urban policy 
into a new comprehensive approach. 
 Just as the Clinton administration’s EZ/EC initiative integrated the lessons and 
experiences of prior urban policy interventions, Baltimore’s experience with national 
urban economic and policy trends shaped its Empowerment Zone strategy.  The same 
macroeconomic factors impacting urban communities across America were at work in 
Baltimore, and the City’s policies were shaped by the trends in federal and foundation 
urban policy.   
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Economic and Social Changes in Baltimore 
 The economic and social decline of America’s cities and the problems related to 
concentrated urban poverty are well documented in the urban policy literature.  Kasarda 
(1988) and Wilson (1987, 1997) described the broad economic and social decline in 
cities.  National and international trends changed the economic fortunes and roles of 
cities.  The decline in urban employment opportunities coupled with social welfare 
programs led to the concentration of poverty in cities supporting the formation of what 
Wilson termed jobless ghettos (1997).  According to Wilson (1987), “[U]rban minorities 
have been particularly vulnerable to structural economic changes, such as the shift from 
goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor 
market into high-wage and low-wage sectors, technological innovations, and the 
relocation of manufacturing industries out of the central cities” (39). 
 Jargowsky (1997) summarized Wilson’s and others’ analyses of the economic 
factors behind the rise in concentrated poverty in urban neighborhoods into four distinct 
causes: deindustrialization, employment deconcentration, occupational bifurcation, and 
suburbanization – first of the white and later of the black middle class.  
Deindustrialization refers to the decline in urban industrial production that occurred as 
manufacturing moved from high cost, unionized facilities in Northern and Midwestern 
cities to suburban and Southern locations in the 1970s and 1980s, and, more recently, 
offshore.  Employment deconcentration refers to the movement of jobs within 
metropolitan areas from central cities to suburban locations.  Garreau (1991) described 
the dispersal of employment to suburban jurisdictions in his book Edge Cities as the third 
phase of suburbanization.  In the first phase, whites and the middle class moved out to the 
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suburbs, and they were followed in the second phase by the retail and personal services 
jobs that serve them.  In the third phase, professional employment opportunities began to 
move to “edge cities” or suburban employment locations.  This suburbanization 
reinforced the “spatial mismatch” between the poor urban minorities and suburban 
employment opportunities as identified by Kain (1968).  Occupational bifurcation refers 
to the polarization of the economy into high-wage and low-wage sectors (Jargowsky 
1997).  Suburbanization is the movement of the working and middle class (first white and 
later African American) out of the cities and into the suburbs. 
 All of these economic trends were evident in the Baltimore metropolitan area.  
Deindustrialization had a profound effect on the Baltimore economy.  Looking at long-
term changes in employment, Baltimore City has fallen from 59% of total private non-
farm employment in Maryland in 1951 to 14% in 2000 (see Table 4).   Since 1951, 
Baltimore City has lost nearly 100,000 manufacturing jobs.  The City’s economic decline 
started in the 1970s.  As Table 5 suggests, since 1970, Baltimore lost 70% of its 
manufacturing jobs, with manufacturing employment falling, from 102,172 jobs in 1970 
to 28,534 jobs in 2000.7  Baltimore accounted for 86% of the manufacturing jobs lost in 
Maryland since 1970, and manufacturing declined from 19% of Baltimore employment in 
1970 to 6% in 2000.   
The suburbanization of the population and of employment led to employment 
deconcentration as Baltimore’s economic role declined.  As presented in Tables 5 and 6, 
Baltimore City’s share of Maryland employment fell from 32% in 1970 to 15% in 2000 
and its share of Baltimore metropolitan area employment fell from 55% to 30% over the 
                                               
7 Because of the transition from Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to North American 
Industrial Classification (NAICs) codes, it is not possible to extend historical economic data past 2000.   
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same period of time.  The deconcentration of employment was most pronounced in the 
retail, transportation, communications and public utilities, and wholesale sectors, which 
moved out of the City to serve and increasingly suburban population.   
As Table 7 illustrates, the suburbanization of the population led to Baltimore City 
falling from 41% of Maryland’s population in 1950 to 23% in 1970 to 11% in 2006.  
While Baltimore City’s economic decline began in the 1970s, its population decline 
started twenty years earlier, in the 1950s.  Regionally, the City fell from 65% of the 
metro area’s population in 1950 to 44% in 1970 to 24% in 2006.  The City lost 318,342 
residents since 1950, losing 43,949 residents between 1950 and 1970, and 274,393 
residents since 1970. 
The City’s population decline was caused by the combination of the “pull” of 
suburban development supported by the combination of new highway construction and 
government backed mortgages, with the “push” of desegregation, declining City services 
and schools, and later, increased poverty and crime.   According to Orser  (1994), “In 
Baltimore and many other cities where African American population had increased 
significantly during the war but housing space had remained virtually the same as the 
result of traditional walls of segregation, African American housing needs intensified. In 
response to the twin forces of postwar residential expansion and the challenge to 
traditional racial patterns, the white middle and working classes experienced the 
proverbial pull and push of suburbanization: the attraction of new housing in a suburban 
setting, the push of groups from whom they sought social distance (63).”  Real estate 
speculators took advantage of the changing housing market through “blockbusting” or 
placing an African American in an all white neighborhood to panic white residents to sell 
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at a low price while selling the property to African Americans at a high price.  
Blockbusting and white flight led to a dramatic demographic change in Baltimore City.  
Orser (1994) in his analysis of blockbusting and demographic change in the Edmondson 
Village neighborhood in Baltimore describes how in 1956 all of the residents in the area 
he analyzed were white, by 1964 the south side of the sample area had become nearly 
entirely African American and by 1970 102 of 108 households in the sample area were 
African American.  The pattern was repeated in neighborhoods across the City. 
White out-migration accelerated in the 1970s, after the 1968 riots and continued 
through the 2000 census.  In the 1990s, the African American middle class joined the 
exodus.  According to the Baltimore Sun (Roylance 2001), Baltimore’s population fell by 
84,860 people between the 1990 and 2000 Census, driven by continued white flight, with 
five whites leaving the City for each African American, but the City’s population decline 
in the 1990s saw the City’s African American population fall for the first time since the 
Civil War.  According to the Baltimore Sun (Siegel 2003) “Part of Baltimore’s 
demographic story of the 1990s, when it lost more people than any city in America, was 
that large numbers of middle class blacks joined the middle class whites in leaving the 
City (2b).”  In the 1990s, the out-migration of the African American middle class and the 
continued exodus of the white middle class were driven by the combination of high 
crime, poor City schools, and a City in social and economic distress. 
 The Baltimore region, with suburban communities like Columbia, Hunt Valley, 
and Towson developing into both population and employment centers perfectly 
illustrated Garreau’s edge cities.  Garreau (1991) listed Baltimore as having three 
established and four emerging edge cities.  Baltimore was also a prime example of the 
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spatial mismatch, according to the Job Opportunities Task Force (2003), since Baltimore 
City was home to the overwhelming majority of the region’s low-skilled, poor, and 
disadvantaged job seekers but less than one-third of low-skill employment opportunities.  
Finally, the Baltimore region, with its high concentration of professional services, 
advanced technology, health care, and higher education employment opportunities, had a 
high degree of occupational bifurcation.  According to the Job Opportunities Task Force 
(2003), 70% of the Baltimore metropolitan area’s employment was in occupations that 
are classified as low-skill and 21% in high-skill.  Thus, Baltimore exhibited all of the four 




1951 1962 1970 1980 1990 2000 1951-62 1962-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1951-2000 
Maryland Private Employment 577,151 714,310 1,264,045 1,571,897 2,233,045 2,555,998 137,159 549,735 307,852 661,148 322,953 1,978,847 
Ag. For. & Fish 1,922 2,192 9,882 14,873 26,393 34,202 270 7,690 4,991 11,520 7,809 32,280 
Mining 2,426 2,300 2,534 3,001 3,875 2,646 -126 234 467 874 -1,229 220 
Construction 50,959 53,144 104,865 124,015 198,214 201,896 2,185 51,721 19,150 74,199 3,682 150,937 
Manufacturing 243,178 251,503 273,459 241,124 213,428 188,226 8,325 21,956 -32,335 -27,696 -25,202 -54,952 
TCPU 51,481 55,195 90,640 96,109 118,231 136,034 3,714 35,445 5,469 22,122 17,803 84,553 
Wholesale trade 39,220 44,992 63,324 92,277 117,559 123,583 5,772 18,332 28,953 25,282 6,024 84,363 
Retail trade 112,315 150,329 279,929 355,819 475,393 508,998 38,014 129,600 75,890 119,574 33,605 396,683 
FIRE 30,206 44,250 111,381 148,681 231,954 250,091 14,044 67,131 37,300 83,273 18,137 219,885 
Services 45,444 110,405 328,031 495,998 847,998 1,110,322 64,961 217,626 167,967 352,000 262,324 1,064,878 
Baltimore City Private Employment 343,246 339,665 453,020 418,507 427,127 365,618 -3,581 113,355 -34,513 8,620 -61,509 22,372 
Ag. For. & Fish 330 306 779 1,010 1,708 (D) -24 473 231 698 (D) (D) 
Mining 335 263 72 111 186 (D) -72 -191 39 75 (D) (D) 
Construction 27,766 19,632 26,068 20,246 21,435 16,207 -8,134 6,436 -5,822 1,189 -5,228 -11,559 
Manufacturing 127,427 104,993 102,172 70,697 43,731 28,534 -22,434 -2,821 -31,475 -26,966 -15,197 -98,893 
TCPU 41,506 38,728 44,898 41,153 26,525 22,320 -2,778 6,170 -3,745 -14,628 -4,205 -19,186 
Wholesale trade 25,108 27,574 33,473 29,359 27,923 19,408 2,466 5,899 -4,114 -1,436 -8,515 -5,700 
Retail trade 68,939 64,270 83,829 76,453 65,330 46,668 -4,669 19,559 -7,376 -11,123 -18,662 -22,271 
FIRE 22,333 26,535 43,388 48,337 57,667 41,224 4,202 16,853 4,949 9,330 -16,443 18,891 
Services 29,502 57,364 118,341 131,141 182,622 191,257 27,862 60,977 12,800 51,481 8,635 161,755 
Baltimore as a % of Maryland 
Total Private Non-Farm: 59% 48% 36% 27% 19% 14% 
Ag. For. & Fish 17% 14% 8% 7% 6% -- 
Mining 14% 11% 3% 4% 5% -- 
Construction 54% 37% 25% 16% 11% 8% 
Manufacturing 52% 42% 37% 29% 20% 15% 
TCPU 81% 70% 50% 43% 22% 16% 
Wholesale trade 64% 61% 53% 32% 24% 16% 
Retail trade 61% 43% 30% 21% 14% 9% 
FIRE 74% 60% 39% 33% 25% 16% 
Services 65% 52% 36% 26% 22% 17% 
TCPU= Transportation, Communications and Public Utilities   FIRE= Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns 
Employment Change 
Baltimore City vs. Maryland 





1970 1980 1990 2000 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1970-2000 
Maryland  1,674,224 2,044,928 2,737,741 3,072,472 370,704 692,813 334,731 1,398,248 
   Private employment 1,264,045 1,571,897 2,233,045 2,555,998 307,852 661,148 322,953 1,291,953 
    Ag. For. & Fish 9,882 14,873 26,393 34,202 4,991 11,520 7,809 24,320 
    Mining 2,534 3,001 3,875 2,646 467 874 (1,229) 112 
    Construction 104,865 124,015 198,214 201,896 19,150 74,199 3,682 97,031 
    Manufacturing 273,459 241,124 213,428 188,226 (32,335) (27,696) (25,202) (85,233) 
    TCPU 90,640 96,109 118,231 136,034 5,469 22,122 17,803 45,394 
    Wholesale trade 63,324 92,277 117,559 123,583 28,953 25,282 6,024 60,259 
    Retail trade 279,929 355,819 475,393 508,998 75,890 119,574 33,605 229,069 
    FIRE 111,381 148,681 231,954 250,091 37,300 83,273 18,137 138,710 
    Services 328,031 495,998 847,998 1,110,322 167,967 352,000 262,324 782,291 
  Government 410,179 473,031 504,696 516,474 62,852 31,665 11,778 106,295 
Baltimore City  533,697 504,056 513,104 450,940 (29,641) 9,048 (62,164) (82,757) 
   Private employment 453,020 418,507 427,127 367,605 (34,513) 8,620 (59,522) (85,415) 
    Ag. For. & Fish 779 1,010 1,708 (D) 231 698 (D) (D) 
    Mining 72 111 186 (D) 39 75 (D) (D) 
    Construction 26,068 20,246 21,435 16,207 (5,822) 1,189 (5,228) (9,861) 
    Manufacturing 102,172 70,697 43,731 28,534 (31,475) (26,966) (15,197) (73,638) 
    TCPU 44,898 41,153 26,525 22,320 (3,745) (14,628) (4,205) (22,578) 
    Wholesale trade 33,473 29,359 27,923 19,408 (4,114) (1,436) (8,515) (14,065) 
    Retail trade 83,829 76,453 65,330 46,668 (7,376) (11,123) (18,662) (37,161) 
    FIRE 43,388 48,337 57,667 41,224 4,949 9,330 (16,443) (2,164) 
    Services 118,341 131,141 182,622 191,257 12,800 51,481 8,635 72,916 
  Government 80,677 85,549 85,977 83,335 4,872 428 (2,642) 2,658 
Baltimore as a % of Maryland 
Total Non-Farm Employment 32% 25% 19% 15% 
   Private employment 36% 27% 19% 14% 
    Ag. For. & Fish 8% 7% 6% (D) 
    Mining 3% 4% 5% (D) 
    Construction 25% 16% 11% 8% 
    Manufacturing 37% 29% 20% 15% 
    TCPU 50% 43% 22% 16% 
    Wholesale trade 53% 32% 24% 16% 
    Retail trade 30% 21% 14% 9% 
    FIRE 39% 33% 25% 16% 
    Services 36% 26% 22% 17% 
  Government 20% 18% 17% 16% 
TCPU = Transportation, Communications and Public Utilities    FIRE = Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
Source: BEA 
Table 5 
Baltimore City vs. Maryland 





1970 1980 1990 2000 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1970-2000 
Baltimore Metro  978,115 1,125,795 1,397,100 1,522,920 147,680 271,305 125,820 544,805 
   Private employment 757,894 875,954 1,141,120 1,263,189 118060 265166 122069 505295 
    Ag. For. & Fish 3,401 5,036 10,591 (D) 1,635 5,555 (D) (D) 
    Mining (D) (D) 1,075 (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 
    Construction 51,859 60,116 89,149 89,188 8,257 29,033 39 37,329 
    Manufacturing 197,064 162,092 132,005 99,877 (34,972) (30,087) (32,128) (97,187) 
    TCPU 61,907 62,662 61,739 70,488 755 (923) 8,749 8,581 
    Wholesale trade 45,091 56,940 68,202 70,781 11,849 11,262 2,579 25,690 
    Retail trade 151,555 184,079 228,026 239,235 32,524 43,947 11,209 87,680 
    FIRE 63,654 84,645 122,771 125,809 20,991 38,126 3,038 62,155 
    Services 182,887 259,890 427,562 552,044 77,003 167,672 124,482 369,157 
  Government 220,221 249,841 255,980 259,731 29,620 6,139 3,751 39,510 
Baltimore City  533,697 504,056 513,104 450,940 (29,641) 9,048 (62,164) (82,757) 
   Private employment 453,020 418,507 427,127 367,605 (34,513) 8,620 (59,522) (85,415) 
    Ag. For. & Fish 779 1,010 1,708 (D) 231 698 (D) (D) 
    Mining 72 111 186 (D) 39 75 (D) (D) 
    Construction 26,068 20,246 21,435 16,207 (5,822) 1,189 (5,228) (9,861) 
    Manufacturing 102,172 70,697 43,731 28,534 (31,475) (26,966) (15,197) (73,638) 
    TCPU 44,898 41,153 26,525 22,320 (3,745) (14,628) (4,205) (22,578) 
    Wholesale trade 33,473 29,359 27,923 19,408 (4,114) (1,436) (8,515) (14,065) 
    Retail trade 83,829 76,453 65,330 46,668 (7,376) (11,123) (18,662) (37,161) 
    FIRE 43,388 48,337 57,667 41,224 4,949 9,330 (16,443) (2,164) 
    Services 118,341 131,141 182,622 191,257 12,800 51,481 8,635 72,916 
  Government 80,677 85,549 85,977 83,335 4,872 428 (2,642) 2,658 
Baltimore as a % of Metropolitan Area 
Total Non-Farm Employment 55% 45% 37% 30% 
   Private employment 60% 48% 37% 29% 
    Ag. For. & Fish 23% 20% 16% (D) 
    Mining (D) (D) 17% (D) 
    Construction 50% 34% 24% 18% 
    Manufacturing 52% 44% 33% 29% 
    TCPU 73% 66% 43% 32% 
    Wholesale trade 74% 52% 41% 27% 
    Retail trade 55% 42% 29% 20% 
    FIRE 68% 57% 47% 33% 
    Services 65% 50% 43% 35% 
  Government 37% 34% 34% 32% 
TCPU = Transportation, Communications and Public Utilities    FIRE = Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
Source: BEA 
Non-Farm Employment, By Sector 





 The combination of the suburbanization of the middle class and the decline in the 
economic fortunes of cities is a principal cause of the rise in concentrated urban poverty 
that has occurred since the 1970s.  Starting in the 1960s, poverty became a recurring 
theme in urban literature, but the publication of Wilson’s Truly Disadvantaged in 1987 
refocused national attention on the rise of concentrated poverty in America’s cities.  The 
study of high poverty neighborhoods again became a central national issue as academic 
literature emerged on the “neighborhood effects” on various social outcomes such as 
child wellbeing, education, employment, and poverty itself.  Poor neighborhoods were 
found to have an independent effect on individual social and economic outcomes.  The 
academic community spent considerable effort on measuring the causes and effects of the 
Jurisdiction 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
Maryland 2,343,001 3,100,689 3,922,399 4,216,975 4,780,753 5,311,508 5,615,727 
   Baltimore Metro as a % of MD 62% 58% 53% 52% 49% 47% 47% 
   Baltimore City as a % of MD 41% 30% 23% 19% 15% 12% 11% 
Baltimore Metro 1,457,181 1,803,745 2,070,670 2,174,023 2,348,219 2,516,617 2,612,164 
   Anne Arundel County 117,392 206,634 297,539 370,775 427,239 491,347 509,300 
   Baltimore County 270,273 492,428 621,077 655,615 692,134 755,995 787,384 
   Baltimore City 949,708 939,024 905,759 786,775 736,014 648,554 631,366 
   Carroll County 44,907 52,785 69,006 96,356 123,372 151,639 170,260 
   Harford County 51,782 76,722 115,378 145,930 182,132 219,506 241,402 
   Howard County 23,119 36,152 61,911 118,572 187,328 249,576 272,452 
Percentage of Baltimore Metropolitan Area 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
   Anne Arundel County 8% 11% 14% 17% 18% 20% 19% 
   Baltimore County 19% 27% 30% 30% 29% 30% 30% 
   Baltimore City 65% 52% 44% 36% 31% 26% 24% 
   Carroll County 3% 3% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
   Harford County 4% 4% 6% 7% 8% 9% 9% 
   Howard County 2% 2% 3% 5% 8% 10% 10% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 




increased concentration of urban poverty.  As a result, efforts to define and measure the 
impacts of high poverty neighborhoods became central to this discussion.   
 The academic community undertook many efforts to define and measure 
neighborhood distress, poverty, and socio-economic status.  Most of these efforts relied 
on census data.  Kasarda (1993) defined distressed neighborhoods as census tracts that 
simultaneously exhibit disproportionately high levels of poverty, joblessness, female-
headed families, and welfare recipients.  In his detailed analysis of the problem of 
concentrated urban poverty, Jargowsky (1997) focused on census tracts with 20% to 40% 
of the population living in poverty as well as tracts with 40% or more of residents living 
in poverty.  He analyzed a variety of characteristics of neighborhood distress including 
housing occupancy, vacancy, and quality; employment and labor force participation; 
income; family structure; and educational attainment.  A Russell Sage foundation-
sponsored, two-volume set of books called Neighborhood Poverty, summarized the 
debate on neighborhood effects.  In this review Gephart (1997) summarized 20 efforts to 
measure neighborhood distress, and they identified more than 25 measures that were used 
to classify neighborhood socio-economic status.   
 Baltimore exhibited most, if not all, of the various measures of increased 
concentration in urban poverty and neighborhood distress.  Because a complete analysis 
of neighborhood poverty in Baltimore is unrealistic for this dissertation, six measures of 
neighborhood distress and socio-economic status that are accepted in the broad national 
literature are used.  They were all measures for which data from 1970 through 2000 were 
readily available.  These indicators included Census tracts with: 
 More than two-thirds African-American residents;  
 High poverty (20% to 40% as well as 40% or more);  
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 Low labor force participation (less than 50%);  
 More than 50% female-headed families;  
 Low housing tenure (less than 50% of residents in the same house for five years); 
and  
 High housing vacancy (more than 10 percent). 
 Table 8 shows that the percentage of Baltimore City census tracts exhibiting these 
measures of neighborhood distress increased dramatically after 1970.8  The percentage of 
tracts with more than two-thirds African American residents increased from 40% in 1970 
to 58% in 2000 as the City went from 46% African-American in 1970 to 64% in 2000.  
The percentage of high poverty census tracts increased from 24% in the 20% to 40% 
poverty rate range and 10% in the more than 40% poverty rate range in 1970 to 40% and 
15%, respectively, in 2000.  In 2000, more than half of the neighborhoods in the City had 
20% or more of the residents living in poverty.  The percentage of tracts with more than 
50% of families headed by a single woman increased from 9% to 59%, and the 
percentage of tracts with more than 10% of housing units vacant increased from 15% to 
60%.  The geographic spread of housing vacancy, poverty, and concentration of African 
American residents from 1970 to 2000 are presented in Map 2, Map 3.  and Map 4.  
Many of Baltimore City’s neighborhoods exhibited multiple instances of distress.  As 
presented in Map 5, of Baltimore City’s 200 census tracts in the 2000 census, only 24 
exhibited none of the measures of distress, while 5 tracts exhibited all 6, 36 exhibited 5, 
38 exhibited 4, and 25 exhibited 3.   More than 50% of the census tracts in the City 
exhibited three or more indicators of neighborhood distress. 
                                               
8 The Urban Institute and Geolytics have produced a database of historical, 1970 to 2000, U.S. Bureau of 
the Census data based on year 2000 Census tracts which allows for geographic analysis based on common 





Baltimore City Neighborhood Dynamics 
1970 to 2000 
          
    1970 1980 1990 2000 
Item # % # % # % # % 
        
Baltimore City       
 African American as a % of Population 46% 55% 59% 64% 
 
Percentage of Population Living in 
Poverty 14% 23% 22% 23% 
 Percentage of 16+ Not in Labor Force 41% 43% 39% 43% 
 Female Headed Families as a % of Total 22% 33% 39% 45% 
 
Percentage of Population in Same House 5 
Years 
51% 58% 54% 53% 
 Percentage of Housing Units Vacant 2% 7% 9% 14% 
          
Total Neighborhoods or Tracts 200 200 200 200 
 More than 2/3 African American 79 40% 87 44% 98 49% 116 58% 
 Between 20% and 40% in Poverty 48 24% 70 35% 61 31% 80 40% 
 More than 40% of Pop. in Poverty 20 10% 34 17% 34 17% 30 15% 
 More than 50% Not in Labor Force 26 33% 41 21% 19 10% 51 26% 
 More than 50% Female Headed Families 18 9% 79 40% 107 54% 118 59% 
 Less than 50% in Same House 5 years 80 40% 53 27% 61 31% 68 34% 
 More than 10% Housing Units Vacant 29 15% 52 26% 65 33% 119 60% 
                    












A History of Trends in Urban Policy in Baltimore  
 Just as Baltimore was a prototypical example of the economic and social 
problems facing urban America, especially its older cities, the broad trends in urban 
policy interventions described in Chapter 2 shaped urban policy implementation in 
Baltimore.  Baltimore rose from a modest trading and commercial center in America’s 
colonial and Revolutionary War period to a major industrial and trade center during the 
Industrial Revolution and into the twentieth century.  The City thrived through the 
immediate post-World War II period, but like many older industrial Northeastern and 
Midwestern cities, its slow decline accelerated in the 1970s.  Because of its Inner Harbor 
development, Baltimore was hailed as a “comeback city” in the 1980s, but glitzy 
downtown redevelopment masked continued social and economic decline in the City’s 
neighborhoods.  In the 1990s, urban analyst, David Rusk, who was hired to do an 
assessment of Baltimore’s future by the City’s largest foundation, labeled Baltimore a 
“city in decline” (Rusk 1996).   
Locally, two important trends influenced City’s governance and separated it from 
other cities.  These were a high level of cooperation between City Hall and the City’s 
business community as well as the strong role of community organizations in City 
governance.  As in other cities, the conflict between Baltimore’s majority African-
American population and the white political establishment also contributed to its political 






Progressive Era and New Deal Reforms  
As Chapter 2 described, modern urban policy traces its roots to the Progressive 
Era.  According to Crooks (1968), the Progressive Era brought efforts to promote 
economic, political, and social reform in Baltimore.  Prior to the Progressive Era, 
political boss Isaac Raisin governed Baltimore.  Crooks (1968) viewed City government 
as mediocre in its management and reported:  
[City government in the late 1800s] cared little more for the City at large.  
Baltimore was the largest unsewered city in the country.  The streets were 
paved with cobblestones and were noisy, bumpy, and unclean.  The school 
system was one of the worst in the country (8).   
Through their collective efforts, Baltimore’s progressives were able to end “boss” rule 
and initiate reforms to improve government.  By the end of the Progressive Era, 
Baltimore passed political reforms, improved government efficiency by reducing 
patronage and spoils politics, initiated urban planning, and began policies to improve 
conditions for poor residents.  It had not, however, gone as far as other cities in political 
reform and continued to be ruled by machine politics into the 1970s. 
According to Crooks (1968), The Progressive Era culminated with a citywide 
congress in 1911 to promote making Baltimore the “best city it could become for rich and 
poor alike by 1920.”  In what would become a theme in the City’s later political 
development, Baltimore’s business community, which was alarmed at 1910 census 
results showing that the City had dropped to seventh place nationally in population, 
promoted this congress.  These businesses wanted the government to promote Baltimore 
to attract new people and businesses.  The business community and government worked 
together on a plan, and this strong, coordinated action set the precedent for future efforts 
to reform or promote development and renewal in the City. 
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According to Baltimore historian Joseph Arnold, a unique characteristic of 
Baltimore’s political development, the rise of neighborhood organizations in City 
governance, can trace its roots to the Progressive Era.  According to Arnold (1979), 
“Baltimore has achieved almost alone among the ten largest cities of the United States a 
unique reputation for strong neighborhoods and a remarkably smooth cooperation 
between local neighborhood organizations and City Hall” (4).  During the Progressive 
Era, these neighborhood organizations were formed outside of the traditional ward and 
party structure by progressive middle-class reformers to promote their interests to Boss 
Isaac Raisin and his seven-term Mayor, Ferdinand Latrobe.  These neighborhood 
associations were able to successfully lobby the City government on the allocation of 
City bond-funded capital improvements, leading to the spread of neighborhood 
organizations across the City as each sought its share of capital spending.   
According to Arnold (1979), these neighborhood associations became a mixed 
blessing for the City.  On the positive side, these organizations served as a means of 
involving citizens in the government decision-making process and gauging public 
opinion.  On the other hand, they created a new set of special interests that intensified 
political rivalries.  These early neighborhood organizations were never able to coordinate 
their efforts at the City level until much later in Baltimore’s history, but they remain a 
force for citizen involvement in City government today.   
 According to Anderson (1977):  
The progressive movement in Baltimore was largely an effort to bring the 
City’s affairs under control.  This was accomplished in much the same 
way that contemporary businesses were rationalizing their organization: 
through a centralized, functionally departmentalized structure.  As 
improvements were made during the years following 1900, the new 
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structure proved fairly successful in administering the day-to-day activities 
of Baltimore. (30)   
As a result of this success, Baltimore City thrived between the First World War 
and the New Deal.  The City added residents and grew in size through a large 1918 
Annexation that tripled the City’s area.  During this time, the economy grew by attracting 
103 new manufacturing facilities in the 1920s, and the port grew to be the third busiest in 
the nation (Argersinger 1988).    
 The business community, through the Baltimore Association of Commerce, 
continued to actively promote the economic development of the City.  However, 
according to Argersinger (1988), “There was another side to changes occurring in 
Baltimore in the 1920s, one that suggested important limits to prosperity and underscored 
the unevenness of the City’s advancements” (2).  The City’s large African-American 
population was largely excluded from the prosperity, and they “lived in the oldest and 
most congested parts of the City where they suffered disproportionately from 
unemployment, crime, disease and infant mortality” (3).  The City also developed a 
system of racially and ethnically segregated ethnic enclaves.  According to Argersinger 
(1988), “The emergence of ethnic neighborhoods in the nineteenth century and their 
persistence into the twentieth, and the proliferation of ethnically based political and 
fraternal clubs, all indicated the presence and significance of ethnicity in the social and 
political life of the City” (6).   
 During the New Deal era, the City’s Democratic mayor was unfriendly to the 
New Deal programs and “not particularly receptive to either the notion of public 
responsibility or to the people whom such a policy would benefit” (Argersinger 1988, 
13).  As a result, local politicians as well as business and real estate interests thwarted the 
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implementation of many of the New Deal’s programs, especially the creation of public 
housing for black or white residents.  Ultimately, however, the Mayor had to relent in the 
face of substantial citizen activism from a new citywide organization, the Citizen’s 
Housing Council, and mounting pressure from the federal government.  It was forced to 
create the Baltimore Housing Authority in 1937.   
Citizens and neighborhood organizations sought a role in the housing authority 
and were supported by the U.S. Housing Authority that, according to Argersinger (1988), 
“served as an important catalyst in neighborhood and tenant organization in Baltimore” 
(99-100).  While a broad-based civic organization was able to advocate on behalf of 
public housing and force the City to create a housing authority, local neighborhood 
organizations often opposed public housing projects.  Housing project opponents 
included both residents of poor communities who opposed the designation of their 
neighborhoods as slums to be cleared and the residents of neighborhoods where the 
projects were to be built.  Thus, the New Deal saw a continuation of community- and 
neighborhood-level activism in the City and the rise of coordinated action among 
community organizations, many of which played a role in the Citizen’s Housing Council.  
New Deal programs also forced the City and State to address the failings of the existing 
relief system, create a separate municipal welfare department, and formalize its planning 
for public works and development.  Political activism among the City’s large African-
American population, long shut out of City politics, also emerged in the New Deal. 
 As in cities across the nation, the Progressive and New Deal eras brought changes 
in Baltimore’s governance.  The Progressive Era brought the modernization and 
increased professionalism of the City bureaucracy and political reforms to reduce 
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patronage and corruption and promote fair elections.  The New Deal established a direct 
federal funding and oversight role in City management and forced the creation of a 
housing authority and a welfare department.  More importantly, these two eras also saw 
the emergence of two developments that dominated the City’s later political evolution.  
The first was the emergence of an alliance between the City’s business community and 
political leadership that began in the Progressive Era and continued into the New Deal.  
The second was the emergence of civic and community activism through the rise of 
formal neighborhood organizations as a force for reform.  These two developments were 
often at odds.  This conflict was demonstrated by the New Deal era’s political and social 
reforms that were opposed by the City’s Mayor and business community only to have 
citizens organizations successfully force their passage.  It was also evident in Roosevelt’s 
1936 reelection campaign in which organized citizens groups and neighborhood 
organizations campaigned vigorously for Roosevelt who won a landslide victory, forcing 
the Mayor and City political establishment into acceptance of the New Deal programs.   
 The Second World War and post-War era brought prosperity and challenges to 
Baltimore.  Wartime production supported industrial development on a massive scale.  
The Martin Company built the largest aircraft assembly plant in the world just outside of 
Baltimore; Baltimore shipyards built 500 Liberty and Victory ships; and metals and 
chemical production expanded (Olson 1980).  In the post-War period, Baltimore’s 
industrial base was converted to civilian production, and industrial output continued to 
grow.  The port of Baltimore was a major driver of the City’s economy, linking the City 
to the rest of the nation and the world.  It was supported by the continuing development 
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of Baltimore’s railroads and the construction of the national highway system in the 1960s 
(Olson 1980). 
 Despite the City’s economic prosperity, social problems continued.  Baltimore 
remained segregated by race, and the influx of workers during the war years and after 
caused an increase in slum conditions in many neighborhoods.  As a result, community 
activism continued to increase during this period.  The Citizen’s Housing Council that 
formed to facilitate the development of City public housing in the New Deal and the 
Johns Hopkins University Planning and Redevelopment Association, a group of 
professional architects, planners, and university professors, merged to form the Citizen’s 
Planning and Housing Association (CPHA) in 1941.  CPHA was “a group of concerned 
citizens intent on improving the quality of residential neighborhoods through the use of 
donated time and talents” (Lyall 1983, 21).  CPHA began with an advocacy mission of 
improving conditions in low-income communities and housing, but the organization 
ultimately evolved into a professional organization that was active in City planning, 
zoning, parks and open spaces, transportation, and environmental issues.   
CPHA affected Baltimore in a number of important ways.  Through advocacy, it 
was at the forefront of housing and other political reforms.  These reforms included 
strengthening housing code enforcement, developing public housing, developing a City 
planning department, and a formalized zoning process.  CPHA also played a central role 
in community organizing by supporting the creation and activities of approximately 150 
neighborhood associations in Baltimore.  CPHA created a widespread network of 
community activists who became involved in City politics and government (Lyall 1983).  
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For the next several decades, CPHA strengthened and coordinated the activities of the 
City’s already strong neighborhood organizations.  
Urban Renewal in Baltimore  
 By the 1950s, suburbanization of the population, increased concentration of poor 
in the City, and the deterioration in housing conditions were recognized as a threat to the 
City’s economic, fiscal, and social health.  In fact, Baltimore was ahead of the federal 
government in its recognition and development of programs to address housing 
deterioration.  The City began a program to improve housing conditions in 1945, 
preceding urban renewal by four years.  According to Olson (1980), “The City’s efforts 
ran consistently ahead of national legislation.  Federal urban renewal assistance 
increased, often building into federal incentives the latest Baltimore Plan” (375).   
 In 1956, Baltimore City formed the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing 
Agency (BURHA) to implement urban renewal in the City.  The Report of the Urban 
Renewal Study Board (Urban Renewal Study Board 1956) that recommended the creation 
of this new agency reported on the scope of need in the City.  This report found that that 
the construction of new housing was entirely concentrated in the outlying areas of the 
City and that more than three quarters of the City’s substandard housing was located in 
blighted inner City areas.  It also found that the problems of substandard housing fell 
predominantly on the City’s non-white population and recognized “The realities of the 
housing situation for Baltimore’s non-white population must be squarely faced and kept 
in mind in shaping the urban renewal program” (23).  BURHA chose the Harlem Park 
neighborhood for new housing development.  Ironically, nearly 40 years later, the 
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Baltimore Empowerment Zone selected the same neighborhood for its redevelopment 
effort, citing similar slum conditions. 
 CPHA played an important role in supporting the implementation of urban 
renewal programs and, according to the Report of the Urban Renewal Study Board 
(Urban Renewal Study Board 1956), “[CPHA] has been squarely behind urban renewal, 
and its continued support, interest, and constructive criticism are indispensable elements 
in launching and sustaining a comprehensive urban renewal program” (63).    
 As in other cities, urban renewal in Baltimore rapidly became associated with 
downtown redevelopment rather than housing.  The City’s business elite supported 
downtown urban renewal politically and financially.  According to Teaford (1990),  
In 1954, a report of the Commission on Governmental Efficiency and 
Economy emphasized Baltimore’s declining property tax base and warned 
of imminent disaster if no action were taken to reverse the trend.  
Responding to this dire prediction, developer James Rouse and some other 
prominent business leaders formed the Greater Baltimore Committee (47).   
The Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) served to coordinate the efforts of the City’s 
largest corporations: “Though the committee originally awarded freeway construction 
and harbor improvements highest priority, James Rouse was named to chair the Urban 
Renewal Subcommittee, which would be significant in promoting Baltimore’s much 
praised projects of downtown reconstruction” (Teaford 1990, 48).   
The GBC played a central role in Baltimore’s downtown revitalization.  It 
financed the City’s master plan for urban renewal and, according to Lyall (1983),  
When time came to implement the plan, GBC recognized the necessity of 
focusing on a smaller project, Charles Center, for which private 
investment and support could be raised quickly.  GBC’s follow-through on 
the Charles Center project was an unqualified success, with the City and 
press giving the organization full credit for its crucial role (30).   
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 The GBC continued to play a major, but often behind-the-scenes, role in 
Baltimore’s successful downtown development; however, the GBC’s Charles Center 
plans ended up replacing the City’s original urban renewal plan that focused on slum 
clearance, residential rehabilitation, and highway development.  According to Lyall 
(1983), “Finding no solid constituency to support its own renewal plan and faced with a 
largely self-financing master plan for downtown redevelopment, the City joined forces 
with the private sector for the first time” (549).  In the case of urban renewal, the business 
community went from supporting City policy to making it.  Noted urban scholar and 
author of Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs recognized Charles 
Center and Baltimore’s unique approach to urban renewal and called the City’s effort a 
“pioneering partnership” (Jacobs 1958). 
 The urban renewal period saw the consolidation of Baltimore government’s two-
tiered system of cooperation with business elites on one-side and community and 
neighborhood organizations on the other.  The City’s work with community organizations 
became more formalized with the development of CPHA.  CHPHA lobbied City 
government on behalf of community organizations and their residents and worked to 
strengthen community organizations through technical assistance.  The formation of the 
GBC in 1954 created a formal structure for the involvement of the Baltimore’s business 
elite in the City’s governance, and this organization played a direct role in the 
implementation of the Charles Center.  These two organizations became the voices for 
the City’s competing constituencies, with CPHA representing citizens and the GBC 
representing businesses.  CPHA and the GBC were often able to cooperate on issues; 
however, they just as often took competing positions when it came to urban renewal and 
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development.  Ironically, given the later competition between these two organizations, 
CPHA’s Businessmen’s Committee was the original group that recommended the 
formation of the GBC.    
 As the urban renewal period was ending, race became a key issue, beginning with 
school desegregation.  Efforts to integrate education in Maryland began in the 1930’s, 
when Baltimore born Thurgood Marshall initiated lawsuits against educational 
discrimination that would lay the groundwork for the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision (Orser 1994).  After the Brown decision, Baltimore City, which had made 
preliminary steps to integrate some programs starting in 1952, was forced to remove 
formal distinctions between white and black schools.   
The early days of desegregation were relatively calm in Baltimore, with only 
scattered protests, and the City was the first segregated school system to approve an 
integration plan.  However, several scholars have identified the combination of school 
desegregation with blockbusting as turning events in the City’s history.  In his study of 
the Edmondson Village community in Baltimore, Orser (1994) identified the 
desegregation and the suburban housing boom as the “twin forces of metropolitan change 
occurring in the postwar era with potentially profound consequences for the rowhouse 
community (72).”  Similarly, Durr’s (2003) assessment of white working class politics in 
the City identifies desegregation and the failure of the City’s leaders to address 
blockbusting, coupled with the rise in African American militancy in the 1960s 
(discussed below) as triggers to the rise of blue collar “working people” political activism 
in the City.  Desegregation hastened white flight from the City.  According to Orr (1999), 
Baltimore City schools went from being less than 30% African American in 1950, to 
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40% in 1960 to almost 60% in 1970, while the City’s white population fell from 75% in 
1950, to 65% in 1960 to less than 55% in 1970 (67).   
These desegregation driven demographic changes had another impact on the City 
school system.  As white teachers left to work in expanding suburban jurisdictions, black 
teachers and administrators found increased employment opportunities in City schools.  
According to Orr (1999) “Baltimore’s dual segregated school system has long been as 
source of income and upward mobility for many African Americans, especially the city’s 
black middle class. By the 1990s, however, the public school had become the linchpin of 
Baltimore’s black employment base (68).”  The schools, which had long been a source of 
patronage jobs, ultimately came under the control of the City’s African American 
political leadership.  According to Smith (1999) “the black establishment in Baltimore – 
its political, religious, and social wings included – had developed a proprietary interest in 
the city’s school system. Control over the city school was given over to African 
Americans as the inviolate pool of patronage (136).”   
The Great Society -- African-Americans Enter the Political Arena  
 The social and political turmoil of the early 1960s was less evident in Baltimore 
than in other cities.  The problems of urban blight, however, continued unabated.  The 
downtown-oriented development of the early urban renewal program did little to improve 
housing conditions or poverty in the City.  In 1964, the City’s community renewal 
process started a two-phase project to identify the urban renewal needs of Baltimore.  The 
1964 first phase report, BURHA’s Inventory of Residential Blight, found that 38% of all 
housing units in the City exhibited “major blight conditions” with 77% of nonwhite 
housing units exhibiting major blight compared to 23% of white housing units.  The 
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report found that the entire central area of the City exhibited moderate to major blight 
conditions, with little or no blight in the outlying sections of the City.  The second phase 
Analysis of Community Needs report (BURHA 1965) found that “Many white families – 
particularly young and middle-aged – moved out of the City” and that “the flow of 
migrants to the City during this period involved mostly low-income non-white families”.  
Few of the non-white, low-income migrants or residents were able to find “sound 
housing. . . thereby enlarging the ghettos”  The level of personal income was identified as 
the key barrier to adequate housing, with one-third of all families, most of them non-
white, having incomes less than $3,000 per year.   
The Johnson’s administration’s War on Poverty programs focused on improving 
conditions in these poor communities, especially in African-American neighborhoods.  
As was the case with urban renewal, Baltimore was ahead of the nation in recognizing the 
need for urban reforms.  According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), “For nearly a decade 
before the Community Action Program (CAP) was formally constituted, the BURHA had 
been carrying on a CAP-type effort, including community organization and neighborhood 
development, in its public housing projects” (165).  Baltimore’s Department of Public 
Welfare and Department of Health had been running multi-component welfare programs 
for years, and three private nonprofits organization—the Archdiocese of Baltimore, 
Associated Jewish Charities, and the Community Chest—ran private social service and 
welfare programs.  Whites, however, ran these efforts and programs.  The initiation of the 
War on Poverty programs instigated racial conflict over the management and direction of 
the new federally-funded programs. 
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 Baltimore’s social service system recognized the need for reform and 
comprehensive services in 1962, and it established a Master Plan for Human 
Development that envisioned a comprehensive and coordinated approach with wide 
community support to address poverty.  They even submitted this plan to the Ford 
Foundation for funding under the Gray Areas program that was the predecessor to the 
War on Poverty programs, but they did not receive funding.  The City built upon its own 
welfare reform efforts to develop its Plan for Action in 1964 that met all of the 
requirements of the Community Action Program.  Before this plan was finalized, 
however, an alternative plan was put forth by a new organization, the Union for Jobs or 
Income Now (U-JOIN), an effort led by the City’s African-American community.  The 
U-JOIN proposal emphasized the mobilization of the poor, African-American 
community.  The City rejected the U-JOIN plan and adopted its own plan, and it received 
CAP funding in 1965.  This resulted in racial conflict over the management of the 
program.  According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), 
Among the politically active Negroes in Baltimore, especially those who 
spoke in the name of the blacks in the Action Area, the belief was 
prevalent that the black community had been largely ignored in the 
process that produced the Plan for Action.  To the Negro leaders, that is to 
say, the Plan was a program designed by the ‘white power structure’ to do 
something for Negros.  As such, the plan was suspect.  Unable to shape 
the Plan to their preferences, the leaders in the Negro community 
determined to have a loud voice in the way in which the CAP was manned 
and implemented. (182) 
 The African-American community was committed to having both its leaders and 
residents serve in the oversight of the CAP.  The Mayor struck a compromise by 
appointing six whites and five African-Americans to the oversight commission.  Three of 
the African-American representatives were active in opposing the City plan, but none 
were poor or area residents.  The federal government, however, later expanded the 
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oversight committee to include four residents, leading to a victory for the African-
American community (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). 
 This racial controversy spilled over into the implementation of the Johnson 
administration’s War on Poverty programs.  While Baltimore avoided the race-based 
conflicts and mass violence of the early 1960s, racial tensions in the City mounted.  The 
City attempted to restrict the Community Action Agency (CAA) operations to service 
delivery, and staff were forbidden to organize residents for political action; however, 
some CAA staff viewed community organizing and empowerment as mandated by the 
law and necessary to achieve their mission.  According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), 
“To put it plainly, without saying so, the CAP’s managers were by the end of 1967 
abetting a policy of organizing the black poor into the City’s political process and of 
building up a political base for the CAA as the City’s ‘chosen instrument’ for the war on 
poverty” (84).   
 In the aftermath of Baltimore’s 1968 riots that occurred after the death of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and despite political concessions by newly elected Mayor D’Alesandro 
who had courted and received the African-American vote, racial conflict emerged as a 
key issue in City politics with the CAA at the forefront.  The CAA reallocated funds to 
support organizing in public housing, opposed the development of Mayor’s stations in 
neighborhoods in the City, helped organize a ‘Poor Peoples’ rally, and organized protest 
demonstrations.  In response, the City Council cut the CAA’s budget and restricted the 
use of funds for organizing.  In 1968, the CAA director resigned, making “no effort to 
conceal his belief that the Mayor and City Council were deliberately undermining the 
agency in reprisal for its increasingly aggressive organizational activities among the 
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poverty area residents” (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 89).  With the federal transition from 
CAP to Model Cities, the Mayor and City Council took control and appointed safe 
appointees to run the programs (Bachrach and Baratz 1970).    
 As in other cities across the nation, the legacy of the Johnson administration’s 
War on Poverty programs in Baltimore was one of conflict.  The CAA became the 
vehicle for promoting the political empowerment of the City’s largely disenfranchised 
African-American community.  CPHA and Baltimore’s community and neighborhood 
organizations continued to influence City policy, and the GBC worked with the City 
government on downtown redevelopment.  Added to this was the strong and increasingly 
vocal efforts of the City’s African-American community to gain political power. 
Tensions Over Development  
During the 1970s and 1980s, under both the Nixon-Ford-Carter period of 
devolution and the Reagan-Bush period of privatization, economic conditions 
deteriorated in Baltimore.  According to Olson (1980), the City’s rapid post-War 
economic progress began to slow in the 1970s with a national and international economic 
recession: “By 1975, many of the companies that had built Baltimore were experiencing 
problems.  Black & Decker shut down local production, Western Electric and Bethlehem 
Steel were laying off workers,” and “some of the City’s oldest large plants were shut 
down for good” (366).  This continued into the 1980s as Baltimore lost further retail and 
manufacturing jobs.  In the 1990s, City employment suffered from financial industry and 
general corporate consolidation that led to large-scale outside acquisition and downsizing 
of leading downtown employers.  Compounding the economic decline of the City, the 
protests of the 1960s destabilized the political status quo. 
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The 1970s and 1980s were a period of conflict over the direction of Baltimore.  
The business community that promoted a downtown-oriented development strategy was 
on one side while citizens groups, often represented or supported by CPHA, sought to 
protect neighborhoods and quality of life issues.  In the middle was the long-serving 
Mayor, William Donald Schaefer, who governed from 1972 to 1986.  Mayor Schaefer 
replaced Mayor D’Alesandro.   Mayor D’Alesandro was the son of a popular three-term 
Mayor and had bridged the racial divide in the City by openly courting and receiving the 
black vote.  Yet, after the turmoil of the late 1960s and the 1968 riots, he chose not to 
seek a second term: “He realized the ‘increasing powerlessness of the big city mayor . . . 
to close the Pandora’s box of urban troubles’” (Teaford  1990, 201).   
A central issue in the political conflict in Baltimore during the 1970s and into the 
1980s was the plan for downtown redevelopment.  Baltimore’s downtown redevelopment 
plans dated back to the urban renewal period.  New York’s planner, Robert Moses, 
proposed a downtown freeway to cut through downtown Baltimore in 1944.  The City 
Council and Downtown Committee supported the highway, but they did not move 
forward with the plans because of fiscal constraints and the need to displace so many 
residents for the plans to be completed.  This highway remained on the planning books 
and a source of conflict for several decades.  It ultimately became the proposed East-
West Expressway, and it remained a part of Baltimore’s urban renewal plans.  The 
Greater Baltimore Committee made the road a key goal and “promised it would ‘spend 
every effort to obtain official City, State, and federal approval of a route for the East-
West Expressway’” (Teaford 1990, 165).   
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Community organizations opposed the business community.  In the 1960s and 
1970s, across the nation, neighborhood leaders and organizations arose to protect 
neighborhood residents from the efforts of City businesses and governments to promote 
downtown-oriented redevelopment.  These leaders and organizations opposed what 
Teaford called the trinity of evils: highway construction, urban renewal, and redlining by 
financial institutions (1990).  The successful efforts of community organizations in 
Baltimore to block the East-West expressway “was one of the most publicized” efforts 
nationally (1990, 245).  The successful effort to block the highway was led by a young 
social worker from east Baltimore, Barbara Mikulski, now Senator, who used 
community-organizing techniques to defeat Mayor Schaefer on the road.  According to 
Smith (1999), Mayor Schaefer learned a valuable lesson, “Baltimore neighborhoods and 
Baltimore people did have spirit  … People would stand up and speak truth to power and 
authority – or respond to it if well-directed (55).”  With the defeat of the East-West 
Expressway, this era represented the height of the power of community organizations in 
the City’s governance. 
African-Americans Assume Political Power  
While racial relations were a recurrent issue in City politics, it joined downtown 
redevelopment at the top of the agenda in the late 1970s.  The City’s African-American 
community was long shut out of government and political power.  Conflict over efforts to 
mobilize the African-American community was a key element in the City’s experience 
with the War on Poverty’s CAA program.  The issue of racial conflict was central in the 
decision of popular one-term Mayor, Thomas D’Alesandro III, to resign in the aftermath 
of the turmoil and riots of the late 1960s.  The 1971 Mayoral election pitted two African-
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American candidates, George Russell who was a member of the old guard, and Clarence 
Mitchell III who was a younger and more militant member of the black political dynasty, 
against the white President of the City Council who was part of the City’s political 
machine, William Donald Schaefer.  Schaefer won the election by winning every white 
precinct in the City while Mitchell diluted Russell’s performance in African-American 
districts.  Even though the white candidate won, this election changed City politics 
because the white political clubs that formed the basis of the City’s political machine 
began to take blacks seriously.   
A black political leadership was beginning to emerge.  According to McDougall 
(1993), “the cohort of black electoral professionals [that] developed during the 1960s and 
1970s licked their wounds and repositioned themselves to bid for power” (94).  In the 
1970s, court rulings forced redistricting, and continued white flight made the City a 
majority African-American city.  By the 1980s, African-American candidates, including 
Kurt Schmoke, who would later be elected Mayor, were winning citywide elections and 
challenging the City’s political machine.  By the 1990s, African-Americans assumed 
control over most of the City’s key elected positions.   
Even while the African-American community gained political strength in the 
1980s, it remained segregated.  Economic conditions in Baltimore deteriorated in the 
1970s and 1980s.  As middle class whites and even African-Americans fled to the 
suburbs, the City’s tax base declined.   Fiscal conditions were worsened by the 
reprogramming of urban aid to the suburbs under devolution and cuts in urban aid under 
the Reagan-Bush administrations.  Retail employment moved to the suburbs, and 
manufacturing employment declined.  Despite the end of exclusionary zoning rules, the 
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City remained segregated.  According to McDougall (1993), “The division of Baltimore 
and its metropolitan area into a prosperous white and a declining black community has 
exacerbated racial tension” (106).   
The efforts to improve social, economic, and political conditions in the African-
American community spawned a new set of African-American-led community 
organizations and actors in the City.  McDougall (1993) analyzed the development of 
these new community groups in Baltimore in the context of the “base communities’ that 
developed with the liberation theology movement in Latin America.  Base communities 
were small peer groups of persons with a similar social background working to improve 
conditions for their group.  They were “important networking and empowering devices” 
to promote economic, political and social gains.  According to McDougall (1993), 
“Community activists remaining in black Baltimore began building institutions designed 
to fill the growing gap between the social functions that the weakened vernacular 
community could no longer perform and the social functions that government was 
increasingly unwilling or unable to perform” (3).  New organizations developed, such as 
BUILD, Community Building in Partnership, and New Song Ministries, to serve the 
African-American community.  Many grew out of the black churches that remained in 
their original, now poor, communities, and the government and private sector supported 
others.  These new organizations added to the already well-developed system of 
community organizations in the City.   
Marion Orr (1999) explored the issue of race relations in the case of school 
reform in Baltimore in the context of social capital.  A simple definition of social capital 
is relationships within groups and between groups and the larger society that facilitate 
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economic, political, or social ends.  To Orr, Baltimore, with its well-networked African-
American community, was a prime location to study social capital.  The African-
American community in Baltimore developed social capital in order to pursue its interests 
in a white-dominated political and economic environment.  According to Orr (1999), 
“Baltimore’s African-American community developed significant common bonds and 
important institutions to combat racial discrimination” (8).  As Baltimore’s African-
American population grew, it was gradually and reluctantly integrated into the City’s 
political power structure.  By 1963, with the election of Republican McKeldin as Mayor, 
and extending into the 1967 election of Thomas D’Alesandro, the City’s political 
machine courted African-American leaders and voters and provided them with patronage 
jobs.  Black political power grew in the 1970s and 1980s as the City became majority 
African-American, and, with the election of Kurt Schmoke as Mayor in 1987, the City’s 
African-American community finally assumed control. 
Racial conflict, however, continued and even intensified with the rise of African-
American political power.  Orr explored this conflict in the context of the fight over 
control over the City’s public schools: “Baltimore’s political culture spawned the 
expectation that the public school system functions principally as a major source of jobs 
and patronage, and the City’s African-American middle class leaders accepted that as 
their vision” (1999, 62).  As the City’s manufacturing and economic base declined, these 
government jobs became more important.   However, as a result of white and middle-
class flight from the City, the resulting rise in the concentration of poverty, and the 
increased use of private schools by the remaining middle-class, school performance 
plummeted.  In the 1980s, as the African-American community finally assumed 
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leadership of the City, school reform became a central issue.  This caused conflict 
between the City’s leadership and community as well as among communities since some 
sought to improve schools while others sought to protect patronage jobs and African-
American school leaders (Orr 1999).   
With its industrial history, education may have been less important in a City 
where a union, blue collar was the path to the middle class and middle and upper income 
residents have a strong private school tradition.  According to Smith (1999), the City 
schools were always a source of patronage jobs and “though politicians never dared to 
intrude openly on education, Sondheim [a long serving bureaucrat and political advisor] 
was told that a principal’s post could be purchased from the bosses for $150, a vice 
principalship for $100 (69-70).”  As the City became home to a disproportionate share of 
the State’s poor, the performance of the City’s patronage driven school system 
plummeted for both demographic and administrative reasons.  As a result, school reform 
has been a City and State issue since the Schaefer era, and a major issue for the Schmoke 
administration.  The conflict over State aid and managerial efficiency continues to this 
day. 
Mayor Schaefer’s Reign  
In the center of these conflicts was Mayor Schaefer.  Schaefer was able to balance 
both the conflict between the City’s community organizations and business community 
over downtown development and over the changing racial environment in the City.  
Under his leadership, Baltimore was hailed as a comeback City on the basis of its Inner 
Harbor development, and the African-American community was able to move into 
political leadership with little conflict.   
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Mayor Schaefer was best known for his successful development of Baltimore’s 
downtown area.  The Inner Harbor redevelopment occurred in two phases.  The first 
phase was the Charles Center project.  During this time, plans were developed for the 
City’s Inner Harbor retail and hotel development, but in 1964 voters rejected a bond issue 
to fund the first part of this development.  According to Levine (1987),  
The election of Mayor Schaefer in 1971 inaugurated the second and more 
critical phase of Baltimore’s downtown redevelopment strategy.  
Schaefer’s aggressive boosterism and entrepreneurial talents permitted 
City planners and corporate leaders to expand the scope of the 1954-1970 
redevelopment initiatives and to implement a comprehensive corporate 
center strategy in the 1970s. (107)   
During Schaefer’s long tenure as Mayor, the Inner Harbor retail and office 
development, the National Aquarium, the Maryland Science Center, the 27-story World 
Trade Center, hotels, and the convention center were built in downtown Baltimore.  As a 
result of this successful downtown redevelopment, the City became known nationally as 
a “renaissance city.”  The development of the Inner Harbor proceeded despite the 
opposition of citizens groups who wanted to preserve the waterfront for public use.   
While citizens groups were not able to implement their vision for downtown 
redevelopment, as described above, they were able to stop the East-West Expressway.  
Ironically, stopping the highway resulted in the preservation of several neighborhoods 
that would become part of Baltimore’s reputation as a comeback city. 
Keeping with Baltimore’s history of cooperation between government and 
businesses, Mayor Schaefer relied on the GBC and development interests to promote 
Inner Harbor development.  Under the Schaefer administration, the City government and 
the business community cooperated through a system of quasi-governmental, public-
private partnerships that came to be called the “shadow government” by the Baltimore 
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Sun.  These public-private partnerships supported redevelopment by pooling the risk of 
projects, combining public and private resources, and avoiding the bureaucratic red tape 
associated with government projects.  Opponents called these agencies anti-democratic 
and held that they reduced the public’s ability to shape or evaluate redevelopment 
projects (Levine 1987, 2000; Stoker 1987). 
While the Schaefer administration was best know for its downtown 
redevelopment as well as cooperation with the City’s business elite and the “shadow 
government,” Schaefer was equally successful in working with the City’s strong 
neighborhood organizations.  Schaefer had a longstanding commitment to the City’s 
neighborhoods and integrated community level organizations into his own political 
machine.  As a young, politician he was a member of CPHA.  As he moved up in the 
City’s political machine, he always maintained his neighborhood credentials and, as City 
Council President and Mayor, he built up his own political machine at the neighborhood 
level.  According to Baltimore Sun political columnist and Schaefer biographer C. Fraser 
Smith (1999), “In the neighborhoods, Schaefer established Mayor’s Stations and staffed 
them with loyal supporters who could be paid from federal funds.  He had a grid of area 
advisory committees to decide (up to a point) how grants should be spent, and the 
neighborhoods saw the money flow” (224).  His commitment to neighborhoods was real 
and more than political expediency.  It was not uncommon for the Mayor to drive around 
the City at night and call department heads in the morning to address any problems that 
he found.  According to Smith, Schaefer had “a devotion to making the government serve 
the neighborhoods” (146).   
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Writing at the height of the Mayor’s popularity in 1983, Johns Hopkins political 
scientist Matthew Crenson wrote a famous book on neighborhood politics analyzing 
Baltimore.  Crenson compared Schaefer to Chicago’s Richard Daley and credited his 
high degree of executive control over the City to his control over the City’s “outsized” 
share of federal funding, the “unwavering support of the local business community,” and 
a “compliant” City bureaucracy.  According to Crenson (1983), “As authority takes root 
downtown, the political prospects for neighborhoods seem to wither away” (292).   
Despite the high degree of centralized control over development, the concept of 
strong neighborhoods remained central to Baltimore.  Mayor Schaefer credited 
neighborhoods with his own and the City’s success.  To Crenson (1983), “Baltimore’s 
neighborhood politics enhance the authority of the City’s leadership not so much because 
of the organized backing that they provide but because they help to ensure that the task of 
leadership itself remains a manageable one” (296).  By providing local leadership and 
information, strong neighborhoods working with the government as well as politicians 
made the City more governable; however, others criticized the Mayor’s neighborhood 
work.  McDougall (1993) reported, “Schaefer put community activists on his payroll, co-
opting many of the City’s once strident neighborhood workers.  Those who refused to 
play were shut out” (87).  Also “Schaefer had adopted the Richard Daley (Chicago) 
model of city administration, and kept all power in his own hands while making City 
leaders feel they had access to power through him” (88).  
Mayor Schaefer was also able to quiet racial tensions in the City.  The riots 
following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King set the context for Schaefer to 
become Mayor.  Even though Mayor Schaefer defeated two African-American candidates 
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in 1971, he earned the respect of the City’s African-American leadership.  During his 
tenure on the City Council, Schaefer had a record of voting “right” on racial issues and 
was rewarded with the support of most of Baltimore’s African-American leadership.  
While he defeated a split African-American ticket in 1971 on the basis of white voter 
support, he won the 1975 and 1979 elections by winning both black and white precincts.   
Racial conflict, however, intensified in the 1983 Mayoral election after, in 1982, a 
slate of African-American leaders, including later Mayor Kurt Schmoke, bypassed the 
established political machine and were elected to citywide office.  In 1983, Schaefer 
faced an African-American judge who sought to awaken “the sleeping giant” of black 
political activism in the City through race-conscious public speaking.  Nevertheless, 
based on Schaefer’s record of accomplishment and support by many black leaders, he 
won both the black and white vote.  According to Smith (1999), “Baltimore’s black 
electorate was not prepared to abandon reason and objectivity for a purely black-based 
political appeal.  Historically, according to State legislator [and African -American 
political leader] Pete Rawlings, black Baltimore resented the suggestion, made from 
within and without, that they would choose skin color over merit and qualifications” 
(221).   
The Schaefer years were impacted by the changes that occurred in federal urban 
policy over that period.  The centralization of federal urban assistance through block 
grants gave the Mayor significant control over federal spending.  He used this to push his 
redevelopment projects and to fund and develop a network of community organizers 
loyal to his administration.  In doing so, the Schaefer administration merged the block 
grant system with Baltimore’s own traditions of government-private sector cooperation 
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and strong community organizations in a way that enhanced his control over the City.  
Federal funding provided the glue that held together the “shadow government” and 
provided a significant amount of the money spent on Inner Harbor redevelopment.  City 
control of block grant funding forced the City’s strong base of community organizations 
to work with his administration.  Thus, the combination of strong leadership and 
devolution provided Schaefer’s administration with the means to mediate the conflict 
between citizens and businesses over the future of the City and shape development to fit 
his vision. 
Mayor Schmoke’s Tenure  
Ironically, racial conflict in the City intensified after the election of its first black 
Mayor.  In 1987, Kurt Schmoke defeated Clarence “Du” Burns, also an African-
American and the City’s acting Mayor who, as City Council President, assumed the 
office after Mayor Schaefer was elected governor of Maryland.  This election represented 
the triumph of the new, modern African-American leadership over the old black 
leadership.  Schmoke was young, photogenic, and articulate as well as a high school 
football star, Ivy League-educated lawyer, and Rhodes Scholar.  Du Burns was an East 
Baltimore political operative who, with the patronage position of being janitor at the 
Dunbar High School, worked his way up and assumed the City Council Presidency with 
the support of the white political machine.   
Mayor Schmoke sought to minimize racial conflicts in the City.  He opposed the 
1991 redistricting of City Council districts to replace the gerrymandered districts that 
favored whites with six majority black and one majority white district.  According to 
McDougall (1993), “This [redistricting] was engineered over vehement opposition from 
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Mayor Schmoke, who wanted to build white support for his citywide policies and felt that 
all black districts would discourage racial coalition politics” (98).  He was right.  
Schmoke’s own non-radical and limited efforts to redress the economic, political, and 
social injustices of the past polarized the racial situation in the City.  According to Smith 
(1999), “[Schaefer] was certain Schmoke and Gibson9 wanted to make Baltimore an all 
black city.  The old integrationalist ideal was fading under Schmoke’s housing and 
neighborhood revitalization policies, Schaefer thought, and he resented it” (368).  Many 
white voters shared this view.  
According to Levine (2000): 
Kurt L. Schmoke, took office in 1987 as Baltimore’s first elected black 
Mayor (in a City that had become, by then, almost 60% black).  Early in 
his tenure, Schmoke appeared anxious to tilt City priorities towards 
education and neighborhood revitalization, stating that “we must build 
upon the successes of our downtown redevelopment program and ensure 
that the benefits of growth reach the neighborhoods” (133).   
Mayor Schmoke gave greater emphasis to resident and community needs and, during his 
time in office, the City began one of the first Comprehensive Community Initiatives, the 
Enterprise Foundation-funded Sandtown-Winchester project in West Baltimore.  
According to Levine (2000), despite his emphasis on communities and education, Mayor 
Schmoke continued to support the downtown development strategies put in place by his 
predecessor and supported by the GBC.  He supported the development of Baltimore’s 
two downtown sports stadiums, expanded the convention center, built the Columbus 
Center (a marine biotechnology center on the Inner Harbor), and supported the 
development of two downtown hotels.   
                                               




Mayor Schmoke was elected to three terms and served as Mayor during difficult 
times.  The City’s fiscal condition deteriorated with the Reagan-Bush era cuts in urban 
aid.  Downtown employment declined as a result of the continued suburbanization of 
employment as well as corporate and financial industry restructuring.  Crime increased 
and City schools declined.  In the 1990s, Baltimore lost its “comeback city” reputation of 
the prior decade.  In 1996, urban analyst David Rusk identified Baltimore as one of the 
cities that had passed “the point of no return” economically, socially, and fiscally.  In 
1999, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Now is the 
Time: Places Left Behind in the New Economy report classified Baltimore City as one of 
the nation's 74 "doubly burdened" central cities that face continued high unemployment 
as well as significant population loss or persistently high poverty rates.  Baltimore City, 
in fact, was one of the extreme cases that faced all three measures of burden analyzed by 
HUD (1999). 
 Mayor Schmoke was able to establish African-American control over City 
politics without the disruptions that occurred in other cities.  There were criticisms by the 
white community, but the Mayor established cross-racial coalitions, especially within the 
white-dominated business community.  In an analysis of race and City politics, 
Henderson (1996) called Schmoke’s strategy “transracial,” meaning that it was inclusive 
of race as an issue but cognizant of the need to transcend racial conflict to focus on “both 
common agendas and ultimate social, economic, and fiscal needs” (172).  Schmoke 
maintained a good working relationship with the City’s business leadership and forged a 
cooperative relationship with State government, especially after Governor Glendening 
replaced Governor Schaefer in 1994.  He developed new systems of working with 
 
 145 
community organizations and supported the creation of African-American civic and 
community organizations.  The experience of two of the organizations created by the 
Schmoke administration, Community Building in Partnership and the Historic East 
Baltimore Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC), figured prominently in the 
application for and design of the City’s Empowerment Zone.  Smith (1999) summarized 
his tenure as follows: “History had chosen him, and he did well enough, keeping the City 
afloat with almost none of the federal help Schaefer had had” (368).   
During Mayor Schmoke’s tenure, the broad federal urban policy and economic 
trends impacting cities nationally also affected Baltimore.  Social and economic 
conditions deteriorated as a result of the global and national economic trends that put 
cities at a disadvantage.  As in other cities, the 1980s and 1990s saw the expansion in the 
operations of CDCs and other community organizations, but, in Baltimore, these 
developed as part of the City’s existing base of community organizations.  Possibly 
because of the City’s emphasis on downtown development and the dominance of quasi-
governmental agencies in development during the Schaefer years, CDCs developed more 
slowly in Baltimore than in other cities; yet, in 1998, the Urban Institute ranked 
Baltimore as a “New Arrival in the Top Tier” of high CDC capacity cities because 
Baltimore experienced an above-average increase in the capacity of City CDCs (Walker 
and Weinheimer 1998).  Maryland was also one of the first states to create Enterprise 
Zones, passing legislation in 1982 that designated much of the City’s industrial land as 
such.  A State Enterprise Zone evaluation found that Baltimore was one of the regions 
reaping the most benefits from the State program (Maryland Department of Business and 
Economic Development 2002).  As a result of the Mayor’s and the City’s emphasis on 
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community organizations, Baltimore was home to one of the first CCIs and was awarded 
one of the first six federal Empowerment Zones.   
O’Malley as Mayor  
In 2000, Mayor Schmoke chose not to run for re-election.  In this election, the 
black vote was again split between two candidates, allowing white City Councilman 
Martin O’Malley, son-in-law to the leader of one of Baltimore’s old “political machine” 
families, to become Mayor.  Four years later, he was reelected with 87% of the vote.  As 
Mayor, O’Malley emphasized crime and quality of life issues, and he executed a forceful 
top-down approach to City management unlike the Schmoke administration.  The pace of 
downtown development quickened with his election, and he sought to improve City 
infrastructure to attract businesses and address quality of life concerns to draw “young 
professionals” to the City.   
Under O’Malley, the City continued to work with and through its substantial base 
of community and neighborhood organizations.  Baltimore reorganized into nine districts 
that acted as City Council districts, planning units, and police districts.  It operated 
neighborhood service centers and informally engaged its many community organizations 
in planning issues.  Mayor O’Malley did not utilize the City’s community and 
neighborhood organizations in the same way as either of his predecessors had, and he 
adopted a highly centralized, bureaucracy-driven administrative style.   
Baltimore was home to more than 600 neighborhood and community associations 
active across the City.  Most were small, had no paid staff, had an annual budget of less 
than $10,000, and focused on housing, sanitation, crime issues, and activities like 
community festivals or beautification (Clinch 2003).  The City was also home to 24 
 
 147 
“umbrella organizations,” most of which were formed in the 1960s and early 1970s and 
served as coalitions of neighborhoods and community groups that focused on planning, 
community organizing, and service delivery.  Umbrella organizations delivered services 
ranging from workforce development and housing counseling to substance abuse under 
contract to City and State government agencies and nonprofits.  While Baltimore’s 
umbrella organizations were formed in the period of neighborhood activism in the 1960s, 
many later became an informal part of the City’s governance.  Many were linked with the 
white political establishment associated with the activist Schaefer administration.   
The Baltimore foundation community also had a long tradition of working with 
and through community organizations.  The Baltimore Community Foundation was one 
of the nation’s leading community foundations and part of the Ford Foundation’s 
Leadership Program for Community Foundations program, an effort to develop the 
capacity of community foundations to serve as promoters of community-led 
development.  In Baltimore, foundations funded a variety projects to promote 
community-based development, including the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative to 
support neighborhood revitalization; the Neighborhood Design Center to assist distressed 
communities with planning and design services; the Maryland Center for Community 
Development to provide technical assistance to CDCs; and the Goldseker Foundation’s 
Healthy Neighborhoods Approach to fund community development activities.  The City 
was also home the national Annie E. Casey Foundation, one of the sponsors of the 
Rebuilding Communities Initiative CCI, and was later involved in East Side 




The Impact of Local Political Trends on the City’s EZ Strategy 
Baltimore’s two-tiered Empowerment Zone Strategy represented the convergence 
of the three trends that shaped the City’s political evolution.  The creation of the 
Empower Baltimore Management Corporation, overseen by a blue ribbon board 
dominated by the City’s business and foundation elite, drew on the City’s history of 
working through “shadow government” quasi-public development organizations.  The 
City’s strategy to implement the Federal Empowerment Zone initiative through the 
creation of local community organizations drew on the City’s rich history and experience 
with community organizations.  The choice of a prominent African American lawyer as 
the initial director, followed soon by a respected African-American community leader, 
represented the ascendancy of African-American population into political control over 
the City. 
The City also had experience with the comprehensive, community-driven focus of 
CCIs through the Sandtown-Winchester effort.  Rouse Company and the Enterprise 
Foundation staff played an important part in the City’s Empowerment Zone application 
process.  Jim Rouse was on the original Board of EBMC, and the President of EBMC for 
most of its operations, Diane Bell, was the City’s representative to Sandtown-Winchester.  
As a result, it is not surprising that the City’s Empowerment Zone chose a community-





THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMMUNITY-DRIVEN 
EMPOWERMENT ZONE STRATEGY IN BALTIMORE 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s 
efforts to build community capacity in six neighborhoods in Baltimore City.  This chapter 
begins with a brief summary of the findings of this assessment of the community capacity 
building experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.  It goes on to describe the 
overall structure and design of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s community capacity 
building effort before a detailed case study description of the formation and ten year 
operating experience of the six village centers.  The case studies are presented in 
geographical order, going clockwise from the north – see Map 1 in Chapter 1. 
This dissertation draws on the results of research conducted for the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone’s management entity – the Empower Baltimore Management 
Corporation (EBMC) by the author, most importantly the June 2004 report, The 
Community Capacity-Building Impacts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, and the 
November 2004 report, The Lessons Learned from the Community Capacity Building 
Efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone Village Centers (Clinch 2004 a and b).  The 
yearlong research effort undertaken for these reports consisted of six focus groups with 
42 EBMC and Village Center staff and Board members and in-person interviews (in 
several cases more than one) with more than 50 persons active in the creation and 
management of EBMC and the village centers.  All of the focus groups were taped and 
professionally transcribed.  About one-third of the interviews were taped and transcribed 
with detailed notes taken by the author in all of the interviews.  A list of the persons 
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interviewed and focus group attendees is included as Appendix A to this dissertation.  
Focus group participants and many of the persons interviewed were guaranteed 
anonymity; so many quotes in the case studies and later in this dissertation are not 
attributed to a specific individual.  This research also draws on EBMC-sponsored 
sustainability reports prepared for each of the village centers in 2003 and 2004 by 
NOMAGIC, Inc.  The descriptions, opinions and analyses presented in this chapter are, 
unless otherwise attributed, the view of the author and represent the results of several 
years of work with EBMC.   
Overview and Summary of Findings 
The federal EZ/EC Initiative set out to reverse the pattern of federal neglect of 
urban areas and problems with a targeted, place-based, redevelopment effort.  The 
Clinton administration’s EZ/EC Initiative emphasized community participation in the 
design and delivery of services.  This represented a break from the decades long 
experience of federal urban block grants, which are generally controlled by cities’ mayors 
and bureaucracy.  The Clinton administration’s goal for the EZ/EC Initiative was that it 
would be community driven, and controlled by the residents of the targeted communities.  
The City implemented a two-tied management structure that is recognized as the most 
community-driven of all of the cities awarded a full EZ (Nathan and Wright 1995; 
Chaskin and Peters 1997; Hebert et al. 2001).  This two-tiered structure consisted of 
EBMC, a quasi-governmental, nonprofit entity, at the top overseeing implementation of 
the new federally funded programs delivered by six community run village centers.   
As described in Chapter 1, the implementation of urban programs through 
community organizations, as was undertaken with the EZ/EC Initiative in Baltimore, 
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presumes sufficient community capacity to plan for and deliver government funded 
services.  In Baltimore, the task was even more complex because five of the six village 
centers were formed as entirely new organizations, and the sixth, HEBCAC, was only 
two years old.  The village centers had to deal with the many difficulties inherent in 
creating new organizations while simultaneously implementing high profile federally 
funded programs.   
The Baltimore Empowerment Zone effort succeeded in creating new community 
organizations that operated through the ten-year federally funded period in five of the six 
village centers.  One village center, the Self-Motivated People’s Community Village 
Center, closed in 2000 as a result of misuse of funds and ongoing board disagreement and 
strife.  As described in Chapter 3 and below, Self-Motivated was home to one of the 
nation’s first CCIs, the Enterprise Foundation’s Sandtown Winchester project.  The 
Village Center was formed as a separate independent organization outside of the 
Community Building in Partnership (CBIP) organization that managed many of the 
CCI’s programs.  The community leaders who formed Self Motivated wanted a new 
organization, independent of CBIP, which they saw as controlled by “outside” foundation 
and City interests.  However, the Village Center was unable to overcome the loss of the 
dynamic leader who led the formation process, only to be removed for the misuse of 
funds.  The remaining five village centers operated throughout the ten-year federal 
funding period.  A second village center, Harlem Park/Lafayette Square Village Center, 
was closed in the waning months of the federally funded EZ operating period, again 
because of misuse of funds.   
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Four of the village centers created by the Baltimore Empowerment Zone continue 
to operate today, one as a smaller, successor CDC.  All continue to implement a variety 
of programs to improve community conditions.  Thus, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
can be considered at least a partial success in creating sustainable community 
development capacity – one of the four core goals established by the Clinton 
administration. 
Baltimore City was designated as a full Empowerment Zone in December 1994.  
It established guidelines for the village centers in April 1995 and accepted the 
applications from the six communities to form village centers between September of 
1995 and February of 2006.  Four of the six village centers received funding starting in 
1996 and the remaining two started operations in 2007.  The operational benchmarks for 
each village center are presented in Table 9.   
The demographic characteristics of the village centers are presented in Table 10.  
As required by the federal EZ/EC initiative’s application, Baltimore’s EZ 
communities were among the poorest in the City.  However, in choosing the communities 
to be included in the application and the program, the City was strategic in its selection 
process.  It chose communities that met the poverty and social distress requirements of 
the initiative, but had some redevelopment potential.  Two of the communities, East 
Harbor and Washington Village, were in the path of redevelopment radiating out from 
downtown.  Two others, HEBCAC and Poppleton, had key university and hospital 
institutions active or interested in the community.  As described above, the Sandown 
community – in the center of the northwestern part of the EZ, was home to a well-funded 




Milestones in the Formation and Operation of  
The Six Village Centers of The Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
       
      Washington       
  East Village/  Harlem   
Milestone HEBCAC Harbor Pigtown Poppleton Park Self-Motivated 
       
Application Accepted September 1995 February 1996 September 1995 February 1996 February 1996 September 1995 
       
1st Admin. Funding Agreement May 1996 June 1996 March 1996 September 1997 August 1997 June 1996 
2nd Admin. Funding Agreement May 1997 June 1997 March 1997 January 2001 January 2000 August 1997 
3rd Admin. Funding Agreement May 1998 June 1998 October 1998 June 2002 October 2001 June 1998 
4th Admin. Funding Agreement July 1999 June 1999 January 2000 June 2003 January 2003 June 1999 
5th Admin. Funding Agreement July 2000 June 2000 January 2001 June 2004 January 2004 Terminated 
       
Transitional Funding Year 1 July 2001 November 2003 January 2003    
Transitional Funding Year 2 July 2003  January 2004    
Transitional Funding Year 3 July 2004      
       
Land Use Plan 1997 1997 1996 2001 1999 1998 
       
Career Center Opens August 1997 November 1997 September 1997 December 1999 September 1998 November 1998 
       
Current Status Operating Operating Operating Successor Operating Closed in 2004 Closed in 2000 




Selected Demographic Conditions and Changes in the Village Centers 
1990-2000 
                                          
      HEBCAC   EHVC   WVPNPC   VCP   HPLSVC   SMCPVC 
Total Population            
 1990  27,682  7,526  8,961  8,849  6,415  12,070 
 2000  18,351  7,003  8,061  6,684  4,283  9,630 
 Change  -9,331  -523  -900  -2,165  -2,133  -2,439 
 % Change  -34%  -7%  -10%  -24%  -33%  -20% 
              Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings         
 1990  25%  23%  50%  14%  13%  22% 
 2000  26%  23%  47%  15%  11%  32% 
 Change  1%  1%  -3%  1%  -2%  10% 
              Percentage of Dwellings That are Vacant         
 1990  14%  25%  10%  18%  23%  18% 
 2000  30%  26%  17%  20%  40%  22% 
 Change  16%  1%  7%  2%  17%  3% 
              Median Household Income           
 1990  $20,911  $25,445  $23,332  $15,704  $16,088  $14,784 
 2000  $20,000  $30,568  $24,607  $12,939  $19,375  $23,606 
 Change  -$911  $5,123  $1,275  -$2,765  $3,287  $8,822 
 % Change  -4%  20%  5%  -18%  20%  60% 
              
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level       
 1990  39%  41%  27%  55%  42%  45% 
 2000  39%  32%  23%  35%  37%  35% 
 Change  0%  -9%  -4%  -20%  -4%  -10% 
              
Resident Labor Force Participation          
 1990  37%  44%  40%  32%  38%  35% 
 2000  35%  49%  39%  34%  33%  35% 
 Change  -2%  5%  -1%  3%  -4%  -1% 
              
Unemployment Rate            
 1990  15%  16%  9%  17%  14%  18% 
 2000  24%  8%  9%  16%  17%  18% 
 Change  9%  -8%  0%  0%  4%  -1% 
                            






As described in the case studies below, all of the village centers had to overcome 
internal and external challenges in both their formation and operation.  As presented in 
Chapter 1 and described more fully in Chapter 5, this dissertation has identified five core 
components of community change capacity: Strategic Planning; Leadership; 
Management; Internal Networks; and External Networks.  The author’s qualitative 
assessment of the performance of the six village centers in each of these components is 
presented in Table 11.   
As described more fully in the case studies, this dissertation found that the village 
centers that were able to build the five core components of community organization 
capacity were successful and continue to operate today.  A brief summery of the 
experience of the village centers is presented here as an introduction to the case studies.   
All of the village centers were required to create strategic plans, but only the three 
most successful village centers, HEBCAC, East Harbor, and Washington Village, 
succeeded in truly basing their operations on the plans created.  Strong leadership is 
essential for a community organization to succeed.  Leadership can come from either the 
organization’s staff or board, and in the most successful organizations it comes from 
both.  The experience of the surviving village centers was mixed – with some being more 
controlled by their staff (HEBCAC and East Harbor) and some being more controlled by 
their board (Poppleton and Washington Village).  The two village centers that ultimately 
failed, Harlem Park and Self-Motivated, experienced the combination of weak staff and 
board leadership – either at critical times in their operation or throughout their operating 





East Village/ Harlem  
Issue HEBCAC Harbor Pigtown Poppleton Park Self-Motivated 
1) Strategic Planning Strong Strong Very Strong Moderate Weak Weak 
2) Leadership 
a) Staff Leadership Strong Strong Strong (1) Weak Weak Weak 
b) Board Leadership Moderate Weak Very Strong Strong (2) Weak Weak 
3) Management  
a) Financial Management Moderate Moderate Moderate Weak Weak Weak 
b) Operations Management Strong Moderate Strong Weak Moderate Weak 
c) Oversight, Monitoring and Evaluation Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak 
4) Internal Networks - Community Relations 
a) Community Participation Weak Moderate (3) Strong Weak Weak Weak 
b) Institutional Participation Strong Strong Strong Moderate (4) Weak Weak 
b) Representation Moderate Moderate (3) Strong Moderate (3) Moderate Moderate 
c) Community Outreach Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
d) Communications Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
5) External Networks Strong Strong Very Strong Moderate (5) Weak Weak 
(1) Washington Village/Pigtown suffered from a high degree of turnover - but each of the directors hired had strong leadership capabilities. 
(2) However, Poppleton suffered from having its board controlled by a dominant board leader. 
(4) Poppleton had little institutional participation until late in the EZ period - when it was able to work with University of Maryland, Baltimore on a major redevelopment project. 
(5) For most of its operational period, Poppleton had weak external networks. However, as a major redevelopment project came to the community in the last years of the Zone, the  
village center was able to form a strong and positive linkage with the University of Maryland, Baltimore to support and represent the community in the development effort and is  
now playing that role in other developments. 
Table 11 
Core Components of Community Organization Capacity 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone Village Center Success in Achieving the  




Community organizations must have competent financial and operational 
management and the most successful village centers were able to both run EZ funded 
programs and attract and run other programs efficiently.  Internal and external networks 
are also vital for community organizations to succeed.  Internally, a community 
organization must communicate with and be representative of the community it serves in 
order to fulfill its mission.  It must also have access to external networks in order to 
attract the financial, political and other resources needed to serve the community.  Most 
of the village centers experienced difficulty in fully engaging the community in their 
activities, but this is common in poor communities.  Several village centers experienced 
difficulty in bridging race, class and income divisions in their communities, notably East 
Harbor and Poppleton.  The most successful village centers, East Harbor, spent the time 
to resolve conflicts early in the process, before formal operations were initiated.  As will 
be described below, this dissertation found that the participation and support of key 
community institutions, such as universities, churches, CDCs, was a critical factor 
supporting the successful village centers.  However, strong institutional support can also 
damage the credibility of organizations, as occurred with HEBCAC, which perceived by 
some members of the community as controlled by a dominant local institution – Johns 
Hopkins Hospital.  This dissertation also found that the village centers that were able to 
form strongest external linkages during the EZ funding period were able to attract the 
additional program and other support to continue after the EZ effort ended.   
There was no direct link between resident socio-economic status, presented in 
Table 10 above, and the success of each village center.  The most successful village 
centers, East Harbor and Washington Village, had the highest personal incomes and 
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lowest poverty rates, but HEBCAC was also quite poor and Poppleton, which created a 
sustainable successor organization, had the lowest income and second highest poverty 
rate.  Interestingly, the two most successful village centers also served the most diverse 
populations, with Washington Village being 60 percent white and 33 percent African-
American and East Harbor being nearly evenly split in 2000.  The least successful village 
centers, Harlem Park and Self Motivated, were overwhelmingly African American 98 
percent and 96 percent respectively.  Theory would predict that organizations serving 
more diverse communities, especially gentrifying communities like East Harbor and 
Washington Village, would face more difficulty in forming strong organizations.  One 
possible explanation for the lack of a link between socio-economic status and the strength 
of the village centers formed, is that Harlem Park and Self Motivated, lack both 
supporting institutions, as existed in HEBCAC and Washington Village, and 
redevelopment opportunities, as existed in East Harbor and in Poppleton, after the 
development of a new research park.  
Empowerment Zone Implementation in Baltimore  
 Baltimore was one of the six cities selected in the first round of the federal 
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) initiative.  The federal EZ/EC 
initiative was based on four fundamental principles: economic opportunity, sustainable 
community development, community-based partnerships, and a strategic and 
comprehensive vision for change (Gittell and Vidal 1998).  As described in Chapter 2, the 
federal EZ/EC initiative was the major urban policy initiative of the Clinton 
administration.  It drew substantially on the evolution of federal urban policy, especially 
the Community Action Program/Model Cities of the Johnson administration and the 
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evolving and expanding role of community organizations, like Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) and foundation sponsored Comprehensive Community Initiatives 
(CCIs) in urban areas.  It sought to expand, enhance, and integrate existing federal 
support for urban communities using a community-based implementation strategy.  
Structured like a CCI, the EZ/EC initiative funded the comprehensive and concentrated 
use of traditional economic and workforce development funds, Enterprise Zone-like tax 
incentives, and other federal grants-in-aid through a locally driven implementation 
strategy rather that the bureaucratic-driven approach of past urban policies.  According to 
the Clinton administration’s National Urban Policy Report, “President Clinton’s National 
Urban Policy is locally driven. The Community Empowerment Agenda promotes 
solutions that are locally crafted and implemented by entrepreneurial public entities, 
private actors, and the growing network of community-based corporations and 
organizations” (HUD 1995, 3).  The federal EZ/EC program gave cities considerable 
latitude in designing their own implementation strategy, but mandated that each city 
include residents and community organizations in its strategy. 
Baltimore City’s Empowerment Zone Application Process 
 Mayor Schmoke kicked off the Empowerment Zone application process with a 
community rally.  Michael Seipp, a staff member from Baltimore’s economic 
development department, the Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC), led the 
application process.  The Mayor relied on the City’s base of community organizations to 
participate in the application process and tasked employees from the BDC and other City 
agencies to lead and staff the various working groups formed to prepare the application.  
Over 400 people participated in the application process, most of them from the targeted 
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communities.  The City also formed an advisory council consisting of 84 representatives 
from universities, community organizations, the business community, religious 
institutions, and City agencies to oversee the effort and make recommendations on the 
application process to the Mayor.   
The boundaries of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone were chosen politically.  
The Mayor ensured that the EZ included the Sandtown-Winchester area in the center of 
his West Side political base and the location of the Enterprise Foundation’s Sandtown-
Winchester CCI.  The East Baltimore area was drawn to include the service area of 
HEBCAC, a recently formed public-private partnership among Johns Hopkins (the 
largest employer in the area), the City, and the community.  According to an interview 
with Mike Seipp (2004), this East Baltimore community was the initial community 
chosen for the Sandtown-Winchester CCI in West Baltimore.  Because this area was the 
political base of his opponent “Du” Burns, Mayor Schmoke relocated the Enterprise 
effort to the City’s West Side to reward his political constituency.  Delegate Hattie 
Harrison reported that the East Side Democratic Club, the African-American political 
machine for the East Side of the City, supported Mayor Schmoke in the next election.  
They were then rewarded with the creation of HEBCAC and a promise that the next big 
redevelopment effort would take place in that part of the City.  Other parts of the Zone 
were drawn to include the districts of key legislators, with the Northwestern part of the 
zone drawn to include the district of Pete Rawlings, a prominent African-American State 
legislator and chairman of the budget committee.   Diane Bell (2006) said that the two 
blighted areas on either side of downtown were included in order to push redevelopment 
into these communities.  
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The City’s Empowerment Zone application highlighted the Baltimore experience 
as an urban policy innovator with community organizations and public-private 
partnerships.  The application stated, “We’re not new at this kind of innovation.  For six 
decades, Baltimore has led the nation in creating public-private partnerships and bold 
urban initiatives” (Baltimore City 1994), and the application cites the City’s “strong 
community organizing tradition” and creation of “the nation’s most active first generation 
of neighborhood federations.”  Baltimore’s overall goal was to turn the targeted 
neighborhoods into “communities of choice” where people would want to live.  
The City’s application set out three “guiding visions”: economic opportunity, 
sustainable community development, and community-based partnerships.  In these last 
two areas, the City’s application drew on the experience of its existing CCI and numerous 
community organizations.  Baltimore proposed “to rebuild all basic social and economic 
systems simultaneously through comprehensive, ‘whole problem’ approaches and to 
build on the critical mass of innovation already working in community-driven efforts 
such as Sandtown-Winchester, Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition, and 
Southeast Community Organization (SECO)” (Baltimore City 1994, vi).  In the area of 
community-based partnerships, the Empowerment Zone application proposed “to solve 
problems and advance Empowerment Zone initiatives through a highly mobilized 
resident-citizen force on a block-by-block basis and grass-driven ‘village partnerships’ 
controlled and directed by residents at the neighborhood level” (vi). 
Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone application called for a two-tiered 
implementation strategy.  To direct the overall effort, Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone 
application proposed the creation of a quasi-governmental entity, the Empowerment Zone 
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Management Council (EZMC), with which the City would contract to manage the 
implementation of Zone programs.  Actual program implementation in the targeted 
neighborhoods was to be carried out by eight village centers that would be responsible for 
developing a land-use plan, providing information to community residents, and 
implementing programs.  Each village center would have a Neighborhood Steward, a 
paid community resident responsible for serving as the community’s voice to the village 
center and EZ, who would build and coordinate a network of block clubs to mobilize 
residents and facilitate community dialogue.  A board of representatives from the village 
centers as well as business, government, and institutional partners would oversee EZMC. 
 In the Empowerment Zone application (Baltimore City 1994), the City recognized 
the key concerns that it sought to overcome through the proposed structure.  Specifically, 
the application reported, “In spite of our wealth of neighborhood institutions, the 
community lacks a formal mechanism for community organizing at the neighborhood 
level” (3-1-1).  Key concerns identified in the application that the City planned to address 
included a lack of resources for community organizing; a lack of connection between 
Zone residents and the City as evidenced by low voter turnout; resident alienation from 
the centralized government and social service delivery system; and a lack of 
organizations in the targeted communities. 
 In order to have the maximum effect in the least time, the City’s Empowerment 
Zone Application also planned to implement all Zone programs and spend-down the 
federal funding in five years, rather than the ten years set out in the federal guidelines. 
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Baltimore City’s Empowerment Zone Implementation Strategy 
Baltimore’s EZ strategy combined the City’s historical reliance on community 
organizations and quasi-governmental agencies.  Its actual implementation strategy 
differed somewhat from the application.  Baltimore received notification in December 
1994 that it would become one of six federal Urban Empowerment Zones.  Soon after the 
award, it formed the Empower Baltimore Management Corporation (EBMC) to mange 
the EZ effort.  After much contention and debate, EBMC was established with two levels 
of oversight, rather than the single Board described in the application.  Baltimore’s EZ 
application called for the creation of a 70-80-person policy Board, half of which would 
be composed of Zone community residents and leaders, with the other half composed of 
business, institution, and government representatives.   
This structure was abandoned to form a more formal 28-member Board of Directors, 17 
of who were appointed by the Mayor.  This majority was made up of business, 
foundation, and institutional representatives.  Only nine members would come from the 
Zone (six from the village centers, one from the industrial Fairfield part of the Zone, and 
two from a newly created Advisory Council).  The Governor appointed the remaining 
two members.  To balance the desire of community residents for a say in overall Zone 
strategy and management, Baltimore created an 80-member (ultimately reduced to 50) 
Advisory Council to advise the EBMC Board.  The Board and EBMC, however, had all 
of the power, and the Advisory Council was never able to direct EZ programs.  The 
creation of the formal Board structure created a more centralized Zone management 
system under the control of the Mayor and the local business, foundation, and 
institutional elite. (Chaskin and Peters 1997; Gittell et al. 1996). 
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 Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone implementation maintained the two-tiered 
governance structure of the application.  The governance structure adopted, however, was 
more formal and centralized than what was presented in the application.  A nonprofit 
entity, the Empower Baltimore Management Corporation (EBMC), oversaw the 
implementation of EZ programs and initiatives.  Building on the City’s history of 
cooperation with the business community and the Schaefer administration’s “shadow 
government” of public-private partnerships, EBMC, was staffed by trusted City staff and 
the City’s business and foundation elite dominated its Board.  Building on the City’s 
long-term experience with community organizations, the EZ implementation strategy was 
based on the delivery of EZ funded programs by the new village centers.  Five of the 
village centers were newly created 501(c)(3) organizations.  As described above, the 
sixth, HEBCAC, the largest of the village centers, was created one year before the EZ 
was awarded.  The HEBCAC area was supposed to be served by three village centers, but 
chose instead to operate as a single organization so as to not dilute the strength of the new 
organization.  This reduced the number of village centers to six rather than the eight 
outlined in the application.   
EZ implementation was also shaped by the Schmoke administration’s efforts to 
create new African-American institutions.  At the time of the initiation of the EZ/EC 
program, City politics was being shaped by the rise to political dominance of its now 
majority African American population.  Mayor Schmoke was the City’s first elected 
African American Mayor, defeating the African American City Council President – who 
had served as Mayor for one year after Baltimore’s long-serving Mayor, William Donald 
Schafer was elected Governor.  The EZ effort drew substantially on the experience of, 
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was drawn to include, and was ultimately headed by the City’s representative to the 
Enterprise Foundation-funded CCI in Sandtown-Winchester.  The Mayor had supported 
the development of several new community organizations, most importantly Community 
Building in Partnership in this community as part of his efforts to build new African 
American community organizations.  In many communities, the creation of new village 
center organizations continued the Schmoke administration’s efforts to create new 
African-American organizations.  Village centers were formed separate from existing 
community “umbrella” organizations that were tied to the City’s old white-dominated 
political machine.  To the Schmoke administration, the EZ effort was an opportunity to 
reshape the historical forces that shaped the City’s evolution to reflect the new reality of 
Baltimore as a majority African-American City.   
Thus, Baltimore’s two-tiered implementation strategy represented a combination 
of the three trends that have dominated Baltimore City politics described in Chapter 3: 
strong extra-governmental agencies; strong community and neighborhood organizations; 
and the rise of African American political leadership.  The Empowerment Zone’s overall 
management and oversight organization, EBMC, joined the City’s shadow government of 
civic groups, quasi-public corporations, and extra-governmental officials described by 
Stoker (1987).  Just as this shadow government had developed Charles Center, 
redeveloped the Inner Harbor, and guided the City’s business development; EBMC 
would spearhead the development of the empowerment zone.  Program implementation 
would be based on the City’s history of strong community organizations.   
Mayor Schmoke’s EZ strategy, however, enlisted stronger community 
involvement than other shadow government institutions.  He did this partly to satisfy 
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Clinton administration’s stated goal of community involvement in EZ planning and 
management and, more importantly, to satisfy his own base of African-American voters.  
The African American community and its leadership had long viewed themselves as shut 
out of the past development efforts and the shadow government created by the Mayor’s 
long-term predecessor, Mayor Schaefer.  The City’s white business and foundation elite 
controlled the still dominant Schaefer era shadow government agencies.  Therefore, in 
order to satisfy the EZ/EC Initiative’s requirement for community participation and meet 
the needs of the Mayor’s African-American constituency, the City turned to its 
established record of working with and through community organizations, and created a 
central role for the proposed village centers in program implementation.   
As the City and EBMC developed and implemented the various programs funded 
by the EZ program, it became clear that the full use of the federal funds would take 
longer than the five-year goal established in the application.  The initial goal was to spend 
the federal money as quickly as possible so as to begin the process of redeveloping the 
six-targeted communities.  This proved to be an overly ambitious program timetable – 
given the larger goal of creating community organizations to implement the program.  It 
took almost a year and a half for the last of the village centers to start operations and 
begin receiving programmatic support and up to two years to start up the job training 
programs that became the core focus of Baltimore’s EZ effort.  Thus, the EBMC 
recommended and the Board approved extending operations until the federal money was 
spent.  Indeed, EBMC continues to operate on a much smaller scale today as some of the 
business and development loans and investments it made are paid back.  EBMC uses 
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these funds to support the four remaining village centers and continue its job training 
programs.   
EBMC Village Center Creation Guidelines 
Soon after being awarded the Empowerment Zone and creating EBMC as the 
central management entity, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone established “Guidelines 
for the Formation of a Village Center” in April 1995.  Community-level planning for the 
formation of the village centers started, in many cases, before the development of these 
formal guidelines.  The City assigned a lead City staff person to work with each of the 
communities planning to form a village center after the application was submitted in 
anticipation of the City’s EZ designation.  Thus, community organizing progressed in the 
communities while the federal government reviewed the EZ/EC initiative applications. 
Organizations were required to submit a Letter of Intent and an Application to 
Form a Village Center.  The formal EBMC guidelines for forming a village center 
mandated that each proposed organization: 
 Be an aggregation of all communities in a specific geographic area; 
 Agree to oversee Empowerment Zone programs; 
 Have at least 7,000 residents; 
 Apply for and receive 501(c)(3) status; 
 Include representation from residents, organizations, associations, religious 
communities, schools, business entities, institutions, and government in the 
village center; and 
 Show how they will plan and oversee required village center Empowerment Zone 
Action Items. 
The EBMC guidelines set nine core goals for the village centers.  These were to: 
1. Mobilize broad-based participation by community residents and groups; 
2. Develop community-based plans; 
3. Implement selected action plans and broker programs and services (followed by a 
list of programs and desired outcomes based on EBMC’s programs); 
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4. Help to enrich the collective life of the community; 
5. Resolve conflicts and differences; 
6. Serve as a gathering place, develop information networks, and coordinate 
volunteer efforts;  
7. Connect residents to opportunities; 
8. Seek operational and programmatic resources (leveraging funds and resources); 
and 
9. Establish a Board of Directors. 
The applications for the first three village centers—the Historic East Baltimore 
Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC), Self-Motivated Community People’s Village 
Center (SMCPVC), and Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council 
(WPNPC)—were approved in September 1995.  The applications for the remaining three 
village centers—East Harbor Village Center (EHVC), Village Center of Poppleton 
(VCP), and Harlem Park/Lafayette Square (HPLSVC)—were approved in February 
1996.  The EBMC Board approved the administrative funding formula for the village 
centers in March 1996 and entered into administrative funding agreements with the 
village centers starting in 1996 and extending into 1997, as some village centers had to 
meet conditions set by EBMC and its Board related to their application before receiving 
funding and beginning operations.   
The village center formation process required some modifications from the City’s 
original application and required overcoming disagreements among the emerging village 
centers.  The original EZ application called for eight village centers.  HEBCAC served 
the area of three of the proposed village centers but decided to form only a single village 
center entity because, as a new organization itself, it feared creating three new 
organizations under its control would divide, rather than unify, the community.  This 
decision created difficulty in developing the administrative funding allocation formula for 
all of the village centers because HEBCAC requested funding proportional to its role as 
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three village centers.  This was opposed both by the other village centers and EBMC 
management.  The final solution was to allocate $300,000 in first-year administrative 
funding to HEBCAC and $200,000 to the other village centers.   
Soon after its creation, EBMC hired two community outreach specialists to work 
with the village centers.  EBMC’s Board created the Quality of Life/Community 
Capacity-Building Subcommittee to develop policies and oversee the community 
capacity-building.  Recognizing that many of the village centers were being formed as 
new organizations, EBMC identified the need for and established a budget to support 
technical assistance.   Map 1, in Chapter 1, shows the Empowerment Zone boundaries for 
the village centers. 
Village Center Case Studies 
 Each of the six communities faced different challenges in forming and operating 
village centers.  This section will summarize the experience of each of the village centers 
as well as describe conditions and changes in each of the village center areas during the 
Empowerment Zone period. 
The Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition 
 The Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC) was the 
only village center formed as part of an existing organization.  A map showing the 
HEBCAC service area and key locations mentioned in this case study is included below 
as Map 6.   
HEBCAC was established to build a more cooperative relationship among the 
City administration, the East Side neighborhoods, and Johns Hopkins Medical School 
and Hospital.  East Baltimore is one of the most distressed areas in the City.  Johns 
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Hopkins dominated the community.  It owns an area several blocks wide and is 
continually expanding by acquiring property surrounding the hospital.  It had no tradition 
of formally working with the community.  As a result, the community did not trust the 
institution or view it as a good neighbor.  Hopkins was not seen as working to overcome 
the problems of drug abuse, crime, and poverty occurring right across the street from the 
affluent and successful institution.  Indeed, by acquiring property in surrounding City 
blocks as it became available and often boarding it up for future demolition and 
redevelopment, Hopkins was seen as contributing to the decline of the community.  Many 
in the City and community thought that Hopkins was purposefully driving down local 







HEBCAC was formed out of a series of meetings about developing a strategy to 
rebuild the community among representatives from Johns Hopkins Hospital, the Kennedy 
Krieger Institute, local businesses, community churches, neighborhood associations, and 
elected officials.  The first meetings were held in August 1992.  By the end of 1993 there 
was a consensus among the various stakeholders to move forward with a coordinated 
plan to promote housing development, community health programs, youth development 
and education, economic development, and leadership development.  The organization 
was formed in December 1994 and hired its first Executive Director, Michael Seipp, who 
had been the City government coordinator of Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone 
application process.   
The creation of HEBCAC was promoted by the City’s powerful East Side 
Democratic Organization (EDO), one of the last remaining Democratic Party 
organizations that had once dominated City politics through its control over patronage 
jobs and contracts.  The Baltimore City Paper newspaper described the EDO as “one of 
the most powerful political machines in East Baltimore for more than a decade,” and said 
it “is believed to have a say in everything from who receives public contracts to who gets 
elected to public office” (Sullivan p 1-2, 2002).  According to The Baltimore Sun, “EDO 
survives as the City’s only powerful, old-time political machine.  It thrives on patronage, 
which it is able to dole out not only through politicians but also through the interlocking 
directorships of a number of nonprofit organizations.  In this way, EDO has turned 
political control into an art form” (Baltimore Sun Writer, 2001).  
In East Baltimore, as in many cities, political leaders created nonprofit 
community organizations to have the combined impact of providing services needed by 
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community residents and patronage jobs to reward supporters.  Starting with devolution, 
federal funds were increasingly delivered in the form of block grants for service delivery 
and outsourced to new nonprofit and community organizations.  These organizations 
became the new opportunities to provide patronage jobs.  In 1969, the EDO created the 
East Baltimore Community Corporation (EBCC) to promote various community and 
redevelopment projects, including the development of a school and health center.  
According to The Baltimore Sun, EBCC, created by former Mayor “Du” Burns and City 
Councilman Robert Douglas, “parlayed its control of Eastside politics from the 1970s to 
the mid-1980s into government contracts and grants” including the redevelopment of a 
City- and State-funded community and job center in 1997 that was called “cronyism” 
(Daemmrich and Roche, 1997).  HEBCAC was to be the newest of the East Side 
nonprofits under the control of the EDO.   
An important leader of the process to create HEBCAC, Delegate Hattie Harrison 
was a founder of the EDO and an influential and long-serving member of the Maryland 
General Assembly.  Harrison was first elected to the General Assembly in 1973, was the 
first African-American woman to chair a legislative committee, and is the longest-serving 
African-American legislator in the General Assembly.  According to Harrison (1994), 
both the formation of HEBCAC and the award of the Village Center was an outgrowth of 
a political fight with Mayor Schmoke after his 1987 election victory over the founder of 
the EDO, Burns.  James Rouse, founder and president of the Rouse Company and 
founder of the GBC, had first targeted East Baltimore for what became his Sandtown-
Winchester CCI in 1990.  Mayor Schmoke moved this redevelopment effort to his West 
Side political base causing political conflict with the EDO.  Harrison was able to work 
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with then-Governor Schaefer to restore legislatively appropriated money to the City and, 
as a result, was able to mend fences with the Mayor.  She reported (2004):  
So at that point where he had taken the money and put it over Sandtown-
Winchester and we really got upset.  He came down one Monday and took 
us out to the City delegation and then he talked to our delegation and he 
said that he was using the [Enterprise] money, but as soon as the City can 
get hold of some money we would be the first to get a large sum. 
HEBCAC was to be her legacy and contribution to the East Side’s base of organizations. 
 HEBCAC’s application to form a Village Center was approved in September of 
1995.  EBMC established its funding allocation formula in February 1996, and HEBCAC 
signed its first year administrative funding agreement in May 1996.  With a population of 
27,682 in 1990, HEBCAC was the largest of the village centers, accounting for 39% of 
the population of the entire Zone.  The HEBCAC community had high poverty rates, low 
labor force participation, and a large amount of vacant housing.  The HEBCAC area, 
however, was home to the State’s largest non-government employer, Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, and had an existing commercial corridor, Monument Street.   
The HEBCAC service area covered the entire portion of the Empowerment Zone 
that was inside of its much larger territory.  HEBCAC tried to increase its service area to 
the south to include some large housing projects, but was rebuffed by that community.  
Because the service area for the Village Center was smaller than the overall HEBCAC 
service area, the Village Center had to address the problem of some of its residents being 
excluded from Empowerment Zone services.   
HEBCAC Village Center Formation 
 As a pre-existing organization, creating the HEBCAC Village Center was much 
easier than for the other village centers.  According to a 2004 interview with Seipp, there 
was considerable debate within HEBCAC over whether to form a single village center or 
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the three separate village centers that the area would qualify to form under EBMC 
guidelines:   
Because some of the folks in the neighborhood said the guidelines for the 
village centers were 6,000 residents, so we could in fact become three 
village centers and hire three sets of staff and have three different Boards, 
and some people in the neighborhood wanted to do that; however, there 
were folks who have invested heavily in HEBCAC process who were 
basically arguing that HEBCAC was one of the models in the application 
to be a village center and there was a reason for that.  We already had a 
business plan established.  We had goals and objectives established, and 
we had spent several years uniting the neighborhood around that.  And 
splintering the neighborhood would diffuse the political benefits of 
HEBCAC.  Some of the neighborhood folks who were opposed to it and 
wanted three village centers say that HEBCAC is too controlled by 
Hopkins, too controlled by Marie Washington [an EDO leader and the 
leader of EBCC] and the elected officials, and the only way to get a really 
empowered organization would be to start anew.  And so that went back 
and forth.” 
Because HEBCAC had only formally started operations in December 1994, it had 
been in business for nine months by the time it applied for its first administrative funding 
agreement and eighteen months by the time it signed it.  The HEBCAC leadership and 
board decided to become a single Village Center because, as a new organization, they 
thought creating three village centers as new sub-organizations would cause confusion 
and dissipate the gains made in bringing the community together.  In this decision, 
HEBCAC chose the viability of the organization over the interest of the EDO in creating 
the largest number of new patronage and leadership jobs. 
Becoming a Village Center led to organizational stress because of the rapid 
growth of the organization.  According to a 2004 interview with Scott Spencer, a 
manager at HEBCAC and now the official at the Annie E. Casey Foundation who 
oversees Baltimore programs: 
On staff were Michael, four community organizers, an office manager, 
and myself.  But from an administrative challenge growing from six to 
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fifteen staff is not something we were prepared or equipped for.  I did not 
come in to HEBCAC as an administrative manager . . . I’ve had an 
architectural career, community development career, but I didn’t manage 
buildings, people, payroll, budgets, I didn’t do all that. (2004) 
The decision to form a Village Center to serve such a large community caused 
tension in HEBCAC’s relationship with the EBMC and the other village centers.  
HEBCAC argued that it deserved three times the funding because it served an area 
equivalent to three village centers.  This was opposed by both the EBMC and the other 
village centers, which thought that, with its ties to the City and State government, it 
would dominate the other village centers.  The ultimate decision was to allocate $300,000 
in administrative funding to HEBCAC for its first year and $200,000 to the other village 
centers for the same period of time.  This compromise solution was supported by the 
EBMC Board, which could not agree to provide such a large level of administrative 
funding to one organization.  The EBMC Board, dominated by downtown business and 
political interests who supported clean government, did not see the need to use EZ 
funding to support patronage jobs.  Furthermore, because HEBCAC was already well 
funded by Johns Hopkins, and the City it was not perceived to need the money.  This 
funding conflict delayed the final start-up process for all of the village centers.  During 
this time, Seipp, along with other village center directors, sought to create a federation of 
the village centers as a counterbalance to the strong centralized control being exerted 
over the village center formation and operations by the EBMC.  This plan never 
succeeded as no clear single leader could emerge.  Overall, there was a level of tension 
and conflict between the leadership of HEBCAC and EBMC over both the formation and 




HEBCAC Village Center Operations 
 HEBCAC signed its first Administrative Funding Agreement with the EBMC in 
May 1996; two months after the EBMC determined the funding allocation formula.  
HEBCAC integrated the Empowerment Zone programs into its own emerging portfolio 
of federal- and City-funded projects.  Seipp served as Executive Director until 2000.   
The Village Center was overseen by a Board of sixteen members: three persons 
appointed by the Mayor, three persons appointed by Johns Hopkins institutions, one from 
the business community, the Chair of the Board – who was nominated by the Board, and 
seven members from the sixty-five neighborhood organizations serving the community.  
Harrison served as the Board Chair, Dr. Marie Washington, an EDO leader and the 
director of the EBCC, served as First Vice President, and Mr. Richard Grossi, a senior 
Johns Hopkins Hospital manager, served as Treasurer.  The leadership HEBCAC’s Board 
was dominated by the EDO political leadership and Johns Hopkins.   
The Board functioned well and did not experience the difficulties of other village 
centers in maintaining the required number of members or a quorum at meetings.  
Overall, HEBCAC benefited from strong leadership at both the staff and Board level.  
Seipp was an experienced manager and leader who could work with the City.  Harrison 
and other members of the Board were powerful, experienced, and politically connected, 
and could use their power to attract City and State funding.  There was some conflict on 
the Board between two leaders of EDO, Washington and Harrison.  Harrison saw 
HEBCAC as her legacy and wanted it to be a strong organization.  EDO wanted to 
control HEBCAC and generate funding for EDO organizations and patronage jobs for its 
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supporters.  Johns Hopkins wanted the organization to function legally and cooperated 
with Harrison to ensure that HEBCAC never fell under full EDO control. 
HEBCAC developed the required EBMC Land Use Plan in 1996 and its own 
strategic plan in 1999 to guide its operations.  According to the strategic plan’s mission 
statement, “HEBCAC facilitates cooperation and communication, brokers services, and 
advocates for positive change to achieve sustained community revitalization” (HEBCAC 
1999 11).   
 HEBCAC’s operational period can best be described in two phases: before and 
after the 1999 election of Mayor Martin O’Malley.  Prior to O’Malley taking office, 
HEBCAC achieved many programmatic and operational successes.  Before it became a 
Village Center, it was awarded the Bridges to Work reverse commuting program as part 
of a national demonstration program.  HEBCAC was also awarded the Historic East 
Baltimore Family Network Grant that created the Men’s Center.  It provided social, 
health, and employment services to men, a domestic violence prevention program, and a 
family network to promote new programs and leverage local foundation support to 
promote community development and organizing.  Nationally, HEBCAC was considered 
an early model for institution and community cooperation to promote change in 
distressed communities, and it was frequently cited as a successful program in the 
national community development literature.   
As a result of its early successes and because of its affiliation with Johns Hopkins 
and the EDO, HEBCAC was very successful in attracting City, federal, and foundation 
funding.  According to an interview with Scott Spencer (2004), “People were coming to 
us saying that the HEBCAC model is a great thing, the fact that you’re trying to do a 
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comprehensive addressing of community issues.  Our renewal thesis was physical, 
economic development, crime and grime, health, and education.”  HEBCAC never had to 
rely on EBMC for more than one-third of its administrative funding and even less of its 
programmatic funding, according to Seipp (2004),  
The best thing was that once we got EBMC to buy in what we were doing, 
and then their money was pretty flexible, which was great because federal 
money was not.  We were able to use it to leverage dollars. We got major 
grant funds, contributions from Goldseker Foundation, Abell Foundation, 
from a foundation out of New York.   
In return for EBMC matching funding provided to HEBCAC, programs were often 
expanded to include residents from other village centers. 
 Programmatically, HEBCAC delivered both EBMC-funded and its own programs 
including: 
 The Gaining Access to Training and Employment (GATE) workforce 
development program, which was EBMC funded and was managed by the 
EBCC allowing HEBCAC to outsource its largest program to a sister EDO-
controlled organization; 
 The acquisition of two industrial buildings for conversion to commercial 
space in order to create jobs and to provide public services; 
 The Weed and Seed program, a U.S. Department of Justice grant of $1 million 
in federal funding for public safety initiatives in partnership with the 
Baltimore City Police Department; 
 Dee’s Place, which provides drug counseling to individuals in recovery; 
 The HEBCAC Boarding and Cleaning Program, which in partnership with 
Living Classrooms, Baltimore City Department of Public Works, and the 
Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, boarded and cleaned over 2,000 vacant 
houses, fenced over 400 vacant lots to prevent illegal dumping, and conducted 
dozens of neighborhood clean-ups; 
 The Community Forestry Program, which planted 500 street trees and 
established 12 community gardens, playgrounds, and parks; 
 The Monument Street Main Street Program to revitalize the community’s 
commercial corridor by providing promotional activities, a façade 




 Housing Assistance Programs, which rehabilitated over 50 vacant houses in 
the Middle East and Oliver communities.  Approximately 150 residents were 
helped with housing counseling and/or relocation assistance. 
The one area in which HEBCAC did not achieve programmatic success was in 
community outreach and organizing.  At one time HEBCAC had six community 
organizers working in the community.  Yet, according to the NOMAGIC assessment of 
HEBCAC, “the perception of HEBCAC and of the partners (particularly Hopkins and the 
City) is not always positive within the community.  The community does not necessarily 
consider itself to be an equal partner in the HEBCAC partnership.  It is difficult for the 
community to feel equal when dealing with large institutions such as Johns Hopkins or 
the City” (2003a, A66).  HEBCAC was never seen as an independent intermediary 
between the community and the City or Johns Hopkins.  Part of this community distrust 
came from a decision by HEBCAC to be tied fiscally to and offer its employee benefits 
through Hopkins.  According to Spencer (2004), “HEBCAC should never become 
fiscally tied to Johns Hopkins.  It is a credibility buster. It continues to be a credibility 
buster.  It puts staff in a no-win position.”  Despite its programs, efforts, and success, 
HEBCAC was seen as dominated by Johns Hopkins and the EDO, not as a true 
community organization. 
Despite HEBCAC’s many programmatic successes, it experienced a very public 
failure in its implementation of a federally funded housing development initiative.  
HEBCAC received $34.1 in million federal housing loans to promote the scattered site 
redevelopment of vacant housing in East Baltimore.  In implementing this plan, the 
HEBCAC community and Board expressed their preference for the renovation of existing 
vacant houses rather than their wholesale demolition and redevelopment.  As a result of 
the slow process in clearing the titles to the vacant properties for renovation, HEBCAC 
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fell behind in its performance agreements with the City.  The City began to investigate 
the program in December 1998 (Penn and Haner 1998).   
After the election of Martin O’Malley in 1999, the City began to lose faith in 
HEBCAC’s housing effort, and EDO leader, State Senator Nathaniel McFadden, publicly 
questioned HEBCAC’s leadership (Siegal, October 15 2000).   Soon after McFadden’s 
questioning, Seipp resigned as HEBCAC leader, a move welcomed by O’Malley 
(Alvarez 2000).   
HEBCAC fell out of political favor.  Mayor O’Malley did not get along with 
Seipp.  Furthermore, the Mayor ultimately pushed his own, larger, East Side 
redevelopment agenda consisting of the development of a new Johns Hopkins 
Biotechnology Research Park and the large-scale condemnation, demolition, and 
redevelopment of a large portion of the community.  Part of this decision was based on 
the recognition that scattered site housing redevelopment was a failure and that wholesale 
condemnation and redevelopment was faster and cheaper.  However, the main reason 
behind this decision to revamp the community was that the Mayor wanted a large-scale 
redevelopment that he could claim as his own, and HEBCAC was in the way. 
The fight between the City and HEBCAC was also a part of a conflict between 
the old and new leadership of the EDO.  The EDO had resented the independence of 
HEBCAC and thought it was time to replace the aging Hattie Harrison.  In 2002, the 
EDO did not put Harrison on their legislative ticket, citing that she had said she was 
going to retire after the 1998 election.  In many parts of Maryland, leading politicians or 
political groups run a slate of candidates for Maryland’s multi-member districts; thus, 
being on the legislative ticket provides an advantage in elections.  According to Harrison 
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“They said you’re too old, and we need to move you out of the way and bring in some 
young people” (Thompson 2002 1b).  Harrison, called ‘Mama’ by some, won the election 
after campaigning on her slogan, “Don’t throw Mama from the train,” breaking the 
EDO’s ticket in the community (Penn 2001). 
HEBCAC, however, was sidelined as a result of the political problems it faced.  
The Executive Director position at HEBCAC remained unfilled for 18 months after the 
departure of Seipp.  O’Malley created a new East Side redevelopment entity, the East 
Baltimore Development, Inc. (EBDI).  EBDI was a nonprofit organization charged with 
leading and managing the $800 million revitalization of an 80-acre portion of East 
Baltimore.  EBDI worked with support from a long list of partners including the City of 
Baltimore, the State of Maryland, and a number of local civic groups and charitable 
foundations, including EBCC.  EBDI was a return to the old “shadow government” form 
of Baltimore redevelopment and its Board consisted of leading business, foundation, and 
government interests.  When HEBCAC finally replaced Seipp with Lawrence “Chris” 
Cager, the local Enterprise Foundation Director, he remained in the job only two months 
and resigned after the new administration made clear that EBDI, not HEBCAC, would be 
firmly in control over East Side redevelopment (Seigel 2002 a and b).  The new Mayor 
favored the old shadow government approach to East Side redevelopment so that it would 
be under his personal control.  
After the loss of its second Executive Director, two interim Directors managed 
HEBCAC until 2004.  During that time, the Village Center continued to implement its 
core EBMC and other programs, but developed no new initiatives.  HEBCAC continued 
to be funded by Johns Hopkins and other organizations to carry out their workforce and 
 
 183 
social service programs.  It received EBMC administrative funding through 2002 and 
transitional funding through 2004.  However, because of the slow pace of hiring new 
management and developing a new strategic plan, HEBCAC was required to report to 
EBMC monthly on its progress towards sustainability.  HEBCAC hired a new director in 
2005 from outside of the State.  It continues to operate today, focusing on social services 
delivery and some development activities outside of the EBDI redevelopment area.  
HEBCAC’s post EZ budget is $2.7 million, with $2.2 provided by program support 
funding with the remaining $500,000 from Johns Hopkins, a CDBG, foundations, and 
income earned from developed properties (Edds 2006).  
HEBCAC Village Center Outcomes 
 HEBCAC achieved some programmatic goals but failed to reverse the decline 
occurring in the community.  As shown in Table 12, in the area of workforce 
development, HEBCAC’s GATE program placed 2,027 residents in jobs, accounting for 
11% of the community’s population in the year 2000.  It had the third highest number of 
Housing Venture Fund closings.  It experienced a 64% decrease in crime, the second 
largest reduction among the village centers, but this may be due to the rapid decline in 
population or to the much larger City and federal anti-crime programs implemented in the 





HEBCAC Empowerment  
Item Village Center Zone Total 
Workforce Development 
Total Placements 2,027 4,725 
Economic Development  
Loans Made 3 109 
Loan Amounts $277,296 $16,325,634 
Project Costs $371,000 $105,882,050 
Jobs Created/Maintained 29 2,555 
Quality of Life 
Home Ownership 
Housing Venture Fund Closings 119 813 
Funds Allocated $494,314 $3,432,636 
Public Safety 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Year of Plan) Sep-02 n.m. 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending) $61,680 $159,513 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending AIR) $43,000 $408,500 
Block by Block $240,952 $487,028 
Block by Block (AIR) $154,000 $612,303 
Change in Crime Rate (1994-2003) -64% -56% 
Community Capacity Building 
Village Center Application Approved Feb-96 n.m. 
Village Center Admin. Funding Agreement  May-96 n.m. 
Village Center Administrative Funds $1,500,000 $5,782,696 
Current Status Operating n.m. 
Source: EBMC 
Table 12 
HEBCAC Village Center 
Selected Baltimore Empowerment Zone Programmatic Inputs and Outcomes 
 
 185 
It is difficult to isolate the impact of the Empowerment Zone on any of the village 
centers using U.S. Census data.  Because the Census data are for ten-year periods, the 
only years of data are for 1990, which was used in the Empowerment Zone application, 
and 2000, the mid-point of the Empowerment Zone effort.  Thus, the available Census 
data only covers a few years of the village centers’ operations. 
 The community benefited from various non-EBMC-funded health and social 
service programs implemented by HEBCAC.  HEBCAC provided job training to more 
than 2,000 residents through the GATE program, provided substance abuse counseling 
for hundreds of residents, built community parks, and redeveloped housing, but it still 
could not reverse the decline occurring in the community.   As shown in Table 13, 
between 1990 and 2000, the community’s population declined by more than 33%, 
housing vacancy increased, labor force participation and median income fell, and the 
poverty rate remained stable.  The HEBCAC experience showed that more is needed to 
address the problems associated with urban decline and poverty.  Community change can 
only occur when larger market forces make redevelopment feasible.  The City, through 
EBDI, is pursuing a much more dramatic redevelopment effort today, consisting of 








Item  Village Center Total EZ Baltimore City 
Total Population 
1990 27,682 71,503 736,014 
2000 18,351 54,012 651,154 
Change -9,331 -17,491 -84,860 
% Change -34% -24% -12% 
Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings 
1990 25% 25% 44% 
2000 26% 26% 43% 
Change 1% 1% -1% 
Percentage of Dwellings that are Vacant 
1990 14% 17% 9% 
2000 30% 26% 14% 
Change 16% 9% 5% 
Median Household Income 
1990 $20,911 $18,499 $32,316 
2000 $20,000 $20,750 $30,078 
Change -$911 $2,251 -$2,238 
% Change -4% 12% -7% 
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level 
1990 39% 41% 21% 
2000 39% 34% 22% 
Change 0% -7% 1% 
Resident Labor Force Participation 
1990 37% 37% 47% 
2000 35% 37% 44% 
Change -2% 0% -3% 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 15% 15% 9% 
2000 24% 17% 11% 
Change 9% 1% 2% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, EBMC 
Table 13 
 The Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition 
Neighborhood Conditions and Changes 
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HEBCAC Village Center Summary   
 HEBCAC’s early success can be attributed to strong leadership and institutional 
support.  At the Board level, it had leading political and institutional members.  Johns 
Hopkins Hospital brought financial, organizational, and management expertise that 
assisted in creating strong management structures.  The EDO-affiliated Board members 
were able to leverage their political power for City and State funding.  HEBCAC also 
benefited from a strong experienced leadership team with ties to City leaders.  Financial 
support from Johns Hopkins created a well-funded organization that did not have to 
scramble for resources like many smaller organizations.  The linkage to Johns Hopkins 
also provided programmatic benefits, such as the hospital hiring graduates from training 
programs and the use of Hopkins’ staff and resources. 
The experience of HEBCAC demonstrated the fragility of community capacity-
building efforts.  As a result of a single failed program (the housing program), a change 
in City administration and political conflict relating to a changing of the guard in the 
EDO, HEBCAC went from an oft-cited national best practice in community capacity-
building to needing to find a new basic reason to exist.  HEBCAC’s early success is an 
example of what can be achieved when leading institutions and political leaders 
cooperate to promote community redevelopment.  HEBCAC’s later failures are an 
example of what can happen when organizations lose favored political status.  HEBCAC 
may have been able to withstand the change in City administration and retain a central 
role in East Side redevelopment had the EDO remained unified and supportive of it.  The 
loss of both reduced its stature, but it remains an important social service provider and, 
on a more limited basis, development entity. 
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HEBCAC also illustrates the difficulty of engaging the residents of poor 
communities in community change efforts.  Despite implementing needed and generally 
successful programs and including local leaders in governance, the organization was not 
able to overcome community suspicion and distrust.  While HEBCAC was financially, 
managerially and programmatically strengthened by the participation of Johns Hopkins, 
its strong ties to this dominant institution, long criticized and opposed by residents, 
diminished community support for and participation in HEBCAC’s operations. 
HEBCAC was a well-led organization that was able to leverage stable Hopkins, 
EZ, and City funding with millions of dollars in federal, State, City, and foundation 
grants to address the core issues of community blight.  HEBCAC is one of the early 
national examples of a CCI-like, place-based, integrated service delivery model that 
combined health, workforce development, social services, economic development, and 
community development to promote revitalization.  The organization’s mission was 
redefined for it just as the City was to begin a transformational redevelopment effort in 
the community, and its model could be fully tested.  Had the political climate not 
changed, HEBCAC may have ultimately been credited with bringing about the 
transformational redevelopment in the community now being implemented through 
EBDI.  Currently, it remains a viable organization providing needed services, but is no 
longer the central player in East Side redevelopment. 
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East Harbor Village Center 
The East Harbor Village Center (EHVC) filed its application to form a village 
center and was approved by the EBMC Board in February 1996.  Three months later, the 
Village Center received its first year’s administrative funding.  EHVC was the third of 
the Empowerment Zone’s six village centers to become operational, and it is one of the 
four village centers still operating in some form today.   A map showing the East Harbor 
service area and key locations mentioned in this case study is included below as Map 7.   
The Village Center’s service area was set by default, encompassing the area to the 
south of the larger HEBCAC service area that dominated the eastern portion of 
Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone.  HEBCAC sought to include portions of the East 
Harbor service area in its already-large coverage area by including several populous 
housing projects.  It was interested in acquiring this area based on initial plans that 
Village Center funding would be proportional to population, but was rebuffed by the 
leader of the tenant council in these housing projects who went on to form and manage 
the East Harbor Village Center itself. 
As presented in Table 15, EHVC, with a population of 7,526 in 1990, was the 
second smallest of the village centers formed by the EBMC.  The Village Center area was 
racially and economically diverse and included some of the most attractive development 
properties in the City.  It included an array of communities including predominantly 
white Little Italy, already-gentrified Fells Point, as well as three housing projects: 
Chapel, Flag House, and Perkins Homes.  EHVC is also home to a large Native American 
population, and it was a center for the City’s growing Hispanic community.  With a 
median household income of $25,445 (in 1999 dollars), East Harbor had the highest 
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median income level of all of the Village Center areas and, in 1990, had a 41% poverty 
rate, the third lowest of the village centers.   
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East Harbor Village Center Formation  
The EBMC Board approved the East Harbor Village Center’s application in 
February 1996, eleven months after the release of the village center formation guidelines.  
During this period, the Village Center had to overcome internal conflict over its 
formation and control.  The community was active in Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone 
application process and continued to plan the Village Center before its application was 
approved.  One of Baltimore’s largest community umbrella organizations, the South East 
Community Organization (SECO), and community organizations in the predominantly 
white Fells Point and Little Italy communities sought to dominate the initial planning 
process.  These groups’ efforts to control the Village Center were opposed by the 
community’s African-American residents.   
The City’s original EZ application proposed that the base of community 
organizations already serving the neighborhoods and communities in the Zone form the 
village centers.  SECO was recognized as one of the leading community organizations in 
the City and as a core asset in the City’s EZ application.  The African-American 
community, however, distrusted SECO.  According to a participant in the East Harbor 
focus group, “SECO had always looked out for neighborhoods, lets say from Broadway 
going east [predominantly white areas].  SECO never looked right across the street to 
Chapel or Perkins [housing projects].  SECO used to get federal grants to serve a mixture 
of neighborhoods.  They never filtered that money down into the African-American 
neighborhoods” (2004).  
As a result, African-American community leaders, many of whom served as 
representatives to the tenant councils in the City housing projects, mobilized an effort to 
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form the Village Center as an independent organization.  These leaders faced opposition 
from representatives of the white communities over control and this conflict had open 
racial overtones.  According to one participant in the East Harbor focus group, “When 
you look at SECO, Little Italy, and the Fells Point Business Association, they were 
hostile to [the African-American community]” (2004).  Another participant reported, 
“What really angered me was when we met at Herbert’s church, and finally got 
everybody in the room, and the man from Little Italy stood up at the podium and just 
called us [racial epithet].  At that time my temper just went” (2004). 
When asked what the most important barrier was that EHVC had to overcome, 
one focus group participant said, “Racism was the top thing on the line because they 
didn’t want to accept it; they didn’t think that we had anything to bring to it as black 
people and it might not be what was said, but it was what was happening” (2004).  The 
Village Center was ultimately formed and led by this group of African-American leaders.  
They took control over the Village Center using traditional community organizing 
techniques—they brought more people to the meetings and elected their own leaders to 
direct the effort.  According to one focus group participant,  
And the business that I really loved and, again I emphasize those numbers 
because everything went by vote, I’ll never forget those numbers.  We had 
200-strong in that room.  Fells Point Business Association had about 45, 
so no matter what they did or said, they weren’t going to out-vote us.  And 
every time there was a meeting they tried to hide it, have secret meetings 
in places, but I was everywhere so no matter where the meeting was going 
to be, we were in the room (2004).  
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Clara Butler, the tenant council organizer for Perkins Homes, was the leader of 
the African-American community’s effort and she went on to serve as the Executive 
Director for the entire ten-year EZ period and continues to serve as the Executive 
Director today.  Butler, a long time activist in the African American community, thought 
it was time for this community to take control over redevelopment efforts, and she 
organized them to do so.  She said, “I’m talking about being down here for 40 years.  I’ve 
watched SECO/Fells Point run things.  And we felt, and I believed, and we’ve shown it’s 
our time.” 
East Harbor Village Center Operations  
While the formation process took a long time, the Village Center was able to 
begin operations soon after its application was approved.  Three months after its approval 
in May 1996, EHVC signed its first administrative funding agreement with EBMC, 
making it the third village center to receive administrative funding.  EHVC operated, like 
all of the village centers were required to, as a 501(c)(3) organization.  EHVC was 
required to produce a Land Use Plan to serve as a strategic plan to guide Village Center 
activities.  Its Land Use Plan was completed in 1998 and was produced by one of the 
leading planners in the City.  The plan, which guided the Village Center’s operations, had 
a clear mission and vision statement, and it set out its goals to EMPOWER the 
community: 
 Employ the residents of the East Harbor Village community; 
 Mobilize the residents to restore their neighborhoods and City environment; 
Promote the diversity of businesses, nonprofits, community organizations, 
institutions and cultures; 
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 Organize the community; 
 Work together to bring about positive change; 
 Educate the residents through literacy and training programs; and 
 Respond to the concerns of the community (EHVC Strategic Plan). 
The Village Center Board, after some revisions, consisted of thirteen members: 
the chair; seven representatives from local community organizations; four at-large 
members from businesses, nonprofits, and institutions; and one non-voting government 
representative.  The long-serving Board chairman, the leader of a local CDC, was not 
active in Village Center leadership.  According to the NOMAGIC assessment of the 
Village Center’s operations, “the Board President appears to have abdicated his 
leadership role,” and “the Executive Director of the Village Center has essentially carried 
the entire load” (2004c, 41). 
Clara Butler ran the organization in a cooperative manner with the Board, which 
met regularly, but was rarely able to achieve a quorum.  Furthermore, a majority of 
members who attended the Board meetings had served on the Board since the Village 
Center’s founding and had a long history of working with the director.  As a result, the 
EHVC Board was not truly independent and did not take an active role in the oversight or 
planning for the Village Center and often deferred to the Executive Director on key 
strategy decisions.   
The Village Center hired all of its leaders and most of its staff from the 
community and made large investments in training its resident staff.  The Assistant 
Director of the Village Center, Talib Horne, took advantage of numerous opportunities 
for personal skills development.  He was supported by the EBMC and other 
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organizations, and he ultimately earned his degree in Community Development while 
working at the Village Center.  Horne went on to form and serve as the director of the 
East Harbor Community Development Corporation, a CDC formed out of EHVC.  The 
East Harbor Village Center was an example of a staff-led organization dominated by a 
single, strong leader.  According to the NOMAGIC assessment of the Village Center, 
“The Executive Director’s assertive approach has been the linchpin in shepherding the 
growth and development of the East Harbor Village Center” (2004c, 41).   
Clara Butler had been a strong leader for both the Village Center and the 
community.  She served as the community organizer in one of the local housing projects 
and used her natural leadership abilities to marshal the community’s Village Center 
formation efforts. The East Harbor area was in the path of redevelopment radiating from 
downtown, and it was also the location of a major HOPE VI housing project 
redevelopment.  Butler’s strong leadership engaged and represented the interests of the 
African-American community in these redevelopment efforts.  According to an interview 
with Diane Bell in 2006, EHVC was able to make sure that past tenants of the Flag House 
housing project were able to return to the low-income portion of the Flag House HOPE 
VI redevelopment.  Because the HOPE VI program requires community oversight, Butler 
was able to trade her organization’s support for the project for the commitment that many 
residents could return.   
Flag House was the last of Baltimore's original four high-rise public housing 
projects to be redeveloped.  The other three had been demolished and rebuilt using 
previous HOPE VI grants.  The 487 units at Flag House Courts were demolished and 
replaced with 130 units of public housing, 52 low-income rentals, 10 subsidized home 
 
 196 
ownership units, and 145 market rate home ownership units.  The Housing Authority 
partnered with H.J. Russell & Company, Mid City, LLC, and the Integral Group in the 
redevelopment effort, and it utilized a variety of funding sources, including tax credits, 
tax-exempt bonds, private debt, and State and City funds.  The redevelopment plan also 
included business incubator space, new retail space, and a new community youth 
development and training center.  Because of the public support and funding for the 
project, there were requirements for community involvement, and Butler and EHVC took 
the lead in representing the community in this process.  She worked with the City’s 
housing commissioner, Danny Henson, and the developers to make sure that existing 
Flag House tenants were given priority in the new public housing units.  Because of her 
leadership, the Village Center also received federal funding to provide transitional and 
self-sufficiency services to former Flag House residents displaced by the redevelopment.  
Based on this success, EHVC was brought in by the City to represent the community in a 
Johns Hopkins land swap and in developing the City’s Central Avenue South Renewal 
Plan.  The City recognized the leadership of EHVC and engaged the organization in the 
ongoing redevelopment of the community. 
EHVC had a community organizer but, as a result of the initial conflicts over its 
formation, it was not able to fully engage the diverse residents in the community.  
According to the 2004 NOMAGIC assessment of the Village Center: 
A common perception of all of the EHVC leadership interviewed is that 
some of the organizations with predominantly or entirely white 
constituencies do not work in cooperation with the East Harbor Village 
Center, despite expressing concern about the East Harbor area and 
otherwise exhibiting behaviors indicative of their investment in the 
revitalization of East Harbor as a place to live or do business. Such 
organizations are perceived to participate only to the extent of ‘protecting’ 
their own neighborhoods’ interests rather than engaging with sister 
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organizations (EHVC members) to work for the betterment of the entire 
East Harbor area. (2004c 43) 
This lack of cooperation was especially true of the predominantly white Little 
Italy and Fells Point communities.  They did not play a major role in Village Center 
governance or activities.  Nevertheless, because of its strong leadership, the Village 
Center was able to work with the leaders of these communities.  Butler worked with them 
on their applications for economic development funding and they, in return, provided 
political and community support to the Village Center when asked.  Because of Butler’s 
leadership, the Village Center was able to organize and represent African-American 
residents and work with the white communities.  Fells Point and Little Italy were able to 
access EBMC’s economic development programs,10 and East Harbor was the largest 
beneficiary of EBMC economic development grants and loans.  Butler was also able to 
work with these organizations on redevelopment issues impacting the community.  
 EHVC focused on the delivery of core Empowerment Zone programs in the 
community.  It operated the EBMC’s core workforce development program, the Harbor 
Jobs Career Center, operated the Block-by-Block and Safe Neighborhood community 
organizing and crime prevention programs, and publicized EBMC’s housing programs.  
During its operational period, EHVC also operated after-school and substance abuse 
programs, but discontinued them when EBMC funding expired.  The Village Center 
generally under-spent its annual operating fund allocations from EBMC.  It kept staff 
salaries and operating expenses low and it was able to leverage its operational funding 
with new City, foundation, and federal resources.  As a result, EHVC was able to 
distribute its EBMC funding to support six, rather than the planned five, years of 
                                               
10 Economic development was the only programmatic area not directly implemented through the village 
centers.  The village centers, however, were required to sign off on each economic development request. 
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administrative funding, and it was even able to conserve some EBMC funding for future 
uses. 
 East Harbor’s leaders recognized the need for the African-American community 
to play a role in community redevelopment, and the Village Center became directly 
active in economic development.  In Baltimore, all EZ economic development activities 
were centrally implemented by EBMC.  EHVC established its own Development 
Committee and, in 1999, it created the East Harbor CDC (EHCDC).  This fulfilled one of 
the goals outlined by the founding Director in EHVC’s strategic Land Use Plan.  Through 
the creation of EHCDC, EHVC became directly involved in the redevelopment occurring 
in the community.  EBMC provided both technical and financial assistance in the 
formation of EHCDC.   
The East Harbor Village Center served a waterfront community to the east of 
downtown.  A large portion of the industrial land in the area was vacant or underutilized.  
Contrary to initial expectations, this area became one of the most attractive 
redevelopment areas in the City as Baltimore’s nationally-recognized downtown 
revitalization moved eastward.  The EHCDC was able to attract Board members from 
major banks (Bank of America), developers (Struever Brothers, one of Baltimore’s 
largest local developers), the State (MSBDFA, the State small business funding 
program), and national institutions (Fannie Mae).  It also attracted local foundation 
funding to develop an Individual Development Account (IDA)11 program.   The EHCDC 
became a strong organization by redeveloping a former City firehouse into a community 
center (with a retail space component) and several homes, and it is pursuing involvement 
                                               
11 IDAs are matched savings accounts that enable low-income American families to save, build assets, and 
enter the financial mainstream 
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in several other projects.  It also became the leading provider of IDAs and an important 
provider of income tax assistance in the City. 
The development and success of the EHCDC is indicative of the strong strategic 
leadership by Village Center staff.  Butler recognized from the beginning the economic 
development potential in the community.  She then established a CDC to develop a role 
for the Village Center in this redevelopment, and she used her reputation with the 
community to secure both involvement of key development interests in the EHCDC and a 
role for the Village Center in redevelopment efforts.  She identified and further developed 
talent in the Village Center’s Assistant Director and CDC Director, Horne, who himself 
became a strong leader of a successful organization. 
East Harbor Village Center Outcomes 
The East Harbor Village Center achieved relatively modest outcomes from formal 
EBMC programs.  As shown in Table 14, the Village Center’s 309 workforce 
development job placements were the lowest of any of the village centers, and the 57 
Housing Venture Fund closings were the second lowest of the village centers.  Overall, 
the Village Center accounted for about 7% of total EBMC activities even though it made 
up about 10% of the EZ population.  It is important, however, to point out that the East 
Harbor area had existing middle-income and gentrified communities (Fells Point and 
Little Italy) and the redevelopment of the housing projects removed many low-income 
residents who qualified for services; therefore, a lower proportion of residents qualified 
for various EBMC programs.     
As a result of the economic redevelopment occurring in the area, East Harbor 
received the largest share of EBMC economic development funding, with 51% of 
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development loans made and 60% of funds lent.  East Harbor had the lowest reduction in 
crime of any community in the Zone.  One factor influencing this could have been the 
redevelopment occurring in the community, which made it an obvious target for crime.  
The most important outcome for EHVC was not its programmatic service delivery.  
Instead, the Village Center and the EHCDC served as a means of representing and 
engaging the poor, minority community which otherwise would have been ignored and 






East Harbor Empowerment  
Item Village Center Zone Total 
Workforce Development 
Total Placements 309 4,725 
Economic Development  
Loans Made 56 109 
Loan Amounts $9,820,993 $16,325,634 
Project Costs $73,553,523 $105,882,050 
Jobs Created/Maintained 1,042 2,555 
Quality of Life 
Home Ownership 
Housing Venture Fund Closings 57 813 
Funds Allocated $269,074 $3,432,636 
Public Safety 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Year of Plan) Sep-02 n.m. 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending) $12,000 $159,513 
Block by Block $32,248 $487,028 
Change in Crime Rate (1994-2003) -36% -56% 
Community Capacity Building 
Village Center Application Approved Feb-96 n.m. 
Village Center Admin. Funding Agreement  May-96 n.m. 
Village Center Administrative Funds $964,958 $5,782,696 
Current Status Operating n.m. 
Source: EBMC 
Table 14 
East Harbor Village Center 
Selected Baltimore Empowerment Zone Programmatic Inputs and Outcomes 
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As presented in Table 15, using data from the 1990 and 2000 Census,12 the East 
Harbor area lost less of its population, had a smaller increase in the share of vacant 
housing, and had stronger income and employment growth than other village centers.  It 
saw the poverty rate fall from 39% to 32%.  Part of these changes can be attributed to the 
strength of the area’s already-gentrified Fells Point community and the HOPE VI 
redevelopment of housing projects that moved many poorer residents out of the 
community.  The available Census data only cover five years of Village Center 
operations and exclude the impact of the rapid development that occurred in this 
community after 2000.  The East Harbor area is in the midst of a major renewal process.  
The activities of the Empowerment Zone and EHVC were able to facilitate and support 
this renewal process and, more importantly, represent the existing community residents 
who frequently had no voice in redevelopment. 
                                               
12 The census is the only available source of data at the neighborhood level and is only available every ten 
years.  As a result, the data start before the creation of the Empowerment Zone and only go through the 




Item  Village Center Total EZ Baltimore City 
Total Population 
1990 7,526 71,503 736,014 
2000 7,003 54,012 651,154 
Change -523 -17,491 -84,860 
% Change -7% -24% -12% 
Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings 
1990 23% 25% 44% 
2000 23% 26% 43% 
Change 1% 1% -1% 
Percentage of Dwellings that are Vacant 
1990 25% 17% 9% 
2000 26% 26% 14% 
Change 1% 9% 5% 
Median Household Income 
1990 $25,445 $18,499 $32,316 
2000 $30,568 $20,750 $30,078 
Change $5,123 $2,251 -$2,238 
% Change 20% 12% -7% 
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level 
1990 41% 41% 21% 
2000 32% 34% 22% 
Change -9% -7% 1% 
Resident Labor Force Participation 
1990 44% 37% 47% 
2000 49% 37% 44% 
Change 5% 0% -3% 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 16% 15% 9% 
2000 8% 17% 11% 
Change -8% 1% 2% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, EBMC 
Table 15 
East Harbor Village Center 
Neighborhood Conditions and Changes 
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East Harbor Village Center Summary   
 The East Harbor Village Center is one of the four village centers that continued to 
operate after the ten-year Empowerment Zone effort was complete.  It created a new 
CDC that provided operating support to the Village Center and continues to attract City, 
foundation, and federal support.  The Village Center’s sustainability was based on its 
ability to leverage its Empowerment Zone funding with other federal and City funds 
related to the federal HOPE VI redevelopment and the creation of new programs, like tax 
return assistance and IDAs, that were and continue to be attractive to funders.   
East Harbor can trace its success to strong staff and leadership and its ability to 
find a niche as both a service provider and partner in ongoing redevelopment activities in 
the community.  It was able to represent the African-American community and maintain 
both resident involvement in the redevelopment while furthering the Village Center itself.  
One weakness of EHVC was its failure to include all of the diverse communities in the 
area.  As a result of the early conflicts over Village Center formation, it achieved only 
limited participation by residents from the predominantly white communities.  These 
communities participated in EZ programs, but had little participation in Village Center 
governance. 
EHVC and EHCDC continue to operate, supported by HOPE VI funds, national 
and local program grants, and revenues from development projects.  At the time of 




Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council 
 The Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council (Washington 
Village) was one of the first three Village Center applications accepted by EBMC in 
September 1995.  In March 1996 it was the first village center to receive administrative 
funding.  The Village Center served a diverse population, 77% of which was white and 
20% of which was African-American in 1990.  Washington Village served the entire 
southern portion of the western section of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.  A map 
showing the Washington Village service area and key locations mentioned in this case 
study is included below as Map 8.   
The area combined several social, economic, and racial groups including poor, 
blue-collar workers and upper-income persons who had already gentrified part of the 
community.  Washington Village had the lowest poverty rate, the second highest income, 
and the second highest labor force participation rate.  While the community had the 
lowest housing vacancy rate of the Empowerment Zone, its housing stock was old and in 








The Washington Village area lay in the path of redevelopment radiating from 
downtown.  While the community lacked the waterfront views of East Harbor, it offered 
proximity to downtown and the Camden Yards sports complex.  Washington Boulevard, 
a commercial corridor running east from Martin Luther King Boulevard, traversed the 
center of the community.  Washington Boulevard traditionally served as the commercial 
center for this community, but it had declined because of the decline of community 
income and competition with other retail centers.  The area also included the City’s large 
Carroll Park, the Carroll-Camden industrial area, and several old industrial parcels.  The 
City had acquired one of these parcels, the Kopper Company site, in 1993.  When the EZ 
effort started this site was being developed into Camden Crossing, a 150-garage 
townhouse complex that would feature paved open streets and walkways, a central park, 
pocket parks, and tree-lined streets.  For more than a decade, the community was seen as 
being on the verge of redevelopment, yet gentrification was occurring at a slow pace.   
Washington Village - Village Center Formation 
 The community planning process that was initiated to support the City’s EZ 
application process continued in Washington Village after its submission.  The 
Washington Village area was served by a number of smaller community organizations 
but lacked an umbrella organization.  The process of applying for the EZ brought 
together a critical mass of activists and organizations, facilitated by the University of 
Maryland School of Social Work, that continued to meet to discuss efforts to improve 
their community even before the City was awarded the Zone.  As a result, the 
Washington Village area was more organized than all of the other village centers in 
efforts to form a village center except the pre-existing HEBCAC. 
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Washington Village had to overcome initial community conflict over who would 
control the Village Center.  Two local developers, Katie McDonald and Hank Abarelli, 
attempted to take over the Village Center formation process.  They were opposed by a 
broad spectrum of community members who thought that they wanted to use EZ funds to 
develop properties that they owned or controlled.  The community opposition was 
organized by leaders of the three community organizations in the area and representatives 
from local institutions, such as Head Start, Tri-Churches Housing (a nonprofit housing 
developer), and UMB.  There was also conflict over who would control the Village 
Center among the larger, existing organizations serving the community: the Hearts of 
Pigtown, the Southwest Community Council, and Washington Village Improvement 
Association. 
Arnold Sherman, who lived in the community and worked for the Governor’s 
Office of Crime Prevention and Control, had experience working with community 
organizations on crime programs.  He worked with activists and institutional 
representatives to “create a Board that was large enough that no single clique could 
dominate it and small enough so it would not be unwieldy” (WVPNPC Focus Group 
2004).  They created a 29-member Board with ten permanent seats for local institutions 
whose support was needed to achieve results in the community.  In order to engage the 
three organizations already serving the community (and a fourth community not active in 
the application process but included in the boundaries), each was given a permanent seat 
on the Board.  According to one focus group participant, “We gave Board seats to each 
community association, to draw them in and make them part of this, because it was their 
community” (2004).  In order to mitigate conflict over control, the Village Center created 
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a rotating Board Chairperson, so that each of the community organizations had an 
opportunity to be in charge.  The UMB School of Social Work assigned an outreach 
person, Bob Kirk, to the Village Center, to provide community organizing and conflict 
resolution support.   
When asked what the most important barrier was that they had to address in the 
formation process, Board member Joe Brown reported: 
Setting up the Board and things like that.  It was trust among community 
residents.  Allowing new leadership to emerge and trying to develop that 
new leadership.  There was no trust in the community at all.  I think that 
there were three community associations: Pigtown, Washington Village 
Improvement Association, and Southwest Community Council.  And they 
were all fighting over nothing. (2004)  
To Brown, the source of conflict was “actually, probably a lot of race.  A lot of past 
history.  Then there were those of us who has just bought housing and so it was also a 
class thing” (2004).   
 Washington Village overcame community conflict to form a functioning 
organization.  In doing so, it benefited from the leadership of a community resident with 
experience in working with community organizations and from local institutional 
representatives experienced in community organizing and development.  The community 
worked together to take control of the Village Center from the two developers.  They 
devised a Board system that incorporated major local institutions into the Village 
Center’s oversight and management, and they gave both a seat at the table and a chance 
to lead to each of the leading community organizations already serving the area.  This 
reduced conflict among these organizations over control and ultimately engaged them in 
the Village Center and activities.  Washington Village hired “Doc” Goodwin, the leader 
of the Hearts of Pigtown, as its first Director, but later replaced him with a person from 
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outside of the community who was skilled in working in social services and community 
organizing.   
By overcoming initial disputes, Washington Village created a strong Board and 
operational structure that could contain, manage, and resolve conflicts.  The creation of a 
new, independent organization with a professional staff reduced conflict among 
community organizations over control of EZ funding and programs.  The creation of an 
innovative Board structure allowed Washington Village to engage its stakeholders in its 
management and success. 
Washington Village - Village Center Operations 
 Washington Village was the first of the village centers to receive administrative 
funding.  From its inception, it was a planning-led organization with strong staff and 
Board leadership.  While the conflicts among community groups over the formation of 
the Village Center continued, the innovative Board structure and participation by 
institutional Board members allowed the Board to control and resolve conflicts and build 
a strong, well-run organization.   
A Board of 30 members, with 20 elected from the community at-large and 10 
designated seats for community organizations and institutions, oversaw the Village 
Center.  In its early years of operation, the Village Center Board suffered from 
considerable infighting.  According to the EBMC-sponsored White and Associates 
review of Washington Village (1998), 
The most consistent concern raised by all of those interviewed was the 
tension and confusion exhibited by Board members, which some believe 
hurts the credibility of the Village Center.  The business of the Village 
Center is fraught with personal agendas and the negative attitudes of some 
Board members.  Those Board members who consistently criticize rarely 
participate in Village Center events and major functions.  The lack of 
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professionalism at the Board meetings discourages residents, the business 
community, and other potential stakeholders from becoming more directly 
involved in the work of the Village Center. (np) 
Through hard work, technical assistance provided by EBMC, and the ongoing 
work of key institutional Board members, the Village Center was able to overcome this 
early conflict.  According to the 2004 NOMAGIC assessment of the Washington Village, 
the Board was considered a core asset.  It reported, “The Board of Directors’ structure of 
WVPNPC is a collective model that incorporates all of the interests of its various 
stakeholders as provided by EBMC.  The Board’s basic makeup and membership 
represents multiple interests that have a vested stake in this community” (2004b, 32).  
The Board benefited from the long-term participation of a committed group of 
community and institutional representatives.  The NOMAGIC (2004b) assessment also 
commented: 
On the WVPNPC Board are also several people who were founders of the 
organization, played significant roles in getting WVPNPC organized and 
‘off the ground,’ and have served without interruption since WVPNPC 
was established.  These individuals, working with other Board members 
and with WVPNPC partners and interested parties at the local, State, and 
national level have been quite instrumental in shepherding the growth and 
development of the Village Center to this point in its evolution. (32)     
 Washington Village benefited from the talents and connections of a committed 
group of Board members who shaped the organization and used their connections to 
attract or develop new services or programs to the community.  Five board members who 
made substantial contributions include: 
 Bob Kirk from the UMB School of Social Work provided experience in 
community outreach and organizing techniques. 
 Anthony Savage, a community resident and employee of the State’s Attorney’s 
Office For Baltimore, was able to bring in a U.S. Department of Justice initiative 




Funded by a $200,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Justice to the 
State's attorney's office, Etheridge's job is to prosecute quality-of-life and 
nuisance crimes for a pilot program in Southwest Baltimore's Washington 
Village/Pigtown community.  Aggressively prosecuting minor offenses—
often ignored in the pursuit of more serious crimes—supports 
neighborhood stability and could keep minor problems from escalating 
into larger ones, Etheridge says.  Part of the program's payoff is requiring 
most violators, who typically get community service penalties, to serve 
their punishment in Washington Village/Pigtown doing tasks such as 
picking up trash, sweeping streets, or planting trees. (Fields, 2003) 
 Arnold Sherman, a community resident and staff member of the Governor’s 
Office of Crime Control and Prevention, provided advice and guidance on crime 
issues and on planning and organizational management.   
 Shannon Jeffords, the head of Tri-Churches Housing, provided insight on 
management and strategic planning and on how to implement housing assistance 
programs.   
 Joe Brown, a community resident, banker, and, later, and employee of the State 
Revitalization Program, provided knowledge on commercial development and 
assisted in the formation of the Washington Village CDC.   
Washington Village and EBMC recognized the strength of the Board.  According 
to Chris Ryer, the third Village Center Director, “My experience with the Board is that 
they worked in a professional way, made decisions, and moved on.  They didn’t get 
stopped; they made decisions. That’s so fundamental; this is my personal opinion, 
because you can’t attract decent staff if you can’t make a decision” (2004).   
Community residents made up most of the Board.  While this engaged the 
community in the governance, it did have one drawback in terms of fund-raising.  The 
Board lacked links to the major foundations or businesses, such as banks, that support 
community organizations.  All of the major institutional partners on the Board were in the 
same position as the Village Center in terms of relying on fundraising to support their 
operations.  As a result, the Board played only a small role in fundraising to support 
sustainability.  According to Ryer,  
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The Board, and maybe this is my fault, it was always a community Board; 
it was never a Board to make money.  If I had been there longer, I think at 
some point, when they had to become really independent, there would 
have needed to be some fiscal responsibility.  There was none at all when I 
was Director because they seemed to be valuable as a community [Board] 
. . . so they never did do that. (2004)   
Washington Village’s operations were the most strategic planning-driven of all of 
the village centers.  In October 1995, it produced its Master Plan, A Grand Vision for our 
Community to Improve the Economic Well-being of All of Our Residents, that established 
goals in eleven areas including economic development, housing and workforce 
development, community mobilization, and public safety (Washington Village 1995).  In 
addition to the EBMC-funded Land Use Plan for the community, Washington Village 
received EBMC support to develop a long-term strategic plan that it updated regularly to 
guide operations, and to organize regular strategic planning retreats for the Board and 
staff.  The community plans were considered one of the most valuable outcomes of the 
entire Empowerment Zone effort, with one Washington Village focus group participant 
reporting, “I think it [the Land Use Plan] is important as a road map because, with the 
outside investors moving in, if we didn’t have that, we would be at the mercy of [the 
developers]” (2004).  The Village Center used its strategic and Land Use plans to 
examine, guide, and organize its response to development activities occurring in the 
community.   
 Washington Village did experience difficulty with staff turnover and recruitment.  
It replaced a community resident with a professional as Executive Director.  This 
Director left when she obtained a job managing a program in her core area of interest.  
The second Executive Director, Ryer, who coordinated the EZ planning for the 
community, left to take care of a sick parent.  The third Director did not have a long 
 
 214 
tenure, and the post was vacant until the fourth Director, Shawn McIntosh, who served 
through 2004, was hired.  The Village Center recruited citywide for the Executive 
Director positions, and only the first Director lived in the community.  
Washington Village reported being “real aggressive in trying to recruit from the 
community” for core program staff, but experienced difficulties in finding people with 
the right skills.  The experienced staff and Board discussed the difficulties of working in 
the field of community development in the Washington Village focus group.  In the focus 
group, one member of Village Center Board reported difficulty in understanding how 
much money would be required to hire a qualified director “It took a number of years 
before people agreed that you have to pay $50,000 or $60,000 if you want somebody who 
can get the job done.” (2004).  The Director of the Village Center [McIntosh] reported 
the difficulties of running a community organization “After your nine to five 
management position, you have to attend Board meetings at night and neighborhood 
events on the weekends” (2004).  One Board member described the pressures of living in 
the community: “They [community residents] seem to respect the boundaries differently.  
If I were a resident of this community, I’d feel like I am never off.  These people are 
going to know where I’m living and they’re going to be, on Saturday, ‘There’s trash to be 
picked up’” (2004).  Low pay, long hours, and constant pressure are core reasons for 
employee burnout in the community development field.   
Despite these difficulties in retaining staff, the Village Center experienced notable 
success in other areas.  The public safety coordinator for Washington Village was 
recognized as one of the best in the City.  The Village Center’s second Director, Kim 
Lane, a community activist interested in “hands-on community work in impoverished 
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neighborhoods,” earned the name “the Princess of Pigtown” as a result of her hard work 
(Klein 2000, 3b). 
 As was the case with HEBCAC, key informants from Washington Village 
reported difficulty in working with EBMC, especially when they developed new program 
ideas or were more successful than other village centers in implementing them.  
According to a Washington Village focus group participant, when they had fully used 
their Housing Venture Fund allocation for residents to purchase homes, EBMC cut them 
off, despite other village centers not using their full allocation: “And now there is still 
money that hasn’t been spent, because all other village centers didn’t do their job.  And 
you know, that’s where I think, I know EBMC was trying to be fair to all the village 
centers, but rather than rewarding success, they kind of held the Village Center back to 
keep pace with those that weren’t as successful.”  According to Ryer (2006), “We felt 
like we were always fighting with Diane Bell to do something.  She would listen and 
would often figure out a way to satisfy what we wanted to do and that would become a 
model for the other village centers.” 
 Washington Village achieved success in all core EBMC-funded program areas 
and developed new programs to address community issues.  In the area of workforce 
development, Washington Village chose to combine its career services and family 
services center into an integrated unit.  The workforce development effort met all EBMC 
established performance criteria.  As a result of its workforce development success, it 
was one of eight City providers to receive funding from two leading local foundations, 
the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Open Society Institute.  The Village Center 
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realized that substance abuse impacted both employment and crime, so it implemented a 
substance abuse program that referred residents to EBMC counseling vendors.  
In the area of public safety, Washington Village set itself apart from the other 
village centers.  Crime was seen as a critical issue in the community, and it became a core 
focus of the Village Center.  According to an article in The Baltimore Sun on the Village 
Center’s crime prevention program to install and operate surveillance cameras (Fields, 
2003b):  
The council's public safety committee, led by [Terry] Smith, has emerged 
as one of the most imaginative neighborhood-based crime prevention 
outfits in Baltimore.  And the group is doing it independent of City 
government, but with a lot of police appreciation. ‘It's like an extra pair of 
eyes out there for us,’ said Baltimore police Officer David Milburn. ‘As 
soon as they see the cameras, if they were thinking about doing a crime, 
they'll think twice.  And if there is a problem, we can go to the cameras 
and review them and help make a case.’  The City operates surveillance 
cameras in some public areas, but this is the only Baltimore neighborhood 
group known to operate its own.  The public safety committee operates 
with an annual budget of about $100,000 with the money coming from 
City, State, and federal grants. 
Washington Village was able to attract new federal, State, and City funding to 
implement a number of public safety efforts including State funding to prosecute 
nuisance crimes, funding to put in anti-crime cameras, and an agreement with the 
courts/probation office to have community offenders perform their public service in the 
community, often on Village Center projects.  The Village Center recognized the 
interrelationship among substance abuse, crime, and workforce development, and it 
created an integrated system where people on probation could be referred to substance 
abuse treatment and, upon completion of treatment, to job training.   
Washington Village excelled in both housing and economic development 
programs.  In housing programs, it led the Empowerment Zone in referrals to the Housing 
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Venture Fund and marketed the exterior repair programs to the community.  In economic 
development, the Village Center became one of the first Main Street commercial 
revitalization program sites in the City, and it also became a CDC that developed three 
buildings. 
Washington Village was able to leverage EBMC operating funds with 
considerable external support from both government and foundation sources.  By 2002, 
the Village Center was able to attract 48% of its funding from non-EZ sources, and, in 
2003 and 2004, it raised most of its operating funds from non-EBMC sources.  
Washington Village continues to operate today with only modest EBMC support.  
According to the new EBMC President, Tanya Terrell (2006), “Washington Village, they 
have a new Executive Director, Lesley Smith, who had been there for five or more years 
as the career center Director.  She is doing a fabulous job in their core competencies, 
which are still in career services and in their Main Street program, which is the signature 
one for City of Baltimore.”    
Washington Village - Village Center Outcomes 
 Washington Village achieved programmatic success that played a supportive role 
in the ongoing revitalization of the community.  As shown in Table 16, its workforce 
development program had the third highest number of job placements despite serving a 
community with a much higher level of education and workforce participation when 
compared to the other village centers.  The Village Center’s economic development 
linked local businesses to EBMC’s business assistance program resulting in the second 
highest utilization and impact of EBMC loan programs.  Washington Village had the 
highest utilization of housing assistance programs and accounted for 40% of total 
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Housing Venture Fund activity.  The public safety efforts of the Village Center leveraged 
the highest level of non-EBMC funding and resulted in the third largest reduction in 
crime, despite only modest population losses and continued gentrification.13 
                                               
13 The village centers with the largest reductions in crime, Harlem Park and HEBCAC, each lost one third 
or more of their population during the EZ funding period.  Thus, crime reduction in these communities 
could be due to smaller their smaller population.  As was the case in East Harbor, gentrification and 
redevelopment often leads to an increase in crime, as the area becomes more of a target.   
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WVPNPC Empowerment  
Item Village Center Zone Total 
Workforce Development 
Total Placements 583 4,725 
Economic Development  
Loans Made 34 109 
Loan Amounts $4,439,447 $16,325,634 
Project Costs $22,354,159 $105,882,050 
Jobs Created/Maintained 953 2,555 
Quality of Life 
Home Ownership 
Housing Venture Fund Closings 324 813 
Funds Allocated $1,385,321 $3,432,636 
Public Safety 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Year of Plan) Sep-02 n.m. 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending AIR) $85,833 $408,500 
Block by Block (AIR) $37,188 $612,303 
Change in Crime Rate (1994-2003) -62% -56% 
Community Capacity Building 
Village Center Application Approved Sep-95 n.m. 
Village Center Admin. Funding Agreement  Mar-96 n.m. 
Village Center Administrative Funds $965,592 $5,782,696 
Current Status Operating n.m. 
Source: EBMC 
Table 16 
Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council 




It is difficult to analyze the impact of the Village Center on community conditions 
using year 2000 Census data because the data only capture the first three years of the 
Village Center’s operations.  During its operations, conditions in the neighborhood 
stabilized and the community lost fewer of its residents than any other village center and 
the City as a whole.  As shown in Table 17, the percentage of persons living in poverty 
fell with the Village Center having the third highest increase in median household income 
(from an already high base).  Other indicators are either mildly positive or negative, but 
again represent only the first few years of Village Center operations.  For example, the 
percentage of owner-occupied dwellings fell between 1990 and 2000 by 3% and housing 
vacancy increased.  However, Housing Venture Fund closings, most of which occurred 
after 2000, account for nearly 9% of total dwelling units, with many of these purchased 
units representing renovated vacant units. 
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Item  Village Center Total EZ Baltimore City 
Total Population 
1990 8,961 71,503 736,014 
2000 8,061 54,012 651,154 
Change -900 -17,491 -84,860 
% Change -10% -24% -12% 
Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings 
1990 50% 25% 44% 
2000 47% 26% 43% 
Change -3% 1% -1% 
Percentage of Dwellings that are Vacant 
1990 10% 17% 9% 
2000 17% 26% 14% 
Change 7% 9% 5% 
Median Household Income 
1990 $23,332 $18,499 $32,316 
2000 $24,607 $20,750 $30,078 
Change $1,275 $2,251 -$2,238 
% Change 5% 12% -7% 
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level 
1990 27% 41% 21% 
2000 23% 34% 22% 
Change -4% -7% 1% 
Resident Labor Force Participation 
1990 40% 37% 47% 
2000 39% 37% 44% 
Change -1% 0% -3% 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 9% 15% 9% 
2000 9% 17% 11% 
Change 0% 1% 2% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, EBMC 
Table 17 
Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council 
Neighborhood Conditions and Changes 
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Washington Village – Village Center Summary 
 The experience of Washington Village exemplifies the potential of community 
capacity building.  Washington Village, with its access to downtown, Camden Yards, 
parks, and employment centers, was considered the “next Federal Hill” for nearly a 
decade.  Nonetheless, prior to the Empowerment Zone, redevelopment was occurring at a 
very slow pace.  The community encompassed a large number of smaller community 
organizations that were interested in advancing their small neighborhoods, but it lacked 
an umbrella organization to promote comprehensive community development.  The 
Empowerment Zone application brought together a diverse constituency of community 
organizations, institutions, and residents who continued to work on broader issues even 
before the City was awarded the Zone.  The creation of the Village Center solidified this 
effort and created a new organization that continues to promote comprehensive change 
and meet community needs, even after the end of the EZ effort.  
The experience of Washington Village also exemplifies the difficulties inherent in 
any community-building effort.  It became mired in internal conflicts during its formation 
period.  Key supportive institutions and technical assistance provided by EBMC helped 
the community to overcome this conflict and build a strong, community-based 
organization.  Washington Village also demonstrates the potential benefits of EBMC’s 
approach of linking community development with social services at the neighborhood 
level.  The problems of neighborhood blight (crime, poor housing stock, lack of 
community amenities, and low sense of community) are inextricably linked to the social 
services-related problems of the residents (lack of education, drug use, poverty).  Efforts 
to improve neighborhood conditions without addressing the needs of the residents are 
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doomed to fail; indeed, efforts to assist poor residents can often be a means of improving 
local conditions.  Ryer noted,  
“It’s funny.  When I started, it was two organizations.  It was the 
community development and the workforce program.  Marrying them was 
interesting, but ultimately productive.  On the development side, their 
priority was crime.  They created a special committee . . . On workforce 
development, their issue was substance abuse . . . So, what happened when 
you start making the sides work together?  They realized that they are the 
same people.  They started to work together.” (2004)   
This led to Washington Village’s successful integrated services that attracted new support 









The Village Center of Poppleton 
 The Village Center of Poppleton (Poppleton or VCP) was the last of the six 
village centers formed.  Poppleton’s application was approved in February 1996, but the 
Village Center did not sign its first year’s administrative funding agreement until 
nineteen months later in September 1997.  During that time, Poppleton attempted to 
overcome divisions within the community and among the community, businesses, and 
institutions in the Village Center area. 
 The Village Center of Poppleton’s boundaries included the middle part of the 
western portion of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.  Its northern boundary was the 
“road to nowhere,” a small stretch of a planned highway that would have extended out to 
the Baltimore Beltway but was stopped by vigorous community protest in the 1970s, that 
formed a barrier between Poppleton and Harlem Park to the north.  Its western boundary 
was Carey Street and its southern boundary was Pratt Street (which leads to the 
downtown Inner Harbor area).  The Poppleton Village Center was the only village center 
that crossed over into a portion of the downtown business district.  The Village Center’s 
boundaries crossed over Martin Luther King (MLK) Boulevard, a major six-lane 
boulevard dividing predominantly poor, residential, West Side neighborhoods from 
downtown, to Paca Street, thereby incorporating parts of the University of Maryland 
Medical Center (UMMC) and the University of Maryland, Baltimore (UMB).  Despite 
the inclusion of these institutions, neither played a major role in the operation of the 
Village Center until very late in the Empowerment Zone implementation period.  
Poppleton was also home to Lexington Terrace, a blighted high-rise public housing 
project that was demolished in 1996, prior to the start of the Village Center.  The 
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Lexington Terrace are was successfully redeveloped into a smaller town house 
community that combined low and middle income housing and a small commercial 
development under HOPE VI.  The Poppleton Village Center participated in the 
commercial part of this redevelopment.  
 According to The Baltimore Sun (Daemmrich and Matthews, 1997), “Today, the 
area has grown impoverished.  Once dignified row houses stand vacant and crumbling; 
family stores have left.”  The area where the “road to nowhere” highway ran was already 
run down by 1966 when the City condemned and demolished 971 houses, 62 businesses, 
and 1 school.  The community lacked the organization or clout to stop the planning for 
the highway as the white residents of Fells Point and Federal Hill had stopped the 1956 
East West Freeway.  Yet, even Mayor Schaefer, who had pushed the first part of the 
highway project, was unable to complete the remainder of the highway over the 
opposition of environmentalists and more affluent African-American communities in its 
path further west.   
Some residents traced the decline of the Poppleton community to this highway 
project and the resulting loss of middle class residents and a small commercial corridor.  
According to one Poppleton Village Center focus group participant, “At one time . . . you 
had a lot of working class people that lived in the area.  People that worked at Sparrows 
Point and General Electric and places like that.  And then, of course, when they started 
laying off people and then they started this renovation and brought the ‘highway to 
nowhere’ through.  They moved out a lot of people.  So a lot of the people that moved 
were middle class” (Poppleton Focus Group 2004).  Another blamed the housing 
projects: “At one time, when Lexington Tower was first built, everybody worked, 
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everybody who lived there was employed.  Then of course that changed; it became a high 
poverty area” (Poppleton Focus Group 2004).   
Poppleton, along with Harlem Park, was one of the first urban renewal areas in 
the City.  Like Harlem Park, the Poppleton effort focused on housing renovation rather 
than demolition and, similarly, the urban renewal effort failed to change conditions in the 
community.  One legacy of the failed urban renewal effort, however, was the 
establishment of the area as a formal planning district in the City.  This resulted in a 
group of community organizations with a history of working together in Poppleton.  The 
community had also seen a failed small-scale redevelopment effort in the early 1990s, 
when the developer of a 12-building mixed retail-apartment complex development 
defaulted on City-backed loans (Jacobson 1993 a b c).  Thus, the area had a history of 
failed attempts at renewal. 
The community was racially divided; some parts of the community were in the 
very early stages of gentrification.  The area to the south of Baltimore Street included the 
Hollins Market community, an emerging arts and restaurant area, which drew its name 
from the City’s Hollins Market.  This area attracted new residents, many of them white, 
artists, or associated with UMB.  These new residents coined a name for their 
community, South West Baltimore (Sowebo) and called themselves the Sowbo-hemians.  
These new residents had not forged a working relationship with the African-American 
population living in the Poppleton neighborhood to the north of Baltimore Street. 
By 1990, the Poppleton area had the second lowest level of median household 
income, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest workforce participation rate of all of the 
village centers.  The community looked suspiciously at the large university and hospital 
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across MLK and enviously at the redevelopment starting to the south (in the Washington 
Village area).   Poppleton had always been concerned that the University of Maryland 
(both the hospital and the university) wanted to cross over MLK and take over their 
community.  
Poppleton Village Center Formation 
 Planning for the Empowerment Zone began in Baltimore’s West Side after the 
City sent its application to the federal government.  The well-organized community 
leaders and institutional representatives that formed the Washington Village/Pigtown 
Neighborhood Planning Council to the south dominated West Side planning.  Planning in 
the Poppleton area fell to existing community organizations and leaders in the planning 
area north of the emerging Washington Village/Pigtown Village Center and south of the 
“road to nowhere.”  Thus, the boundaries of Poppleton and the efforts of the leaders and 
organizations that formed it were set by default between an organized community to the 
south and a geographic and symbolic barrier to the north.  A map showing the Poppleton 
service area and key locations mentioned in this case study is included below as Map 9.   
As a result of the failed historic urban renewal effort and the City’s designation of 
the community as a formal planning area, the community and neighborhood 
organizations were very familiar with one another.  These organizations, however, 
experienced little or no success in promoting redevelopment and were weak in 
comparison to neighborhood organizations in other parts of the City.  Poppleton was also 
served by an umbrella organization, Communities Organized to Improve Life (COIL) that 
ran a nationally recognized adult education and employment program called the Learning 
Bank.  Despite the strength of COIL’s education program, it was one of the weakest 
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umbrella organizations in the City, and it was not linked to the City’s political power 
structure.   
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      The boundaries of Poppleton caused conflicts in the Village Center formation 
process.  As with HEBCAC on the East Side, the Empowerment Zone boundaries were 
drawn specifically to include UMB and UMMC to serve as institutional partners and 
promote redevelopment.  Unlike the East Side, however, Martin Luther King Boulevard, 
a physical and psychological barrier between these institutions and the residential 
Poppleton community, divided the area.  The redevelopment occurring around these 
institutions had historically taken place entirely on the east side of MLK.  There had 
always been suspicion in the community that UMB and UMMC wanted to take over their 
community. UMB did move across MLK Boulevard late in the Empowerment Zone 
implementation, but these institutions did not have the interactions with the Poppleton 
community that Johns Hopkins had had with its immediately adjacent community.  
Unlike the East Side, there was no history of or formal mechanism for these institutions 
to interact with the Poppleton community.  Since both institutions near-term plans did not 
call for expansion across MLK, there was no immediate need for such interaction. 
The boundaries of Poppleton included the Hollins Market community and a 
portion of the Union Square community.  These illustrated the very early stages of 
gentrification and had a base of white-owned businesses.  Representatives from these two 
communities and from UMD dominated the initial planning process for the Village 
Center with participation by COIL.  Representatives from the predominantly African-
American Poppleton community opposed these efforts.  When asked what barriers the 
Village Center had to overcome to begin operations, one participant in the Poppleton 
focus group (2004) responded, “in-house fighting, neighborhood fighting, racial 
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fighting.”  Another focus group participant observed that this fighting was racially 
driven: 
Before the Village Center actually formed we had all the meetings and . . . 
the first time I’d gone down there and you probably wouldn’t have thought 
no African-Americans lived in Poppleton . . . Well let me say that for you 
like this, there has always been a dividing line in this neighborhood, 
Baltimore Street.  The majority of whites live on the south side and the 
blacks live on the north side.  And so there’s always a fight, when it comes 
down to doing something for the neighborhood.  And it seems that the 
whites thought that they should control the neighborhood.  It’s that simple.  
(2004) 
 As the African-American community became organized, they selected Dr. Doris 
Hall, the leader of a local youth service organization, “For Little Sisters Only,” and a part 
of the old Schaefer administration’s neighborhood outreach system, to lead their efforts.  
Hall had ties to the community and relationships with many of the community leaders 
including Lenny Clay, a local barber and the unofficial “Mayor of Poppleton.”  She also 
owned property in the community and served as a volunteer in the community for the 
City Housing Administrator and power broker, Dan Henson.  These efforts were initially 
backed by EBMC, since it had pursued as a goal the development of new African-
American leaders and organizations outside of the existing umbrella organizations.   
The African-American community became mobilized to attend planning meetings 
and elect their own community leaders to the VCP Board.  This resulted in conflict 
between the original community representatives who were active in the EZ application 
and the emerging African-American leadership.  As a result of this conflict, many of the 
original organizations involved in the planning process simply left, leaving behind an 
organization dominated by Poppleton’s African-American community.  The conflict over 
the Village Center formation process was covered in The Baltimore Sun.  It reported that 
the Empowerment Zone “has brought infighting to at least one [community]—the 
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Poppleton area in West Baltimore where a member of the Empowerment Zone ‘Village 
Center’ is threatening to sue his fellow Board members” (McCraven, 1996).  The 
aforementioned Board member opposed changes to the bylaws to extend the term for ten 
Board members without an election.  According to The Sun article,   
Some observers say Dannenberg's public dispute with the Board reflects 
infighting that has dogged the Board from its inception.  Mostly poor 
black residents of Poppleton fear that white residents of Union Square and 
Hollins Market and even representatives of major institutions such as the 
University of Maryland would dominate decisions.  Among the ten 
members whose terms would be extended are people whose views are at 
odds with Dannenberg's.  ‘People on the [south] side of West Baltimore 
Street want to tell people on this side of Baltimore Street what they can 
and cannot do,’ said one Board member from Poppleton. (McCraven, 
1996 3b) 
By the time that the Village Center application was submitted, the Hollins Market 
Merchants Association and Union Square Association were not even listed as partner 
organizations, and they had no members on the final Board of Directors.  The Board was 
chosen through a combination of general community elections and set-aside Board seats 
for community associations.  One community association, Barre Circle, separated from 
Poppleton to become part of the Washington Village/Pigtown Village Center to the south.  
The VCP application included UMMC and UMB as partners, but neither was active 
during the early years of Village Center operations.  COIL remained involved and had a 
seat on the Board but, seeing the conflict, made no effort to create the Village Center 
within its existing structure.   
The African-American community, led by Hall as Chairperson, took control over 
the Village Center and its Board through community mobilization and election.  
According to one Poppleton focus group participant, “I think its just that more people got 
involved, and then when people get involved in the political process, some folks got 
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voted out.  So using a democratic process, that’s how it changed.  And then, once that 
happened, then of course certain segments left until the University of Maryland piece 
started to come up, and now people are coming back” (2004).   
The initial planning for the Village Center started with the participation and 
leadership of local institutions (UMB and UMMS), COIL and the community activists 
and organizations serving gentrifying communities.  The African-American community 
opposed this process and eventually prevailed.  The losing side ultimately withdrew until 
a large redevelopment opportunity became available.  Overcoming this conflict took 
considerable time and delayed the start-up of the Village Center for nineteen months.  It 
also left the Village Center weakened and lacking a strong institutional partner.   
EBMC, by its own admission, stayed out of the conflict.  According to The 
Baltimore Sun, the EBMC “refuses to become involved in the disagreement. ‘Our policy 
is to let them solve it,’ said Michael Preston, Empower Baltimore's spokesman” 
(McCraven, 1996, 3b).  Indeed, the focus group participants recognized the lack of 
EBMC support.  One participant reported, “We had to fight [EBMC] harder than we had 
to fight the neighborhoods” (2004).  During the Village Center formation process, the 
people working for the Village Center had to volunteer their time and had no support in 
finding places to meet, finding office space, or working to resolve the conflicts in the 
community.   
Poppleton Village Center Operations   
 A Board of 30 community residents’ plus four non-voting members representing 
government and local institutions (including UMB and UMMC) oversaw the Village 
Center.  The community elected ten voting Board members, and each of these ten 
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positions were allocated by a defined formula to the census tracts in the community.  
Another ten Board members were “Interim Selected Directors” or persons active in the 
formation of the Village Center, including Hall and several institutional representatives.  
These members were supposed to have an election after the first year of operations, but 
the Board extended their terms without an election.  Many of these interim members 
served on the Board for the life of the organization.  The remaining ten Board members 
were elected by the other members of the Board and were drawn from community 
organizations, schools, churches, businesses, and institutions.  According to the 
NOMAGIC (2004a) assessment of the Village Center of Poppleton, “The Board was built 
on a strong leadership model with most of the power residing with the chairperson” (37).  
The Board was dominated by a group of several people, including Hall, who founded the 
organization and emerged successful in the conflicts over Village Center control. 
 The Poppleton Village Center Board never provided unified leadership.  
Dissatisfied Board members reported that the group that took over the Village Center was 
unable to bridge the gap between white and black residents or to develop and implement 
a vision for the community.  According to a Baltimore City Paper article,  
Michael Dannenberg remembers the early days of the Village Center of 
Poppleton as ‘a time when it looked like there would be a lot of 
partnerships and cooperation’ among disparate community groups.  
Edward Robinson recalls a time ‘when people thought they could direct 
the changes that needed to be made’ in the impoverished West Baltimore 
region.  But Dannenberg, a current member of the center's Board, and 
Robinson, formerly its Vice Chairperson, say those ideals have been 
buried by infighting and mismanagement of the Village Center. (Anft, 
1999, 1)   
 These Board members went on to discuss how the current Board leadership and 
staff failed to develop a strong organization, overcome internal disagreements, and 
engage the community:   
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Interest in attending Village Center Board meetings has been low—the 
panel hasn't had a voting quorum all year—but a battle over control of the 
Board has been running in high gear, leading to threats, fisticuffs, and 
even the shooting out of car windows, according to some Board members.  
Dannenberg, who lives in Sowebo, says the current ruling ‘clique’ has had 
a ‘chilling effect’ on center participation: ‘There are a lot of carcasses 
from this group—people who have come with good intentions who've 
been intimidated into leaving.’  ‘Why doesn't the Board have quorums at 
their meetings?’ asks Robinson, who runs the outreach ministry at the 
nonprofit Agape House on North Carrollton Street. ‘Because people don't 
want to work with them.’ (Anft, 1999, 1)   
 The Poppleton Board was never able to get past its internal conflicts.  
Furthermore, within the Board there was suspicion about interactions between the Village 
Center and a related CDC formed by Hall.  According to a Baltimore City Paper review 
of the Village Center,  
‘We haven't seen any accounting of how the money's been spent in [the] 
two years and eight months since the center opened,’ says William 
Pointer, a member of the Poppleton Board.  ‘Dissension and disinterest 
among Board members has long stifled the center's growth,’ Pointer says.  
He was briefly voted off the Board last year after complaining that then-
chairperson Doris Hall was ‘vindictive’ and should step down. (Board 
members later determined the Village Center's bylaws didn't allow 
Pointer's ouster; see The Nose, 11/3/99; www.citypaper.com/1999-
1103/nose2.html.) Pointer says little has changed under current chair Sam 
Singletary's leadership. ‘There are still questions about the relationship 
between the Village Center and the Poppleton Community Development 
Corp.,’ a nonprofit group co-led by Hall that owns the building in which 
the Village Center is housed, Pointer says. (Singletary could not be 
reached for comment.) (Anft, 2000 1) 
 The NOMAGIC assessment noted that 12 organizational members of the Village 
Center Board “had not been attending meetings for some time” (2004a, 37).  As a result 
of the conflicts within the Board, many of these members had simply stopped attending 
meetings.  Because of the large size of the Poppleton Board and the low quorum 
requirement (a simple majority of members), the Board was able to function despite the 
lack of participation by these members. 
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 Hall dominated the Poppleton Village Center.  She served as the Village Center’s 
Chairperson from 1997 to 1999 and as Executive Secretary through 2004.  She led the 
Village Center’s efforts to form a CDC, the Poppleton Village Community Development 
Corporation (PVCDC), soon after the Village Center’s creation, and she served as the 
CDCs Chair and CEO.  Hall continued to dominate the Board even when she moved out 
of State through her control of the CDC and because of strong support of many of the 
founding Board members.   
Hall’s dominance was recognized in the NOMAGIC (2004a) assessment of the 
Village Center: 
VCP has faced challenges presented by much of its Board leadership 
functioning in a developmental mode under the guidance of one 
committed funding member who is extremely knowledgeable, well 
experienced, politically savvy, multi-talented, and enormously skilled.  
One senses a general dependence on this person to provide the leadership, 
overtly or behind the scenes, for pursuit of VCP’s vision and associated 
strategies. (6)  
Many observers have reported that Hall’s management style was too controlling 
and that she was too involved in the operations of the Village Center.  According to one 
key informant who requested anonymity, “She comes out of the Schaefer years.  She 
worked for William Donald Schaefer.  She comes out of the era of believing that you do 
for the community, you protect the community.  She was going to protect the community, 
even from itself” (2004).  While Poppleton had a large number of community groups and 
local ministers playing a leading role in the community, they all fell in line behind Hall 
and her vision.   
The Village Center did not base its operations on a strategic operational plan or 
vision like the other village centers.  The Board, on an ad hoc basis not through any 
formal local planning or needs assessment, set VCP’s strategic goals.  It used its EBMC-
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sponsored land use plan as its strategic plan despite caution expressed by the authors that 
it is a “physical land use master plan. It is not a revitalization strategy or comprehensive 
planning document” (NOMAGIC 2004a, 19).  The plan did outline goals for the Village 
Center in areas such as housing and economic development.   
Hall and the Board members were either interviewed or participated in the focus 
groups and all reported that economic and real estate development should be key goals 
for the Village Center despite the social service orientation of Zone programs.  The 
Village Center had EMBC fund a retail base study and a study of the feasibility of 
establishing a medical corridor on Baltimore Street, linking UMMC and UMB on the east 
with Bon Secours Hospital on the west (outside of the EZ).  EBMC also prepared a 
housing development assessment of the community.  Despite the Village Center’s interest 
in real estate and retail development, it was unable to overcome the initial differences and 
work with the Hollins Market businesses, and it did not participate in the Main Street 
retail development effort brought to the City by EBMC.  Rachael Edds, a former City 
planner and early EBMC staff member, reported that the area lacked a sufficient 
population and income base to support a Main Street program (2006). 
 The Village Center of Poppleton experienced continuous problems with staff 
turnover that limited the effectiveness of the organization.  For example, the NOMAGIC 
(2004a) assessment reported, “No program staff can be described as long term; three 
years is the longest tenure.  This contributes to limited operational history/institutional 
memory at the staff level in addition to limited experience working with community 
residents” (7).  The Executive Director of the Village Center was hired to run the 
workforce program in 2001 and soon elevated to run the entire Village Center while 
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continuing to run the workforce program.  Every other village center split responsibilities 
for running the village center and its largest program, workforce development.  As a 
result, the Executive Director had little time for strategic management and was not highly 
experienced in community organization management.  The Board, led unofficially by 
Hall who was Secretary at this time, continued to run the Village Center. 
 Poppleton experienced continuous organizational difficulties.  It failed to meet 
EBMC’s financial and performance requirements.  It had problems with the IRS over 
withholding taxes, leading to an audit and fines.  The NOMAGIC (2004a) assessment 
alluded to poor bookkeeping and a lack of available financial statements.  Poppleton’s 
administrative funding was suspended from May 1999 through April 2001 as a result of 
both ongoing conflicts within the organization and a lack of required documentation on 
expenditures.  According to a Baltimore City Paper assessment, “Ongoing battles among 
Board members and questions of accountability have dogged the leadership at the Village 
Center of Poppleton.  A February review of the Poppleton Empowerment zone's 
operations by an independent auditor found its career center's ‘performance was below 
operating standards in 1999.” (Anft, 2000) 
 Throughout its operations, the Village Center of Poppleton essentially remained 
entirely dependent upon EBMC funding.  According to the NOMAGIC (2004a) 
assessment, “VCP receives money from one source, EBMC, making its operations totally 
dependent on federal EZ money from EBMC.  Its fundraising efforts to date have been on 
a very small scale and have produced less than 1% of the VCP annual average budget for 
the last four years” (10).   
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One person (who requested anonymity) involved with the Empowerment Zone 
reported that Poppleton’s leadership was squarely to blame for the problems the Village 
Center experienced: “We had control issues.  I think it’s more about personality issues, 
control issues.  Again this is strictly my opinion.  I think a different individual sitting at 
the table may have had a greater success than the person that was there.  That’s my 
opinion” (Anonymous 2004).  Another, also off the record, went further by saying that 
Poppleton failed “because Doris is a bully” (Anonymous 2004).  A final individual 
concluded, “My opinion of Poppleton is that they have not and never had, they don’t now 
and never had, the capacity to operate as an organization based on the leadership and the 
staff that they had in house.  It’s all about capacity and skills.  They don’t have it.  For 
me, having tried to work with them for the last few years has just been impossible” 
(Anonymous 2004).   
While the Village Center failed to thrive, the Poppleton Village CDC formed out 
of the Village Center, chaired by Hall, and managed by her son, was able to tap into a 
major redevelopment project.  The City Housing Authority brought the PVCDC into a 
Nations Bank-funded development of a 41,000 square foot office building.   This 
development, the Parren J. Mitchell Business Center, is named after former U.S. Rep. 
Parren J. Mitchell, a Democrat who served the 7th District through eight terms in 
Congress.  It houses the local offices of the Enterprise Foundation, a Housing Authority 
Police Station, and a Rite Aid drug store.  This building stands on a portion of the site of 
the demolished Lexington Terraces housing project that was being redeveloped under the 
Federal Hope VI program into a mixed use and mixed income community.   
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Under the terms of the agreement, after Nations Bank recouped its initial 
$500,000 investment, its share of the property would be sold to the Poppleton Village 
CDC for $1.  The housing authority would retain its 55% interest in the property.  This 
project would begin to generate revenues for the CDC in 2007.  According to an article in 
The Baltimore Sun, “‘The best part about this venture is that members of the community 
will eventually get a chance to own a piece of the property as part of a deal forged by the 
Housing Authority of Baltimore City, Nations Bank Corp. and Poppleton Village CDC,’ 
[Doris] Hall said” (Leffall, 1998 1c).  PVCDC currently owns the Village Center’s 
offices and is developing an office building on North Carey Street.  According to the 
NOMAGIC (2004a) assessment of the Village Center, VCP and PVCDC submitted eight 
applications for federal funding for the CDC but did not disclose how these would 
contribute to the sustainability of the Village Center. 
VCP did deliver EBMC services to the community.  It, however, experienced 
problems with EBMC’s core workforce development program throughout the EZ 
implementation period.  According to a report evaluating the program, it was noted that, 
“From the outset, the Career Center has been beset by friction between the Village Center 
and the local Urban League [that was brought in to create the program] . . . Many of the 
original plans for the Career Center never materialized” (Elsman 1998, 18).  The Village 
Center of Poppleton failed to hire an Executive Director and one of two staff members 
quit very rapidly.  The Village Center continued to experience problems in its workforce 
development program, but met or came close to meeting most performance goals set by 
EBMC.  VCP also implemented a substance abuse program as well as public safety and 
community outreach programs, but these generally failed to meet program goals.  Thus, 
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the Village Center performed its core EBMC program implementation, but did so half 
heartedly as it focused its efforts on the goals of its Board and chair, Hall, to become 
active in redevelopment through its CDC. 
 The long-term prospects for the Village Center of Poppleton appeared bleak until 
2003 when UMB began to plan for the development of a new research park, the UMB 
BioPark, on vacant City-owned land in the center of Poppleton.  While the CDC was 
doing well, the Village Center was struggling operationally and financially.  After the 
initial conflicts over Village Center formation through 2003, the institutional partners, 
UMB and UMMC, which were supposed to anchor redevelopment efforts in the West 
Side of the City as Johns Hopkins was doing on the East Side, largely ignored the Village 
Center.  UMB would now need to work with and through PVC in order to address 
community concerns over the development of the research park. 
 In the early years of the Empowerment Zone, the Village Center of Poppleton 
played very little role in the redevelopment occurring on the east side of MLK despite its 
inclusion in the Village Center service area.  In 2000, the City formed West Side 
Renaissance, Inc. to promote redevelopment in the area surrounding UMB and UMMC.  
This redevelopment effort had no interaction with the Poppleton Village Center, which 
focused its efforts on the other side of MLK.  There was little formal interaction with 
PVC because almost all of the territory in the Empowerment Zone was hospital- or 
university-owned land that did not need or qualify for EZ incentives.  As a result, neither 
institution needed to work with the Village Center.  (Krietner 2006).  This would change 
as the development of the BioPark moved development across the symbolic MLK divide.  
The move represented the movement of downtown redevelopment into a predominantly 
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residential area in West Baltimore.   An article in The Baltimore Sun on the 
groundbreaking for the project highlighted he importance of crossing MLK: 
[Governor] Ehrlich said, ‘To have a project cross Martin Luther King; it 
was not just a road, but a line.  Today, there was an official erasing of that 
line,’ the Governor continued. ‘The University of Maryland is an integral 
part of West Baltimore's development.  I've seen the gradual deterioration 
of West Baltimore over a number of years, and now I am in a position to 
see this community excited,’ Ehrlich said.  But Dr. David J. Ramsay, 
UMB's president, was more direct.  ‘When I first arrived here, it seemed to 
me that Martin Luther King symbolically separated the community of 
West Baltimore from the rest of the City,’ said Dr. Ramsay, who's headed 
the university since 1994. ‘There is development of the west side, but it 
stopped at Martin Luther King.  What we wanted to do was to bridge 
Martin Luther King, and this project serves this purpose,’ he said.  And 
Clarence Brown, Vice Chairman of the Village Center of Poppleton 
community group, was even more blunt.  ‘It was like an invisible wall,’ 
Brown said of the boulevard, ‘But in reality, Martin Luther King is 
nothing but a street. There's no wall there, and we proved that today. 
(Beamon, 2004, 1) 
Because the UMB development was and a Planned Unit Development to occur on 
City land, both political and community review were required.  For the research park 
development to occur in a timely manner, community support was necessary.  According 
to Jane Shaab (2006), the UMB official focusing on community outreach for this project, 
the Village Center played a positive and vitally important role in facilitating the 
community outreach required for the project: “We walked into a community that had an 
organization in place to work with.  We benefited from having a single point of contact to 
reach 31 Board members from various organizations in the community . . . Dr. Hall was 
our constant advisor.  She taught us about the community and pushed back to defend the 
community’s interests.”  Both the Village Center and Hall played an important 
supporting role in the development of the research park. 
UMB’s leadership (organized by Shaab), working the Village Center, attended 
over 180 community and public hearings on the development.  It hosted a meeting with 
 
 242 
the community to discuss the development every other Friday, a meeting that would 
regularly attract 14-15 attendees, mostly from the Village Center or its Board.  The 
Village Center, PVCDC, and Hall worked with UMB to make sure that the development 
would benefit the Poppleton community.  UMB agreed that $.25 of the rent paid per 
square foot would go into a community benefits fund.  The fund was not linked to the 
Village Center or the CDC, but was instead managed by the University and business 
leader dominated Research Park Corporation Board.   
The Village Center and the CDC were eligible to apply for this funding and, in 
2006, the first year of BioPark operations, PVCDC received a $30,000 grant to run a 
community education program.  Once the BioPark is developed and fully leased, this 
fund could generate more than $300,000 annually.  UMB, the Village Center, and the 
CDC also attempted to jointly develop a resident training program as part of the food 
service contract in the first building of the BioPark.  Unfortunately, the scale of catering 
operations was too small to support this idea.  Both the VCP and CDC worked to assist 
the development of the BioPark and were able to develop a community benefits fund, but 
neither received a formal commitment of funding in return. 
  The PVCDC did, however, receive a 1% interest in another development 
occurring in the community.  The Baltimore Department of Housing and Community 
Development was implementing a $100 million plan to redevelop a several-block portion 
of Poppleton.  This plan would require the demolition of 500 homes, 130 of which are 
occupied, including several by Village Center Board members.  This development, 
awarded to the La Cité developer, included a 1% interest in the development for the 
PVCDC.  The community also negotiated that 20% the La Cité homes be affordable to 
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renters and homeowners who make 80% or less of the area’s median income, and 
relocated residents would be given first consideration to move into the new, affordable 
units.   
Poppleton Village Center Outcomes 
 The Village Center of Poppleton achieved only modest programmatic success.  As 
presented in Table 18, in the area of workforce development, it placed 563 people in jobs, 
about 8% percent of the community’s 2000 population.  The Village Center had the third 
highest number of Housing Venture Fund closings, but had less than half of the closings 
of Washington Village to the south, despite having a similar housing stock.  The Village 
Center experienced a 46% reduction in crime, the second lowest, and was one of only 
two village centers in which crime decreased by less than the citywide average.  In 
contrast, Washington Village, where crime prevention was a major programmatic 







Poppleton Empowerment  
Item Village Center Zone Total 
Workforce Development 
Total Placements 563 4,725 
Economic Development  
Loans Made 6 109 
Loan Amounts $597,234 $16,325,634 
Project Costs $1,837,960 $105,882,050 
Jobs Created/Maintained 66 2,555 
Quality of Life 
Home Ownership 
Housing Venture Fund Closings 140 813 
Funds Allocated $541,792 $3,432,636 
Public Safety 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Year of Plan) Sep-02 n.m. 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending) $0 $159,513 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending AIR) $25,000 $408,500 
Block by Block $81,078 $487,028 
Block by Block (AIR) $143,141 $612,303 
Change in Crime Rate (1994-2003) -46% -56% 
Community Capacity Building 
Village Center Application Approved Feb-96 n.m. 
Village Center Admin. Funding Agreement  Sep-97 n.m. 
Village Center Administrative Funds $862,923 $5,782,696 
Current Status Closed - 2004 n.m. 
Source: EBMC 
Table 18 
Village Center of Poppleton 
Selected Baltimore Empowerment Zone Programmatic Inputs and Outcomes 
Poppleton CDC still operating 
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The most important success of the Village Center of Poppleton was its role in 
facilitating the UMB BioPark development.  According to an article in The Baltimore Sun 
describing the impact of the Empowerment Zone, “Not everything is quantifiable.  Doris 
Hall, a community leader in Poppleton, says relationships forged by the Empowerment 
Zone helped the community embrace the creation of a University of Maryland 
biotechnology park just west of Martin Luther King Boulevard. ‘Had we not had an 
Empowerment Zone, we never would have gotten past the politics of having them in the 
neighborhood,’ she said” (Siegel, 2004).  UMB agrees with this assessment.  EBMC 
played a leading role in the collaboration between UMB and VCP by requiring that the 
University work with the Village Center in order to access EZ funds and political 
support.  UMB created a central role for VCP in communicating with and representing 
the community that both promoted development and protected the community’s interests. 
 As described above, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the Empowerment Zone 
on Poppleton using U.S. Census data.  Prior to the Village Center’s founding, the 
Poppleton community was significantly affected by the demolition of the Lexington 
Terraces housing project in 1995.  Lexington Terraces was a fifteen-acre, five building 
high-rise housing complex built in 1959 with 677 apartments.  Run down, crime ridden, 
and only half occupied, it was demolished and replaced with 303 row houses (203 pubic 
housing units and 100 for sale units) and a cooperative with seniors’ apartments.  The 
Lexington Terrace complex accounted for 18% of the total dwellings in the community; 
thus, its demolition impacted community conditions.  As shown in Table 19, between 
1990 and 2000, the Poppleton community lost 2,165 residents, nearly 25% of its 
population.  During this same period of time, the percentage of residents living in poverty 
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fell, labor force participation increased, and unemployment declined slightly.  Many of 
these improvements can likely be attributed to the relocation of 291 low-income families 




Item  Village Center Total EZ Baltimore City 
Total Population 
1990 8,849 71,503 736,014 
2000 6,684 54,012 651,154 
Change -2,165 -17,491 -84,860 
% Change -24% -24% -12% 
Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings 
1990 14% 25% 44% 
2000 15% 26% 43% 
Change 1% 1% -1% 
Percentage of Dwellings that are Vacant 
1990 18% 17% 9% 
2000 20% 26% 14% 
Change 2% 9% 5% 
Median Household Income 
1990 $15,704 $18,499 $32,316 
2000 $12,939 $20,750 $30,078 
Change -$2,765 $2,251 -$2,238 
% Change -18% 12% -7% 
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level 
1990 55% 41% 21% 
2000 35% 34% 22% 
Change -20% -7% 1% 
Resident Labor Force Participation 
1990 32% 37% 47% 
2000 34% 37% 44% 
Change 3% 0% -3% 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 17% 15% 9% 
2000 16% 17% 11% 
Change 0% 1% 2% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, EBMC 
Table 19 
 The Village Center of Poppleton 
Neighborhood Conditions and Changes 
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Poppleton Village Center Summary 
The Village Center of Poppleton essentially closed when the EBMC funding ran 
out.  The Village Center board continues to meet and to work on the UMB BioPark and 
La Cité developments, but had no funding or programs.  The PVCDC continues to 
operate and appears to have strong potential if it can be part of the planned La Cite’ 
development and continue its relationship with the UMB BioPark.  According to Rachael 
Edds (2006), the Village Center recently reopened to work with the PVCDC through its 
recent award of community impact funding from the UMB BioPark.  As a result, the 
impact of the Empowerment Zone on community capacity is mixed.  The Village Center 
never emerged as a strong organization, but it facilitated the creation of the PVCDC, 
which performs many of the tasks of the Village Center in representing the needs of the 
community. 
The failure of the Poppleton Village Center to achieve sustainability is an 
example of the difficulty of community capacity building.  The failure of the Village 
Center while the PVCDC continues to operate and have a role in two major development 
projects points to the possibility that the Village Center may have been a success if it had 
been better led and organized.  While PVCDC continues to represent the community, it is 
nonetheless operating without the responsibility of underwriting the operations of the 
Village Center programs, as is the case with both the East Harbor and Washington 
Village CDCs.   
The experience of the Poppleton Village Center demonstrates the importance of 
leadership.  Poppleton appears to have suffered from too strong of a leader.  This leader 
alienated key potential partners who stayed away from the Village Center until they 
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needed it.  Were it not for the development of the BioPark, which was based on the 
availability of vacant City-owned land and not a desire to move into the Poppleton 
community, the Village Center would have closed in 2004 and never reopened.   
 The failure of VCP can be attributed to the initial conflict over the start of the 
Village Center.  Unlike both East Harbor and Washington Village where strong 
community leadership overcame initial conflicts to form strong community organizations, 
Poppleton’s leaders were never able to re-engage the Hollins Market or Union Square 
communities or its institutional partners back into the Village Center or EZ process.  
These communities and UMD/UMMC did not work with the Village Center in any 
meaningful way until 2003.  As a result, the Village Center Board lacked the support and 
experience of key institutional partners and failed to represent the whole community. 
 Poppleton is also an example of the problems caused by externally driven 
community change efforts.  The EZ effort came from outside of the community, and the 
community never took ownership of the program or the opportunities it created.  The 
leadership that emerged was interested in development, not program delivery.  Thus, 
Poppleton never focused on the sustainability of the core EBMC programs, and these 
ceased when the funding ran out. 
 The Poppleton community was so intent on taking over the process from the 
“white” Hollins Market/Sowebo community and “outside” UMB/UMMC interests that it 
never focused on what it should do with the Village Center once the immediate battles 
were won.  No local leaders emerged to focus on building a strong Village Center 
organization that bridged the racial divide to meet the needs of the entire community.   
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Unlike East Harbor, the Poppleton community was never able to re-engage the 
organizations it displaced to take charge of the Village Center, nor did it develop a 
strategic plan to better the community.  East Harbor built a successful CDC and 
developed and implemented programs that continue with only minor EBMC support.   
Poppleton spent federal money and built a CDC that was run by the son of the key 
organizer.  This organization represented the needs of the community, but did not 
continue the core programs of the Empowerment Zone.  Poppleton can be viewed as a 
partial success for EBMC.  The Village Center never functioned well and did not survive 
in any meaningful form, but the CDC survived and continues to represent and deliver 
services to the community.   
Poppleton provides the best example of the limitations or EBMC’s hand-offs approach of 
letting the village centers function with a high degree of autonomy and only providing 
assistance when asked.  An early and more forceful intervention by EBMC forcing the 
Village Center to include broader community representation or create stronger 
management structures may have formed a stronger Village Center.  However, EBMC 
saw its role with Poppleton as grantor-grantee.  It insured that the Village Center met its 
legal, accounting, and performance requirements, but stayed out of internal issues in this 
and other village centers, unless asked to provide assistance.  It discovered and required 
that the Village Center remedy financial and managerial problems, but only advised 
Poppleton on how to form a stronger organization.  The Poppleton experience 
demonstrates the complexity and difficulty of community capacity building efforts in 
balancing community independence with the central goals of the effort.  
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Harlem Park/Lafayette Square Village Center 
The Harlem Park and Lafayette Square community was a neighborhood of 
formerly beautiful, old row houses and community parks.  It does not have an existing 
commercial area or a large institution located in the community.  The Harlem 
Park/Lafayette Square Village Center (Harlem Park) was one of the last three village 
centers approved by EBMC in February 1996, and it was the second last to sign its first 
year’s administrative funding agreement in August 1997.  When it began operations, the 
Harlem Park Village Center was the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s smallest Village 
Center, serving an area with 6,415 residents in 1990, a number that was even smaller 
when the Village Center became operational in 1997.  Harlem Park served one of the 
most distressed communities in the Zone, having the third lowest level of household 
income and third highest rate of poverty.  Harlem Park’s population fell 33% to 4,283 in 
the 2000 Census.  The Harlem Park community had a history of failed redevelopment 
attempts, as it was one of the nation’s first urban renewal communities in the 1950s. 
A map showing the Harlem Park service area and key locations mentioned in this 
case study is included below as Map 10.  The service area for Harlem Park was in many 
ways set by default.  The Poppleton Village Center covered the area from “the road to 
nowhere,” which formed a geographic barrier between Poppleton and Harlem Park to the 
south.  The Harlem Park area had been planned by EBMC to link with the Sandtown area 
to the north.  However, these communities had no history of or interest in working 
together and Sandtown became part of the Self Motivated Village Center.  Harlem Park 
was the remaining area between Poppleton and Self-Motivated.  The small population of 
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Harlem Park was less than the 7,000-person target established in EBMC’s Village Center 
Guidelines, but the EBMC Board nonetheless approved its formation.   
Harlem Park Village Center Formation 
 The application and the formation processes for the Harlem Park Village Center 
were long and contentious.  Both the key informants interviewed and focus group 
participants reported having to overcome local conflict and competition over who would 
control the Village Center.  In the 2004 Harlem Park focus group, participants reported 
that the award of the Empowerment Zone brought in “undesirable people” with “ulterior 
motives” and “external organizations that weren’t in the community but said they were 
affiliated with the community.”  Furthermore, while the service area for the Harlem Park 
Village Center was small, it combined two neighborhoods, Harlem Park and Lafayette 
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Square, with little history of working together.  According to a 2004 interview with Bill 
Wiley, one of EBMC’s two community outreach specialists, Harlem Park and Lafayette 
Square viewed themselves as two distinct communities.  The Village Center came to be 
dominated by representatives from the better-organized Harlem Park community, and, as 
Wiley stated, “I don’t believe that there were very many people from Lafayette Square 
that bothered to come to the meetings.”   
In order to serve both the Harlem Park and Lafayette Square communities, the 
Village Center was formed as an independent entity despite the existence of two strong 
organizations already serving parts of the community:  
 The Harlem Park Revitalization Corporation (HPRC), a housing and 
community developer located in the community but working Citywide.  It 
started operations as St. Pious Housing Committee in 1995); and 
 The Harlem Park Neighborhood Council (HPNC), a smaller nonprofit 
community organization and CDC that provided outreach and human services 
programs.  
Both organizations played a role in the formation of the Village Center with the President 
of the HPNC, Robert Ford, serving as the first Chairman of the Village Center Board, and 
the President of the Board of Directors of HPRC, Carmena Watson, as an active 
participant in the Village Center formation process.  Watson would later serve for several 
years as the Chair of the HPVC Board of Directors. 
To complicate matters further, one of the trusted leaders of the community who 
had taken a leading role in the effort to form the Village Center, Jasmine Gunthorpe, the 
community organizer for HPRC, died unexpectedly.  According to one Harlem Park 
focus group participant:  
I remember that there was a lady who was chair of the Board at that time 
but she really embodied a lot of positive things about what all this process 
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would be.  And she died out of the blue.  And you know some of the 
vision and direction that she was providing was not available to us any 
longer. 
According to an interview with Rachael Edds, a former city planner and EBMC staff 
member, Gunthorpe, an active and popular member of the HPNC and a staff member of 
HPRC, could have served as a strong leader and brought the various groups together. 
(Edds 2006). 
Harlem Park applied for Village Center status in July 1995, and its application 
was approved in February 1996.  During the period between the application and approval 
and again between approval and the first year’s administrative funding agreement in 
August 1997, EBMC provided a high degree of technical assistance and support to 
Harlem Park in order to overcome ongoing conflict and disorganization in the 
community.  According to Serena Neal, the other of the two EBMC community outreach 
specialists, the technical assistance, however, failed to get the Village Center staff and 
Board to cooperate: “We had more retreats with Harlem Park than any other organization 
in the Zone. The capacity building retreats, three to four days, they had no knowledge.  It 
was just like a vacation to them” (Neal 2004).   
Harlem Park Village Center Operations 
 The HPVC was able to put aside community conflict to begin operations.  It hired 
an Executive Director who worked with the State Department of Economic Development 
and grew up and lived in the Harlem Park community.  The Village Center received 
501(c)(3) status and developed a mission statement and goals.  It completed its Land Use 
Plan in 2001 and, according to one focus group participant, the Land Use Plan “was the 
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only thing, in my opinion, that probably brought us together more than anything else” 
(Harlem Park Focus Group 2004).     
The Village Center Board consisted of 27 community members and two 
governmental representatives (who could participate in discussions but not vote).  The 
Harlem Park Village Center operated with the Chairman of the Board having a strong 
degree of control over operations.  The Board rarely had the full 29 members called for in 
its by-laws in attendance and, according to a 2002 assessment of the Village Center, “The 
Board’s ability to operate appears to be impacted by this shortage of members.  In several 
of the Board’s minutes, it states there is an ongoing problem with attendance and its 
ability to achieve a quorum” (Spraggins 2002, 40).   
Not only was the Harlem Park Board unable to achieve a quorum at many of its 
meetings, it was unable to develop a strategic direction for the Village Center.  According 
to the NOMAGIC assessment, “HP/LS-VC appears to have a fragmented vision at the 
Board level, resulting in no coherent leadership for the staff to follow.  This has left the 
organization’s programs extremely limited in ability to adapt to the community’s 
changing needs and its resident clients growing requirements for new services” (2003b, 
29).  The Board included two political leaders, City Councilman Dr. Rev. Abayomi and 
Carmena Watson, the HPRC chair who was elected into the Maryland General Assembly.  
Unlike other village centers, notably HEBCAC, Harlem Park was not able to leverage 
these political connections to receive City or State support.   
The failure of past redevelopment efforts in the community may have been a 
cause of the inability of the Harlem Park Board and community to get behind the EZ 
efforts.  Not only did the 1950s urban renewal effort in the community fail to turn around 
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local slum conditions, a later redevelopment effort under Mayor Schaefer had failed to 
improve the community and, in fact, demolished community parks and buildings.  
According to Watson (2004),  
We were the first urban renewal area in the City, and so we were 
Schaefer’s pet at that time.  But then he deserted us after coming in and 
tearing our community up, taking all the inner park houses down, and 
making them parks.  When they took them, they decided on parks . . . But 
what they didn’t do, and I think some of the things that we still did not 
follow through on is, was being able to teach the people how to survive, 
how to make us be worthy of what you have, how to keep it, make it 
useful.  They put out the parks but they [were not maintained by the City 
or the community]. 
The Village Center hired its Executive Director, Dr. Howard Hill, and most of the 
staff from within the community.  It started with five staff members and ultimately grew 
to eight.  It had very low employee turnover, and only one staff member left in its core 
years of operations.  The stability and local ties of the Village Center staff were 
considered to be a key asset by the NOMAGIC (2003b) evaluation of the Harlem Park 
Village Center.  These assets were also a source of pride to community members, with 
one Harlem Park focus group participant reporting, “What I can say and what makes me 
proud of this center is that the residents who actually lived here in Harlem Park ended up 
being employed by the center, gave the services.  So that’s one thing that made us really, 
in my opinion, outstanding from many other centers” (2004). 
Despite this community pride, the experience of the Harlem Park also 
demonstrates the difficulties associated with employing local leadership and staff.  Even 
though Harlem Park was small in size, the NOMAGIC assessment found that 
management was a challenge to its sustainability, “It appears that the most critical 
missing piece is someone to focus only on the internal management and project issues 
and to make sure all of the signature approaches, strategies, tactics, functions, programs, 
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projects, tasks activities, tools, technology, and labor are working in harmony” (2003b, 
41).  In such a small organization, this was clearly the job of the Executive Director.   
A founder and past Chair of the Harlem Park Board, Watson criticized the 
Executive Director’s performance and reported that, since he was from the community, it 
was impossible to replace him:   
We tried to use our community people but it was a disadvantage to us 
because we picked our Executive Director from the community thinking 
that we have somebody who was good.  It took them like one to two years 
to realize with all his training and stuff; he didn’t have good management 
procedures.  He could not manage and still doesn’t know how to manage.  
But, I found out, that became a handicap for the Board because by 
everybody on the Board knowing him, knows what his talents and 
capabilities are when, because of situations where it came time to really do 
what was necessary to be done, when he had to be removed, they didn’t 
want to do that.  [They said] give him another chance.  Give him another 
chance. (2004) 
 The Harlem Park Village Center emphasized community organizing and reported 
pride in building working relationships with the churches in the area.  Harlem Park, along 
with Poppleton, was home to several large African American churches that continued to 
serve and increasingly suburban membership.  These churches were some of the few 
institutions remaining in the community and offered important social service programs.  
The Village Center implemented numerous neighborhood clean ups and community 
meetings, and it distributed periodic newsletters.  The Village Center, however, was not 
able to bridge the gaps between the two communities it served.  The communities did not 
feel involved with the Village Center and distrusted some of the organizations, such as 
HPRC, that were closely tied to it.  According to the NOMAGIC assessment, “The 
perception of HP/LS-VC and the collaborators is not always positive in the community . . 
. Some communities have the perception that they are ‘not an equal partner’ and ‘their 
voice is not heard’” (2003b, 34-35). 
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Wiley, the EBMC outreach specialist for the community reported that Harlem 
Park was not successful in collaborating with the various organizations existing in the 
community.  EBMC provided technical assistance to the Village Center in order to 
improve management and governance, but the other EBMC outreach specialist, Neal, 
reported, “We did some great training with Harlem Park but they just didn’t get it.  It 
wasn’t the kind of training that they needed.  It built capacity; it brought them together; it 
gave them an opportunity to develop some priorities or strategies for the organization; but 
it didn’t teach them how to do it on their own” (2004). 
 The Harlem Park Village Center focused on the delivery of EBMC-funded 
services.  It created the HP/LS-VC Career Center to implement EBMC-funded workforce 
development and social service programs.  Through its community outreach efforts, it 
operated a substance abuse program that referred residents to programs.  In the area of 
public safety, the Village Center hosted the City’s HOTSPOT anti-crime program and 
Citizens on Patrol (COP) program.  Harlem Park did not begin to implement EBMC’s 
core Block-by-Block or Neighborhood Design Initiative until 2003.  It also referred 
residents to EBMC’s exterior repair and Housing Venture Fund as well as housing and 
substance abuse programs offered by HPRC. 
The Harlem Park Village Center narrowly focused on implementing EBMC’s 
core workforce development program.  It regularly exceeded its goals for career service 
intakes and placements, and the individuals placed in employment consistently had 
higher earnings gains and job retention rates than other EZ residents.  While the Village 
Center achieved success in workforce development programs, it failed to engage the 
community and develop and implement a strategic plan for community change.  It did not 
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implement some core EBMC public safety programs in any meaningful way.  More 
importantly, the Village Center did not plan for sustainability of its operations and was 
nearly entirely dependent upon EBMC for both operational and programmatic funding 
over its entire operational period.   
Harlem Park was weakly led at the staff and Board levels and never formed a 
strong organization.  According to EBMC’s Neal:   
I think that, unfortunately for this particular effort, those leaders in Harlem 
Park were too territorial in the sense that they were not willing to partner, 
they did not want to share, they did not want to cross over the boundary 
lines [internal and external], those lines that were unfortunately created as 
a part of this initiative.  They did not want to cross over.  They did not 
want anybody in their space. That led them to where they are today. 
(2004)   
 At the end of Harlem Park’s EBMC-funded operating period, the NOMAGIC 
assessment of its sustainability options reported that there was an immediate need for 
short-term intervention in the Village Center’s operations.  It was nearly entirely 
dependent on EBMC funding, had done little to plan for new funding, and had “strained 
infrastructure,” “staff experiencing stress,” and “frustrated Board members” (2003b, 6).  
NOMAGIC determined that the best route for the sustainability of Empowerment Zone 
activities in the Harlem Park area would be to form a strategic relationship between the 
Village Center and a stronger organization: 
The future of HP/LS-VC lies in their ability to build a strategic partnership 
with a complementary partner to maximize resources, reduce costs, and 
share a common vision and agenda that enables them to continue their 
mission of serving the needs of this vital community.  A partnership with 
HPRC would enable HP/LS-VC to increase its administrative efficiency 
and provide further programmatic services for its growing client needs 
through combined strengths, capabilities, vision and mission. (2003b, 32)   
Unfortunately, the Harlem Park Village Center did not make it past its last year of 
EBMC-funded operations.  In the last few months of EBMC funding, the Village 
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Center’s Executive Director was accused of receiving $20,000 in undocumented 
payments, and the Chair was alleged to have received $7,000 in undocumented payments 
(Baltimore Sun Writer 2004).  These funding discrepancies are currently being 
investigated by the Department of Health and Human Services, the EZ funding agent.  
After the discovery of this discrepancy, EBMC ceased all administrative funding to the 
Village Center, which was closed.  EBMC is now providing some support to HPRC to 
expand its community outreach capabilities.   
Harlem Park Village Center Outcomes 
The Harlem Park Village Center achieved relatively modest formal outcomes 
from EBMC’s core programs.  It focused its efforts on workforce development programs 
where it achieved relatively strong results.  As shown in Table 20, Harlem Park 
accounted for 8% of the Empowerment Zone’s population but more than 10% of total 
Zone workforce development placements.  Harlem Park’s resident job placements also 
had higher earnings gains and job retention rates than other Zone resident placements.  
While 494 job placements may seem small, it represents more than 12% of the total 
population of the community in the year 2000.  On the other hand, the Village Center had 
very low referrals into the Housing Venture Fund and little or no participation in 
EBMC’s public safety programs.  It participated in the City’s HOTSPOTS and COPS 
programs, and it experienced the largest reduction in crime with reported crime.  Crime 
fell by 76%, compared to 56% in the Zone and 38% citywide; however, the decline in 
population appears to be the largest contributor to this reduction in crime since the 





      As presented in Table 21, Harlem Park’s population declined by 33%, the share of 
owner-occupied dwellings declined and housing vacancy increased by 17%, the largest 
increase in any Village Center.  The community’s poverty rate fell, but so did labor force 
Harlem Park Empowerment  
Item Village Center Zone Total 
Workforce Development 
Total Placements 494 4,725 
Economic Development  
Loans Made 2 109 
Loan Amounts $258,328 $16,325,634 
Project Costs $850,908 $105,882,050 
Jobs Created/Maintained 8 2,555 
Quality of Life 
Home Ownership 
Housing Venture Fund Closings 31 813 
Funds Allocated $128,236 $3,432,636 
Public Safety 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Year of Plan) Sep-02 n.m. 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending) $0 $159,513 
Block by Block $26,500 $487,028 
Change in Crime Rate (1994-2003) -71% -56% 
Community Capacity Building 
Village Center Application Approved Sep-95 n.m. 
Village Center Admin. Funding Agreement  Aug-97 n.m. 
Village Center Administrative Funds $839,923 $5,782,696 
Current Status Closed - 2004 n.m. 
Source: EBMC 
Table 20 
Harlem Park Village Center 
Selected Baltimore Empowerment Zone Programmatic Inputs and Outcomes 
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participation and unemployment increased.  In short, the Empowerment Zone did very 
little to halt the decline occurring in this community and the Village Center failed to 
engage the community members in efforts to improve their community. 
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Item  Village Center Total EZ Baltimore City 
Total Population 
1990 6,415 71,503 736,014 
2000 4,283 54,012 651,154 
Change -2,133 -17,491 -84,860 
% Change -33% -24% -12% 
Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings 
1990 13% 25% 44% 
2000 11% 26% 43% 
Change -2% 1% -1% 
Percentage of Dwellings that are Vacant 
1990 23% 17% 9% 
2000 40% 26% 14% 
Change 17% 9% 5% 
Median Household Income 
1990 $16,088 $18,499 $32,316 
2000 $19,375 $20,750 $30,078 
Change $3,287 $2,251 -$2,238 
% Change 20% 12% -7% 
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level 
1990 42% 41% 21% 
2000 37% 34% 22% 
Change -4% -7% 1% 
Resident Labor Force Participation 
1990 38% 37% 47% 
2000 33% 37% 44% 
Change -4% 0% -3% 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 14% 15% 9% 
2000 17% 17% 11% 
Change 4% 1% 2% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, EBMC 
Table 21 
Harlem Park Lafayette Square Village Center 
Neighborhood Conditions and Changes 
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Harlem Park Village Center Summary   
 Harlem Park is an example of what happens when a community organization 
focuses on meeting the goals of an external funding organization instead of identifying 
and meeting the needs of the community it serves.  This is a significant potential pitfall of 
externally driven interventions, such as CCIs.  The failure of Harlem Park can at least 
partially be blamed on EBMC’s own hands-off policy of letting the Village Centers 
function independently and intervening only when asked.  It was clear throughout its 
operations that Harlem Park had not been able to engage the community in its operations, 
even while successfully implementing programs.  The Village Center also suffered from 
a lack of Board and staff leadership.  In the end, after failing to achieve sustainability as 
an organization, the Village Center fell prey to malfeasance as its Executive Director and 
Board Chair (allegedly) sought to profit from any resources remaining as the Village 
Center was winding down operations.  
 The failure of Harlem Park is related to the history of past redevelopment efforts 
in the community, the small size of the community to be served, and EBMC’s own 
failure to build on the resources existing in the community.  Harlem Park was one of the 
first areas targeted for urban renewal and was the focus for some redevelopment activities 
in the Schaefer years.  These efforts not only failed to promote any real redevelopment, 
but often made matters worse by destroying buildings or parks. As a result, it was 
difficult to overcome resident cynicism.  Harlem Park was too small to be able build a 
critical mass of services, and lacked institutions involved in the community and a viable 
economic base to be a target for development.  Furthermore, the creation of a new 
organization in a small community already served by several existing organizations 
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overshadowed the opportunity to strengthen existing organizations, leading to the 
diffusion of community efforts.  EBMC recognized this weakness and is currently 
working to assist and strengthen the HPRC. 
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The Self-Motivated Community People’s Village Center 
The Self-Motivated Community People’s Village Center (Self-Motivated) was 
one of the first three village centers approved in September 1995 and the fourth Village 
Center to begin operations.  Self-Motivated served a large, economically-depressed area 
encompassing the entire northern part of the western portion of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone.  According to a 2004 interview with Serena Neal, this portion of the 
Empowerment Zone was specifically designed in the EZ application to include both an 
existing CCI, the Enterprise Foundation’s Sandtown-Winchester effort, and the 
legislative district of a powerful Maryland General Assembly Delegate and Chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee, Howard “Pete” Rawlings.    
The Self-Motivated Village Center service area combined the entire Sandtown 
area with portions of the existing Penn North, Coppin Heights, and Southern Mondawmin 
neighborhoods to the north.  These communities were served by a number of existing 
organizations, each targeting a specific neighborhood, and had no history of working 
together.  There existed a feeling of division among the communities to the north of 
North Avenue that were somewhat less distressed, and the very distressed communities to 
the south.  The boundaries also included Coppin State College, a historically black 
college, which served as an institutional partner.  The college, however, never played a 
major role in the activities of Self-Motivated. A map showing the Self Motivated service 




The Self-Motivated Village Center included portions of the target area for one of 
the first CCIs in the nation, the Enterprise Foundation’s Sandtown-Winchester effort.  As 
described in the HEBCAC case study, the Sandtown-Winchester community was selected 
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for noted national developer, Jim Rouse’s, Enterprise Foundation-funded community 
transformation effort because it was in the center of Mayor Schmoke’s West Baltimore 
political base.  Rouse, the developer of Columbia, Maryland and numerous projects 
across the country, became convinced that the solutions to poverty needed to be as broad 
as its causes, so he sought an arena to demonstrate what could be achieved through a 
comprehensive approach to community renewal.   
The Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative began with a 
seven-month visioning process involving 600 residents, followed by a year-long design 
phase in which residents worked with staff from the Enterprise Foundation and the City 
on four areas of program design: community building, physical and economic 
development, health and human services, and education.  This effort produced a 
comprehensive plan for community revitalization that became known as the “puzzle 
book” because the picture on the cover of the plan showed the various components of 
community change as puzzle pieces fitting together. 
The Sandtown-Winchester effort established six new organizations to promote 
comprehensive community change: 
1. The Community Building in Partnership organization was formed in 1993, as an 
independent, nonprofit organization responsible for ensuring the most effective 
implementation of all the renewal work through coordination and monitoring.  
Both the Board and the staff, which numbered 53 at its peak, were mainly 
Sandtown-Winchester residents; 
2. The Neighborhood Transformation Center, formed in 1993, which was part of the 
Enterprise Foundation.  This effort concentrated on fundraising and program 
coordination, and it brought in consultants to advise on program design; 
3. The Neighborhood Development Center, formed in 1993, which was an 
independent nonprofit organization that coordinated housing and commercial 
development and acted as a developer.  One of its projects was the renovation of 
the neighborhood’s market; 
4. The Vision for Health, formed in 1994, which was a community-based 
partnership set up to improve health in the neighborhood by bringing the health 
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authority and healthcare providers together with the neighborhood’s regeneration 
bodies to establish unified goals and strategies.  It set up clinics in all three 
elementary schools and immunized every child in the neighborhood; 
5. The Compact Schools program, started in 1994, which was a partnership among 
the neighborhood’s three elementary schools, the local education authority, and 
the Enterprise Foundation.  Its purpose was to improve educational attainment, 
and it introduced innovative teaching methods that had some success in helping 
achieve this goal; and  
6. The Sandtown Readiness program of 1996, which was a job program that 
provided employment advice, life skills and job readiness training, and job 
placements for young people and adults in the neighborhood. (Renewal.net ND). 
The Sandtown-Winchester CCI was a widely cited example of a successful CCI in 
most books and many articles on community capacity-building reviewed for this 
dissertation.  The effort, however, is viewed with far more skepticism in Baltimore, 
especially in the Sandtown-Winchester community itself.  An investigative journalist 
wrote a critique of the effort entitled Left Behind in Sandtown (Yeoman 1998).  He 
concludes that the Enterprise Foundation set out to repair a broken neighborhood, but all 
it fixed was the houses.  Nearly ten years after this article and almost twenty years after 
the effort officially started, this assessment remains largely true.  The Baltimore Sun 
reports that Enterprise Community Partners has invested millions of dollars in a fifteen 
year effort to build and rebuild more than 600 homes – but “even after more than 15 
years of focused effort, crime and decay have not been beaten back for good (Hopkins 
2006, 1D).”  Despite investing millions of dollars, building hundreds of houses, and 
developing new community institutions, the Sandtown-Winchester effort essentially 
failed to turn around the community, which continues to be plagued with crime, poverty, 
vacant housing, and other social problems.      
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Self Motivated Village Center Formation 
The efforts to establish the Self-Motivated Village Center were shaped by the 
Sandtown community’s experience with the Sandtown-Winchester CCI.14  The 
Community Building in Partnership (CBP) organization, a joint effort between the City 
and the Enterprise Foundation to oversee and attract funding to support the Sandtown-
Winchester effort, was the local management entity for the CCI.  CBP had an 11-
member15 governance Board with neighborhood representatives occupying six seats, 
local government representatives occupying four seats, and one seat reserved for the 
Enterprise Foundation.  Diane Bell, the president of EBMC, was the City’s designated 
contact with CBP.  CBP was officially recognized as a key asset in the City’s EZ 
application and the initial plan was for it to serve as the Village Center for this area.  
Indeed the Enterprise Foundation’s leader for the CBP effort, Pat Costigan, submitted a 
letter to EBMC in 1995 highlighting how CBP fit the proposed structure of village 
centers established in the EBMC guidelines (Costigan 1995).  
The concept of forming Self-Motivated as part of CBP was broadly opposed, 
especially in Sandtown.  In a summary of a community meeting over the formation of the 
Village Center provided to EBMC, the meeting facilitator reported, 
Many Sandtown-Winchester residents have heard rumors about the City already 
designating CBP as the tax-exempt organization for any Village Center 
established in this area.  This has caused great concern in the Sandtown 
community.  Residents don’t like the ‘done deal’ feeling of this, resent CBP and 
the City for imposing this decision or impression on Sandtown residents, and feel 
that it is useless to participate if the City has already made this decision. (Wallace 
1994 1) 
                                               
14 The Sandtown-Winchester CCI served the Sandtown and Winchester communities in West Baltimore, 
but only the Sandtown area was included in the Zone. 
15 There are numerous case studies of CBP in the literature and none are consistent on the number of people 
on the Board, which has ranged in size from 53 to 11 members. 
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There was a broad-based feeling in the Sandtown community that the Enterprise 
Fund’s efforts were done to the community, not with the community.  Enterprise created 
several new organizations to implement its community change efforts.  Unfortunately, it 
created these new organizations independently of the several organizations already 
serving the community.  This alienated existing community leaders.  In addition, the 
institutions created to implement the Foundation’s community change efforts, despite 
having both Board and general membership from the community, were seen as controlled 
by “outside” interests: the City, the Enterprise Foundation, and the Rouse Company.  
According to one Self-Motivated key informant (2004), “That might have been one of the 
problems, that they [Enterprise] did not work more cooperatively with the entities that 
were in the community and tried to run it on their own.  That is probably one of their 
downfalls.”  In fact, the name chosen for the Village Center, Self-Motivated, is a direct 
response by the community to the Enterprise Foundation’s efforts.  The community 
wanted to control the EZ funds itself and would be “self-motivated” to achieve the 
changes it wanted for itself.    
Despite having raised and spent millions of dollars on building and renovating 
over 1,000 homes, improving education, promoting community public health, and 
training and placing over 400 residents in jobs, the Sandtown-Winchester effort failed to 
stem the continued decline of the community.  According to one Self-Motivated 
informant,  
The Enterprise Foundation was in this community since 1990, and they 
have not transformed this community, but they have taken over $70 
million from all kinds of agencies from this community, and the only thing 
they dealt was with houses.  They did nothing for sustainability in the 
community so you’ve got houses but you don’t have no economic 
development to sustain the community so the community will remain 
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poor.  They will never get the chance to sustain themselves because they 
have don’t have stores, they don’t have nothing to come in the community 
to sustain themselves. (2004) 
Another informant reported,  
What happened was that 10-12 years ago, they did have a lot of meetings, 
and the community residents came out, and we all committed to build 
these community groups.  And that’s when the community revitalization 
started, and what happened when the year was up, in the puzzle book all 
the different groups put out recommendations but I guess none of them 
were implemented.  That’s why people were pissed.  They wasted a year 
of lives and time, and the puzzle book was created, but then Enterprise 
that came in and said that ‘we’re going to do what we want to do.’ (2004)   
Leonard Jackson, a Sandtown community resident, activist, and the Deputy 
Director of CBP, coordinated the community’s efforts to form the Village Center.  
Jackson was a well-liked man with ties to the community and, through his CDP 
affiliation, to City government.  He, along with other Sandtown residents such as Abner 
Robinson and General Seitu Muhammad, viewed the Community Building in 
Partnership/Sandtown-Winchester CCI as externally driven and a failure.  They wanted to 
lead the new EZ effort in a more community-controlled fashion.   
The existing Sandtown community organizations that felt shut out of the CBP 
implementation supported these men.  The existing community organizations in Penn 
North, Coppin Heights, and Mondawmin, each of which served a portion of Self-
Motivated’s service area and saw the potential to get a portion of the EZ funding for their 
own organizations also threw their support to these men.  According to one key 
informant, Jackson saw the Empowerment Zone as an opportunity to use EZ funds to 
create a West Side political organization like the EDO in East Baltimore (Anonymous 
2005).  Jackson coordinated the application process and became the first Executive 
Director of Self-Motivated. 
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Self-Motivated created an overly complex Board structure that ultimately 
contributed to its failure.  The Village Center created a 44-member Board to oversee its 
operations.  Thirty-one members were representatives of designated organizations, each 
entitled to a seat as long as the organization and Village Center were operational.  Twenty 
of these designated organizations were community organizations from the Mondawmin 
(five members), Penn-North (two members) and Sandtown (thirteen members) 
communities.  The other Board members included a youth representative, four 
organizational representatives (Healthy Start, a community center, a medical center and 
the police department), five educational institution representatives, and a member 
designated by the City government.  The other thirteen Board members were popularly 
elected.  Seven of the elected members were residents (four from Sandtown, two from 
Mondawmin, and one from Penn North) selected through community elections.   The 
remaining six were three business and three religious organization representatives, one 
from each of the three communities, and they were selected by local businesses and 
religious organizations.  Such a large Board was unwieldy and difficult to manage.  
Furthermore, a clear majority of the Self-Motivated Board members were designated 
from the community organizations already serving the community, and these 
organizations viewed the EZ as a means of enriching their own organizations.  Unlike 
Washington Village, Self-Motivated lacked local institutions interested in the community 
and engaged in assisting to resolve community conflicts. 
Self Motivated Village Center Operations 
 The Self-Motivated Village Center was the fourth Village Center to begin 
operations, and it signed its first year’s administrative funding agreement in May 1996.  
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While Self-Motivated was able to apply for Village Center status and begin operations 
more rapidly than several of the other village centers, it was never able to overcome the 
turmoil involving its Executive Director.  Soon after its creation, the Village Center 
experienced the first of two financial problems that ultimately led to Jackson’s 
resignation.  In the first few months of operations, Jackson was accused of forging the 
Village Center Chairman’s name on a $6,500 check.  The Self-Motivated Board that 
Jackson helped organize approved a salary of $70,000 for the Executive Director, a 
considerable raise over the $55,000 he was making at CBP.  This higher pay was not 
approved by EBMC and, as a result, the Executive Director was not paid for several 
months.  (Siegel 1996 a and b).   
Jackson was reinstated as Executive Director after EBMC and the Village Center 
Board began to review the debacle.  According to an article in The Baltimore Sun (Siegel, 
1996c), “Roland Sturm, Jackson's attorney, said his client denied the forgery charge.  
Sturm acknowledged that Jackson did not follow ‘good practice’ by depositing a $6,500 
Village Center check directly into his personal account, but said he was owed the 
money.”  The article went on to discuss the partial resolution of the situation:  
‘At Monday night's meeting, the Village Center Board did not resolve the 
allegation of forgery,’ Studivant [Village Center spokesman] said.  ‘But 
the Board was swayed by Jackson's statement that he was owed money by 
the Village Center and that he had made a ‘good-faith’ effort to follow the 
proper procedures to get paid,’ Studivant said.  Studivant said Jackson 
would be paid retroactively from yesterday once his pay was determined, 
but said that a decision had not been made on whether to pay him from his 
July 3 suspension until yesterday (Siegel 1996c). 
In 1997, a second payroll discrepancy was discovered leading to a second 
suspension of Self-Motivated’s funding by EBMC and ultimately the resignation of 
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Jackson as Executive Director.  According to an article in The Baltimore Sun 
(Daemmrich, 1997),  
Money has been cut off to a West Baltimore Village Center that is part of 
the multi-million dollar empowerment zone—and its director has 
resigned—after an audit turned up a $1,974 payroll discrepancy.  The 
turmoil marks the second time in 14 months that financial questions have 
engulfed the Self-Motivated Community People's Village Center. 
 Self-Motivated never overcame the loss of Jackson.  He brought together the 
various community organizations that led the Village Center.  After his resignation, no 
clear leader emerged, and the Village Center became mired in internal conflicts.  Three 
co-chairs, Ronald Anderson, Abner Robinson, and General Seitu Mohammed, led 
community organizations and jointly managed Self-Motivated’s Board for several years.   
 The Village Center had two Executive Directors after Jackson, but neither was 
able to build a functioning organization, let alone a strong one.  Immediately after the 
resignation of Jackson, an interim Director oversaw operations while a search was 
conducted for a new Director.  In 1998, Self-Motivated hired Avon Bellamy, a 
community organizer and Director of the Men’s Center at HEBCAC.  Then-Board Chair, 
David Chestnut, hired Bellamy but, before he started, General Seitu Mohammed replaced 
Chestnut as Board chair.  According to Bellamy,  
They had to vote and he [Chestnut] didn’t become the chair.  So now I’m 
dealing with General Seitu Mohammed and I’m not dealing with Mr. 
Chestnut.  And it started right off the bat.  The first thing they tried to do 
was get me to accept a lower salary than I was initially offered . . . I don’t 
have the job yet and I’m already in an adversarial position with someone 
who’s trying to power play me in this situation. (2004)  
Bellamy resigned in 2000 after (unproved) allegations that he provided EBMC workforce 
development services to non-residents of the community and then ordered that records be 
 
 276 
falsified (SMCPVC 2000).  Self-Motivated’s administrative funding was suspended soon 
thereafter in September of 2000.  According to a Baltimore City Paper summary,  
The reason is ‘a lack of obtained outcomes’ in the management of that 
Empowerment Zone's job placement programs, says Diane Bell, EBMC's 
Chief Executive Officer. ‘We'll be looking at their Board to determine 
what the barriers are to achieving their goals,’ Bell says.  EBMC had 
earmarked the money for administration of a career center, but its Board 
voted to withdraw the funding until the Village Center improves low job 
placement numbers.  (Bell wouldn't quantify the center's performance 
except to say that it hadn't met specific goals.)  David Chestnut, 
chairperson of the Self-Motivated People's Center's Board of Directors, 
says the center itself instigated the EBMC action because its Board lacked 
cohesiveness.  ‘Has there been infighting?  Yes, there has been infighting,’ 
Chestnut says.  ‘There's been a clear lack of accountability regarding our 
leadership.  We've requested technical help from EBMC. (Anft, 2000, 2)   
 The Self-Motivated Village Center lacked strong staff and Board leadership.  
After the resignation of Jackson, the Board degenerated into conflict among community 
groups and leaders over the control of the program and budget.  Overcoming this conflict 
among organizations, each of which was guaranteed seat at the Board, was identified as 
one of the major challenges facing the Village Center in a 1998 EBMC-sponsored 
assessment.  This assessment found that, “Another concern raised by all of the 
individuals interviewed related to turf issues and how the VC’s agenda could be 
integrated into a community that is already heavily serviced by a number of veteran 
organizations” (White and Associates 1998, np).  One Self-Motivated Board member 
(un-named) reported, “The VC should act as convener, mediator, and coordinator, but 
should not be involved in providing direct services” (White and Associates 1998, np).  
This is contrary to the stated role of the village centers as program delivery organizations 
in both the EZ application and the EBMC Village Center Guidelines.  Self-Motivated was 
unable to fully resolve the “turf” issues over control and delivery of services among the 
various community organizations.  
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 The various community organizations and their leaders continued to argue over 
control of the money and the programs throughout the entire operation of Self-Motivated.  
According to a key informant, “They thought that this money is theirs, and everybody 
wanted a large share of the money, but with a competent Board and a competent staff, 
you could have gotten through that.  That was nothing” (2004).  Another informant 
reported,  
In these meetings, everybody had their own agendas, and I’m going to get 
my piece of the pie—I don’t care what.  So then the other pieces, people 
would come to the EZ meetings and talk about, ‘I’m going to open a day 
care and I want the EZ to give me a $1000.’  ‘I’m going to open a 
restaurant and I want . . .’ But wait; this is not was it is about.  ‘Well, Mr. 
Jackson or Mr. Whatever told me I can come do this.’  People . . . got the 
wrong impression of EZ, that they can just get the money, a quick fast way 
of getting a couple of dollars (2004)   
One key informant went on to describe how the leader from one of the communities left 
the Village Center when it became clear that his organization would not be able to 
receive money directly from the Empowerment Zone effort: “They still started bickering.  
Mr. X at Mondawmin got mad because he thought that we can get all this money, but you 
only got a small section of Mondawmin and the money can only go to that.  So he quit, 
resigned, got angry” (2004).  
The Village Center Board never functioned well.  After the departure of Jackson, 
the other Board members who had been involved in the Village Center formation tried to 
take control of the organization.  According to another key informant, this group of 
several members of the Board sought to micromanage Self-Motivated’s operations and 
reported, “These three guys were acting as co-chairs.  And I brought up to them, ‘Where 
are your plans?  Mission statement?’  All this good stuff.  The reaction I got . . . was 
that—‘Who are you and why are you talking about this?’  So they wanted to control 
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everything.”  The informant continued, “[Board Member Name] wanted to micromanage 
the staff—that was another issue.  He came to that Village Center everyday as if it was 
his office.  That was not his job; he was a Board member” (2004)     
Despite the attempts by these leaders to assert control over Self-Motivated and its 
Board, the Board could not get past the conflict to function competently.  An informant 
observed, “So I went to a few meetings, and it was like so much petty community politics 
and fractionalization of the Board, the leadership—it was just a mess” (2004).  The Board 
meetings would last for hours and accomplished very little.  Another informant noted, 
“They would rehash, over hash.  They don’t get anything accomplished” (2004).    
As a result of the ongoing conflicts and poor management of the Board, many 
members resigned.  According to a key informant, “What I found is that people in the 
Board who could have done the most good, got frustrated with the b.s. so they just left” 
(2004).  Another reported, “People got burnt out and people stopped coming.  I think we 
did have people that were really legitimately concerned and would have done a great job, 
but they got tired sitting at the meetings for hours.  So people got bored and got off it” 
(2004). 
After Self-Motivated’s suspension of operations in 2000, EBMC provided 
technical assistance in order to attempt to salvage it.  A preliminary assessment of the 
Village Center by UMB’s School of Social Work that had been working with the Village 
Center found many problems including confusion over roles and responsibilities; conflict 
over power and resources that “may be the result of individuals viewing the 
empowerment program as a means of securing power and resources;” and the lack of a 
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strategic plan (Field 2000, 2).  The consultant who provided Board development 
assistance reported,  
It appears the Village Center does not have the ability to build the required 
capacity to meet its performance goals.  The current realities of 
SMPCVC’s internal conflict; lack of leadership and structure; lack of 
contract compliance; and lack of planning required to establish priorities, 
structure and governance systems, and management and staffing needed to 
position the organization to operate and produce the required outcome 
within the required timeframe and create sustainability after the EBMC 
funding is in great jeopardy. (Link 2000, 1)   
EBMC hired a firm to conduct a formal assessment of Self-Motivated Village 
Center, and it found two core problems: 
1. The geographic boundaries for the Village Center combined three communities 
with little history of working together, and each community “believed they would 
get a share of the funding and be allowed to go and do their own thing.” 
2. The creation of designated Board seats created a significant structural barrier for 
the organization.  Many of the organizations represented lacked accountability to 
their own constituents and had no stake in or accountability regarding the success 
of the Village Center. (Community Development Associates 2001, 4) 
The assessment concluded:  
SMCPVC leadership (Board and staff) has not been adequate to meet the 
needs of an organization requiring experienced, trustworthy, unselfish 
leadership possessing the wisdom and skills required to build bridges 
between divided stakeholders.  The leadership deficiencies have persisted 
throughout the life of the organization and cannot be attributed to any one 
individual or organization.  No Board Chair was able to garner enough 
support and confidence from a large enough proportion of Board members 
to develop a cohesive decision-making body.  On the contrary, Village 
Center Board Chairs seemed to either have contributed to deepening 
Board divisions among members or have been unable to build common 
ground among members. (Community Development Associates 2001, 6) 
As a result of these negative assessments and the ongoing inability of the 
community to come together, even with outside technical assistance, EBMC did not 
renew administrative funding for Self-Motivated.   
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 The decision to form Self-Motivated as a separate entity, despite the existence of 
a capable organization, may have been the primary cause of the problems.  According to 
one key informant (2004), “I think Community Building in Partnership could have been, 
it would have been, a safe fiscal agent for the Village Center.  I think it would have 
handled the administrative functions properly.  I think an independent Board could have 
directed their activity and expenditure.”  In the end, the operations of the Village Center 
were terminated in 2000, and the community could never get organized to restart it.  
According to Bill Wiley (2004), 
They never asked us for [further] technical assistance [TA].  They never 
called another meeting in order to discuss whether they would ever want 
TA.  They had one more meeting, and Diane [Bell] and I went and 
explained to them what we’re going to do and what was on the table.  But 
the request never came.  Our Board chair even allowed David [Chestnut] 
to stay on our Board to represent their community.   
The core EBMC workforce development program continued to be implemented in 
the community by Goodwill Industries.  EBMC worked with members of the community 
on coordinating a community fair and public safety planning, but every time money or 
programs became available, the community organizations would start to fight, and 
EBMC would again step back.   
Self Motivated Village Center Outcomes 
 Despite the organizational problems experienced by the Village Center, as shown 
in Table 22, the Empowerment Zone achieved programmatic results in the Self-
Motivated community.  Goodwill Industries operated the EBMC workforce development 
program and placed 749 persons in jobs.  Other community organizations, including 
CBP, advertised for other EZ programs like the Housing Venture Fund, and the Village 
Center area had the second highest number of home closings.  Despite the lack of a 
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programmatic emphasis and late implementation of EBMC crime programs, overall 
crime in Self-Motivated fell more rapidly than in the City, but by less than the overall 
average for the Empowerment Zone as a whole.  As a result of a lack of local marketing 
combined with a small business base, the level of business use of economic development 
incentives was low, but a large-scale project was funded. 
It is difficult to isolate the impact of the Empowerment Zone on the Self-
Motivated community using Census data, especially since the EZ overlapped with the 
much larger Sandtown-Winchester CCI that spent millions on housing demolition and 
development as well as operating employment and public health programs.  As shown in 
Table 23, between 1990 and 2000, the Self-Motivated community lost 2,439 residents, 
20% of its population.  The percentage of owner-occupied dwellings increased, but this 
was a major emphasis of the Enterprise program, and the region also had a large Habitat 
for Humanity program.  Average income increased and poverty fell, but this may be 
related to the Enterprise-funded housing programs.   
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SMPCVC Empowerment  
Item Village Center Zone Total 
Workforce Development 
Total Placements 749 4,725 
Economic Development  
Loans Made 4 109 
Loan Amounts $426,836 $16,325,634 
Project Costs $942,500 $105,882,050 
Jobs Created/Maintained 403 2,555 
Quality of Life 
Home Ownership 
Housing Venture Fund Closings 142 813 
Funds Allocated $613,899 $3,432,636 
Public Safety $0 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Year of Plan) Sep-02 n.m. 
Safe Neighborhood Design (Spending AIR) $83,000 $408,500 
Block by Block (AIR) $80,981 $612,303 
Change in Crime Rate (1994-2003) -53% -56% 
Community Capacity Building 
Village Center Application Approved Sep-95 n.m. 
Village Center Admin. Funding Agreement  May-96 n.m. 
Village Center Administrative Funds $649,300 $5,782,696 
Current Status Closed - 2001 n.m. 
Source: EBMC 
Table 22 
 Self-Motivated Peoples Community Village Center 




Item  Village Center Total EZ Baltimore City 
Total Population 
1990 12,070 71,503 736,014 
2000 9,630 54,012 651,154 
Change -2,439 -17,491 -84,860 
% Change -20% -24% -12% 
Percentage of Owner Occupied Dwellings 
1990 22% 25% 44% 
2000 32% 26% 43% 
Change 10% 1% -1% 
Percentage of Dwellings that are Vacant 
1990 18% 17% 9% 
2000 22% 26% 14% 
Change 3% 9% 5% 
Median Household Income 
1990 $14,784 $18,499 $32,316 
2000 $23,606 $20,750 $30,078 
Change $8,822 $2,251 -$2,238 
% Change 60% 12% -7% 
Percentage of Residents Living Below the Poverty Level 
1990 45% 41% 21% 
2000 35% 34% 22% 
Change -10% -7% 1% 
Resident Labor Force Participation 
1990 35% 37% 47% 
2000 35% 37% 44% 
Change -1% 0% -3% 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 18% 15% 9% 
2000 18% 17% 11% 
Change -1% 1% 2% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, EBMC 
Table 23 
The Self-Motivated People's Community Village Center 
Neighborhood Conditions and Changes 
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Self Motivated Village Center Summary 
 The failure of Self Motivated demonstrates the importance of leadership.  The 
Village Center never overcame the loss of the leadership resulting from the resignation of 
Leonard Jackson.  Mr. Jackson had built the coalition among the organizations to form 
the Village Center, which fell apart after his resignation.  After his resignation, an 
unwieldy Board structure and ongoing and unresolved Board conflict weakened the 
organization.  The Village Center hired a respected community activist to serve as 
executive director, but he could not work with or through the Board.  Furthermore, the 
loss of Mr. Jackson’s leadership made it more difficult for the directors that followed 
him.  According to one key informant “It [firing Mr. Jackson] was a board splitting 
activity because some of the people who were all for him were still on the Board.  So 
anybody else coming in was like you have come into the footsteps of the messiah, you’d 
never be as good as him, etc.”   
 The failure of Self Motivated also provides an example of the importance of 
geography and history in community building.  By combining communities with no 
history of working together and indeed some level of organization competition and 
animosity, the boundaries selected contributed to the failure of the Village Center.  
Lacking a common identity or agenda, the community ended up simply fighting over the 
money.  According to Bill Wiley, “now clearly, if I would have drawn the boundaries for 
the Village Center I wouldn’t put those communities together (2004)."  The EZ effort 
also could not overcome the community’s skepticism over the failure of the Sandtown-
Winchester effort.   
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 Another key informant blames EBMC and the rushed process to form the Village 
Center and the lack of technical assistance over the process and during the problems.  
This person reported,  
What I’m saying about the process is that the process did not consider 
from its inception how people who weren’t used to power were able to 
control the situation.  That you have to have the training to do it, I don’t 
care if they have the intelligence. It was never intelligence that’s the issue, 
the issue is the experiences, and the needs, and the processes. And it was 
kind of throwing a sophisticated weapon there, the only thing that you’re 
taken a chance on is to hurting themselves because they don’t know how 
to use the weapon. (Interview Self Motivated Key Informant 2004). 
 Ironically, two key informants (Mike Seipp and Rachael Edds) viewed the Village 
Center as starting with a strong possibility of success.  Like HEBCAC, the Sandtown area 
had national visibility and a potential institutional partner in the Enterprise Foundation.  It 
was also the political base of Mayor Schmoke.  All of these factors would have assisted 
in attracting the resources necessary for building a strong community organization.  It 
was initially led by a strong leader who was able to build a coalition of community 
organizations and had a vision for the community.  The problem was he (allegedly) stole 




LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMMUNITY CAPACITY-BUILDING 
IMPACT OF THE BALTIMORE EMPOWERMENT ZONE 
 
Introduction 
Community organizations have played a central role in national urban policy 
since its inception.  Community organizations evolved from informal local and 
philanthropically supported reform and assistance efforts in the Progressive era, to direct 
implementers of federal policy interventions during the Great Society, to indirectly 
supported implementers of federal policy under devolution and privatization.  The 
Clinton Administration’s EZ/EC Initiative was an attempt to tie together the various 
trends that shaped the evolution of the role of community organizations into a new 
federal urban policy under which community organizations would be at the center of 
policy design and implementation. 
Chapter 2 describes the overall national policy context for this dissertation by 
describing how the Clinton Administration’s EZ/EC Initiative was shaped by the 
evolution of the role of community organizations in urban policy.  Chapter 3 describes 
the local context for this dissertation by analyzing how the implementation of the 
Empowerment Zone was shaped by local economic, social and political conditions in 
Baltimore City.  Chapter 4 describes as six case studies the experience of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone in building the capacity of community organizations to act as agents 
of change.  This Chapter will analyze the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone and its six village centers and set in the context of the national literature on 
community organizations the lessons that can learned from Baltimore’s decade long 
effort to build community organization capacity.  
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The Clinton administration called for community organizations to have a central 
role in Empowerment Zone implementation and Baltimore, with its rich history of 
community involvement, was recognized as having the most community-driven 
implementation strategy (Stoker 2003; Hebert et al. 2001).  Among the cities awarded a 
full Empowerment Zone, only Baltimore employed community organizations at the 
center of its implementation strategy.  The combination of long-term federal funding in a 
City with a strong history of community involvement provides an excellent test case to 
examine the feasibility of community-driven urban policy interventions.  If community-
driven urban policy cannot succeed in a well-funded and supportive environment, then it 
is fair to question the overall value of the approach. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, after ten years of effort and more than $8 million in 
expenditures, the legacy of Baltimore’s community capacity building effort is that four of 
the six village centers continue to operate in some form.  Three village centers, East 
Harbor, HEBCAC, and Washington Village continue to operate in much the same role 
and capacity as they did during the EZ and the fourth, Poppleton CDC, is a community 
development corporation that is the successor of the Poppleton Village Center.  These 
four remaining organizations all continue to represent and serve their communities, as 
Baltimore’s redevelopment efforts are moving into each community.  Furthermore, the 
three remaining full village centers are continuing to offer similar programs and services 
even after the end of federal funding.   
This chapter will begin with a summary of the lessons learned from the 
community capacity building efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.  It will then 
present, summarize, and analyze the experience of the community capacity-building 
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efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone and its six village centers in two parts: the 
formation of the village centers and the operations of the village centers.  It will conclude 
with a summary of the overall relevance of the research conducted and recommendations 
for future research.  
The Lessons Learned From The Community Capacity Building 
Efforts of The Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
The community capacity-building experience of the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone can be summarized into twelve lessons that can guide future community capacity 
building efforts. 
Community capacity building is a time intensive process.  The Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone set an initial goal of spending all of the federal money over a five-
year period rather than the full ten years allowed.  Not only did this goal prove to be 
impossible, the rush to implement zone programs conflicted with Baltimore’s goal of 
creating sustainable community development capacity in the village centers.  The rush to 
form the village centers severely limited the ability of these new community groups to 
engage the community in the organizational development and planning process.  This 
reduced community support for the village centers.  A longer start-up process would have 
allowed more time for community mobilization and planning as well as more extensive 
early technical assistance and allowed the new village centers to better engage the 
community in their operations. 
Community change efforts should target appropriately sized and resourced 
communities.  The size of the village center service area and concentration of local 
resources and institutions had a large impact on success.  The HEBCAC area, with a 
population of nearly 30,000 in 1990, was too big to form a truly community led 
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organization, and community mobilization and support was lower than in other village 
centers.  The Harlem Park community with only 4-6,000 residents and no sizeable local 
institutions or commercial area was too small to generate any development momentum or 
form a viable community organization.  The target of creating village centers to serve 
communities with 7,000 residents that was set in the initial EBMC village center 
guidelines was an appropriate goal for community service area size.   
An early focus on sustainability is critical in community building.  Despite the 
initial goal to spend down the federal EZ money over five years and resulting rush to 
form the village centers, EBMC did not formally begin sustainability planning until seven 
years into EZ implementation.  Rather than designing steps, such as engaging City 
agencies, foundations, and other stakeholders, into the early implementation of the village 
centers, the Baltimore EZ initiated a sustainability effort, fairly late in the implementation 
period.  It proved to be difficult to generate outside funds to continue to support EZ 
funded efforts, which been run with little formal interaction with City agencies and 
foundations.  EBMC did not seek early and ongoing foundation or City support for its 
targeted initiatives, indeed one representative of the foundation community reported that 
foundations saw the EZ as a reason to target their efforts on other communities.  The 
village centers, such as Washington Village, that operated with the greatest support from 
institutional and internal stakeholders from the beginning, faced much less difficulty in 
post-EZ sustainability.  Had EBMC and the other village centers emphasized long-term 
sustainability from the start, they might have experienced less difficulty in planning for 
sustaining operations after the EZ program ended. 
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Community centered planning and strategies are critical for success.  The focus 
on the delivery of EBMC developed programs hindered efforts to promote organizational 
sustainability for some of the village centers.  EBMC developed the programmatic focus 
of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone in a centralized manner, with its board and staff 
developing the core programs.  EBMC required that village centers develop community 
plans, and all village centers viewed their plans as a core accomplishment.  However, 
most village centers focused, at least initially, on meeting the EBMC established 
requirements for organizational and programmatic support.  This focus on externally 
developed programs hindered efforts to mobilize community residents, who wanted more 
control over strategy and focus.  Village centers that developed their own programs to 
address community needs, such as East Harbor with economic development and 
Washington Village with crime programs, built stronger, organizations.   
The village centers that based their operations on a clear and concise plan with 
community support, East Harbor, HEBCAC, and Washington Village, were the most 
successful village centers.  For most village centers, the Land Use Plan required and 
funded by EBMC served as the long-term guide for their efforts, even after it was 5 years 
old.  Several village centers supplemented their Land Use Plans with their own strategic 
plans, and Washington Village, in particular, revisited its strategic plan every year or so.  
In the more successful village centers, their plans served to both engage the community 
and guide operations. 
Community change efforts must recognize and address the legacy of past 
efforts.  Many urban communities have a legacy of failed redevelopment efforts.  In the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone, Harlem Park has been the target of redevelopment 
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attempts since the City’s first urban renewal plan in 1956, yet community conditions 
were among the worst in the City.  The Sandtown community in the Self Motivated 
Village Center was the target of the Enterprise Foundation’s CCI effort in the 1980s and 
Johns Hopkins had dominated East Side redevelopment since the 1970s.  Village centers 
with a history of failed interventions like Harlem Park and Self-Motivated, or a history of 
conflict with key institutions over redevelopment like HEBCAC, were less likely to form 
strong, sustainable organizations.  It proved to be difficult to overcome residents’ 
cynicism about past failures or substantial power differentials relative to dominant 
institutions.  However, village centers like East Harbor that put a direct and early focus 
on addressing a history of conflicts created stronger organizations.  Any effort to build 
community capacity must recognize and address the historical context of past efforts. 
One of the most critical findings of this research is that community momentum 
matters.  It is easier to engage a community and keep its residents engaged if their 
community is in the path of redevelopment, as was the case with both East Harbor and 
Washington Village.  Community momentum provides a reason for residents to become 
involved, in order to either benefit or protect their interests from redevelopment.  
Poppleton was a failed Village Center until a large-scale redevelopment project created a 
reason for local institutions and the community to work with and through the Village 
Center.  More importantly, community momentum provides incentives for the City’s 
power structure to pay attention to community organizations because they can stop or 
delay development projects.  Community momentum also provides incentives for other 
investments in the community as development makes the return on housing, workforce 
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development, or economic development programs more attractive to outside 
organizations, such as City agencies or foundations. 
Conflict resolution is essential for building strong community organizations.  
All of the village centers had to address conflicts among communities, residents, 
community leaders, and community organizations over control over the new 
organizations.  The village centers brought new programs, jobs and resources into 
underserved communities, all of which wanted to at least protect their interests, if not 
control the new opportunities created.  The village centers, like East Harbor and 
Washington Village, which spent the time necessary to truly resolve initial conflicts, built 
stronger organizations.  Village centers that were unable to resolve these initial conflicts, 
like Harlem Park, Poppleton, until the development of the BioPark, and Self-motivated 
were less successful as core institutions or communities did not work with or support 
each village center.  Indeed, with Self Motivated the organization was never able to 
resolve its internal conflicts, after its first executive director resigned. 
The presence of strong, engaged local leadership is critical to the success of 
community-building efforts.  Village centers with strong leadership succeeded, those 
without it failed.  The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, however, does 
not point to a single model of effective leadership.  East Harbor was an example of a 
staff-led organization while Washington Village was an example of a board-led 
organization with a strong staff.  Organizational leadership was also based on hiring and 
training local residents as was seen in East Harbor, or hiring a professional staff, as in 
Washington Village.  Harlem Park focused on hiring local residents to run the Village 
Center, but, this created a reluctance to remove local staff when they were not effective.  
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In contrast, East Harbor identified and trained a cadre of local resident leadership that is 
now running respected citywide programs.  The Self-Motivated Village Center collapsed 
when its strong, founding leader was removed for misuse of funds.  
Community mobilization is important, but difficult.  Overcoming apathy and 
conflict in poor communities in order to engage residents in community change efforts is 
important for success.  In forming and operating village centers, all of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone communities faced challenges in mobilizing and engaging their 
residents.  The two village centers that were the most successful in community 
mobilization, East Harbor and Washington Village, were also the most successful 
programmatically and had the least difficulty in sustaining operations.  Again, the 
experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone does not point to a single strategy for 
community mobilization efforts.  East Harbor’s leaders used direct community 
organization techniques to mobilize the African American community.  Washington 
Village mobilized its community indirectly, through the existing community 
organizations that oversaw the Village Center.  Community mobilization is not resource 
dependent, HEBCAC at one time had five community organizers, but failed to achieve 
high levels of community support. 
Village centers with a strong record of community involvement, like East Harbor 
(for the African American community) and Washington Village, created stronger and 
more sustainable organizations.  All of the village centers reported that they would have 
benefited from more extensive community outreach and engagement activities.  More 
extensive community involvement aided in organizational sustainability as external 
funders, most importantly foundations, were more likely to support organizations with 
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high levels of community engagement.  In mobilizing the community, overcoming 
conflict is key.  There were numerous sources of conflict in the village centers.  It was 
race-based as was seen in East Harbor, Washington Village, and Poppleton; class-based 
as in gentrifying East Harbor and Washington Village; or history-based as with Self 
Motivated.  Conflict was also seen between newcomers and existing residents in 
gentrifying Washington Village.  With the Baltimore EZ, the key to conflict resolution 
was effective technical assistance, sometimes from within the community (Washington 
Village) and other times provided by EBMC.  Organizations that were able to get past 
conflict and mobilize the community became stronger organizations. 
Effective communication is essential in any community capacity building effort, 
especially in a large-scale approach like the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.  The 
principal means of mobilizing and engaging the community in change efforts is through 
effective communications.  Effective internal communication strategies between the 
coordinating agency (EBMC) and the community organizations (village centers) would 
have ensured that all were working toward common goals and that community 
organizations were aware of technical assistance opportunities and other issues.  While 
village center leaders served on both the EBMC board and Advisory Committee, this did 
not always guarantee effective dissemination of information.  In the case of Harlem Park, 
one board member reported that the Executive Director failed to communicate issues and 
opportunities to the Village Center Board.  Effective external communication was critical 
for both the coordinating agency and the community organizations in order to control the 
expectations of the community, inform stakeholders on the status and results of efforts, 
and engage and mobilize the community.  All of the village centers used newsletters and 
 
 295 
flyers to advertise meetings and opportunities, but face-to-face communication between 
community organizers and residents was often the most successful communications 
strategy.   
Building internal networks within and external networks outside of target 
communities is essential for building strong community organizations.  The village 
centers that created the strongest internal and external linkages created the strongest 
organizations.  Washington Village provided the best example with the strength of both 
its internal and external networks.  It had stronger Board participation by the many 
organizations within the community than other village centers, and created a stronger, 
more representative organization.  It also had strong Board participation by external 
organizations active or interested in the community that attracted both resources and 
programs into the community.  Similarly, the political and institutional linkages of the 
HEBCAC Board contributed to that organization’s early successes in attracting non-EZ  
programs and support.  All of the village centers focused too heavily on attracting key 
community leaders to their boards.  The capacity-building efforts of the Empowerment 
Zone would have been strengthened if both the village centers and EBMC had done more 
to attract participation by external stakeholders, such as City agencies, foundations, and 
nonprofits, to the village centers’ boards early in the process. 
Politics can support or hinder the development of community development 
capacity.  In its early days, HEBCAC’s strong ties to the City’s political leadership 
allowed the Village Center to attract significant City, State, and external funding and 
programs; however, once the Mayoral administration changed, HEBCAC was sidelined, 
its core staff leadership left, and the City created a competing organization to direct 
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redevelopment in its area.  As a result of this political change, HEBCAC went from a 
nationally recognized best practice in community redevelopment to needing to find a new 
basic mission. 
Goal setting, monitoring, evaluation, and technical assistance are critical.  
EBMC engaged in a formalized, long-term process of working with the village centers to 
set annual goals that were required as a part of receiving administrative funding as well 
as monitoring and evaluating progress towards these goals.  When village centers failed 
to achieve their goals, they were required to present the reasons to the EBMC Quality of 
Life/Capacity-Building Subcommittee, which could sanction the village centers (some 
had their funding cut until a problem was remedied while others had funding completely 
cut off), provide additional time, or provide technical assistance to address problems.  
Surprisingly, only one village center complained about the monitoring and evaluation 
process.  The monitoring system put in place enabled EBMC to recognize the problems 
with Self-Motivated early, and when efforts to address the problems failed, funding was 
terminated.  All village centers reported that they benefited from the technical assistance 
received, and the major compliant about technical assistance was either that village 
centers were not aware that they could receive it or that they needed more of it.  
The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone demonstrated that federal 
and other community change efforts programs can create sustainable community 
capacity.  Furthermore, based on Baltimore’s experience, the ability of an intervention to 
create community development capacity is not dependent on either the socio-economic 
status or diversity of the targeted communities.  Baltimore’s efforts succeeded in creating 
sustainable village centers in both highly poor and highly diverse communities.  Two 
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keys to success are the presence of supporting local institutions and opportunities for 
redevelopment to occur.  However, Baltimore’s experience also highlighted the 
difficulties and complexities involved in these efforts.  Success is not guaranteed, even in 
a well-funded effort in a nurturing environment, as demonstrated by the closure of two of 
the six village centers.  None-the-less, the lessons learned from the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone can guide future efforts. 
Federal and philanthropic efforts have often viewed community-based 
implementation strategies as both a means and an end of urban policy interventions.  
Community-based strategies are viewed as more efficient and targeted than the people-
based policies that now dominate federal policies.  Community-based strategies are 
viewed as more efficient, because they are located within concentrated areas of poverty 
or other social problems that the intervention is directed to address.  This reduces 
transaction costs for outreach and participation and can integrate the various people-
based strategies now housed within different federal, state and local agencies.  
Community-based strategies are viewed as more targeted than the people-based policies 
that now dominate federal policies, because they directly serve communities and their 
residents in need.  Community-based strategies are also popular because they are seen as 
a return to the retail community-based politics of the past, rather than the wholesale 
politics of today.  They are seen as a means of promoting “civic engagement” and 
“building social capital.”   
All of these goals of community-based strategies can be true – but they are all 
based on the presumption that there is sufficient community capacity to implement a 
policy intervention.  However, the poor communities targeted for such policy 
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interventions, often lack the community organizations, institutions, leaders, and other 
elements of community capacity required for change efforts to succeed.   
By treating community capacity as both a means and an end, past federal and 
philanthropic urban policy interventions have confused strategies and results.  As a result, 
the national legacy of community capacity building is mixed.  A core criticism that can 
be leveled at community change efforts, including the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, is 
that by concurrently working to build community capacity while implementing 
community programs, the opportunity for forming strong community organizations to 
serve as change agents is not fully realized.  These efforts would benefit from a longer 
process to build community capacity in the form of strong, viable community 
organizations with the capacity to deliver services and represent the interests of 
communities.  Had Baltimore spent more time: supporting community mobilization and 
planning; providing technical assistance; and designed an early emphasis on 
sustainability into the implementation strategy; the success of the effort would have been 
greater.  Such an emphasis on early planning and capacity building runs against the need 
for federal programs and philanthropic interventions to quickly demonstrate results and 
even the desire of community to immediately begin to fix their problems.  A longer, more 
focused and patient design process should yield a greater likelihood of success.  
Based on the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, community-based 
strategies can offer benefits over current people-based strategies.  Baltimore’s strategy 
demonstrates that community driven efforts can achieve results in terms of crime 
reduction, improving community quality of life, and implementing workforce programs 
(discussed more fully in the following Epilogue).  The Baltimore EZ’s village centers 
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were able to offer integrated services, such as combining substance abuse counseling 
with job training or job placement and home-ownership assistance, in innovative ways.  
More importantly, Baltimore’s EZ effort created organizations that represented and 
engaged their communities as Baltimore’s redevelopment success reached into these 
neighborhoods.  The most successful village centers, most importantly East Harbor, 
HEBCAC (before the change in City administration) and Washington Village, were all 
able to play a positive role in larger redevelopment efforts, where they both represented 
their communities and facilitated redevelopment.  
The core lesson of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone is that community capacity 
building is a worthwhile, but expensive and complex undertaking.  The experience of the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone demonstrates that future efforts to implement community-
based strategies should: 
 Allow sufficient time for community mobilization and planning, at least a year 
to eighteen months before program implementation; 
 Target communities with 6-8,000 residents and containing and some 
interested stakeholder institutions; 
 Target communities where there are at least some development potential, and 
preferably, some redevelopment occurring; 
 Focus on addressing community-identified needs and issues;  
 Provide sufficient technical assistance, especially in the areas of conflict 
resolution, board and leadership development; and  
 Design accountability, monitoring, sustainability planning, and evaluation into 
the process. 
The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone also demonstrates that the 
success of future efforts to implement community-based strategies will depend on: 




 Effective communications strategies, both between funding agencies and 
community organizations and between community organizations and the 
residents they serve; 
 Effective, hands on, mobilization strategies to inform and engage community 
residents; 
 The development of internal networks, linking the community organization 
with their service area; 
 The development of external networks, linking the community organization to 
core external stakeholders, such as City agencies or foundations; and  
 Sufficient time and resources to support a long term effort, the Empowerment 
Zone’s ten year target is much more realistic than the 3-5 year efforts of many 
CCIs. 
This dissertation will now describe the experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
in building community development capacity and relate it to the national literature on 
community organizations and development.  The remainder of this chapter will discuss 
and analyze in context of the national literature on community organizations the case 
studies presented in Chapter 4. 
The Capacity-Building Experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone: 
The Village Center Formation Period 
Four key issues shaped the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s village center formation 
process.  These were:  
1. Determining of the geographic boundaries of the village centers;  
2. Determining whether to create new organizations or to rely upon existing 
organizations;  
3. Overcoming conflicts within each of the communities served; and  
4. Overcoming barriers formed by the formation process as designed and 
implemented by EBMC. 
Village Center Boundary Selection   
 The boundaries of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone were determined in the 
City’s application to the federal government, but the specific service areas for each of the 
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village centers were established during the village center application and formation 
process that began after the EZ was awarded to Baltimore.16  The strategy used to 
establish the boundaries for the Zone created difficulty in the village center formation 
process.  Nathan and Wright (1995), argued that cities sought to balance a variety of 
factors in selecting the EZ/EC boundaries.  The federal government established 
guidelines that required that the targeted areas have pervasive poverty, unemployment, 
and general distress, and it established poverty-based guidelines for the census tracts to 
be included in each Zone.  Cities needed to target areas of real need; however, in doing 
so, they had to balance political pressures, community lobbying, and the overall desire to 
achieve success.  All of these pressures shaped the selection of Baltimore’s 
Empowerment Zone boundaries and influenced the village center service area selection. 
 Two communities were included in the Zone because of political pressures: Self-
Motivated and HEBCAC.  The Mayor made sure that the Sandtown neighborhood that 
became part of the Self-Motivated Village Center was included in the Zone because it 
was home to an existing CCI and City redevelopment efforts, and, more importantly 
because it was located in the heart of the Mayor’s West Baltimore political base.  The 
northern border of the western portion of the Zone extended north of the Sandtown 
community in order to include portions of the district of the powerful State legislator, 
“Pete” Rawlings; similarly, the area served by HEBCAC was included because of a 
political agreement between the Mayor and the powerful East Side Democratic 
Organization.   
                                               
16 This analysis focuses on the east and west portions of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.  The Zone 
actually consisted of three areas: the east and west portions analyzed here and an industrial area, Fairfield, 
in the southern part of the City.  Because the Fairfield area is nearly entirely industrial and commercial land 
and has few residents, it was never planned to have a village center organization. 
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 In setting the boundaries for the EZ, the federal government required that cities 
rely on census tract information to define Zone geography; however these tracts often did 
not match how residents defined the boundaries of their “neighborhoods.”  As a result of 
this reliance on artificial census tract boundaries, Baltimore’s effort experienced three 
problems: 
1. Communities with little history of working together were combined into village 
centers (in East Harbor, Self Motivated and Washington Village); 
2. Communities with a strong history of collaboration were divided (for example in 
Self Motivated the only Sandtown portion of the Sandtown-Winchester CCI was 
included and the HEBCAC service areas was larger than the EZ); and  
3. The tract-based designation did not match the service areas of preexisting 
community organizations, like CBP or HEBCAC, leading to further division 
within these communities. 
 The boundaries for three of village centers were established fairly rapidly.  
HEBCAC’s boundaries matched its service area that was included in the Zone, although 
in establishing its boundaries it initially sought to extend its boundaries further to the 
south to include several large housing projects.  Washington Village and Pigtown had 
little history of working together prior to the Empowerment Zone, but a group of 
community leaders emerged in the EZ application process.  This group continued 
working together to address community issues after the application was sent to HUD and 
working with the City’s designated facilitator, were able to select boundaries and form 
their Village Center quickly.  Since HEBCAC assumed control over the entire northern 
section of the eastern portion of the Zone, the boundaries of East Harbor were selected by 
default as the remaining southern communities included in the EZ.   
 The boundary selection process for the rest of the western portion of the Zone was 
more complex.  Washington Village assumed control over the entire southern part of the 
Zone.  The Village Center of Poppleton’s boundaries followed the designation of a City 
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planning district.  During the early days of the EZ, City officials planned that the 
Sandtown portion of Self-Motivated would be part of the Harlem Park area, but these two 
communities could not agree.  As a result, Sandtown became part of Self-Motivated.  
This left the service area of Harlem Park as the territory between Poppleton and Self-
Motivated.   
Existing Versus New Community Organizations   
 Baltimore has a two-tiered system of community organizations.  There are 
numerous organizations, formal and informal, large and small, serving neighborhoods 
throughout the City.  The Baltimore City Planning Department identified more than 700 
community organizations in the City ranging from tenant councils and block clubs to 
large associations (Baltimore City Office of Planning 2006).  Many communities in the 
City are served by a system of 23 “umbrella organizations” which provide services to 
larger service areas that combine multiple neighborhoods.  They are larger and better 
organized than the smaller neighborhood associations; many have paid staff, and have 
experience in contracting and service delivery. 
Four of the Empowerment Zone’s communities were served by umbrella 
organizations.  The Southeast Community Organization (SECO) served East Harbor, and 
Communities Organized To Improve Life (COIL) served the Poppleton area.  The 
Sandtown-Winchester CCI, the City, and the Enterprise Foundation-funded Community 
Building in Partnership (CBP) served the Sandtown-Winchester part of Self-Motivated.  
HEBCAC was a newly formed umbrella organization that ended up serving as the 
Village Center itself.   
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In its EZ application, the City referenced these organizations as “strengths to 
build on” and stated, “Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone is largely covered by well-
organized and active organizations” (Baltimore City 1994, 1-2).  In the village center 
formation process, however, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone had to address the 
question of whether the village centers should be formed within these existing umbrella 
organizations or as separate and independent entities. 
 According to an interview with Michael Seipp (2004), the City’s application 
envisioned that the village centers would be formed as part existing umbrella 
organizations.  HEBCAC would have managed its territory; SECO would manage the 
southeast part of the Zone; and COIL and CBP would form village centers in the western 
part of the Zone.  However, many in the Zone neighborhoods and the EBMC Board did 
not share this vision.  According to one long-term EBMC Board member who 
participated in a focus group on the capacity-building impacts of the EZ effort,17 
From the beginning there was a common feeling at the Board level, and I 
think it was justified, that as it was structured at that point in time, 1995, if 
you allowed any lead organization, for example SECO, if you give it [the 
village center] to them to run, there will be no collective ownership for 
that.  There will be none because that’s an existing organization and they 
always take the lead and so – so what?  So there was a distinct effort to put 
into place a new structure that would have a chance with all the 
communities that wished to get involved, and in a way putting a demand 
on the communities to get involved in order for the village centers to be 
created. (2004) 
As a result, HEBCAC was the only Village Center formed as part of an existing 
organization.  All of the other village centers were formed as new, independent 
organizations.   The conflict over whether to form village centers as a new or as part of an 
existing organization was most important in the East Harbor and Self-Motivated areas.  In 
                                               
17 In implementing the focus groups, all participants were guaranteed anonymity so that they could speak 
freely.  The list of focus group participants is included in the appendix.   
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each case, the existing umbrella organizations were seen as either not responsive to the 
African-American community, as with SECO and East Harbor, or as controlled by 
outside interests, as with CBP and Self-Motivated.     
The EBMC staff and Board recognized the difficulty in creating new 
organization.  One focus group participant reported: 
That’s [starting new organizations] the hardest way to do it.  It’s the right 
way to do it, I really agree with that, but it’s the hardest because you’re 
starting from absolute ground zero.  Nothing exists, and you’ve got to try 
to bring all of these people together and somehow create a sense of 
organization there, which doesn’t exist at all, and you’ve mentioned the 
history of conflicts, and race, and all kinds – those are all the elements that 
were involved in trying to put these village centers together.  And it is not 
surprising that it took years before they could be effective as any kind of 
community center. (2004) 
Overcoming Division Within Village Center Communities   
 All of the Empowerment Zone communities had to overcome some level of 
internal conflict in the village center formation process.  Distressed communities often 
lack core elements of local capacity, sometimes called social capital, to control, 
implement, or even adapt to change (Gittell and Vidal 1998).  This lack of local capacity 
was explicitly raised at the Harlem Park focus group, when one participant concluded: 
“What you had was a community that wasn’t astute enough to understand the overall 
process of how you go about developing a plan from the ground and making it live” 
(2004). 
Conflict also arose when communities with little history of working together were 
joined, as was the case with Self-Motivated, which combined the Sandtown, Coppin 
Heights, Penn North and Mondawmin communities.  In the case of the East Harbor 
Village Center, neighborhoods with a history of racial animosity (white Little Italy and 
the predominantly African-American housing projects) were united.  With Poppleton, 
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there was a division between residents living on the north and south sides of Baltimore 
Street.  The African-American residents on the north side of the street expressed a fear 
that the white residents from the southern part of the community and local institutions 
wanted to control the Village Center.  In the case of HEBCAC, only a portion of the pre-
existing organization’s service area was included in the Village Center.  In all of the 
village centers, problems arose because residents on one side of a street were often part of 
a village center while family and friends across the street were in a separate village 
center, or in some instances, excluded from the Empowerment Zone altogether.   
The core community-level barriers to village center formation were:  
 Controlling expectations and communications 
 Conflict among community organizations 
 Conflict with local institutions 
 Racial and class conflict 
 Community leadership 
 Community history 
Controlling Expectations and Communications  
Issued related to communications and controlling expectations were raised by all 
of the village centers in both the interviews and focus groups.  Residents heard that $100 
million was going to be spent on programs and redevelopment efforts, and they thought 
that their communities and would change overnight.  One participant in the EBMC staff 
and Board focus group reported, 
 I think it was cruel to put the hundred million dollars up there which, if it 
were in my bank account, I’d be very happy, but when its in 10 years’ 
worth of development of some of the most depressed areas in this City, 
when the school budget is $1 billion a year, it’s peanuts.  But you know, I 
really think it raised expectations cruelly among the residents. (2004)  
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 Another reported, “I remember hearing people say, ‘You have all this money. 
How come something hasn’t changed yesterday?’” (2004).  Every village center thought 
that the EBMC should have done a better job of communicating how and what the money 
would be spent on and what residents should expect.  One Harlem Park focus group 
participant reported, “The mandate of the Empowerment Zone concept wasn’t laid out in 
a manner that was understood by the everyday lay person” (2004). 
Conflict Among Community Organizations 
Many of the existing community organizations in areas that would become village 
centers thought that they should become or control the village center.  During the 
formation process for Washington Village, each of the three leading organizations in the 
community fought for control over the new Village Center.  Washington Village was 
successful in overcoming this conflict by engaging all three of the community 
organizations in Village Center management using an innovative rotating-Chair system 
developed by a Board member.  In contrast, Poppleton Village Center was never able to 
overcome the initial conflicts that erupted between the Hollins Market Merchant 
Association, a predominantly white business association, and University of Maryland 
representatives and the African-American community.  Hollins Market Merchant 
Association and University of Maryland started the village center application process 
only to be forced out of its leadership by the African-American residents from north of 
Baltimore Street.  In the case of Self-Motivated, after the loss of a strong leader who 
coordinated the formation process, the leaders of the many organizations serving that 




Conflict With Local Institutions 
Several of the village centers reported that conflicts between the community and 
dominant local institutions impacted the village center formation process.  There was 
often a strong history of conflict between the local communities and the institutions in 
their neighborhoods, especially in the East Side of Baltimore.  Overcoming community 
distrust of Johns Hopkins was a key barrier to the formation of HEBCAC.  As described 
above, on the West Side, the Hollins Market Merchants Association and the University of 
Maryland started the Poppleton Village Center, but were forced out by African-American 
community leaders.  As a result, the Merchants Association and the University had very 
little interaction with the Village Center during its early years.   
Racial and Class Conflict 
Conflict between different racial and socio-economic groups impacted the 
formation of village centers, especially in the more diverse communities of East Harbor 
and Washington Village and in Poppleton.  Racial conflicts dominated the formation of 
the East Harbor, and Washington Village reported having to overcome both racial and 
socioeconomic divisions between long-time residents and new residents, both African-
American and white.  Poppleton never overcame its initial racially based conflicts over 
control. 
Community Leadership 
While strong leadership often benefits the process of village center formation, 
changes in or a loss of leadership can set the process back.  Harlem Park reported that the 
loss of a community leader who had served as the focal point for the Village Center 
significantly hurt the formation process.  In contrast, the strong leadership of Clara Butler 
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brought the East Harbor Village Center through initial conflicts to build and a strong, 
effective organization. 
Community History 
The efforts to form the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s village centers were 
shaped by the history of past redevelopment efforts and community issues.  Johns 
Hopkins was a founder and major supporter of HEBCAC, whose staff became Hopkins 
employees in order to receive benefits.  This funding relationship between HEBCAC and 
Johns Hopkins caused credibility problems with the local community because of the long 
history of conflict between Hopkins and the surrounding community.   
Harlem Park residents never recovered from the failure of past redevelopment 
efforts in their community.  One focus group participant reported: 
Urban renewal did a lot of damage in Harlem Park.  We were one of the 
first urban renewal sites in the nation, and they did a lot of damage.  They 
came in; they told us what they were going to do; they did it and they left.  
And they left us with whatever they left behind (2004). 
 Self-Motivated was formed as a Village Center independent of the City and the 
Enterprise Foundation’s Sandtown-Winchester redevelopment effort managed by 
Community Building in Partnership because of a feeling in the community and among its 
leaders that the CCI’s efforts were neither improving or involving the community.  One 
resident said, “The Enterprise Foundation was in this community since 1990, and they 
have not transformed this community” (2004).  Another reported, “Residents of 
Sandtown-Winchester felt that outsiders were always coming in to tell them what to do.  
The money went to administration and housing, not programs, and the community 
thought all that money was wasted” (2004).  In all three cases where past redevelopment 
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efforts failed, in Poppleton, Harlem Park, and Self-Motivated, resident cynicism 
hampered community mobilization and engagement. 
Process Barriers 
 There was very little time between the City’s being awarded the Empowerment 
Zone in December 1994 and the beginning of the village center formation process in 
March 1995.  EBMC itself was formed as an entirely new organization and had to hire 
staff, form a Board of Directors, finalize a strategic plan, and begin operations.  It created 
the guidelines for village center formation by March 1995, and accepted applications for 
the first four village centers by September 1995.  This fast pace of implementation 
resulted from the City and EBMC’s goal to complete the EZ effort in five years rather 
than the ten years allotted by the program.  As a result, opportunities for planning, 
technical assistance, facilitation, and negotiation were limited. 
The village centers all experienced some level of difficulty caused by the rushed 
EBMC processes, especially the limited time available to create the village centers and 
the lack of start-up financial, technical, and other support.  The time pressures for village 
center formation came from both EBMC, which wanted to spend the money in five years, 
and from community residents who wanted to get started on improving their communities 
immediately.  The village centers that were the first to begin operations, HEBCAC and 
Washington Village, were the ones who complained most about time pressures and the 
lack of technical assistance in the interviews and focus groups, while the village centers 
that began operations later reported fewer time-related constraints and a higher utilization 
of technical assistance. 
One Washington Village focus group participant reported:  
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EBMC did nothing to protect the [village center formation] process, and 
they did nothing for a very long time to provide the technical assistance 
that was necessary for a Board to learn how to be a Board . . . They just 
gave out this matrix and said, ‘Go form a village center!’ and then they 
have about one page in there that said, ‘A village center should consist of 
a, b, c, and d, and when you get that together, submit it to me and we’ll let 
you know whether you are one or not.’(2004) 
 A Harlem Park focus group participant reported, “[EBMC provided technical 
assistance] after we got started.  We were more or less left on our own to form as a 
Village Center” (2004).  The time constraints were also recognized at the EMBC staff 
and Board level with one focus group participant reporting, “The heat was on from day 
one to get organized and get going . . . We should probably have had a slower start up 
and much more attention focused on leadership and plans you could get a grip on” 
(2004).   
Village centers needed to be incorporated as a 501(c)(3) organization to access 
EBMC funds, but they needed the funds to become incorporated.  Washington Village 
reported that they had to “pass the hat around to pay for incorporation because they 
wouldn’t release any money until you had your 501(c)(3) designation” (2004).   
The lack of funding and support in the village center formation process caused 
logistical difficulties.  One Poppleton focus group participant reported, “I’ll start out by 
saying we had a whole lot of problems just finding some places to meet.  We looked here 
there and everywhere” (2004).    
Summary and Conclusion – Village Center Formation 
All of the village centers were able to overcome initial barriers to become 
functioning organizations.  In doing so, they relied on both internal and external 
resources and on technical assistance.  Washington Village and HEBCAC relied 
extensively on internal resources in the village center formation process.  HEBCAC had a 
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professional staff and Board before becoming a Village Center, and Washington Village 
had a core group of committed institutional Board members who brought both skills and 
resources to the formation process.   
As described in Chapter 4, Washington Village needed to overcome substantial 
community conflicts in the formation process.   In response to this conflict, Board 
members with community organizing and outreach experience designed a Board structure 
and bylaws that would not allow any one group to dominate the process: “We 
conceptualized a strategy to create a Board that would be big enough so that no single 
clique could dominate it and small enough that it wouldn’t be unwieldy” (2004).  They 
also devised an initial rotating Chairmanship for the Board so that no group could control 
it and more citizens could experience leadership.   
All of the village centers reported using traditional community organizing 
techniques to engage the community.  East Harbor, in particular, used an effective 
outreach process: “We had a person at Flag House, one at Chapel, and me representing 
Perkins.  But one of the things we did right was that I didn’t just stay at Perkins.  I was in 
Chapel; I was in Flag House; I went to Little Italy.  Before the Hispanics even became the 
Hispanic Community they are today, I was already dealing with them” (2004).   
EBMC technical assistance was viewed more positively by those village centers 
that had a longer start-up process.  The assistance provided by the University of 
Maryland, Baltimore through EBMC was viewed as critical in getting 501(c)(3) status.  
Poppleton reported, “[The UMB volunteer lawyer] was very instrumental in helping us 
get started” (2004).  EBMC technical assistance was seen as critical in overcoming 
community conflict in East Harbor: 
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I went to EBMC, told them what the problem was.  They got a facilitator.  
We had two meetings.  We had one at SECO; that was the planning 
session.  Then we had a big meeting at Lombard Middle School, and we 
invited everybody.  And all I wanted them to see was the community, not 
color.  The facilitator started and what happened was they forgot about 
color because they started talking about what does your community need. 
(2004) 
 Harlem Park also reported that EBMC technical assistance was critical:  
We had technical training, Board training, early on.  They [the TA 
providers] explained what a Board was to do, what the organization was to 
do.  So we were able, with that training, to get the center off the paper 
(2004). 
 The primary lesson of the village center formation period is that creating 
community organizations, or even implementing programs through existing organizations 
(in the case of HEBCAC), is a complex, long and time consuming process.  The poor 
communities targeted by place-based initiatives often lack the organizations and 
resources required to implement programs and have a history of failed efforts.  Any 
community change effort must allow sufficient time to overcome conflicts, mistrust and 
apathy in the targeted community.  Initiating a “bottom up” community-centered 
planning effort to identify key needs and program goals is the best way to start a targeted 
community program.  This process will increase community engagement in and support 
for the effort. 
The Capacity-Building Experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone: The 
Village Center Operation Period 
Upon completion of the application process, the first step in beginning operations 
and the delivery of EZ services was to enter into an Administrative Funding Agreement 
with EBMC.  These agreements had to be approved by EBMC and ratified by its Board.  
Four village centers signed Administrative Funding Agreements and became operational 
in 1996 [Washington Village (3/96), East Harbor (5/96), HEBCAC (5/96), and Self-
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Motivated (6/96)], and the remaining two became operational in 1997 [Harlem Park 
(8/97) and Poppleton (9/97)].  Within EBMC, the community capacity-building effort 
and the village centers were managed by a staff of two community outreach specialists 
who were overseen by the Quality of Life/Community Capacity-Building Subcommittee 
of the EBMC Board.  EBMC also developed a technical assistance system that was 
overseen by the community outreach specialists in order to provide requested assistance 
to the village centers.  
During the early operations of the village centers, EBMC and its Board began to 
understand the complexity involved in creating and implementing programs through new 
organizations.  In May 1997, EBMC and its Board realized that the village centers would 
need sustained levels of funding, so they increased the administrative funds available to 
the village centers by $2.5 million to a total of $6.5 million over the planned five-year 
funding period.  At this time, the Board approved the funding allocation for the first 
year—$300,000 for HEBCAC and $200,000 for the remaining five village centers—as 
the annual allocation formula for the expected five-year funding period.  The Board also 
established that each village center would propose an annual administrative budget and 
provide an annual report regarding outcomes of the funding.  It also ruled that the EBMC 
President would approve village center administrative funding levels (Empower 
Baltimore Management Corporation, 2003).   
These decisions created the village centers and solidified the centralized control 
of EBMC and its business- and foundation- dominated Board over the Zone.  EBMC and 
its Board decided on the overall strategy and created the core Zone programs.  It acted as 
the funding agent of the village centers and supported the core administrative operations 
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of the village centers through an annual performance-based grant system.  The village 
centers were required to apply to EBMC for funding for each of the core service delivery 
programs, and, as part of the Administrative Funding Agreement process, each village 
center was to annually report its programmatic goals as well as the progress and 
outcomes attained on the previous year’s goals. 
The centralization of control of EBMC and its Board was contrary to the more 
diffused strategy outlined in the City’s application, and it was opposed by both the village 
centers and their residents.  This centralization of City control, however, was consistent 
with the experience of federally-funded community initiatives in the Johnson era.   
The lesson of the Great Society’s Community Action Partnership (CAP) program 
was that creating new organizations outside of City Hall was a threat to existing power 
structures.  As a result, in the transition from CAP to Model Cities, city government 
became the fiscal and oversight agent to control community programs.  City government 
control over federally-funded community programs was later strengthened by the 
transition to block grants.  As a result of this history, it is not surprising that the 
Baltimore’s EZ effort was implemented in a more centralized manner than was outlined 
in the original proposal.  No mayor would cede control over a highly visible and well-
funded program.  Still, it is important to note that EBMC was more independent than 
EZ/EC efforts in other cities.  This independence was in many ways an outgrowth of 
Baltimore’s long-term experience with its shadow government of quasi-governmental 
agencies and experience in working with community organizations. 
Under the initial implementation plan developed by EBMC and its Board, each 
village center was to receive five years of administrative funding; thus, the formal 
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funding period was expected to run through 2001 and 2002.  Many village centers had 
interruptions in their funding as a result of problems in service delivery and reporting, 
and some would deliberately not request their full allocation in a year in order to be 
eligible to receive administrative funding for longer than five years.  As a result, East 
Harbor, Harlem Park, and Poppleton, received administrative funding through 2003.  
Five of the six village centers continued operations through 2003 with Self-Motivated 
ceasing operations in 2000 because of financial irregularities.  The total administrative 
and programmatic funding of the village centers is presented in Table 24. 
 
 
Item 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Funding 238,324 843,034 1,235,434 2,369,757 2,069,148 2,643,461 2,268,418 2,243,249 
EHVC 29,463 118,574 350,631 421,442 374,540 500,918 295,636 337,283 
HEBCAC 14,514 441,758 205,071 654,183 437,178 591,334 416,753 293,372 
HPLSVC 2,000   --    27,368 357,337 239,043 263,503 364,166 575,402 
VCP   --    26,860 126,289 53,393 217,182 513,391 697,389 806,800 
SMPCVC 76,122 146,244 107,266 473,706 279,245 14,084   --      --    
WVPNPC 116,225 109,598 418,809 409,696 521,960 760,231 494,474 230,392 
Administrative Funding 198,324 645,810 677,732 1,156,054 905,909 980,505 455,154 669,446 
EHVC 29,463 87,574 157,485 207,056 78,664 200,000 19,979 184,737 
HEBCAC 14,514 306,624 127,886 439,013 305,607 260,404 0 45,952 
HPLSVC 2,000 0 27,368 170,632 128,352 119,692 151,956 200,000 
VCP   --    26,860 95,064 0 11,055 154,129 283,219 238,757 
SMPCVC 76,122 146,244 95,418 176,004 141,428 14,084   --      --    
WVPNPC 76,225 78,508 174,511 163,349 240,803 232,196   --      --    
Programmatic Funding 40,000 197,224 557,702 1,213,703 1,163,239 1,662,956 1,813,264 1,812,560 
EHVC   --    31,000 193,146 214,386 295,876 300,918 275,657 152,546 
HEBCAC   --    135,134 77,185 215,170 131,571 330,930 416,753 247,420 
HPLSVC   --      --      --    186,705 110,691 143,811 212,210 375,402 
VCP   --      --    31,225 53,393 206,127 359,262 414,170 806,800 
SMPCVC   --      --    11,848 297,702 137,817   --      --      --    
WVPNPC 40,000 31,090 244,298 246,347 281,157 528,035 494,474 230,392 
Source: EBMC 
Table 24 
EBMC Village Center Total, Administrative and Programmatic Funding 
Core Operational Period 1996-2003 
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During the village center operational period from 1996 through 2003, the village 
centers had to address both internally- and externally-driven challenges.  Internally-
driven challenges are those issues within the village center that impact operations 
including staffing; board relations; mission and strategic planning; community organizing 
and mobilization activities; outreach and communications; size; interactions with 
community institutions; and community momentum.  Externally-driven challenges refer 
to issues concerning the village centers’ relationships with EBMC, the City, and other 
external stakeholders.   
Internal Operational Issues 
Hager et al. (1996) identify six clusters of factors that impact nonprofit 
organizations: size; age; instability; managerial acumen; success and other.  Applying a 
similar model to the experience of CDCs, Rohe, Bratt and Biswas (2003) identify the 
core internal organizational factors affecting community groups as: staffing; board of 
director’s issues; mission; community involvement; networking; and funding. The 
Village Centers faced many of these issues in their operations. Based on the research 
conducted, the key internal operational issues related to Village Center operations 
included: staffing; board relations; mission and strategic planning; community organizing 
and mobilization activities; outreach and communications; size; interactions with 
community institutions; and community momentum.   
Village Center Staffing 
Staff and the Board of Directors provide the leadership of community 
organizations; therefore, the strategies used to staff the village centers had significant 
impact on their operations.  According to Chaskin et al. (2001), “Leaders are a core 
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component of a community’s capacity.  They facilitate and give direction to the work of 
community organizations” (27).  Glickman and Servon (1998) cite an effective Executive 
Director and competent and stable staff as two core elements of the internal capacity of a 
community organization.  Cowan, Rohe, and Baku (1999) note that Executive Director 
tenure improves organizational efficiency and outcomes.  Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas (2003) 
also found that the loss of key staff is a primary cause of the failure of community 
groups.  All of these were present in Baltimore’s EZ effort. 
The village centers were located in many of the City’s poorest and most 
disadvantaged communities.  These communities often lacked residents or leaders with 
the formal skills and training necessary to create and run an organization.  One Poppleton 
key informant reported, “Finding, training, and retaining staff was a problem.  And 
basically, the problems that were identified in retaining and finding a staff was the fact 
that so many had specific barriers themselves” (2004).   
  The first decision that village centers had to make with respect to staffing was 
whether to recruit from within the community or through an open recruitment effort.  
East Harbor focused on hiring and training local leaders, and it had significant success in 
developing new community leadership.  HEBCAC and Washington Village tried to hire 
local leadership and staff but often hired from outside of the community for key 
management positions.   
Three of the village centers recruited their Executive Directors from outside of the 
community.  HEBCAC’s Executive Director was a senior manager in the Baltimore 
Development Corporation, the manager of the City’s EZ application process, who had a 
strong relationship with Mayor Schmoke.  After a short period under the management of 
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a local community leader, Washington Village hired an experienced social services 
professional as its Director.  The Poppleton Village Center was led by its Chair, a person 
with a relationship with the Mayor and Housing Commissioner, who had ties to but did 
not reside in the community.   
The other three village centers recruited leaders from within.  Self- Motivated’s 
Executive Director was an established community leader active in the Zone and Village 
Center application process.  Harlem Park recruited a Director who grew up in the 
community, and East Harbor’s Director was a long term resident who led the Village 
Center application process.  All of the village centers recruited support and programmatic 
staff from within the community. 
 Hiring and training local residents is a widely accepted core goal of any 
community capacity-building effort.  The tradeoffs involved between hiring local 
residents versus experienced professional staff from outside of the community are seen in 
the experience of the village centers.  The two village centers that hired experienced, City 
staff members as Directors, HEBCAC and Washington Village, formed stronger 
organizations more quickly than the others.  The Directors had existing relationships with 
City agencies, which facilitated interactions with the City, and had management 
experience.  In contrast, the Self-Motivated Village Center hired an established 
community activist as its first Director only to have this person removed for misuse of 
funds.   
In the case of the Harlem Park Village Center, the hiring of local leadership had 
mixed results.  One Harlem Park focus group participant reported pride over their success 
in hiring local residents: “What I can say and what makes me proud of this center is that 
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the residents who actually lived here in Harlem Park ended up being employed by the 
center, gave their services.  So that’s one thing that made us really, in my opinion, 
outstanding from many other centers” (2004).  Yet another Board member criticized the 
Director as ineffective and reported that it was impossible to remove him because of his 
ties to the community.  He was ultimately removed in the last year of operations as a 
result of (alleged) financial misdeeds. 
According to an interview with Serena Neal (2004), East Harbor had substantial 
success in recruiting both its Director and staff from the community, but this required 
significant direct and technical assistance from EBMC.  She reported that the Village 
Center undertook considerable efforts and expense to train its leaders, even sending one 
local resident to earn a degree in community development.  The success of East Harbor 
shows that developing community leaders is possible with sufficient time, technical 
assistance, and training. 
Vidal (1992) reports that, because of low salaries and benefits and high stress, 
community organizations often have difficulty in finding and retaining good leadership 
and staff.  The Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s commitment of high and stable funding 
to the village centers helped to solved this problem by offering competitive, stable 
salaries; however, by solving this problem of competitive salaries, it created another as 
the community members resented the pay scale offered to managers.  Most village center 
Executive Directors earned salaries between $50,000 and $75,000, which were 
substantially higher than the earnings of most community residents.   
Vidal (1992) and Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas (2003) argue that staff turnover hurts 
organizational performance.  Poppleton, Self Motivated, Washington Village, and 
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HEBCAC were all impacted by staff turnover and long-term vacancies in key positions.  
This loss of leadership had significant implications for the operations of each of these 
village centers.  For example, HEBCAC lost most of its senior management in a six-
month period, and it was forced to operate with an interim Director as the City was 
planning a major East Side redevelopment effort.  After a long search process, the person 
hired as Director left after a few months, and the position was vacant again for 
approximately 18 months.  As a result, the organization lost much of its early momentum 
and had to both rebuild its operations and redefine its mission.  Washington Village, on 
the other hand, was able to overcome problems with staffing turnover and vacancies, 
primarily because of the strength of its board.  Self Motivated was never able to 
overcome the loss of the dynamic leader who led the Village Center formation process.   
There was also a problem associated with how the village centers’ professional 
staff and board members related to community members.  Many community residents 
reported that the more educated staff and board members undervalued the contributions 
of community residents, many of whom had lower levels of formal education: “I don’t 
put a whole lot into the degrees.  Because I’ve been in this neighborhood 50 years on one 
corner, and I have been from the mountaintop to the basement, and the people I’d rather 
be around with are the ones who hocked their degree to get common sense” (Poppleton 
focus group, 2004).  Another EZ community resident noted: “They [more educated staff 
and board members] talk about all this stuff, and I can’t vote because I don’t know what 
they are talking about.  They use the initials and this or that, and we don’t know” 




Village Center/Board Relationships 
Gittell, Newman, and Ortega (1997) argue that, because policy makers assume 
community organizations to be appropriate vehicles for articulating and promoting 
community needs, it is best when the staff and board are representative of the 
communities that they serve.  Glickman and Servon (1998) and Gittell and Vidal (1998) 
in their reviews of CDCs and community organizing found that successful CDCs have 
both active and representative boards, and that an inactive board and lack of resident 
participation undermine CDC effectiveness and capacity.  EBMC emphasized active, 
representative, and diverse boards.  Village centers were required to annually report on 
board structure, attendance, and activities in their Administrative Funding Agreements.  
Technical assistance on forming and managing a board was provided to the village 
centers that requested it. 
 Village centers utilized various strategies to create and populate their boards.  
Local residents dominated each of the village centers’ boards.  Resident board members 
were generally selected by direct election or by nomination by an existing community 
organization that was a supporter of the village center.  All village center boards had seats 
set aside for institutional and business representatives.  In cases such as Poppleton, these 
institutional representatives did not have a vote.  In others, like HEBCAC and 
Washington Village, institutional board members typically let residents serve as Chair but 
played an active role in management and oversight. 
In Poppleton and Self-Motivated, the boards were dominated by a slate of 
designated board members.  In Poppleton, a group of ten “interim selected Directors” was 
able to avoid election and control operations throughout the operation of the Village 
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Center.  In Self-Motivated, a majority of board members were the designated 
representatives of community organizations and were guaranteed their seat.  In 
Poppleton, these un-elected Board members dominated the Village Center and in Self 
Motivated, this slate of guaranteed Board members are the same Directors the fought for 
control, ultimately contributing to its closure.   
 There were substantial variations in the level of board activity and control among 
the village centers.  East Harbor is an example of a staff-led organization where the board 
played a supportive role to a strong leader.  Washington Village was more of a board-led 
organization where the board provided management continuity in the face of high staff 
turnover.  Poppleton was an example of an organization where a key board member 
played a dominant role.  After the resignation of its first Executive Director, the Self-
Motivated board was dominated by a small group of Board members, which caused other 
members to feel excluded from the decision-making processes. 
 Almost every village center experienced some level of difficulty in developing 
and maintaining a board of Directors, and most reported low attendance and participation 
in board meetings.  The difficulties included: managing the operations of the board; 
engaging members in the management process; and balancing the strengths and 
responsibilities of various members.  As a result, EBMC provided substantial technical 
assistance on board development. 
East Harbor, Harlem Park, and Poppleton all reported difficulty in engaging their 
boards in operations, maintaining a quorum at meetings, and having each board take 
active roles in operations: “Recently, I’ve had a problem with maintaining a board.  And 
I’d say in the past two years most of the Board members have moved out of the area.  
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Some have moved out, some of them organization-wise have changed functions” (East 
Harbor focus group, 2004).  A Harlem Park focus group attendee noted: 
Our Village Center did not have a quorum for the board.  Let me tell you 
how they operated.  With one of the previous chairpersons, they would 
claim they had an executive session.  They did not call it, and what they 
were doing was that they were running around to certain people’s houses 
when they wanted to get something done who was on the executive 
committee and telling them to vote for this, vote for that, things like that.  
They just did things (2004). 
A Poppleton resident commented: 
Keeping the board working has been a struggle. The executive committee 
of the board has remained intact and very strong and active, and then a 
few of the community organizations have as well (2004). 
Village centers also experienced problems in maintaining the appropriate roles for 
board members in relation to the organizations.  Self-Motivated faced difficulties with 
key Board members trying to micromanage the organization.  When board members 
turned over, especially after conflicts, the village centers often lost access to the 
information collected by the exiting board members: “When board members and Chairs 
left they didn’t pass on all of the information to new members or Chairs.  It was like ‘I’m 
going to hold this and this person ain’t going to know’” (Harlem Park Board member 
interview, 2004).  
With one notable exception, the village centers that formed the strongest boards, 
HEBCAC and Washington Village, formed stronger village centers.  Board members not 
only provided strategic direction and oversight (an area where Washington Village was 
especially successful), they also served as links to the City and State government.  One 
Washington Village Board member worked for the court system and was able to bring a 
community court to the Village Center, which was recognized as a best in practice effort 
by the Clinton administration.  HEBCAC’s Board had high-powered political leaders and 
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representatives from Johns Hopkins who were able to bring in federal, State, City, and 
Johns Hopkins resources.   
Both Self-Motivated and Harlem Park had high levels of board-related conflict 
(within the board and with the village center staff) and low levels of board participation.  
Self-Motivated ceased operations in only four years of funding, and Harlem Park never 
became a strong Village Center.  A very strong leader dominated the Poppleton Village 
Center Board and staff in a way that stifled the Village Center’s development.   
East Harbor is the exception.  As a result of the conflict over the formation of the 
Village Center, the Board never attracted significant participation from white residents or 
organizations serving white communities.  Furthermore, the Board exerted very little 
control over the Village Center’s operations and the Chairman rarely attended meetings.  
Very high-level leaders and developers were on the Board, especially for the East Harbor 
CDC, and they did assist the Village Center and CDC, but East Harbor was essentially 
staff-run. 
Mission Statement and Strategic Planning 
Roman and Moore (2004) found, “Studies suggest that the presence of a clear, 
concise mission statement with articulated goals and objectives is important to an 
organization’s success in the community” (19).  EBMC required that all of the village 
centers develop a Land Use Plan and strategic plan to guide their operations.  The Land 
Use Plan analyzed current and expected patterns of development.  The strategic plan 
outlined key social and programmatic goals.  These plans not only directed the efforts of 
the village centers, but through the charettes and public meetings held to develop these 
plans, they served as a means of mobilizing community engagement with the village 
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centers.  Nearly every village center considers the Land Use and strategic plans to be 
among the most important things produced by the Empowerment Zone, and despite being 
five or more years old, most still guide their village centers’ operations today.   
HEBCAC and Washington Village had the most detailed strategic planning 
efforts, and Washington Village updated its strategic plan annually.  One flaw in the 
EBMC process was that the village center strategic planning occurred after the village 
centers were formed.  Some key informants reported that more planning would have been 
beneficial during the village center formation process; most importantly a thorough needs 
assessment of each community.  Moreover, because EBMC and its Board developed the 
Zone’s overall strategy and program emphasis, the core activities of Zone programs did 
not always match community level priorities.   
The village centers that emphasized strategic planning formed stronger 
organizations.  Washington Village engaged in annual strategic planning retreats as a 
means of both guiding the organization and maintaining board and community 
involvement.  HEBCAC had a detailed strategic plan that guided its efforts.  East 
Harbor’s strategic plan laid out the Village Center’s successful strategy to become 
engaged in community development. 
Community Organizing/Community Mobilization 
Community organizing is the mobilization of local community residents to 
participate in and support the activities of a community organization.  Haeberle (1986) 
summarized the literature on the demographic and environmental influences on resident 
participation and found that socioeconomic status (income and occupation), 
environmental conditions (population, home ownership, and age of housing stocks) and 
 
 327 
race all influence community participation.  Community organizing in Baltimore’s 
Empowerment Zone with its high rates of poverty, low home ownership, and 
concentration of African-American residents was difficult.  While community organizing 
was once a core activity of community organizations, it has often become only one of 
many functions as a result of the growing professionalization of the role that CDCs and 
other community organizations in housing development and service delivery.  Work by 
Stoecker (2003) has identified the tensions facing CDCs between community organizing, 
with its emphasis on representing the needs of the community, and community 
development, with its requirement of cooperation with political and for-profit actors who 
often have different goals from the community.  The federal EZ program sought to 
resolve this conflict by emphasizing the community outreach aspect and directly funding 
programs.  Similarly, the Baltimore City Empowerment Zone emphasized the need for 
the village centers to organize and mobilize residents as a core goal, and it funded 
community organizer positions in each of the village centers.  EBMC’s community 
mobilization goal was for the village centers to directly engage residents in both 
oversight and activities.   
All of the village centers reported difficulties in mobilizing and engaging the 
community in operations.  One Washington Village key informant reported:  
It was hard to get people to come to meetings.  Then they cry that their 
area is getting left out.  There was apathy in Washington Village towards 
the EZ, but rich community life under this apathy.  The Empowerment 
Zone under-invested in community organizing” (2004).   
Even HEBCAC, which at its peak had four or five community organizers, reported 
difficulty in overcoming community apathy and mobilizing the community.  The 
community’s history of distrust of Johns Hopkins University, which was both a founder 
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and a funder of the organization, exacerbated this problem.  Other village centers 
reported problems in getting community organizations to work with the village center: 
With any group, they will come if there’s something for them or that they 
need.  With any group that I’ve worked with where they should have been 
part of the Village Center, that has been the pattern.  They only come if 
it’s in their interest, and they don’t participate otherwise. (East Harbor 
focus group 2004) 
A Harlem Park focus group attendee commented,  
I got this impression that you got all these communities and all these 
organizations and don’t nobody know what this community does or that 
community does.  I’m just saying nobody knows their roles and then when 
you get these organizations and these groups, nobody wants to work 
together, but you’ve got everybody who wants to be in charge. (2004) 
Most of the village centers experienced only modest success in engaging the 
community, and none obtained broad-based participation.  The difficulties involved in 
successful community organizing have been well established in community development 
literature.  For example, in their evaluation of a LISC demonstration program, Gittell and 
Vidal (1998) highlight the difficulties, complexities, and problems encountered in 
community organizing.  The results in Baltimore were similar.  Nearly all village centers 
started with broad-based participation, but community interest and involvement declined 
over time as the more mundane aspects of running an organization overshadowed the 
initial excitement of community members.   
Some village centers were more successful than others in engaging and 
involving the community.  Washington Village, HEBCAC and East Harbor 
reported fairly large numbers of residents participating in activities such as 
neighborhood clean-ups; however, overall public participation in village center 
governance was modest.  Across the village centers, public participation in 
governance most often came from the leaders or members of existing community 
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organizations, people who were already active in City or community issues.  The 
successful village centers, like Washington Village, were able to fully engage 
these active community leaders and residents in governance and operations.  
Weak village centers, like Self-Motivated and Harlem Park, were crippled by 
conflicts between those leaders over the money and power associated with the 
village centers. 
Outreach and Communications 
Community organizations must have an effective outreach and communications 
strategy in order to support their programmatic and community mobilization missions.  If 
neighborhood residents are unaware of an organization’s services, utilization will be low.  
If they are not informed of the issues impacting their community, they will not become 
involved in efforts to improve local conditions.  Furthermore, effective outreach by 
community organizations can be a vital means of collecting information on key issues 
facing the community and acquaint staff with stakeholders.  According to Chaskin et al. 
(2001), “Although outreach and communication by themselves do not constitute 
community organizing as we have defined it, they are often vital to capacity-building 
efforts in neighborhoods where the populace is alienated from institutions and lacks self-
efficacy” (115).  According to Chaskin et al. (2001), community-building efforts utilize 
advertising, door-to-door canvassing, and outreach through existing community 
organizations.  The Empowerment Zone and the village centers employed all of these 
strategies. 
 Overall, the village centers did not develop effective outreach and 
communications strategies.  More effective communications could have assisted the 
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efforts at mobilizing the community.  Most village centers produced newsletters, but they 
were published irregularly.  The village centers also publicized their community meetings 
but often had low turnout.  Even with better communication, many village center key 
informants reported how difficult it was to increase community participation:   
But you know what I think it all boils down to?  One of the barriers is we 
did not have and still don’t have total community awareness of what’s 
going on.  I think the community has been informed, but I can agree that 
the community as a whole has been reluctant and slow to come to the table 
to take part in the overall process.  But as far as getting the word out, I 
think we did an excellent job at getting the word out about the programs 
that are offered here at the Village Center. (Harlem Park focus group 
2004) 
Size 
The size of the communities served also affects the viability of community 
organizations.  If the area is too large, it will make it difficult for a community 
organization to have broad-based resident participation (Haberle 1986), but if is too 
small, it will limit the potential service and development activities, and tie success to a 
small market (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas 2003).  As a result, a community organization will 
need to define a service area that is large enough to attract sufficient interest and 
programmatic funding, but be small enough to maintain resident participation and 
commitment.   
In the year 2000, the Empowerment Zone portion of HEBCAC had a population 
of 18,351.  One HEBCAC key informant reported, “I think it might have been too big for 
– I think it was too big for them to really get the things done that should have been done” 
(2004).  On the other hand, Harlem Park had a population of 4,283 in the same year and 
also had several existing community organizations already serving the community.  It 
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was too small to support a village center in addition to the existing community 
organizations already serving the community. 
Interaction with Community Institutions 
Efforts to organize residents and form community organizations can be shaped by 
the participation and reputation of key local institutions.  Eicher and Hoffman (n.d.) 
identify the involvement of an institutional partner as essential in building community 
capacity.  Local institutions such as hospitals, universities, and large employers can serve 
as psychological and fiscal anchors and external relationship brokers of a community 
organizing effort.  However, if the institutional partner has ulterior motives, this can 
damage the credibility of the community organizing effort.  The participation of 
institutional partners will generally also support the creation of stronger organizations, 
but ties to a dominant local institution can cause mistrust among community residents.   
 HEBCAC was the best example of the positive and negative impacts of 
organizational relationships with dominant institutions.  East Baltimore residents have 
long viewed Johns Hopkins with suspicion.  It was seen by many as benefiting from the 
blight in the surrounding neighborhood that drove out the residents and allowed Hopkins 
to acquire local property at a low price.  By acquiring and boarding up properties on 
surrounding blocks, the institution was seen as contributing to local decline.  According 
to an interview with Mike Seipp, HEBCAC’s first Director, people in the community 
even thought that Hopkins was distributing crack cocaine to residents to cause urban 
decline (2004).  HEBCAC was formed to address these negative perceptions and to foster 
cooperation between Hopkins, community organizations, local political leaders, and the 
City in revitalizing this community.  HEBCAC received a substantial base of its funding 
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from Hopkins and the City, and it never relied on the Empowerment Zone for more than 
one-third of its funding.  The relationship with Hopkins also attracted external federal and 
foundation support for programs and access to drug treatment and other services.  
However, the relationship between Hopkins and HEBCAC damaged the relationship of 
HEBCAC with the community.  A strong institutional relationship strengthened 
HEBCAC as an organization, but weakened its relationship with the community. 
In the formation of the Poppleton Village Center, African-American community 
residents opposed the initial formation plans developed by the University of Maryland, 
Baltimore and Hollins Market Association and took control of the Village Center.  
Poppleton leaders were suspicious that the University of Maryland wanted to move 
across Martin Luther King Boulevard (a boundary between the University and the 
neighborhood).  Their suspicions were validated in 2003 as the University made plans for 
a research park on a vacant City parcel in the community.  After that decision, Poppleton 
reported both a stronger working relationship with the University: “Certain segments left 
[the Village Center] until the University of Maryland piece [research park] came up, and 
now people are coming back” (2004).  This demonstrates that community organizations 
and institutions can overcome initial disagreements to work together.   
In Washington Village, an involved and committed institutional presence on the 
Board provided access to both organizational skills and programmatic funding, 
demonstrating the supportive role that institutions can play in organizational 
development.  In contrast, Harlem Park demonstrates that communities lacking an 
institutional presence can be at a disadvantage in building strong community 
organizations.  One EBMC staff key informant reported, “Harlem Park actually suffered 
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a double whammy.  Not only were they small, but they had no institutional partners and 
they had no business district” (2004).  Thus, strong institutional support tended to assist 
in forming strong village centers; however a too dominant institutional presence can 
weaken organization’s credibility. 
Community Momentum 
Neighborhood redevelopment, renewal, and gentrification often provide the 
impetus for community mobilization.  Most community-based organizations are 
organized to address the problems associated with poor and blighted communities.  These 
organizations often face new challenges when redevelopment occurs in their 
communities.  Redevelopment and gentrification often threaten to uproot the residents of 
poor communities who are forced out by increasing rents or the outright condemnation 
and demolition of existing structures, both occupied and unoccupied, to make way for 
upscale housing and commercial space.  As a result, existing community organizations 
and residents often end up opposing rather than participating in this redevelopment.  This 
represents a loss of an opportunity to develop a new socially-oriented redevelopment 
paradigm that combines traditional redevelopment with the community-oriented 
development activities of CDCs (Peterman and Hannan 1986; Robinson 1996).  
Robinson’s community-based “alternative social production process” is more cooperative 
and sensitive than traditional redevelopment by including residents and community 
organizations in the process, production, and projects completed (1996). 
 Patterns of redevelopment and gentrification in Baltimore City played an 
important role in the strategy of the Empowerment Zone and operations of the village 
centers.  Two of the Zone’s communities were in the path of redevelopment and 
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gentrification radiating from downtown Baltimore.  The East Harbor Village Center was 
located on prime, waterfront real estate between downtown Baltimore and the already-
gentrified community of Fells Point.18  The Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood 
Planning Council was centered on a historic commercial corridor, Washington 
Boulevard, and had been considered a prime redevelopment site for many years before 
the Zone was awarded.  HEBCAC was also at the center of redevelopment activities 
occurring around Johns Hopkins Hospital. 
 Most models of community capacity-building strategies predict the failure of 
community organizing efforts when the target communities are in the path of, or more 
cynically, in the way of redevelopment.  Fainstein and Fainstein (1986) and Stone (1989) 
both find that neighborhood groups rarely develop the skills or power to challenge 
‘downtown regimes.’  This is especially true in a City like Baltimore with its shadow 
government of quasi-governmental organizations formed to limit, not enhance, pubic 
control over redevelopment projects (Stoker 1987).  Ironically, the two strongest village 
centers, East Harbor and Washington Village, were formed in such communities. 
  The East Harbor Village Center was formed to meet the needs of the poor, 
African-American residents living in the public housing projects and communities 
existing between downtown and Little Italy on the west and Fells Point on the east.  Its 
strategy was to represent this community during the dramatic redevelopment that 
occurred in this community.  It served as a bridge between the City, the developers, and 
the community.  In this role, the Village Center received substantial City, State, and 
federal funding related to HOPE VI redevelopment, community planning, and relocation 
                                               
18 Portions of Fells Point are in the Zone, but the Fells Point community organizations have played only a 
minor role in the East Harbor Village Center or the Zone. 
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assistance.  With many of the City’s most successful developers supporting the East 
Harbor Village Center, it formed its own CDC that developed a community center that 
included retail space, and it is in the process of developing new federally-funded housing 
in the community.   
According to Serena Neal, East Harbor protected the interests of the local 
African-American community:  
“She [Clara Butler, Director of East Harbor] has partnered with City, local 
developers, Hopkins to do development, getting absolutely little or 
nothing out of the deal for her organization, but she’s developed a 
partnership to assist Flag [Flag Court Housing Project – which was being 
demolished and redeveloped].  For the last five years, almost five years 
now, they’ve been fighting over how many residents would come back to 
them into that thing.  The developer wanted to keep them all out.  She’s 
fought them.  She’s got housing now for those folks who came out of Old 
Flag.” (2004) 
East Harbor ensured that existing residents would not only be provided with 
transition services but that many would be able to return to the redeveloped 
housing. 
 Washington Village was located to the west of downtown between Martin Luther 
King Boulevard and Interstate 95.  With its proximity to downtown and the City’s two 
sports stadiums, and with the presence of a pre-existing commercial strip and 
townhouses, it has long been considered a candidate for redevelopment.  Gentrification 
was occurring on a small scale in Washington Village before the City was awarded the 
Empowerment Zone, and there was tension between the community and the new higher- 
income residents as well as several developers investing in the community.  Washington 
Village did not become as active as East Harbor in the development process, but did work 
to represent the community’s needs to the City as redevelopment occurred.   
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The differences in the roles of each village center in community redevelopment 
was most likely due to the differences in the redevelopment activities occurring in each 
community.  Located on the waterfront outside of downtown, East Harbor had seen large-
scale redevelopment projects such as new office towers, hotels, and retail space 
developed by the City’s major developers.  The East Harbor community was home to 
several large public housing projects, many of which were being redeveloped under the 
Federal HOPE VI program.  The political requirements associated with these large-scale 
development activities created the need for including residents in the redevelopment 
process, thereby creating a role for East Harbor.  In contrast, redevelopment in 
Washington Village consisted mainly of individual investors developing small-scale 
properties, and it did not create a formal role for the Village Center in representing the 
community. 
 The village centers serving communities experiencing redevelopment and 
gentrification formed strong organizations.  Both East Harbor and Washington Village 
were in the natural path of Baltimore’s waterfront and downtown-driven redevelopment.  
Redevelopment provides internal mechanisms to support capacity building as community 
residents either band together to protect themselves from gentrification or rally to support 
that things in their communities are starting to change.  For example, in both East Harbor 
and Washington Village, defending the interests of existing residents in the City’s 
redevelopment plans was a central factor supporting community participation.  East 
Harbor sought to ensure that residents were able to return to redeveloped housing, and 
Washington Village sought to ensure that residents were able to benefit from 
redevelopment through home ownership and renovation programs.   
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Redevelopment also provides external mechanisms to support capacity building 
since the City’s agencies and developers need to work with local organizations as part of 
the public participation component of large-scale redevelopment efforts.  As a result, 
developers often find it expedient, as in the case of the UMB BioPark and Poppleton, or 
required of them, as with HOPE VI, to work with community groups.  As reported by an 
East Harbor resident, “Another issue is the unique development opportunities along the 
waterfront that were part of these boundaries, which was different from any other village 
center.  The big powers—the Struever Brothers, Paterakis—the people in control were a 
factor in this Village Center” (2006).  External funders like foundations see and feel that 
they can make more of a difference in a changing community; thus, the foundation 
community stepped up and supported programs in both East Harbor and Washington 
Village.   
External Operational Issues 
Externally-driven issues refer to factors outside of the village centers or their 
communities that influence operations.  National, regional and local factors as well as the 
political environment influence community organizations.  Hager et al. (1996) identify 
four external factors that impact nonprofit organizations: local competition and carrying 
capacity, local demand for goods and services, the availability of resources, and 
legitimacy.  Applying a similar model to the experience of CDCs, Rohe, Bratt, and 
Biswas (2003) identify the core contextual factors affecting community groups as federal 
policies and support, national intermediary support and assistance, and local market 
conditions.  Because the village centers were created and supported by a large-scale 
federal program, this analysis will focus on local conditions, most importantly the 
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relationship of the village centers with EBMC, the City, and with other external 
stakeholders. 
Relationship with EBMC  
Rather than the bottom-up approach proposed in the City’s Empowerment Zone 
application, EBMC structured the Zone’s operations in a grantor-grantee format.  EBMC 
was the funding agent for Zone programs and the village centers.  One Board member 
reported in the focus group, “It got clearer to me, as I was here a few years, that we were 
really the grantor agency and we should function as such.  And we provided a lot of 
things that other grantors don’t provide” (EBMC Board/staff focus group 2004).   
This grantor-grantee relationship resembled a CCI in that a new external agent 
sought to improve conditions in targeted neighborhoods through a specified set of funded 
policy interventions, implemented through community organizations, and supported with 
technical assistance.  This CCI-like structure was shaped by the early participation in the 
Zone’s design by James Rouse, whose Enterprise Foundation created the Sandtown-
Winchester CCI, and by Diane Bell, the City’s representative to the Sandtown-
Winchester CCI.  According to an interview with Bell, the local representatives from the 
Enterprise Foundation were active in the City’s application process and the early 
development of the Zone’s management strategy (2004).   Similar to a CCI, EBMC 
sought to leave behind the local capacity to continue to organize and implement programs 
to improve the targeted communities, with the village centers as the most important 
legacy of the Zone effort. 
Like a CCI, EBMC interacted with the village centers in three main ways: it 
funded, developed, and implemented a centralized system of control over village center’s 
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operations; it required evaluation and monitoring as part of it fiscal control; and it 
provided funding and referrals for technical assistance to the village centers when 
requested. 
As the village centers started operations, they had to adapt to the centralized 
control system created by EBMC.  The initial conflict over centralized versus 
decentralized control was an important early area of tension between EBMC and the 
village centers, especially with HEBCAC, a pre-existing organization run by the 
coordinator of the City’s EZ application, and Washington Village, one of the first village 
centers formed.  Some centralized control was essential, especially in the area of setting 
the strategic goals for the Zone.  Baltimore City’s Empowerment Zone application laid 
out a considerable number of goals and programs that sought to address the full spectrum 
of urban problems.  As the City and EBMC began to implement the plan, it became clear 
that EBMC would need to focus its efforts on a few key programs and goals or risk 
dissipating the money with little impact.  According to one long-term EBMC Board 
Member:  
There was every good thing in the world in that application, and there was no 
way in the world that those good things could all be achieved.  So a decision 
had to be made pretty early on where we were going to put the focus, and that 
may have been a different focus from what people in the village centers, many 
of whom probably worked on the application and saw different things in it. 
This Board made a decision that we’re going to focus on job creation and 
workforce development and the other things that impact employment.  And 
that could have been a disappointment to people who didn’t see it that way. 
(EBMC Board focus group 2004) 
Workforce development, economic development, community capacity-building, 
and a variety of smaller programs (crime reduction, housing assistance, lead paint 
abatement, after-school programs, and others) aimed at improving neighborhood quality 
of life became the core programmatic areas of the Zone, with program funding highly 
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concentrated in workforce and economic development.  In EZ implementation, EBMC 
and its Board developed a list of core programs for which the village centers needed to 
apply for funding to implement in their area.  Workforce development consisted of job 
referral, training, and substance abuse programs.  Economic development, or job creation, 
was implemented by EBMC and focused on grants, loans, and programs to assist 
business recruitment, retention, and expansion.  Community capacity-building consisted 
of the support provided for the formation, operation, and sustainability of the village 
centers.  Quality of life programs focused on improving community conditions through 
housing and crime programs.  With the exception of economic development, all of the 
programs were implemented by the village centers under contract with EBMC. 
This centralization of control and implementation was not consistent with the 
City’s application.  According to an interview with Mike Seipp (2004): 
My premise is that the Empowerment Zone should have been six 
laboratories to test creative ways of community development, service 
delivery, management of City obligatory services like education, and the 
partnership entities, which included government institutions and 
neighborhood residents.  And what it became was a central entity that 
established the rules and regulations for how employment development 
was going to be structured, for how workforce was to be structured, and 
how housing would be structured. 
According to one Washington Village focus group participant, EBMC’s 
centralization of control and strategy cost the EZ effort early momentum: 
What I am saying is the team that was in place, ready to make things 
happen was dissipated.  Mike Seipp was thrown to the side.  Diane was 
brought in, and the direction that we would have gone in was changed 
dramatically with much less concern for the individual village centers and 
much more concern for the impact on the City, and a blue ribbon panel to 
protect those interests.  Everything was changed, and the culture, the 
manpower, and the energy was lost. (2004) 
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The village centers also criticized EBMC’s centralized control as not rewarding 
innovation or success.  Village centers that attracted new programs or funding or fully 
implemented their allocated share of an EBMC program reported that, rather than getting 
behind their success, EBMC often slowed the process down so that other village centers 
could catch up.  The EBMC Board acknowledged this with one focus group participant 
reporting, “If you give money to village center x, village center y is saying, ‘Well I 
deserve the same thing,’ so we’re [EBMC Board] always doing this balancing act” 
(2004). 
As part of EBMC’s centralized control system, each of the village centers was 
required to set and report progress toward meeting annual goals as part of EBMC’s 
evaluation and reporting requirements.  Surprisingly, most village centers did not object 
to the evaluation and reporting requirements set by EBMC as a condition of their 
administrative funding agreement.  According to Seipp, “I would say that the upside was 
that there was limited opportunity for gross negligence, malfeasances, and undocumented 
barriers” (2004).  One of EBMC’s core goals was to limit opportunities for misuse of 
funds.  EBMC forced each of the village centers to obtain formal 501(c)(3) status so that 
they would be legally responsible for their funding.  This system worked, and EBMC was 
able to quickly find the misuse of funds that occurred at the Self-Motivated Village 
Center and later at Harlem Park and remedy poor fiscal management at Poppleton. 
Because the village centers drew their boards and much of their staff from the 
local communities that were poor and disadvantaged, there was a substantial need for 
training and technical assistance to provide the skills necessary to create and run the 
village centers.  As a result, EBMC played a critical role in supporting the village centers 
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through training and technical assistance.  EBMC community outreach staff provided 
informal technical assistance by working with each of the village centers in the areas of 
general management, board management, and explaining EBMC rules and regulations.  
Staff could also recommend, and the village centers could request, specialized consultant-
provided technical assistance.  This was most often provided in the areas of strategic 
planning and board management. 
All of village centers reported that EBMC training and technical assistance had a 
positive impact.  According to one Poppleton focus group participant, “The board had 
several [EBMC-facilitated] retreats to assist them in handling operating issues of the 
Board.  That was very positive” (2004).  Harlem Park received a great deal of technical 
assistance regarding board development as well (Harlem Park focus group 2004).   
The core criticism of the technical assistance effort was that all village centers did 
not take advantage of it.  One Washington Village key informant reported, “The 
[technical assistance] money was there, but I don’t think the Board and/or the staff 
necessarily knew to ask for certain things.  I don’t think we knew what to ask for” (2004).  
Several HEBCAC key informants reported that they also could have benefited more from 
technical assistance, but that they did not ask for it or might not have received it because 
they were a larger, better-funded organization than the other village centers.   
Overall, the village centers overcame their initial opposition and adapted to 
EBMC’s centralized control.  Most village center board members and staff interviewed 
viewed EBMC with a grudging respect; however the EBMC Board was viewed as driven 
by downtown business and political goals, not community issues.  The EBMC Advisory 
Council that was established to provide community input was never able to take a major 
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role in setting or changing EBMC’s Board-driven policies, and served mainly as a vehicle 
for the community to respond to EBMC initiatives.  Over time, participation in the 
Advisory Council fell and the group exercised very little control over the Zone.  While 
some village center leaders resented the centralized strategy and control system in place, 
all were able to work within the established system.   
EBMC used its fiscal control to put in place an annual performance-based 
monitoring and evaluation system to track village center performance.  It developed fiscal 
accountability procedures and audited the village centers.  Through these monitoring 
procedures, EBMC discovered fiscal improprieties in the Self-Motivated Village Center 
in July 1996 and again in 1997- ultimately closing the Village Center, and it halted 
funding of the Poppleton Village Center in May 1999 until better fiscal controls were put 
in place.  In 2004, EBMC found fiscal improprieties at Harlem Park and closed the 
Village Center immediately.   
Overall, there was a tension between the Empowerment Zone’s accountability 
requirements and technical assistance efforts.  Village centers had to request technical 
assistance.  When EBMC saw problems, it suggested but did not force village centers to 
receive assistance.  The village centers that experienced the most problems reported that 
they wished that EBMC had stepped in earlier; however, EBMC wanted the village 
centers to solve their own problems.  According to an EBMC Board Member,  
Some people have said, ‘EBMC should come in [to the Village Center] 
and make this right.’  And what we say is, ‘If you’re not violating your 
bylaws, you’re not violating criminal law, you’re not violating any federal 
mandate or your funding agreement, then maybe this is the situation that 
you’re unhappy with, a decision that your village center is making, and 
you need to muster support among your colleagues to move that in a 
different direction’ (2004). 
 
 344 
EBMC’s stand-back approach was evident in the events leading to the suspension 
of operations of the Self-Motivated Village Center.  After the discovery of fiscal 
improprieties at the Village Center in July 1996, there followed a fourteen-month period 
of conflict within the organization between members of the Board and the Director.  The 
Executive Director resigned in September 1997.  He was replaced, but the Village Center 
was never able to overcome the various conflicts in the community and on the Board.  In 
September 1999, the Village Center, with the assistance of EBMC, formed a new Board 
of Directors.  This new Board failed to resolve the problems and, in September 2000, the 
new Self-Motivated Board requested that EBMC assume a trustee-like role and manage 
the Village Center itself.  After a consultant-conducted assessment of the community and 
the Village Center, EBMC terminated support for Self-Motivated.  Goodwill Industries 
continued to run the workforce development program in the community, and it served 
some of the functions of a Village Center.  One key Self-Motivated informant reported:   
I felt Empower Baltimore at some point should have stepped in and have 
been more of a force in instituting proper fiscal policy and restraints over 
and above what the Village Center Board did.  If they perceived a problem 
early on, not wait, wait, wait, and then when operation is not functional 
say let’s close it.  It should have never gotten to that point (2004). 
Overall, the relationship between EBMC and the village centers worked.  EBMC 
required planning and monitored progress, exercised fiscal control, and provided 
technical assistance when requested.  Village centers accepted and could work within the 
guidelines set by EBMC.  In its oversight function, EBMC’s stand back approach of 
waiting for help to be requested by the village centers may have contributed to the 
problems experienced in Harlem Park and Self Motivated.  However, had EBMC 
assumed a more direct role in Village Center management, it would likely have been 
resented or resisted.   
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Relationship with the City 
Most of the village centers did not see the City government as an ally in the 
community capacity-building efforts of the Empowerment Zone.  Many key informants 
reported that they felt there was an effort by City agencies to take over the core programs 
implemented by the Empowerment Zone and the village centers.  There was also a 
feeling in the village centers that the City did not meet its responsibilities when it was in 
charge of programs or needed to make investments or actions to support the 
Empowerment Zone.  The informants said that this was especially true of the public 
safety, housing demolition and redevelopment, and housing exterior repair programs: 
The Department of Housing and Community Development was doing 
what they call scattered-site demolitions, and you see it now.  You walk 
down a block and in the midst of it will be a clear lot where one house was 
in such disrepair that, under Mr. Henson [Commissioner of DHCD], they 
just took it out.  I think it finally came to everybody’s awareness that 
neither scattered-site renovation nor scattered-site demolition leads to big 
development or any development at all (Washington Village focus group 
2004). 
City politics also impacted the success of the village centers, especially on the 
East Side of Baltimore because, as one key informant reported, “East Side and West Side 
politics are a bit different.  East Side, they [the politicians] really control.  You have a 
small group controlling everything.  In West Baltimore, you have a lot of different 
groups” (2004).  The West Side village centers reported that City politics played a minor 
role in the creation and operation of the village centers with Harlem Park reporting the 
most cooperative relationship with local political leaders.  On the East Side, HEBCAC 
was in many ways a creation of the political power structure in that part of the City, and 
this benefited the Village Center in the form of both program funding and administrative 
support, especially in the early days of the Empowerment Zone,  However, with the 
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change in City administration in 1999, HEBCAC’s cooperative relationship with the City 
changed, and the City created a competing organization to manage its East Side 
redevelopment efforts.  One key informant reported,  
When Martin O’Malley was elected, HEBCAC leadership tried to meet 
him.  ‘Here is our plan, we want you to understand what our plan is, and 
we want you to be on board.’  He basically would refuse to meet . . . At 
that point, the City’s participation in everything we were doing 
disappeared.  We used to have weekly meetings with City agencies.  
Gone.  They just stopped meeting with us (HEBCAC Village Center focus 
group 2004). 
This termination of political support was in part due to conflict between the new 
Mayor and the East Side political establishment that had run its own candidate for Mayor.  
In a Baltimore Sun article on the resignation of Mike Seipp as HEBCAC Director, the 
Mayor “welcomed” his departure, and the City’s new Housing Director said, “This is not 
the Mike Seipp Community Action Coalition” (Siegel, 2000b).  The City targeted 
HEBCAC and its Director for removal in order to pursue and control its own major 
redevelopment effort in the community.  In doing so, the City benefited from divisions in 
the formerly coordinated East Side political system as new leaders sought to take control 
from the old guard.  These emerging younger leaders targeted delegate Hattie Harrison, 
the leading political supporter of HEBCAC, for removal. 
One key informant reported that the entire relationship among all of the village 
centers and the City changed after O’Malley’s election: “[Former Mayor] Schmoke 
assisted the Empowerment Zone because it was his baby.  O’Malley, he knew nothing 
about Empowerment.  O’Malley didn’t care about Empowerment” (EHVC focus group 
2004).  The O’Malley administration took a more centralized role than either of the two 
mayoral predecessors in City management.  Mayor Schaefer was a very strong leader, but 
he worked with and through community organizations throughout his political career.  
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Mayor Schmoke broadened the base of community organizations in the City to include 
new African-American organizations.  Mayor O’Malley created an Office of 
Neighborhoods, but the City was governed by a centralized, bureaucratic management 
system. 
Relationships with Other Stakeholders 
 In spite of the call for partnerships to be formed to facilitate the Empowerment 
Zone, few of the village centers had any large-scale interactions with other stakeholders 
in the City.  Only HEBCAC had any major external funding throughout the Village 
Center operating period.  It received program and operating support from the City, grants 
from major local foundations, and a large workforce grant from the federal government.  
East Harbor slowly built up its external funding and, by 2003, it began to receive 
substantial external funding to support the development of its new CDC.  In 2003, the 
East Harbor CDC received a $350,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services to redevelop an old City firehouse and a $50,000 grant from Hewlett-
Packard to develop a technology center in the firehouse.  In addition, the organization 
received $149,000 in federal and local grants to develop Individual Development 
Accounts.  The other village centers had only limited success in leveraging EBMC 
funding.  Both Washington Village and HEBCAC operated Main Street commercial 
redevelopment projects, and Washington Village began an effort to submit proposals for 
alternative funding in 2001.  The Poppleton Village Center received modest City and 
private support for its CDC, and Harlem Park received almost no external funding. 
 The village centers were supposed to be the sustainable portion of the City’s 
Empowerment Zone strategy.  They were supposed to continue after the federal money 
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was spent.  Despite this goal, one significant flaw in EBMC’s strategy was the failure to 
emphasize sustainability from the beginning.  According to the EBMC Action Item 
Review, the tracking report on progress toward attaining goals, EBMC did not begin 
discussions with the village centers and the Advisory Council until May 1999, and it did 
not form its Sustainability Committee until January 2001 (EBMC 2003).   
The City’s strong base of foundation support for community issues and advocacy 
was not brought in to support the village centers or their programs.  According to Ann 
Sherrill, the Director of the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative (BNC), an 
organization formed by the leading foundations in the City to support community 
development and neighborhood revitalization, “I think the assumption was that there was 
not a need for BNC to invest in community capacity-building in the Zone because of the 
federal dollars and other dollars that the Zone would leverage, and that there was an 
assumption that groups in the Zone would be getting funding from Empower Baltimore, 
and there wasn’t a need for the collaborative to invest in the Zone” (EBMC 2004, 322).  
As a result, the foundation community, whose efforts were coordinated by BNC, saw the 
Zone areas being helped by EBMC and used this as an opportunity to redirect their 
efforts to other communities.  Federal funding was actually seen as an excuse not to 
invest in the poor communities in the Zone.  Furthermore, no efforts were made to get the 
major businesses or foundations serving on the EBMC Board to invest in or assist the 
village centers, and the blue ribbon EBMC Board did little to force the City to work with 





Summary and Conclusion – Village Center Operational Period 
Five of the six village centers made it through the formal operational period of the 
EZ.  EBMC’s monitoring and evaluation systems discovered and remedied the misuse of 
funds, closed the Self-Motivated Village Center, and found and remedied poor fiscal 
management in the Poppleton Village Center before it became a problem.  All of the 
village centers were able to overcome internal barriers and adapt to the environment in 
which they operated in order to become functioning organizations.  There was a general 
consensus among the EBMC staff and Board members and other key informants 
interviewed that the Zone’s community capacity-building effort was most successful with 
the Washington Village and East Harbor village centers.  Both of these village centers 
formed strong organizations that not only delivered core EBMC services but also 
represented the needs of their communities and were able to attract outside support.  
HEBCAC was viewed as an important and potentially strong organization that needed to 
adapt to a changing political environment.  Poppleton and Harlem Park were viewed as 
organizations that would face challenges in attaining sustainability (Interviews EBMC 
Staff and Board 2004 and Clinch 2004a and b). 
The factors that contributed to village center success differed among village 
centers.  HEBCAC and East Harbor were both examples of staff-led organizations while 
Washington Village was a board-led organization.  Poppleton was a board-led 
organization, but a dominant member of the Board so monopolized the village center that 
it never developed a highly functioning staff or organization.  HEBCAC experienced 
problems in community mobilization because it was so large and was seen as dominated 
by a single institution, while Harlem Park never achieved a critical mass in its operations 
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because it was too small and had no institutional support.  Washington Village faced 
racial conflict and went on to form a successful organization serving a diverse population, 
while East Harbor overcame racial conflict only to become a successful organization 
serving primarily its African-American population.  Poppleton was never able to 
overcome its early racially driven conflicts.  All of the village centers suffered from low 
levels of community participation and poor outreach and communications. 
EBMC’s implementation strategy caused difficulties that affected village center 
operations and sustainability.  EBMC’s failed goal of spending the federal money in five 
years rushed the village center formation and operational process.  Numerous observers 
have likened EBMC as “running a sprint when community development requires a 
marathon. (Various interviews 2004)” EBMC’s centralized control over the strategic 
emphasis of the EZ effort forced the village centers into a centralized strategy.  As a 
result, the village centers were formed without having engaged in a localized process of 
setting their own agenda.  Both of these factors contributed to low levels of community 
mobilization and resident participation.   
EBMC provided technical assistance when requested, but did not take an active 
role in addressing problems in the village centers before they became critical.  EBMC 
and its staff recognized the difficulty of their community capacity-building efforts.  In a 
presentation to the EBMC Management Team, Robert Stoker, the local evaluator for the 
HUD Team, reported that he was astonished that EBMC stuck with the community 
capacity-building effort given the complexity, difficulty, and uncertainty associated with 
the task (EBMC 2004).  When asked to comment on the overall capacity-building effort, 
one EBMC Board member reported, “We started six village centers.  If four are 
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successful, we’re batting over .600, and I’ll take that” (EBMC Board and staff focus 
group 2004). 
Several core lessons from the Baltimore Empowerment Zone’s community 
capacity building efforts can be applied to other federal or philanthropic efforts.  The 
primary lesson is that fiscal and managerial accountability systems are essential in order 
to monitor progress and use of funds.  EBMC successfully used accountability systems to 
control and monitor village center operations and reduce opportunities for misuse of 
funds.  However, EBMC’s hands-off approach of waiting for the village centers to 
request help allowed some village centers, most importantly Harlem Park and Self 
Motivated, to fail.  Early and strong interventions could have assisted these organizations 
overcome their problems.  The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone also 
demonstrates the value of technical assistance, with the most successful village centers 
relying on internal or EBMC assistance to overcome problems.   
A new finding of this research is the community development momentum plays 
an important role in developing community organizations.  The successful village centers 
were able to play a positive role in community development projects while representing 
and defending the interests of residents.  The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone validates past research that leadership; community service area; board relations; and 
planning all contribute to the success of community change efforts. 
Village Center Sustainability Planning Period 
 EBMC administrative funding for village center operations was supposed to 
continue for five years.  As a result, administrative funding should have ended for the 
village centers in 2001 and 2002.  Just as this five-year funding period was ending for 
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some village centers, EBMC and its Board recognized that more time would be necessary 
to meet the goal of creating sustainable community development capacity in the form of 
the village centers.  In January 2001, EBMC replaced its Quality of Life/Community 
Capacity-Building Subcommittee with an ad hoc Sustainability Committee to explore 
sustainability options for the village centers.  In September 2001, the EBMC Board 
allocated an additional $1.5 million to support village center sustainability.  Each village 
center would receive funding if it achieved its administrative funding agreement goals, 
developed a sustainability plan, and received matching funds from other sources.  The 
village centers began to meet with this committee in December 2001.  Sustainability 
planning and support started that same month and continued through 2004, with most 
funding provided in 2004 and 2005.  During this period, an assessment of the overall 
status of the Empowerment Zone’s community capacity-building effort was conducted by 
the Jacob France Institute (Clinch 2004 a and b), and a detailed analysis of the 
sustainability issues for the five operating village centers was prepared for the EBMC by 
a consultant - NOMAGIC.  
At the end of the sustainability-planning period in 2004, East Harbor and 
Washington Village appeared to be well on their way toward sustainability.  HEBCAC 
and Poppleton were in the process of inserting themselves into neighborhood 
redevelopment efforts as a means of representing the needs of their respective 
communities.  It was determined that these two village centers could become sustainable 
to the extent they can provide the services needed to support these redevelopment efforts 
and that both could benefit from a strategic planning effort to redefine their missions in 
the context of ongoing redevelopment efforts.  Harlem Park achieved some programmatic 
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success and built a functioning organization.  However, the NOMAGIC (2004) 
assessment recommended merging of the Village Center with either the existing CDC or 
another community organization was the optimal strategy for Harlem Park sustainability.  
However, before this could be implemented, the Director and Chair of the Village Center 
were removed for (alleged) misuse of funds.  EBMC is now providing limited funding to 
the Harlem Park Revitalization Corporation to serve this community, and it continues 
some EZ programs and functions. 
A summary of the findings of the 2004 sustainability assessment of each of the 
village center follows (Clinch 2004a): 
East Harbor Village Center built a strong relationship with the lower-income residents 
targeted by the Village Center programs.  It had a clear programmatic mission, a track 
record of success in program implementation, and a strong management team.  It was 
highly viable in terms of near-term stability because it had financial reserves sufficient to 
support at least two more years of operations; it had established a CDC to provide future 
funding streams; and it had diverse  funding sources.  The Village Center was benefiting 
from the effects of positive momentum as development moved into the area from 
downtown.  Long-term sustainability will depend upon maintaining a positive role in 
serving as an intermediary between community residents and the development activity.   
Harlem Park/Lafayette Square had a moderate level of community engagement.  It had 
a mission statement and plan, but experienced ongoing difficulties in engaging its Board 
of Directors and facing competition from existing organizations serving the same 
community.  Harlem Park achieved positive programmatic outcomes, but the small size 
of the Village Center service area made achieving a sufficient scale of operations 
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difficult.  The Village Center had only one more year of operations funding available 
from EBMC, but remains almost entirely dependent upon EBMC funding.  The Harlem 
Park/Lafayette Square area was also adversely affected by the lack of a real economic 
driver to promote redevelopment in the area, and the Village Center lacked a strong 
institutional partner.  Given the lack of an economic driver, the lack of a potential 
institutional partner, and the nearly complete reliance on EBMC for funding support, the 
long-term sustainability of the organization is questionable.19   
Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC) had a head start 
over the other village centers because it was formed as part of a pre-existing organization, 
because it had the benefit of a strong institutional partner in Johns Hopkins and political 
ties to the East Side Democratic Organization.  The Village Center reported substantial 
early success in attracting programmatic funding from non-EBMC sources, and it was 
traditionally the least dependent upon EBMC funding.  However, the Village Center’s 
efforts were negatively impacted by the loss of a dynamic leader, employee turnover, and 
political conflict with the City.  Despite the clear community momentum building around 
the East Side redevelopment efforts, HEBCAC did not reap the organizational benefits 
that other Village Centers received from redevelopment.  This is because of the creation 
of a City-sponsored competitor organization, EBDI, which assumed some of HEBCAC’s 
core functions, most importantly in the area of housing development.  Nonetheless, 
HEBCAC had a strong record of success in program management implementation and 
the economic and political benefits of a strong institutional sponsor.  In order for the 
organization to continue, it must redefine its mission as it relates to EBDI and the East 
                                               




Side redevelopment.  In redefining its mission, the Village Center should recognize that 
the social service program delivery, community organizing, and land-use planning areas 
where HEBCAC was successful are still needed by the community and are fully 
compatible with and supportive of the goals for East Side redevelopment.  If HEBCAC 
can redefine its mission to focus on the services needed to support East Side 
redevelopment, and if the City can recognize the need for these services, HEBCAC will 
be a sustainable organization. 
The Village Center of Poppleton achieved a moderate and increasing level of 
community engagement as well as a moderate level of programmatic success.  The 
Village Center formed a CDC that completed three development projects and is planning 
new projects for the future; however, the Village Center remained highly dependent upon 
EBMC for core funding.  Poppleton sought out and achieved a high level of success in 
working with the University of Maryland, Baltimore (UMB) on supporting the 
development of the UMB Research Park.  It can achieve sustainability if it can link its 
efforts to this development project and play a supportive role in promoting 
redevelopment within its boundaries. 
Washington Village/Pigtown Neighborhood Planning Council achieved a high level 
of success in community outreach.  It was successful in implementing programs for 
workforce development, public safety, community clean-ups, and substance abuse.  The 
Village Center formed strong vertical linkages with community organizations and 
horizontal linkages with City agencies and service delivery organizations.  Washington 
Village operated a successful Main Street program.  It was in its seventh year of 
operations and had diversified its sources of funding, but still relied on EBMC for more 
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than half of its operational funding.  The Village Center has several factors that 
contribute to its long-term stability including a well-defined strategic plan, good real 
estate, community momentum, and an energized Board; however, employee turnover and 
job vacancies are a constraint.  The successful record of the organization in both service 
delivery and community outreach bodes well for the Village Center in terms of attracting 
new funding sources and maintaining stability. 
Current Status and Conditions 
As of the end of 2007, EBMC is continuing to operate as a much smaller, five-
person office.  Three of the original six village centers are operational with the same 
staff, functions, and programs: East Harbor, HEBCAC, and Washington Village.  The 
Poppleton Village Center was closed when the EBMC funding ran out in 2005, but the 
Poppleton CDC that was formed out of the Village Center continues to operate and has 
maintained the Village Center Board.  The CDC has also recreated some of the Village 
Center functions with funding from the community impact fund of the UMB BioPark.  
EBMC de-funded the Harlem Park Village Center in 2005 as a result of its discovery of 
misuse of funds by the Harlem Park Executive Director, possibly in collusion with the 
Chairperson of the Village Center Board.   
All of the federal funds have been spent or committed, but EBMC is continuing to 
operate based on residuals and the proceeds of loans and investments made in several 
large-scale redevelopment projects.  EBMC expects to operate for three to five more 
years until the money runs out.  EBMC is concentrating on continuing the workforce 
development and quality of life programs.  It does not provide operational support to the 
remaining village centers, but is providing funding for specific projects.  Spending on 
 
 357 
community capacity-building activities is currently about $500,000 per year, but is spread 
across a number of projects.  EBMC is funding a community organizer for both 
HEBCAC and East Harbor and a public safety program at Washington Village.  EBMC is 
also organizing the creation of a Technical Assistance Collaborative with CPHA to 
provide both ongoing support and technical assistance to the village centers.  EBMC is 
providing minimal technical assistance to the Harlem Park Redevelopment Corporation, a 
local CDC serving that community, to serve as the link between that community and the 
continuing Zone programs. 
Summary and Conclusion – The Community Capacity Building Experience 
Of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
The federal Empowerment Zone program may be viewed as a one-time event, and 
the substantial efforts made by Baltimore to develop local capacity may be considered a 
unique experience among the small set of federally designated Empowerment 
Zone/Enterprise Communities.  The lessons of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone can, 
however, be generalized to any place-based urban policy initiative implemented through 
community organizations.  It is especially relevant to those that attempt to build local 
community development capacity as a means of promoting community change.  The 
implementation of interventions through community-based organizations is a recurrent 
theme in both federal and foundation urban policy efforts.  There is rich literature on both 
the role and importance of communities and community organizations in urban policy.  
As a result of devolution and reductions in federal funding, nonprofit organizations have 
been called on to take an increasingly active role in the implementation of social and 




 Replacing the fragmented implementation of national people-based policies, 
such as welfare or job training, with coordinated neighborhood services; 
 Improving the delivery of services by involving the community and 
stakeholders in the design and delivery of social services;  
 Leveraging declining federal funding for poverty alleviation and other social 
programs with local and foundation support; and  
 Building a more “civil society” and expanding “social capital” through 
community engagement (Poole & Colby 2002). 
 All of these factors were evident in Baltimore’s community-driven EZ approach.  
Village centers provided integrated services that cut across various programmatic 
categories.  The village centers linked diverse programs such as workforce development, 
substance abuse counseling, projects promoting community development, home 
ownership and crime prevention.  Village centers also sought to improve service delivery 
by involving the community in planning and implementing EZ programs.  Community 
residents were hired to staff key programs and were engaged in village center planning 
and governance.  The successful village centers were able to leverage EZ funding with 
City, State, federal, and foundation funding.  The Baltimore EZ made it a core goal to 
build social capital by creating new, resident-driven community organizations outside of 
the existing power structure, which was seen as non-responsive to the poor and African-
American residents of EZ communities. 
All of the village centers were able to implement programs to achieve the EZ/EC 
initiative’s four goals of creating economic opportunity, sustainable community 
development, community-based partnerships, and a strategic and comprehensive vision 
for change.  The village centers promoted economic opportunity through workforce and 
economic development programs.  They supported sustainable community development 
by organizing and engaging residents in development activities and implementing 
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housing, crime, and other community programs.  The village centers were organized as 
community-based partnerships with a strategic and comprehensive vision for change 
though their land use and strategic plans, most of which are still guiding development in 
their communities today.  Thus, Baltimore’s EZ effort can be judged a success in 
promoting the core goals of the federal EZ/EC program. 
The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone and the central emphasis it 
placed on building and delivering services through community organizations is an 
important case study for community capacity-building.  It tied together federal urban 
policy, community organizations and capacity issues, and the performance and impact of 
CCIs, and it tested the arguments for and against expanding the role of community-based 
organizations. 
The expanding role of community-based organizations was documented by the 
National Congress for Community Economic Development (1991, 1995, 1999, 2004) and 
analyzed by numerous urban scholars (Vidal 1995; Gittell & Vidal 1998; Halpern 1995; 
Keating, Krumholz, & Star 1996; Rubin H. 1993, 1994, 1995, 2000; Von Hoffman 2003).  
Community based organizations’ role and performance were critiqued (Lehman 1994; 
Stoecker 1997, 2003, 2005), and the causes of organizational successes and failures have 
been analyzed (Cowan, Rohe, & Baku 1999; Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas 2003).  This 
dissertation contributes to this base of literature on the roles of CBOs as well as the 
factors influencing their successes in urban policy and service delivery.  
Beginning in the 1990s, national and local foundations recognized the potential 
and increased the importance of community organizations, and they began CCIs to assist 
and strengthen existing community organizations or form new ones to encourage 
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community change efforts.  Few good evaluations of the experiences of CCIs exist, but 
the most recent national study of CCIs concluded, “The enduring aspects of CCIs seems 
to be not the initiatives themselves but the capacity for change that they build, the 
connections they forge among people and organizations, the broad strategic principles 
that they promote, and the opportunities for knowledge that they provide” (Kubisch et al. 
2002, 8).  The national EZ/EC initiative was likened to a CCI (Walsh 1997; Gittell & 
Vidal 1998; Gittell et al. 2001), and, among the EZ cities, Baltimore was both structured 
like a CCI and recognized as the most community-driven.  The successes and failures of 
Baltimore’s efforts in leaving behind capacity for change in the form of village centers 
can inform future CCIs and community change efforts. 
As a result of the growth in the role of community organizations, the rise of CCIs, 
and the establishment of federal Empowerment Zones, Kingsley, McNeely, & Gibson 
(1997) reported that “community building is coming of age.”  Clavel, Pitt, & Yin (1997) 
called for a “community option” in public policy.  The community-driven 
implementation strategy of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, a well-funded, long-term 
effort in a City with a strong history of community organization involvement, provides an 
excellent case study of the potential role of community organizations in urban policy.  
Robert Stoker (2003) viewed Baltimore’s EZ experience as a policy innovation, the 
success of which rested on the survival of the village centers.  This dissertation tests 
Stokers criteria for success and provides a useful analysis of efforts to build community 
development capacity to implement community change at the neighborhood level.   
Overall, the community capacity-building experience of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone demonstrated both the challenges and opportunities of community-
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driven urban policy interventions.  The Baltimore Empowerment Zone succeeded in 
creating and supporting five of the six targeted village centers over the decade long 
implementation period.  As its legacy, it left behind four organizations, three of the 
original village centers and a successor CDC, to continue its work.  These organizations 
continue to represent their communities as Baltimore’s downtown renaissance moves 
outward into new communities as well as deliver services needed and desired by their 
communities.  According to an interview with Diane Bell (2006), one of the most 
important successes of the Empowerment Zone was the creation and role of the village 
centers as representatives of their communities in the redevelopment process.   
Traditionally, as neighborhoods are redeveloped, they become gentrified and local 
residents are displaced.  Through home-ownership programs and advocacy, the village 
centers were able to ensure that each community’s residents shared in the benefits from 
redevelopment.  The failure of two village centers was almost inevitable in an 
undertaking as complex as community building.  In addition, the fact that the financial 
improprieties that led to the ultimate closure of Self-Motivated and Harlem Park were 
discovered very quickly indicate that federal and outside funds can be effectively 
monitored. 
This dissertation set out to answer the question: Can a federal policy which links 
the long-term provision of discretionary federal resources for the creation of new or 
expansion of existing community-based organizations result in the development of 
sustainable organizations which are effecting positive change?  The short answer to this 
question is maybe, but with much difficulty and great chance of failure.  The Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone created five new (and supported the expansion of one existing) 
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community organizations.  Five of the six village centers operated throughout the core EZ 
implementation period from 1996 through 2004.  Four of the six village centers proved 
themselves to be sustainable in some form.  Two, East Harbor and Washington Village, 
achieved a high level of programmatic success, were recognized as leading CBOs in the 
City, and continue to operate with only modest EBMC support; and both attracted new 
programs and resources to support operations.  HEBCAC was able to redefine its mission 
and continues to serve the community despite its loss of political favor.  It provides 
needed services with little EBMC support.  The Poppleton CDC, formed out of the 
Village Center with EBMC support, reconstituted the old Village Center Board to direct 
the use of community impact funding it received from the UMB BioPark, an investment 
itself stimulated and supported by the EZ effort.  It became a successful CDC with 
participation in three large-scale redevelopment deals.  All of the Village Centers 
contributed to positive change in their communities by implementing job training, 
housing, crime, and other EBMC programs, and four continue to effect positive change 
through their own programs.  Many of these programs continue today, and new services 
have been developed in four of the six targeted communities.   
This dissertation set out to address two related research questions: (1) What 
internal–(community) factors influenced the development of community development 
capacity? and (2) What external (political, policy, social, and economic) factors 
influenced the development of community development capacity?  It is in addressing these 
two questions that this dissertation contributes to the growing base of literature on the 
factors that impact the success or failure of community organizations. 
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The community capacity-building effort of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
succeeded where it should have failed for all of the right reasons.  The two most 
successful village centers, East Harbor and Washington Village, were in racially and 
socially diverse communities in the path of redevelopment.  Community building is far 
more difficult in diverse communities (Haeberle 1986), and cities and developers do not 
want to have to deal with community organizations as they redevelop an area (Stone 
1989).  Nevertheless, each village center was able to overcome initial conflicts to build a 
strong organization, and each was able to deliver services and represent its community.  
In the case of East Harbor, success was attributed to strong and dedicated leaders 
supported by EBMC.  In Washington Village, success was attributed to strong board 
leadership and good staff that were able to identify and meet the needs of the community.  
The lessons from these village centers are that leadership and community momentum 
matter. 
The community capacity building-effort of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
failed where it should have failed for the right reasons.  Chaskin et al. (2001) and 
Glickman & Servon (1998) discussed the importance of leaders in community 
organizations, and Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas (2003) analyzed the impact of the loss of 
leaders on community organizations.  Self-Motivated was never able to overcome the 
loss of its leader who formed the organization and became mired in internal conflict.  
EBMC learned a lesson from this and strengthened its technical assistance capabilities.  
Harlem Park was weakly led at the staff and board level, having also suffered the loss of 
an early leader, and it served a community that was too small and had no economic 
drivers (Haeberle 1986).  It competently delivered EBMC services, and was one of the 
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most successful workforce development providers; but never formed a strong, capable, 
community-led organization.  This was in part due to: poor leadership; the lack of 
development opportunities; the lack of supporting institutions; the failure to engage the 
community; and a history of fifty years of failed redevelopment efforts.  The lessons of 
Harlem Park and Self- Motivated were that overcoming conflict is a key barrier to 
community capacity-building and that good leadership is a prerequisite for success.  Both 
cases also demonstrate that history matters: Harlem Park was a failed urban renewal 
effort, and Self-Motivated was home to the locally discredited Sandtown-Winchester 
CCI. 
In the cases of both HEBCAC and Poppleton, the results of the Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone were mixed.  The lesson from of HEBCAC was very clear: politics 
matter.  It went from being a well-funded, nationally recognized best practice in 
community capacity-building to needing to find a new basic mission overnight as a result 
of the election of a new Mayor and divisions within the East Side Democratic 
Organization that formed it.  That HEBCAC continues and has found a new niche in 
social service delivery alongside the Mayor’s East Baltimore redevelopment effort is a 
testament to the resilience of strong community organizations.  That EBMC technical and 
financial assistance supported HEBCAC is a testament that community capacity-building 
efforts can sustain and strengthen existing organizations. 
Poppleton, in a way, was an example of accidental success.  As a Village Center, 
Poppleton was a failure.  It experienced programmatic and administrative problems from 
the start and was never able to get past the initial conflicts over its formation and engage 
the entire community.  It suffered from the dominance of a strong leader who seemed not 
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to share the vision of Baltimore’s EZ effort and had an adversarial relationship with 
EBMC.  However, under this person’s leadership, the Village Center created, with 
EBMC support, a CDC that became involved in several redevelopment projects.  In 
addition, the Village Center Board was able to work with UMB to facilitate a 
transformational redevelopment project in the community, the UMB BioPark.  This CDC 
is now playing a similar role with the proposed La Cité residential development.  In the 
case of Poppleton, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone left behind enhanced community 
capacity, but not in the form it desired.  Despite the failure of the Village Center, the 
Poppleton CDC enjoyed the support of the community’s leadership, negotiated on behalf 
of the community for the UMB and La Cité projects, and applied for and received 
community impact funding from the UMB BioPark.  Poppleton was an example of the 
complexities of community building.  EBMC incubated the development of community 
capacity in the CDC as a byproduct of its core capacity-building effort to form the 
Village Center, which failed.   
After the conclusion of the ten-year federally-funded Empowerment Zone effort, 
EBMC is continuing on a smaller scale, until all funding is exhausted.  The EBMC 
community capacity-building legacy is the creation and sustained operation of three of 
the six village centers that it started and the creation of a CDC formed out of the 
Poppleton Village Center.  This survival rate is consistent with the experience of CCIs 
and other community capacity-building efforts. 
 In an overall evaluation of the extent to which the federal EZ/EC Initiative 
achieved its goal of promoting redevelopment through increased citizen participation 
through community organization, Gittell et al. (2001) concludes that the EZ program has 
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fallen far short of its stated goals.  The study found that despite varying successes in 
maintaining citizen participation in the implementation of EZ programs, none of the six 
EZs succeeded in creating governance structures that included citizen participation.  It 
also found that the traditional closed political structure of City politics deterred efforts to 
expand citizen participation.  Gittell et al. (2001) noted that the federal mandate for 
citizen participation that guided the EZ application process was abandoned in 
implementation and that the broadening of the concept of community capacity-building 
by the inclusion of CBOs was summarily abandoned (97-100). 
Robert Stoker, the local evaluator for the HUD-sponsored EZ/EC Evaluation, 
differs with Gittell et al.  He concludes that governance in all six EZs emphasized 
community participation, and that “In comparison to other Empowerment Zones, 
Baltimore has sponsored more community-based organizations and given them more 
responsibility for delivering services to Zone residents” (Stoker 2004).  He observes that 
Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone strategy represents a policy innovation, and he believes 
that the success of this innovation is made manifest in the survival of the village centers 
after the end of EBMC funding. 
Stoker’s analysis is consistent with Gittell et al.’s overall finding that governance 
of the EZs was dominated by the governing political, business, and foundation elite in the 
EZ cities.  In Baltimore, overall EZ strategy was nearly entirely set by the EBMC Board, 
which was controlled by downtown business, foundation, and political interests; 
however, the village centers were represented on the Board and did have a voice in 
shaping overall policy.  The village centers and residents had only an advice and consent 
role through the Advisory Council.   
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This dissertation contradicts Gittell et al.’s finding that citizen participation and 
CBO involvement was abandoned by all EZ cities.  At least in Baltimore, CBOs in the 
form of village centers played a central role in program implementation.  With 
Baltimore’s EZ effort structured like a CCI, with EBMC as the organizer and funder, the 
village centers needed to function within guidelines and deliver programs and services 
designed, funded, and controlled by an oversight agency.  The three successful village 
centers were able to leverage EZ funding and programs to attract new programs desired 
by their residents and boards.  A fourth organization spun out of the village centers, the 
Poppleton CDC, has become involved in three major redevelopment projects and met the 
goal of its founder and Board to engage the African-American community in the 
redevelopment process.  In Baltimore, CBO involvement was not abandoned.  CBOs 
were not only involved, they were created and strengthened by the EZ effort. 
This analysis tests Stoker’s hypothesis that the success of the innovative capacity-
building strategy adopted by the Baltimore Empowerment Zone rests with the survival of 
the village centers.  Three of the six village centers are operational and not dependent 
upon EBMC funding, and the Poppleton CDC is in a strong position to participate in 
several redevelopment efforts in its community.  The 50%-66% survival rate of 
Baltimore’s village centers points to the complexity and difficulty involved in building 
community capacity.  The experience of this capacity-building effort tests the feasibility 
of the “community option” in urban policy and can inform future capacity-building 





Thoughts on the Impact of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone and Future Areas of 
Research 
 These case studies explored the factors that contributed to the success or failure of 
the community capacity-building effort in Baltimore.  This analysis assumed the 
continued operation and survival of the community organization as the core measure of 
success.  If a community organization has the capacity and ability to effect positive 
change in a community, it will be able to garner the support of the key urban policy 
stakeholders, such as city, state, and federal agencies, foundations, and businesses.  
Future research should develop a means of defining and measuring what capacity is and 
how it contributes to the vitality of a community.   
 These case studies do not explore the issue of how the capacity of community 
organizations impacts the actual redevelopment or vitality of a targeted community.  
Apart from the difficulties involved in even defining vitality or redevelopment, it is 
nearly impossible to isolate the presumably small impact of a community organization in 
the context of the broader regional, national, and even international trends impacting 
urban communities.  Future research, however, could analyze the impact of community 
capacity on neighborhood change. 
 My review of the literature found that there is no “scientific” means of measuring 
the capacity of a community organization or to isolate the impact of the organization 
from the other larger influences on community vitality; however, the experience of the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone can shed some light on these issues.   The three village 
centers that had either a strong board (Washington Village), a strong staff (East Harbor), 
or both (HEBCAC) had higher capacity in terms of financial, staff, and network 
resources to utilize in community change efforts.  In my opinion, these stronger village 
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centers were able to facilitate revitalization efforts in their communities but not, by 
themselves alone, bring about revitalization.  To me, the strongest impact of these 
organizations may have been their ability to assist residents in benefiting from 
redevelopment.  In the case of East Harbor, the Village Center was able to lobby to 
ensure that local residents were able to return to the HOPE VI redevelopments occurring.  
In the case of Washington Village, the large number of residents participating in the 
home ownership program gave them a stake in gentrification. 
 It is more difficult to assess the impact of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone and 
the village centers on the lives of Zone residents and social environment in the targeted 
communities.  Census data are unavailable for the start (1995) and end (2005) years of 
the EZ effort and, even if available, do not measure individual benefits.  According to a 
review of the EBMC evaluation materials prepared over the decade-long implementation 
of the EZ program (Jacob France Institute 2005), the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
created 5,777 and retained 826 jobs in the Zone.20  According to Jacob France Institute 
(2005b), 7,007 residents (13% of total 2000 Zone residents) registered with a village 
center run career center, and 3,159 were either placed in a job or received training. (10% 
of the working age population) were placed in a job or received training.  Annual 
earnings gains ranged from $2,948 for a person placed in a job to more than $6,000 for 
the 1,425 residents who received customized training.  Clearly, some of these residents 
would have participated in other City or State workforce programs, but the localized 
workforce development program made it easy to serve residents and is likely to have 
improved participation.  As described in Chapter 4, crime rates in the Zone fell by 56% 
compared to a 38% decline citywide, and 813 households were able to purchase a home 
                                               
20 Job creation is for the whole Empowerment Zone, including the industrial Fairfield area. 
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through the Housing Venture Fund (Clinch 2005, 21-30).   See the Epilogue for a 
discussion of the overall impact of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone.   
 The Baltimore Empowerment Zone emphasized job creation, workforce 
development, crime prevention, and home ownership, and the village centers were in 
charge of implementing the last three.  While it is impossible to determine how much of 
these program outcomes would have happened without the Empowerment Zone, it is 
clear that the job creation, workforce, crime, and housing programs made some 
contribution to the individual and community quality of life.  In my opinion, the stronger 
village centers (East Harbor, HEBCAC, and Washington Village) generally had stronger 
participation in and outcomes from these programs. 
As described by Gittell & Vidal (1998), poorer communities tend to have lower 
levels of local leadership and fewer organizational resources.  By leaving behind four 
organizations to organize and protect community interests, the Baltimore Empowerment 
Zone added to the stock of social capital in these communities and, in the case of both 





The Impact of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone on Baltimore City 
 
 This dissertation focused narrowly on the question of whether a federal policy 
intervention can create sustainable community development capacity based on an 
analysis of the experience of the Clinton administration’s EZ/EC Initiative in Baltimore 
City.  As a final analysis in this dissertation, one committee member posed the following 
questions: 
 Was the Empowerment Zone “worth it” to Baltimore? 
 Was the money well spent? 
 Did it have the desired impact on the City and the targeted poor communities? 
 Should the federal government try these comprehensive, place-based strategies in 
the future? 
 
This Epilogue will address these questions from the perspective both of a researcher 
involved in Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone effort for the past five years and as a student 
who has conducted this detailed assessment of the village centers.   
 Answering these questions could be another dissertation in itself, so this Epilogue 
will, of necessity be, brief, high level, and based in large part on the author’s opinions.  
However, this high level analysis can be viewed as valid for two reasons.  The first is that 
because Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone effort employed the village centers studied in 
detail in this dissertation to deliver its workforce, social and community development 
programs, the author is in good position to discuss the overall results of these efforts.  
Only the economic and business development programs were delivered in a centralized 
manner by EBMC and these only accounted for 20% of total Empowerment Zone 
spending.  The second is that the author has been engaged by the EBMC to produce 
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evaluation reports in several of the core programmatic areas – including workforce 
development (the largest program) and economic development (Jacob France Center 
2005 a and b).   
 The answers to each of these questions follow. 
“Was it worth it?” 
As described in Chapter 1, the federal EZ/EC initiative was based on four 
fundamental principles: economic opportunity, sustainable community development, 
community-based partnerships, and a strategic and comprehensive vision for change 
(Gittell & Vidal 1998).  The efforts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone met each of 
these the four goals.  It created economic opportunity through successful economic and 
workforce development programs.  It created community-based partnerships in the form 
of village centers, five of which operated over the entire ten-year period.  It left behind 
sustainable community development capacity in four of the six targeted communities 
where the original village centers or successor organizations continue to operate as of the 
beginning of 2008.  Finally, both EBMC and the village centers operated with a clear and 
formal strategic and comprehensive vision for change.  A program that meets its stated 
goals can clearly be viewed as worth it.  The results of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 
in each of these areas are discussed in more detail below. 
In Baltimore, the EZ created economic opportunity by supporting and investing in 
economic development to create jobs in the targeted communities and by providing 
workforce development programs to assist residents find jobs.  As described earlier, there 
have been few ex post evaluations of the overall federal EZ/EC effort.  The 2001 HUD 
Interim Assessment of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC) 
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Program: A Progress Report evaluated the performance of the six urban Empowerment 
Zones and twelve of the Enterprise Communities at the mid point of the ten year effort, 
but HUD has never published a final evaluation.  This report is the only national HUD 
evaluation of the program and only contains information on the first five years of the 
program.  The Interim Assessment Report analyzed the performance of the EZ and 
selected EC communities in employment growth, their strategic vision for change, 
economic development, workforce development, and community capacity building.  
According to the Interim Assessment report, as of the mid-point of the ten-year 
implementation period, Baltimore experienced the following major selected changes: 
 Between 1995 and 2000, employment in Baltimore’s Empowerment Zone grew 
31% from 53,200 to 69,770.  This was the most rapid employment growth of any 
of the EZ communities.  Employment in Baltimore’s EZ grew more rapidly than 
in the contiguous and comparison areas selected in the Interim Report’s 
evaluation; 
 Baltimore was one of three EZ’s where Zone business’ employment of Zone 
residents more than doubled in the first five years of the effort; 
 Baltimore was one of four EZ’s where the number of businesses owned by Zone 
residents doubled; and 
 The Interim Report did not provide quantitative measures for economic 
opportunity or workforce development, but cited the Baltimore EZ as being 
successful in integrating social services with workforce development and 
workforce development with the larger regional economy through its reverse 
commuting program (originated by HEBCAC and expanded to serve the larger 
EZ by EBMC). 
In 2006, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO 2006) published an 
evaluation of some of the demographic, economic, and social changes occurring in 
thirteen EZ and EC communities.  This report found that the number of business 
establishments in the Baltimore Zone fell, but in-Zone employment increased by 5,667.   
In addition to the analyses of the community capacity building efforts of the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone described in Chapters Four and Five (Clinch 2004a and 
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2004b), the author directed two reports cumulating available reports and data on the 
various impacts of EBMC and the Empowerment Zone (Jacob France Institute 2005a and 
2005b).  The Job Creation Impacts of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone 1994-2004 
report (Jacob France Institute 2005a) analyzed available information on the impacts of 
EBMC’s business development efforts.  Some of the selected findings of this analysis are 
as follows: 
 Overall the tracking system maintained by EBMC on its economic development 
programs identified 5,777 jobs created or maintained by assisted businesses; 
 EBMC business development loans of $16.3 million leveraged or supported 109 
projects with total project costs of $105.9 million that retained 826 and created 
1,729 jobs.  The repayment of these loans is supporting EBMC’s continued 
operations; 
 EBMC brought the Main Street commercial revitalization program into the City, 
and supported the development of two designated Main Street areas in the Zone 
that created 206 jobs through 55 business starts, relocations or expansions and 
funded 88 façade renovations;  
 EBMC provided funding and technical assistance to form CDCs in four of the 
Village Centers, and two of these CDCs, East Harbor and Poppleton, are quite 
active in redevelopment efforts in their communities; and 
 EBMC provided funding, political support, and community outreach for several 
major reinvestments now occurring in parts of the Zone, most importantly the 
Montgomery Business Park, the UMB BioPark, and East Baltimore Development 
Inc.  
Based on these evaluation materials, the Baltimore EZ appears to have created, or 
at least facilitated, economic opportunity through its economic development programs; 
however, as with many economic development programs, it is impossible to know the 
role that EBMC’s efforts truly played in many of these projects.  Presumably, many of 
these deals would have happened without EBMC funding or assistance.  However, based 
on interviews with the developers for many of the EBMC assisted projects, and all of the 
major projects, EBMC provided early financial and political support considered to be 
important in catalyzing these investments.  EBMC also required that the developers of 
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these efforts work with and through the village centers, giving the communities both a 
say and stake in these projects.  Both the East Harbor and Poppleton CDCs were brought 
in to participate in redevelopment projects in their communities, providing revenues to 
support their community development efforts.  The cooperation between the village 
centers and the development community also yielded programmatic benefits, as many of 
the graduates of EBMC funded and village center provided workforce training found 
employment in EBMC funded projects.  Thus, on balance, it appears that the Baltimore 
EZ’s economic development programs successfully created economic opportunities in the 
target communities.   
The Baltimore EZ played an even more important role in creating economic 
opportunity through its workforce development programs, which were the largest 
programmatic emphasis in Baltimore.  The Review and Synthesis of EBMC Evaluation 
Materials report (Jacob France Institute 2005b) analyzed available information on the 
various programs implemented by the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, with an emphasis 
on its workforce development programs.  In the area of workforce development, a total of 
7,007 Empowerment Zone residents received workforce services from a Village Center 
Career Center.  This amounts to 13% of the total number of 54,012 Empowerment Zone 
residents as of the 2000 Census and 22% of residents of working age (18-64).  However, 
not all persons that visited a Career Center received placement or training services.  Of 
the 7,007 residents that signed up at an EBMC Career Center, 3,159 were either placed in 
a job or received training.  This accounts for 10% of the EZ’s working age population 
and 6% of the EZ’s total population.  A total of 2,587 Zone residents were referred to a 
job or directly hired by an employer working with the Zone’s workforce programs, 253 
 
 376 
received occupational skills training, and 319 received customized skills training.  Thus, 
a large percentage of Zone residents participated in EZ workforce programs.   
Jacob France Institute evaluations found that residents placed in a job experienced 
a $737, 42% increase in quarterly earnings, those receiving occupational skills training 
experienced a $1,341, 76% increase in quarterly earnings, and those receiving customized 
training received a $1,515, 83% increase in earnings.  These results were comparable to 
other City and national programs.  Furthermore, because the EBMC funded workforce 
programs provided stipends for training program participants, they were able to serve 
many of the poor community residents unable to participate in existing City and state 
workforce programs. 
One of the other key successes of the Baltimore’s EZ workforce program 
identified in the research conducted for this dissertation and recognized in several of the 
EZ/EC Initiative analyses, is the integration of workforce development with other social 
services.  Unfortunately, the EBMC evaluation materials did not track referrals of 
residents served between programs.  Anecdotal information, however, suggests that the 
combination of the delivery of workforce development and other social services in a 
single office community setting led to a greater ability to provide integrated services than 
the fragmented, people-based approach implemented by separate City and State 
bureaucracies.  All of the village center leaders interviewed or participating in the focus 
groups discussed their ability to find and help persons in need in their own communities 
as a core value of the community-driven implementation approach.  Representatives from 
HEBCAC and Washington Village in particular discussed how they referred the 
graduates of drug treatment or persons identified in public safety programs into their 
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workforce development programs.  Washington Village even referred some graduates of 
its workforce development program into their home-ownership program. 
The EZ created sustainable community development and community-based 
partnerships by leaving behind four community-based and community run organizations 
that continue to represent and provide services to their communities.  These four village 
centers or successor organizations themselves are important remaining impacts of the EZ 
effort and continue to operate and represent their communities as redevelopment efforts 
are moving into these areas.  East Harbor has played an important role in supporting 
several HOPE VI projects in East Baltimore where they succeeding in advocating on 
behalf of current residents, many of whom have been able to return to newly constructed 
housing units.  Poppleton CDC was able to negotiate similar rights of return for the 
planned La Cite’ redevelopment, participated in the redevelopment of the Parren Mitchell 
building, and has applied for and received funding from the UMB BioPark community 
impact program.  One of Washington Village’s proudest achievements is its role in 
representing and protecting resident interests in that community’s ongoing 
redevelopment.   
Finally, the Baltimore EZ had a strategic and comprehensive vision for change by 
developing and implementing a clear strategic plan and vision at both the overall EBMC 
level and in each of the six communities.  The land use and operational plans developed 
by the village centers continue to guide efforts in each of the communities today. 
 “Was the money well spent?” 
As described above, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone succeeded in developing 
and delivering programs that met the stated goals of the federal EZ/EC Initiative as well 
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as the goals established in the City’s own plans.  The program provided needed services 
to the residents and achieved results in its major programmatic emphasis, workforce 
development, comparable to City and state programs, while targeting a quite poor 
population.  It fostered and supported the development of organizations and programs in 
four communities that continue to operate, and have, thus, passed the market test of 
sustainability.   
EBMC implemented formal performance reporting requirements for the village 
centers as part the funding mechanisms put in place.  This system forced the village 
centers to be accountable to EBMC.  Where problems occurred, EBMC provided 
technical assistance to the village centers and to the workforce development and other 
programs.  EBMC also tracked and annually reported on its own performance, both to its 
Board and to the City – though an annual President’s Report, and to the federal 
government, through the formal HUD performance and evaluation system.  EBMC 
required formal audits of the village centers and found and remedied fiscal problems 
where they occurred.  This reduced opportunities for fraud and misuse of funds, and 
EBMC found and closed the two village centers where fraud occurred and remedied poor 
financial reporting at a third.  Thus, it appears that the money was well spent, on 
programs consistent with the goals of the initiative, with formal accountability, and 
financial controls that found and remedied problems. 
“Did it have the desired impact on the City and the targeted poor communities?”   
The answer to the question is more complex.  If the desired policy impact is to 
fundamentally change poor communities into non-poor communities, then the answer is 
no.  However, in light of the small amount of money committed relative to the larger 
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governmental budgets or economic forces impacting urban communities, this goal of 
fundamental change in the targeted communities is probably unrealistic.  If one accepts a 
more modest impact, of providing needed services, assisting communities in need, and 
facilitating community participation in and benefits from redevelopment activities, than 
the EZ effort can be viewed as a success. 
Some of the programmatic outcomes of the EZ effort on positive impacts on the 
City and Zone are described in the Review and Synthesis report (Jacob France Institute 
2005b), which cumulates and describes some of the impacts of the Baltimore EZ effort.  
In addition to the economic and workforce development outcomes described above, the 
Baltimore Empowerment Zone reported other programmatic successes consistent with its 
goals of creating communities of choice in the six targeted communities.  EBMC 
implemented four public safety programs, and several village centers, HEBCAC and 
Washington Village, were able to attract other City, State or federal anti-crime program 
funding.  Overall crime in the Zone fell by 56% in the EZ compared to 38% in the City.  
This reduction in crime was identified as a core impact of the program by Diane Bell 
(2004, 2006) and the EBMC Board (2004).  An analysis of housing sales in the Zone for 
the 1996-2000 period analyzed housing sales transactions in the village center service 
areas.  This analysis identified a total of 1,361 sales for owner occupancy (as opposed to 
3,375 sales for investors interested in flipping the property).  Of the 1,361 owner-
occupied purchases, 710 purchases or 51% of the total were made through the EBMC 
Housing Venture Fund.  By 2002, the number of Housing Venture Fund purchases had 
increased to 813.  The majority of Housing Venture Fund purchases occurred in 
Washington Village (324), Self-Motivated (142) and Poppleton (140).  In the case of 
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Washington Village, and to a lesser extent in Poppleton, the Housing Venture Fund 
enabled many long-term residents to purchase homes in a rapidly gentrifying community, 
thereby reducing resident displacement.  Thus, the EZ effort contributed to a decline in 
crime and promotion of home ownership in the targeted communities.   
However, two national studies question the impact of the EZ/EC Initiative in 
Baltimore and nationally.  The 2006 U.S. Government Accountability Office evaluation 
report attempted to evaluate the demographic, economic, and social changes occurring in 
thirteen EZ and EC communities.  In Baltimore, this report found that:  
 The percentage of EZ residents living in poverty fell from 41.8% to 35.6%, falling 
more rapidly than comparison census tracts; and 
 The unemployment rate increased, but less rapidly than comparison census tracts. 
This report found that improvements in poverty, unemployment and economic growth 
occurred in the EZ communities analyzed, but that these improvements could not be 
definitively or statistically linked to the EZ Initiative  (GAO, 2006, p.5).   
There has been a single published article that quantitatively analyzes the impact of 
the EZ/EC Initiative across the different jurisdictions identified by the author.  Oakley & 
Tsao (2006) analyzed the changes in 1990 and 2000 census data for core demographic 
variables for the six urban Empowerment Zones.  According to this analysis, the poverty 
rate decreased and incomes increased in the Baltimore Empowerment Zone, but not by a 
statistically significant difference when compared to similar comparison tracts.  Oakley 
and Tsao (2007) reach a quite negative conclusion about the overall impact of the EZ/EC 
initiative and conclude that the results are unimpressive, not linked to the level of 
funding, and similar to changes in comparison communities.  They end their article by 
stating, “What we can state more definitely is that the Empowerment Zone was no 
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panacea to tackling urban distress, and certainly was not as innovative a policy as the 
initial rhetoric indicated 446-7).” 
The existent national evaluation material, the GAO report and Oakley and Tsao 
article, both conclude that the positive impacts of the Empowerment Zone effort, in 
Baltimore and across the various sites, were minor and not statistically significant when 
compared to comparison tracts or relative to funding levels.  Based on these two analyses 
it would seem fair to conclude that the EZ/EC Initiative was a failure, and not worth the 
resources committed.   
This would be a false conclusion based on incomplete data.  There are no 
available pre and post Empowerment Zone data on demographic, economic or social 
conditions in the EZ communities.  As a result, the two analyses above are forced to rely 
on 1990 and 2000 census data.  The EZ/EC Initiative began between these two years, and 
programmatic funding, at least in Baltimore, did not begin in any significant way until 
1998.  Thus, these evaluations are based on only one to two years of programmatic effort.  
As described above, based on evaluation materials prepared for EBMC, there is reason to 
think that a later analysis, when 2010 Census data become available, may yield more 
positive results.  
As described in Chapter 2, there is a lack of good, quantitative evaluation data on 
government or philanthropically implemented community change efforts.  It is almost 
impossible to separate the impacts of any community initiative from the influence of 
much larger and stronger national, and even international, demographic, economic and 
social changes.  Moreover, the size of most community change efforts is quite small in 
comparison to government or even philanthropic expenditures in a city and is dwarfed by 
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broader economic trends and flows.  The seemingly large EZ budget of $100 million 
dollars, or $10 million per year, is in fact quite small in light of Baltimore City’s annual 
budget of approximately $2 billion.  To put the $100 million EZ budget in context, the 
Zone’s 2000 population was 54,000 and dividing the $10 million annual budget by the 
Zone population equals $185 per person per year.  The first two buildings of the UMB 
BioPark cost more than $102 million to develop.  While $100 million seems a great deal 
of money, it is small relative to need and economic forces.  Thus, it is impossible to 
expect any effort to completely change any targeted community.  The EZ effort, however, 
did succeed in the mode modest goal of provided needed and integrated services in areas 
of need and providing residents with both a voice and stake in redevelopment. 
“Should the federal government try these comprehensive, place-based strategies in the 
future?” 
This question also requires a more complex answer.  This dissertation 
demonstrates that community capacity to implement comprehensive community change 
efforts can be created, but it is an expensive, time consuming process where success is far 
from guaranteed.  Where it succeeds it can create an opportunity to provide the integrated 
services needed by poor communities, achieve positive results, and give poor 
communities a stake in redevelopment efforts.  In an environment of government cost 
cutting, the wholesale approach of people-based programs and market directed 
redevelopment is the lowest cost alternative, but this often ill-serves the poor and leaves 
them at whim of market forces.  A retail, community driven approach can often better 





Summary and Conclusion   
The experience of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone demonstrates that targeted, 
place-based initiatives can improve conditions and develop integrated social service 
delivery systems to better serve residents of poor communities.  The Baltimore 
Empowerment Zone created or supported four community organizations that continue to 
implement programs to serve community residents as independent and viable 
organizations no longer reliant on federal funds.  These organizations are providing 
needed services in underserved communities.  The EZ implemented a workforce 
development program that reached as much as 10% of the Zone’s resident population, 
many of whom experienced an immediate increase in earnings.  It assisted 813 resident 
families purchase homes, accounting for 11% of the entire number of owner occupied 
dwellings in the 2000 Census.  It implemented anti-crime programs that coincided with a 
larger decline in crime than occurred in the City as a whole.  It offered integrated social 
services provided in a local office that were provided in a way that, at least anecdotally, 
allowed for better outreach and combined the multiple services needed by the urban poor, 
many of whom face multiple barriers.   
Another, more important lesson of the Baltimore Empowerment Zone is that 
targeted, place-based initiatives can both support and protect community residents and 
interests from market-supported urban redevelopment.  Baltimore by design targeted its 
EZ effort largely on communities in the path of redevelopment radiating outward from 
the City’s successful downtown revitalization efforts.  In doing so, Baltimore succeeded 
in the dual goal of facilitating redevelopment and ensuring that local residents and 
communities have a say in and a stake in redevelopment.  This strategy differs from 
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traditional urban redevelopment projects, which most often displace existing residents 
and communities.  In Baltimore, the efforts of the Empowerment Zone gave local 
communities a stake in redevelopment by giving them a seat at the table; gave residents 
an opportunity to capitalize on redevelopment, through integrated social, workforce 
development, and homeownership programs; while facilitating the redevelopment 
activity directly, through economic development incentives, and indirectly, through anti-
crime programs.  Baltimore’s EZ experience can help guide other urban initiatives, like 
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